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At the General Election of October 1974#, the Scottish 
National Party achieved 30 per cent of the Scottish vote. 
The aim of thesis is to account for this rapidly achieved 
electoral success on the basis of an analysis of patterns 
of social change in modern Scotland. The study offers a 
range of widely differing perspectives on this single 
problem. As far as possible however these perspectives are 
presented as aspects of a structured account. 
On the one hand I have been both theoretically and 
methodologically eclectic in order to get as many 
triangulations on the problem as possible. On the other 
hand, the overall shape has been determined by the need to 
inter-relate these differing perspectives and the levels of 
social reality on which they focus. 
The first years of work on this study were spent in a 
search for an adequate theoretical framework and initially 
the intent was to produce a primarily theoretical work. 
At this stagey the two most important sources of 
inspiration were the works of Alain Touraine and Jurgen 
Habermas. From Habermas I gained a sense of the importance 
of communicative processes in the generation of 
orientations to the state in late capitalist society. 
Touraine's theoretical legacy has been equally pervasive 
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but in a rather perverse manner. I had originally 
approached Scottish nationalism intending to apply a 
Tourainian framework to it as a social movement. As my 
topic shifted to that of explaining the electoral success 
of the S. N. P. it became clear that the categories developed 
by Touraine for the analysis of 'post-industrial movements, 
were not appropriate. What I did learn from* . Touraine was a 
'totalizing' approach to the problem. 
As the opportunity arose to introduce a good deal more 
empirical material than I had originally intended or 
thought possible, the balance of the study shifted. The 
main legacy of the early theoretical work is the structure 
of the study as a whole. 
If electoral trends are to be understood in terms of 
an analysis of social changer social change cannot merely 
be regarded as something happening 'in the background' or 
as something which must simply be 'taken into account'. In 
the real world, there is no neat dividing line between the 
factors which influence how people vote and the pattern of 
social change as a whole in all its complexity. The 
relatively complex structure of the thesis is only a 
reflection of the complexity of social change. 
Given this rather labyrinthine structure, the main 
purpose of this introduction is to indicate the contents of 
the various chambers and, more importantly, to provide some 
guiding threads to show how they are connected. 
Chapter 1 provides an empirical lead-in to the more 
theoretically based chapters which follow. It is purely and 
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simply an exercise in data reduction - the data being the 
patterns of voting in Scotland at the six general elections 
from 1964 to 1979. In particular it aims at illustrating 
what could be called national (Scottish), regional and 
constituency levels of voting change. The final section of 
Chapter 1 presents the correlation of S. N. P. voting with 
sex and age at the S. N. P. 1s peak election of October 1974. 
Chapter 2 represents a shift to a quite different level 
of analysis. It should be seen as providing a form of 'deep 
theoretical background' for the rest of the study. It is an 
exploration of how Marxism has tended to handle 'the 
national level of analysis'. This exploration was provoked 
by a need to understand some of the theoretical reasons why 
it has often seemed plausible to apply an analytical 
imagery derived from Third World to Scotland's present 
condition. I also explore some aspects of Marx's' own 
approach to the 'national level'. The main purpose here is 
to understand how Marx's 'blind spot' with respect to the 
national level came about, in order to provide a relatively 
solid footing for applying some of his insights to the 
quite different historical conditions of today. 
The following four chapters divide into two strands. 
One strand, Chapters 3 and 41 is aimed at grounding an 
understanding of nationalism in late capitalist society in 
terms of what can most concisely be expressed as the 
experience of the state. The other strand, contained in 
Chapters 5 and 6j, presents a more conventional account of 
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social change in modern Scotland. 
Chapters 3 and 4 run very much in tandem. Chapter 3 
develops a concept of ideology which enables us to deal 
with the ideological implications of the shift from liberal 
to late capitalist society. Chapter 4 outlines the 
successive satisfaction of several conditions of 
possibility for the electoral success of the S. N. P. The 
f irst was the emergence at a British level of the 
conception of a national economy which can be managed. Only 
in this context, could the conception emerge of Scotland as 
an analogous economic unit. Finally the chapter traces some 
of the mechanisms by which this framework was transmitted 
to the mass electorate. 
Turning to the other strand of analysisr Chapter 5 
is a Isocio-graphic' account of social change in modern 
Scotland. The aspects covered are industrial and 
occupational structure and patterns of social mobility and 
female employment with a final section dealing with some 
relevant demographic aspects of social change. One main 
concern of the chapter is to show the structural 
interconnections between these different domains. The other 
is to assess the extent to which such patterns of social 
change in Scotland were typical of the rest of Britain. 
Chapter 6 is an attempt to take us closer to an 
understanding of how these patterns of social change were 
experienced. This provides a context for an analysis of the 
socio-economic correlates of S. N. P. voting on the basis of 
the October 1974 Scottish Election Survey. Finally, 
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television is discussed as a crucial mediator between the 
experience of everyday life and the experience of national 
politics. 
Chapter 7 attempts to pull some of the earlier themes 
together in the context of a focus on the role of Scottish 
identity and symbolism. 
The main problem involved in adopting a wide-ranging 
approach is that inevitably the exploration of each 
perspective on the problem has had to be stopped short in a 
rather arbitrary manner. I am acutely aware that many 
individual sections deserve more comprehensive treatment. 
My only justification is that the most important thing is 
to get a sense of how different levels of social and 
political change are interwoven. This brings us to what is 
in one sense a problem but in another sense an advantage. 
In attempting to show how an array of different theoretical 
and substantive levels inter-relate, what emerges most 
clearly is the nature of the gaps remaining to be bridged. 
The chasm which I see as yawning widest, although no doubt 
others will pinpoint different lacunae, is that between the 
general and theoretical consideration of the treatment of 
social change at the national level in Chapter 2 and the 
socio-graphic treatment of social change in Scotland in 
Chapter 5. Similarlyr although Chapters 3 and 4 run 
parallel, one theoretical and one more concrete, their 
relationship is anything but unproblematic. In general I 
have tried to suggest connections even if I have not been 
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able to establish them adequately and despite the 
intellectual vertigo which this causes. 
When I started work on this topic in 1976, the growth 
of the 'Scottish nationalism industry' was still 
accelerating. Since then it has reached full tide and ebbed 
away again. This study takes a rather broadl structural 
approachr standing well back from events. I hope that the 
flood of words on Scottish nationalism has to some extent 
relieved me of the responsibility of spending time on a 
detailed historical account. Although I do not refer to' 
them specifically, the following works in particular have 
been invaluable in providing a sense of historical 
sec. u*rity: Hanham's Scottish Nationalism (1969); Harvie's 
Scotland and Nationalism (1977); Brand's The National 
Movement in Scotland (1978); Drucker and Brown's The 
Politics of Nationalism and Devolution (1980) and The 
Referendum Experience: Scotland 1979 (1981) edited by 
Bochelf Denver and McCartney. In Chapter 4 in particular I 
have found myself echoing the insights of Kellas' The 
Scottish Political Sysýem (1975). 
I have found myself operating in the space between two 
approaches to the understanding of Scottish nationalism 
which,, to judge from the extent they refer to each other, 
might as well be on different planets. The first is the 
broadly Marxist approach concentrating on placing the 
Scottish experience in its long term. 'world-historical' 
context. The second is that of electoral survey analysis. 
Not surprisingly I have found myself defining my 
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approach in these two directions. On the one handf in terms 
of and to an extent against the work of Tom Nairn and on 
the other hand in terms of and to an extent against the 
analyses of the Scottish Election Survey. If these in 
particular have been the focus of my criticism it is only 
because of their importance to the process of the 
development of the analysis. 
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Chapter 1. 
The Pattern of Electoral Change 
Introduction. 
This chapter sets out the explanandum of the study as 
a whole. In any study which is to any extent structural 
however explanation is never so neatly one way and placing 
the electoral success of the Scottish National Party firmly 
in its temporal and spatial context itself provides many of 
the most important clues as to its social meaning. This 
initial empirical account is not angled towards presenting 
only those patterns which are explicable in terms of the 
subsequent more theoretical discussion but simply aims to 
provide as transparent a picture as possible and if the 
account raises more questions than are subsequently 
answered, well and good. 
The purpose of this first chapter is simply to set out 
the main trends in voting at General Elections in the 
period which encompassed the electoral rise and fall of the 
Scottish National Party. 
Methodologically 'the chapter can be regarded as a 
mapping of surface events while the rest of the study will 
be devoted to mapping the 'deeper' levels of social change 
which have worked to determine them. 
Recent electoral trends in Scotland have been well 
documented. M The ambitions of the present survey are 
limited to providing a minimum description highlighting 
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broad trends of spatial and temporal variation. 
The main focus will be on the six General Elections 
from 1964 to 1979. One of the more perilous forms of 
political commentary in Scotland in recent years has been 
prognostication about the electoral prospects of the S. N. P. 
Table I. IA. Trends in S. N. P. voting 1945 to 1979. 
S. N. P. Seats fought Share of vote Share of 
in seats fought total vote 
1945 8 7.6 1.2 
1950 3 7.4 0.4 
1951 2 12.2 0.3 
1955 2 14.5 0.5 
1959 5 11.4 0.8 
1964 15 10.7 2.4 
1966 23 14.1 5.0 
1970 65 12.2 11.4 
Feb 1974 70 22.1 21.9 
Oct 1974 71 30.4 30.4 
1979 71 17.3 17.3 
Table l. lB. Other main partiesm, percentage share of total 
vote#, 1964 to 1979. 
Feb Oct 
1964 1966 1970 1974 1974 1979 
Conservative 37.3 37.7 38.0 32.9 24.7 31.4 
Seats fought (71) (71) (70) (71) (71) (71) 
Labour 48.7 49.9 44.5 36.6 36.3 41.6 
Seats fought (71) (71) (71) (71) (71) (71) 
Liberal 7.6 6.8 5.5 8.0 8.3 10.6 
Seats fought (26) (24) (27) (34) (68) (28) 
(Source: Craig, 1971,1977,1980,1981) 
Howeverr the six General Elections in question can safely 
be said to have constituted a particularly well-marked 
phase in the electoral history of the S. N. P. By 1979, the 
all but halving of the S. N. P. vote compared with 1974 
heralded the end of this phase. Most recently, the result 
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of the 1983 General Election, although it cannot be 
included in the analysisr with S. N. P. support down to 11% 
confirms the ending of the phase. 
Table 1.1A gives the number of seats fought by the 
S. N. P., its share of the votes in those seats and its share 
of the total Scottish vote from 1945. Table l. lB gives the 
share of the vote of the other main parties from 1964 to 
1979. The tables largely speak for themselves and I will 
leave further discussion of these national trends to be 
woven into the analysis of regional trends, since the two 
trends interrelate in an intriguing way. The one point 
which should be made here is that it can be seen from Table 
IA that the 1964,1966 and 1970 General Elections saw a 
#widening' rather than a 'deepening' of S. N. P. support in 
that the S. N. P. Is increasing share of the total Scottish 
vote resulted more from their contesting more seats rather 
than from achieving higher shares in the seats they did 
contest. Only from 1970 when the SNP first contested the 
vast majority of Scottish seats did the 'deepening' process 
take off. 
Regional trends. 
We only begin to get a feel for the texture of S. N. P. 
support when we begin to explore trends at a regional 
level. The methodology employed will aim at giving a 
panoramic overview followed by a more detailed probing of 
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shifts in the crucial period after 1970 when the S. N. P. was 
operatingr in terms of seats fought, at a national level. 
Table 1.2 gives regional trends in the mean 
constituency share of the vote for the four main parties 
from 1964 to 1979 (see the Key to Figure 2 on pp28-29 for 
the constituency composition of the ten regions used. ) 
The normal way of analysing regional shifts in voting 
is to add up all the votes for each party in each region 
and to calculate the share of the total regional vote 
obtained by each party. Given that the S. N. P. fought only a 
f if th of all seats in 1964 and around a third in 1966, and 
that the number of seats fought by the Liberals fluctuated 
markedly throughout the period, such a method'would lead to 
a distortion if what is really wanted is an idea of trends 
in the shar. e of the vote only in those constituencies which 
were actually fought. 
The alternative which I have used throughout is to base 
all the calculations on each party's percentage share of 
the vote at the constituency level. (2) 
For example, in 1970 the SNP fought five of the six 
seats I have classified as comprising the Highlands and 
Islands region. Thus the SNP 'share' for the region was 
calculated simply by averaging the SNP's share of the vote 
in the five constituencies it actually fought. This means 
of course that the percentages for all four parties in a 
given region may add up to more than 100%. The figures in 
Table 2 do not represent party shares of the regional vote 
but the average constituency share of the vote obtained by 
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each party. 
The main stumbling block to a series such as this is 
the major revision of constituency boundaries between the 
General Elections of 1970 and February 1974 (3). In-such a 
situation one is pulled by the opposing demands of strict 
continuity and completeness of coverage. For the purposes 
of the present regional analysist it was decided to retain 
all constituencies which had maintained any degree of 
continuity. Given that most of the redistribution took 
place within the regions, the degree of resultant 
distortion at the regional level is likely to be small and 
is more than compensated by the completeness of coverage. 
Given this extremely loose criterion, only one of the 
constitencies extant from 1974 to 1979 was dropped entirely 
- Glasgow Queen's Park which had only 52% continuity with 
the former Glasgow Gorbals. In addition two constituenciest 
Dunbartonshire East and Lanark were each split into two at 
reorganisation. For the purposes of this analysis the two 
resulting pairs,, East and Central Dunbartonshire, and 
Lanark and East Kilbride, were recombined into the original 
units. 
The constituencies were assigned to regions on the 
basis of fairly common-sense criteria - primarily 
geographical contiguityr the separation of rural from urban 
constituencies, and maintaining the integrity Of the cities. 
Tablel. 2, as is the case with all large and complex tables 
isitself not very helpful for revealing broad patternsand 
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Table 1.2. Mean share of vote in constituencies f ought by 
region, election (1964 to 1979) and party 
Election: 1964 1966 1970 F74 074 1979 
Region 
Con 28.0 28.0 30.4 25.4 23.2 27.7 
Highlands and Lab 31.0 34.5 28.4 20.0 19.7 24.6 
Islands SNP - - 21.5 34.6 36.3 26.9 
Lib 38.9 37.5 35.0 37.1 24.9 24.8 
Con 53.1 51.1 49.3 43.8 39.1 45.2 
North-East and Lab 22.4 24.2 19.0 10.3 10.3 13.2 
Tayside SNP 12.6 14.9 20.2 34.0 39.8 32.4 
Lib 26.2 30.5 15.4 15.9 10.9 14.7 
Con 48.7 49.1 47.2 41.3 36.0 40.6 
Southern Lab 31.9 34.9 27.3 21.2 21.9 22.0 
Scotland SNP 7.4 12.6 12.8 17.9 25.0 16.0 
Lib 31.4 25.8 25.6 26.3 17.1 21.4 
Con 43.1 35.9 37.0 28.3 20.5 25.4 
Aberdeen a nd Lab 55.3 55.9 51.3 39.4 39.9 45.5 
Dundee SNP 4.4 - 7.8 25.4 33.2 22.2 
Lib - 9.6 6.2 12.9 6.3 9.0 
Con 37.2 31.1 36.3 31.4 22.7 29.9 
Fif e Lab 53.1 51.4 49.7 38.6 38.6 44.0 
SNP 8.9 14.2 11.1 21.4 31.4 16.9 
Lib 13.1 9.5 9.0 15.1 9.0 17.2 
Con 48.9 45.7 . 45.0 39.6 32.1 37.6 Edinburgh Lab 45.3 48.3 41.9 33.0 33.6 39.5 
SNP - 7.3 7.1 14.0 23.8 10.1 
Lib 13.5 11.2 8.0 15.5 10.5 14.4 
Con 35.1 27.0 30.4. 26.4 16.7 25.6 
Central Lab 55.2 52.9 50.3 40.4 39.7 48.7 
SNP 16.2 19.4 16.9 30.8 38.5 21.9 
Lib - - 5.2 9.1 4.5 8.3 
Con 38.7 36.1 33.7 29.8 18.4 27.4 
Lanarkshire Lab 60.0 60.5 52.7 47.8 4ý. l 54.9 
SNP 4.6 8.3 12.6 20.2 30.2 12.8 
Lib - - - 11.2 4.9 14.6 
Con 38.0 34.6 34.7 28.0 19.5 25.0 
Glasgow Lab 58.1 59.9 54.7 48.9 49.4 59.0 
SNP 7.3 9.9 10.1 20.2 26.6 11.7 
Lib 9.9 - - 9.9 4.7 9.3 
Con 37.0 38.4 41.7 35.7 26.9 32.4 
Renfrewshire and Lib 50.5 54.2 48.4 41.9 40.9 43.1 
Ayrshire SNP - - 7.4 14.7 23.8 11.5 
Lib 18.5 16.1 17.4 13.7 8.4 13.9 
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trends. Figure 1 represents an attempt to present the 
information in Table 1.2 in as concise a way as possibler 
using the technique of multi-dimensional scaling purely as 
a tool for data reduction. It must be stressed that the 
multi-dimensional scaling plot is used purely to give a 
visual overview of the regional trends since details will 
inevitably be distorted by the technique. 
-The principle involved is simplicity itself. Each 
election for each region is treated as a single data point. 
Thus each data point consists of four percentages e. g. the 
Highlands and Islands in 1970 are defined as a data point 
with the four values of 30.4,28.4,, 21.5 and 35.0. 
The first step is to calculate the percentage 
differences between all pairs of the 60 data points (6 
elections multiplied by 10 regions) e. g. the perdentage 
difference between the Highlands and Islands in 1970 and 
Southern Scotland in 1970 is the sum of the absolute 
differences between the four pairs of party percentages 
i. e. the difference between 47.2 and 30.4equals 16.8 
plus the difference between 27.3 and 28.4 equals 0.9 
plus the difference between 12.8 and 21.5 equals 8.7 
plus the difference between 25.6 and 35.0 equals 9.4 
equals 35.8 
This figure, 35.8, can be taken as a measure of the 
dissimilarity between the voting pattern in the Highlands 
and Islands in the 1970 General Election and that in 
Southern Scotland at the same election. The same principle 
is applied when the region is the same but the election is 
different or when both region and election are different. 
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This dissimilarity measure#, the percentage difference, 
(4) 
is calculated for all pairs of region/election data points 
and the resulting triangular matrix, oi dissimilarities fed 
into the multi-dimensional scaling program 
(5). All the 
program tries to do is to reproduce these dissimilarities 
in terms of distances in the plot of data points (i. e. 
Figure 1). The program tries to maximise the extent to 
which the smaller are the percentage differences between 
the election/regions (i. e the more similar are the voting 
patterns)r the closer together are the corresponding points 
on the plot. 
Given that the 60 data points consist of 6 successive 
elections for each of the 10 regionst we can 'join up the 
dots' for each region, producing a 'track' or 'trajectory' 
for the region which can be seen as tracing its motion 
through 'political space'. 
Given that each data point consists only of four 
percentage values, we could plot the points perfectly in 
four dimensions. The trouble is that we can't visualise 
patterns in four dimensions and have great difficulty in 
doing so in three dimensions. What the program has done is 
to squeeze information which needs four dimensions for 
perfect representation, into a more comprehensible two 
dimensional form. It does this by squeezing out fine detail 
and idiosyncratic variation, retaining only the broad 
pattern of variation. 
The points to remember in interpreting a plot such as 
Figure 1 are that 
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1. the closer together are two pointst the more 
similar are their voting patterns likely to be 
2. the more parallel are the 'tracks' joining two 
pairs of data points, the more similar will be the changes 
in voting patterns indexed by these tracks 
3. the longer a track isr the more change in voting 
pattern there has been between the two dates for the region 
concerned. 
Thus armedy we can glean a good deal from this one 
plotr which is purely and simply a condensation of the 
information contained in Table 1.2, to which we can turn 
for confirmation. 
The most obvious feature is the division of the regions 
into two clear groups -a tight cluster of the 'non- 
peripheral' and more urban regions on the left and a looser 
cluster of the more peripheral and rural regions - the 
Highlands and Islands,, the North-East and Tayside and 
Southern Scotland - on the right. 
The major differentiating factors involved here are the 
generally higher Liberal vote and lower Labour vote in the 
more peripheral and rural regions. 
This could be seen to be related to the persistence in 
the more rural and peripheral areas of what has been termed 
the 'the politics of independence' 
(6). The term has 
nothing to do with independence for Scotland but refers to 
the relative independence of politics in these regions from 
national party structures and trends - the most obvious 
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manifestation of this being the prolonged influence in many 
of the local authorities in these areas of 'Independent' 
councillors. In terms of the pattern of votingr the higher 
Liberal and lower Labour vote in these areas can be seen as 
a direct reflection of the fact that these areas were to a 
c ertain extent by-passed by the national trends whereby the 
Labour Party took over from the Liberal Party as the main 
opposition to the Conservatives. 
This is only one aspect of the way in which 'the 
politics of independence' reflects the extent to which 
politics in the periphery has not been 'nationalized' or 
fully absorbed into the dominant national pattern (whether 
British or Scottish). 
Another indicator of the divide between the urban/non- 
peripheral and the rural/peripheral regions is that 
whereas#, especially after 1970, the changes in voting 
patterns in the urban regions show a close parallelism from 
region to region, the trajectories of the three peripheral 
regions are somewhat more heterogeneousf with the Highlands 
and Islands having a particularly idiosyncratic pattern. 
In terms of the kinds of social forces underlying 
these trendst voting changes in the non-peripheral regions 
would seem, especially from 1970 onwards when the SNP was 
fighting the vast majority of seats, to have been governed 
primarily by forces operating at a national level to 
produce these strikingly parallel shifts. Of course, these 
national forces were also at work in the three peripheral 
regions but there they were operating as an overlay to a 
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much more strongly constituted and independent local 
political system. Even at this level of aggregationj the 
effect of personal factors, themselves an aspect of the 
continued relevance of micro-structural factors in small 
communities, can be perceived. Much of the idiosyncracy of 
the track of the Highlands and Islands can perhaps be 
attributed to the effect of the continued personal hegemony 
of Jo Grimond in Orkney and Shetland for the Liberals and 
the rise to a position of almost non-partisan community 
representative on the part of Donald Stewart in the Western 
Isles. 
The methodological implication of this contrast is 
that in order to understand the growth of the SNP on the 
periphery, the situation to be examined in each area, 
constituency, town or village will be a complex interaction 
between local and national factors, whereas in the rest of 
the country, the balance of causality will be found to lie 
much more at the national level - as indexed by the 
relative parallelism of voting changes in these areas - or, 
to*use the more familiar term, the uniformity of swing. 
Although the fit is inevitably imperfect, the share of 
the vote of at least three of the parties seems to be 
represented fairly unambiguously by directions in the 
'Political space' represented in Figure 1. 
The Labour vote increases as one moves leftwards 
across the plot in a direction 'just North of East'. The 
Conservative vote increases as one moves towards the top of 
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the plot in a North North-Westerly direction. Most clearly 
of allf the S. N. P. vote increases towards the bottom of the 
plot. Apart from the obvious divergence of the peripheral 
and non-peripheral regions with the Liberal vote generally 
higher in the former, the directionality of the Liberal 
vote in the plot is not so clear cut. 
For looking at more detailed aspects of the regional 
trends we are safer working more closely with numerical 
changes derived from Table 1.2 and for this purpose the 
discussion will focus separately on the three inter- 
election periods from 1970 onwards when the S. N. P. was 
contesting most or all of the Scottish seats. 
Regional voting shifts: 1970 to February 1974 
The general pattern of change between the General 
Election of 1970 and that of February 1974 was that the 
S. N. P. picked up votes-from both Labour and Conservative 
but took rather more from Labour, so that whereas in 
England the two party swing was 1.3% to Labour, in Scotland 
it was 1.2% to the Conservatives. (Butler and Kavanaght 
1974, p278). 
More interesting however are the regional variations 
in the balance of vote loss by Labour and Conservative. 
Table 1.3 gives the the regional average percentage point 
change in the share of the vote gained by the four main 
parties in the constituencies that they fought. (These 
figures are simply the difference between the 1970 and 
February 1974 figures in Table 1.2). 
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Table 1.3. Regions. Percentage point change in mean share of 
vote in constituencies fought. 1970 to February 1974. 
Prop. change 
Con Lab SNP Lib Con Lab 
Edinburgh -5.4 -8.9 +6.9 +7.5 -12 -21 
Fife -4.9 -11.1 +10.3 +6.1 -13 -22 
Aberdeen/Dundee -8.7 -11.9 +17.6 +6.7 -24 -23 
Central -4.0 -9.9 +13.9 +3.9 -13 -20 
Renfrew/Ayr -6.0 -6.5 +7.3 -3.7 -14 -13 
Lanarkshire -3.9 -4.9 +7.6 (+11.2) -12 -9 
Glasgow -6.7 -5.8 +10.1 (+9.9) -19 -11 
Highlands + Is. -5.0 -8.4 +13.1 +2.1 -16 -30 
N. E. + Tayside -5.5 -8.7 +13.8 +0.5 -11 -46 
Southern -5.9 -6.1 +5.1 +0.7 -13 -22 
(Bracketed figures. No Liberals stood in region in 1970 and 
1 in Lanarkshire, 3 in Glasgow in February 1974) 
In terms of relative vote loss by Labour and 
Conservativep the seven non-peripheral regions divide into 
three main groups. 
First are the three regions in which Labour lost 
around double the votes lost by the Conservatives - 
Edinburgh,, Fife and Central. This similarity is reflected 
in the parallelism of the 1970 to February 1974 tracks of 
these regions in Figure 1. 
On its own is Aberdeen/Dundee which showed the largest 
shift in terms of losing both Labour and Conservative votes 
and of gaining SNP votes. 
Also losing roughly similar numbers of Labour and 
Conservative votes but at around half the level of 
Aberdeen/Dundee come the three 'Western industrial' 
regions. Glasgow in particular stands out as being the only 
region to lose f ewer Labour votes than Conservative votes 
between 1970 and February 1974. This is especially 
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important if we remember that in 1970 the mean constituency 
share of the Conservatives in Glasgow was 35% whereas that 
of Labour was 55%. So if we take the percentage point loss 
between 1970 and February 1974 divided by the share of the 
vote in 1970 as giving us a rough measure of the 
proportional loss of votest Glasgow's position is put into 
even clearer perspective (see last two cols of Table 1.3). 
Lanarkshire and Glasgow were the only regions to lose an 
appreciably smaller proportion of Labour votes than 
Conservative. Renfrew/Ayrshire and Aberdeen/Dundee lost a 
similar proportion while in the rest of Scotland,, Labour 
lost proportionately more votes than the Conservatives. 
This trend was most pronounced in the Highlands and 
Islands and North-East and Tayside regions. Although in 
absolute terms the falls in the share of Conservative and 
Labour were very close to the national trend (e g. 5.0% and 
8.4% in the case of the Highlands and Islands) , as a 
proportion of the percentage voting Conservative and Labour 
in 1970 the difference was much greater,, with the Labour 
vote being cut by almost a third in the Highlands and 
Islands and by almost a half in the North-East and Tayside. 
One important aspect of what was happening was pinpointed 
by Michael Steed in his analysis of the results of the 
February 1974 Election: 
where conditions were made favourable for 
tactical switchingr it was extremely marked. " (in 
Butler and Kavanagh, 1974j p321). 
He picked out as satisfying these conditions the four seats 
in Scotland in which a Nationalist had won second place in 
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a Tory seat in 1970 with a margin of less than 25%. In the 
same format as Table 1.3 . the changes were as follows 
Con Lab SNP Lib Con Lab 
Argyll -6.4 -12.7 +19.1 -14 -. 50 
Moray and Nairn -5.7 -15.7 +21.4 - -12 -69 
Banff -4.2 -11.0 +23.2 -8.0 -11 -63 
Aberdeenshire East -5.9 -11.3 +21.0 -3.8 -14 -63 
In these seatst the extremes of a wider pattern,, the 
Conservative share of the vote went down by around an 
eighth while the Labour vote slumped by from a half to two 
thirds. 
Thus at the two poles of the political spectrum of 
Scotland's constituenciesp Glasgow's Labour strongholdst 
and traditionally rural Conservative seats, there were 
parallel processes of opposite political sign. In Glasgow, 
it was the Tory vote which slumped to the relatively 
limited benefit of the SNP while in the periphery it was a 
collapsing Labour vote which gave the SNP several 
victories. (7) 
Regional voting shifts. February 1974 to October 1974 
As we have seen, in the period 1970 to February 1974, a 
major feature of patterns of voting change was the 
differential crumbling of the Labour vote - both in 
percentage point terms andf even more markedly, in 
proportionate terms. In contrastf the single most dramatic 
feature of the period February to October 1974, apart from 
the SNP surge itself, was the way the Labour vote 
stabilized in all regions, so that the increase in the 
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share of the vote of the SNP was matched only by a drop in 
Conservative and Liberal support. In Figure 1 this can be 
seen very clearly reflected in the parallel tracks for the 
period February 1974 to October 1974 (between the '+' 
markers) of the seven non-peripheral regions. The tracks 
for Edinburgh, Fifer Aberdeen/Dundee and Central appear to 
form a kind of Iwavefront' with the tracks for Renfrew/Ayr, 
Lanarkshire and Glasgowr stepped back from but parallel to 
this f ront. 
Table 1.4 again gives the change in the four main 
parties average constituency share of the vote from 
February to October 1974. 
Table 1.4. Regions. Percentage point change in mean share 
of vote in constituencies fought. February 1974 to October 
1974. 
Con Lab SNP - Lib 
Edinburgh -7.6 +0.6 +9.8 -5.0 Fife -8.7 -0.1 +10.1 -6.1 Aberdeen/Dundee -7.8 -0.5 +7.8 -6.6 Central -9.7 -0.7 +7.7 -4.6 Renfrew/Ayrshire -8.8 -0.9 +9.1 -5.3 Lanarkshire -11.4 -1.7 +10.1 -6.3 Glasgow -8.5 +0.5 +6.4 -5.3 
Highlands and Islands -2.2 -0.2 +r. 7 -12.2 North East and Tayside -4.8 0.0 +5.6 -5.1 
Southern -5.3 +0.8 +7.1 -9.2 
Given that there was very little decrease in the share 
of Labour anywhere in Scotland after February 1974, it 
would appear that the Labour vote in that election 
represents very much the maximum penetration of the SNP 
into the Labour vote of all these areas. In other words it 
would seem that by February 1974 the SNP had run out of the 
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'Sof tI Labour votes the variable crumbling of which had 
produced much of the variation in trend of the previous 
inter-election period and before. 
By looking at the IV's formed between the February 
1974 to October 1974 tracks and the October 1974 to 1979 
trackst we can see very clearly the variation in this 
maximum penetration both in terms of the SNP peak share and 
the 'hard-core minimum' of the Labour vote. 
As a rough interpretative approximation, the further 
down the plot the IV's of the non-peripheral regions 
penetrate, the higher was the peak SNP vote. Thus Central 
represented the greatest penetration with an SNP average in 
October 1974 of 38%r followed by Aberdeen/Dundee at 33%, 
Fife at 31%, Lanarkshire at 30%p Glasgow at 27% and finally 
Renfrew/Ayrshire and Edinburgh at 24%. 
Even more interesting is the ordering of these regions 
in the level of the 'minimum' Labour support of both 1974 
elections. The lowest level was reached by Edinburgh at 
33%. Then followed Fife, Aberdeen/Dundee and Central at 
around 39-40% closely followed by Renfrew/Ayr at 41%. Then 
as we move through Labour's industrial heartland in the 
West, the Labour vote in Lanarkshire troughed at 47% while 
the low in Glasgow was 49%. 
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Regional voting shifts. October 1974 to 1979 
Several features of the pattern of change (Table 1.5) 
from the General Election of October 1974 to that of 1979 
deserve comment. 
Table 1.5. Regions. Percentage point change in mean share 
of the vote in constituencies fought. October 1974 to 1979. 
Con Lab SNP Lib 
Edinburgh +5.5 +5.9 -13.7 +3.9 
Fife +7.2 +5.5 -14.5 +8.2 
Aberdeen/Dundee +4.9 +5.6 -11.0 +2.7 
Central +8.9 +8.9 -16.5 +3.8 
Renfrew/Ayrshire +5.5 +2.2 -12.2 +5.5 
Lanarkshire +9.0 +8.7 -17.4 +9.7 
Glasgow +5.5 +9.6 -14.9 +4.6 
Highlands and Islands. +4.6 +4.9 -9.4 -0.1 
N. E. and Tayside +6.2 +2.8 -7.3 +3.8 
South ern +4.6 0.0 -9.0 +4.3 
With respect to the extent of the SNP collapser one 
could not have a clearer contrast between the 'peripheral' 
and 'non-peripheral' regions. In all three peripheral 
regions the decline was less than ten percentage pointst in 
all seven non-peripheral it was more. 
The general pat'tern was for the decline in the SNP 
vote to be matched by roughly equivalent increases in the 
Conservative and Labour vote. The most important exceptions 
to this werep at one extremej Glasgow#, with a much larger 
increase in the Labour vote than in the Conservativer and 
at the other end of the spectrumf Southern Scotland and the 
North-East and Tayside where part of the relative 
resilience of the SNP vote appears to have been associated 
with the failure of Labour recovery to match Tory recovery 
after October 1974. 
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Regional voting shifts. 1970 to 1979 
Looking at the pattern of change over the whole period 
1970 to 1979 (Table 1.6) allows us to see how the trends 
within each of the three inter-electoral periods already 
discussed combined to produce an overall pattern of change 
in the 1970s. 
Table 1.6. Regions. Percentage point change in mean share 
of the vote in constituencies fought. 1970 to 1979. 
Con Lab SNP Lib 
Edinburgh -7.4 -2.4 +3.0 +6.4 
Fife -6.4. -5.7 +5.8 +8.2 
Aberdeen/Dundee -11.6, -5.9 +14.4 +2.8 
Central -4.8, -1.6 +5.0 +3.1 
Renfrew/Ayrshire -9.3.. -5.3 +4.2 -3.5. 
Lanarkshire -6.3.. +2.2 +0.2 (+14.6) 
Glasgow -9.7. +4.3 +1.6 (+9.3) 
Highlands and Is. -2.7ý -3.8- +5.4' -10.2 * 
N. E. and Tayside -4.1. -75.9, +12.3' -0.7* 
Southern -6.6- -5.3. +3.3, -4.1 
(Bracketed figures: no Liberals stood in region in 1970) 
In terms of the overall Labour/Conservative balance at 
a Scottish level#, the decisive period would appear to have 
been February to October 1974. In the period 1970 to 
February 1974F the Conservative decline was accompanied by 
a smaller Labour decline- (see Table 1.1B). Between February 
and October 1974 the Conservative decline continued while 
that of Labour was halted while both shared equally in the 
recovery of the period October 1974 to May 1979. Thus while 
the Conservatives had had two periods of decline and one of 
recovery, adding up to a net loss of six percentage points 
in the national share of the vote, the Labour Party had 
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suffered one period of decline, one of stability and 
largely recovered its ground in the third to leave a net 
loss of three percentage points. 
Turning to the regional trends for the decade, it is 
clear how much any sustained SNP advance was concentrated 
in the North-East of the country (North-East and Tayside 
and Aber deen/Dundee) . The resilience of the SNP vote in the 
Highlands and Islands should also be notedr given that it 
started from the highest base there in 1970. Conversely it 
is clear how little lasting progress the SNP made in 
Lanarkshire and Glasgow. 
An equally clear pattern can be seen in the relative 
loss of votes by Labour and Conservative. In only two 
regions did Labour lose more votes than the Conservatives - 
the Highlands and Islands and the North-East and Tayside. 
The modal pattern was for regionst in line with the 
national trend,, to lose more Conservative votes than they 
did Labour. In only two regions did the average Labour 
share increase - Glasgow and Lanarkshire. 
So,, just as Scotland as a whole has been represented 
as an extreme in a Britain-wide pattern of North-South 
polarization (8) so we see a similar pattern of political. 
polarization within Scotland - the areas beginning the 
decade with the lowest Labour share marginally losing 
Labour votes relative to Conservative and the regions with 
the largest Labour share in 1970 ending the decade with an 
even larger share. 
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The pattern of change at constituency level. 
So far, the primary aim has been to identify broad 
regional patterns of change in voting. At the lowest level 
of aggregation however#, the constituency itself,, there is 
an added layer of complexity. 
William Miller has given an excellent account of the 
extent to which SNP success (and in particular the winning 
of seats) has been associated with factors operating at the 
constituency level. In the first placep, the S. N. P. polled 
relatively well at General Electionst compared with 
national trendst in seats which they had previously won in 
by-elections. Secondlyr as the S. N. P. tide in general ebbed 
between October 1974 and 1979l the S. N. P. vote 'held up 
best in the party's best seats' (Miller,, 1981,, p209). The 
analysis which follows largely serves to confirmp or rather 
illustrate, Miller's findings and again should be regarded 
simply as a search for patterns in the data. 
Although it would have'been nice to apply the same 
scaling technique at the constituency level as was applied 
at the regional level, the number of data points involved 
(6 elections times, sayr 60 constituencies) far exceeds the 
current capacity of the available multi-dimensional scaling 
programs and even if they could cope numerically would 
produce an immensely complex and probably incomprehensible 
plot. (It is possible to apply the technique already used 
to limited subsets of constituencies, e. g. all the 
Highlands and Islands constituencies, and interesting 
patterns can be discerned. ) 
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As a limited alternative however it was possible to 
make a stab at scaling constituencies on the basis of a 
dissimilarity measure assessing how different 
constituencies were in terms of the pattern of change in 
voting between 1964 and 1979. 
Since the boundary changes which were implemented 
between the 1970 and February 1974 elections have much more 
drastic effects on patterns of change at the individual 
constituency level than they do when the figures are 
averaged at the regional level, it was necessary to be be 
rather less permissive in deciding which constituencies to 
retain. 
There can be no hard and fast cut off point. In the 
end, 10 constituencies were dropped which had a continuity 
of 76 per cent or less to leave 58 constituency units for 
the constituency level scaling. 
Fortunately, none of the constituencies in the 
'peripheral' regions and none of the constituencies in 
which the S. N. P. had won the seat in a byelection had to be 
dropped. 
The constuencies droppedr with their degree of 
continuity in brackets, werer by region: 
Fife: Central/WestFife (64%),, Dunfermline (66%) 
Edinburgh: Central (70%),, North (72%), West (70%) 
Renfrew/Ayr: Greenock. and Port Glasgow (76%) 
Glasgow: Cathcart (71%),, Central (62%)j, Kelvingrove 
(68%),, Springburn (71%) 
For the purpose of. calculating the dissimilarity measure, 
the pattern of voting change for each constituency was 
regarded as consisting of a maximum of twenty components. 
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Each component consisted of the 'percentage point change in 
the share of the vote of one party in one inter-election 
period. In a constituency in which all four parties fought 
all six elections, we have four parties and five inter- 
election periods to give twenty components. The next stage 
was to comparep for each pair of constituencies, the 
corresponding party/inter-election period components. 
If for example in Constituency A the Conservative 
share of the vote declined from 25% to 15% between the 
elections of 1970 and February 1974 -a decline of 10 
percentage points - and in Constituency B, the Conservative 
share of the vote declined from 25% to 20% -a decline of 5 
percentage points - in the same period, the difference 
between the two constituencies in the change in the 
Conservative vote is the difference between a decline of 
10% and a decline of 5% which equals 5. This calculation 
was made for each party and each inter-election period and 
all the resulting absolute differences were added together 
to give a crude dissimilarity measure. 
The fact that all four parties did not stand at all 
six elections in all 58 constituency units introduces a 
complicating factor which can be only partially overcome. 
The fact that in comparing voting changes between two 
constituencies the same set of parties may not have stood 
in the two constituencies at either or both of the 
elections involved will obviously lead to distortion. The 
problem cannot be completely circumvented. 
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However the following rules of thumb were adopted in 
calculating the dissimilarity measure in order to rule out 
the more obvious distortion due to differences in the 
parties contesting the two seats. 
The change in vote for a given party in a given inter- 
electoral period was only allowed to contribute to the 
overall measure of dissimilarity between two constituencies 
if either of the following two conditions were satisfied: 
1. the party had fielded candidates in both elections 
in both constituencies 
or 2. in the first election the party had not stood in 
either constituency but in the second election had stood in 
both constituencies. (9) 
This cuts out false comparisons such as would result if 
e. g. the Liberals had stood in Constituency A in 1964 and 
1966 but in Constituency B had stood in 1966 but not in 
1964 or vice versa. Obviously comparing the change in the 
Liberal vote between the two constituencies would in these 
circumstances be meaningless. 
Explicitly excluding such meaningless comparisons 
however solves only half of the problem. It does not deal 
with the differential effects on changes in the share of 
the vote of the other parties contesting the seats of, for 
example,, the Liberals having contested both seats in 1964 
and only one in 1966. 
Obviously one could try various analytical subterfuges 
to minimise this distortion but such an attempt would 
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Key to Figure 2 and composition of Figure 1 regions 
Highlands and Islands. Continuity 
1 H Orkney and Shetland 100% 
2 H Caithness and Sutherland 100% 
3 H Ross and Cromarty 100% 
4 H Western Isles 100% 
5 H Inverness 100% 
6 H Argyll 100% 
North-East and Tayside 
7 N Moray and Nairn 100% 
8 N Banff 100% 
9 N Aberdeenshire East 100% 
10 N Aberdeenshire West 100% 
11 N Angus North and Mearns 99% 
12 N Angus South 100% 
13 N Perth and East Perthshire 100% 
14 N Perthp Kinross and West Perthshire 100% 
Southern Scotland 
32 S Berwick and East Lothian 100% 
33 S Roxburgh, Selkirk and Peebles 100% 
34 S Dumfries 100% 
35 S Galloway 100% 
Aberdeen and Dundee 
15 A Aberdeen North 100% 
16 A Aberdeen South 99% 
17 D Dundee East 100% 
18 D Dundee West 100% 
Fif 
19 F East Fife 100% 
20 F Kirkcaldy 92% 
x Central Fife (formerly West Fife) 64% 
x Dunfermline 66% 
Edinburgh 
x Central 70% 
28 E East 99% 
29 E Leith 81% 
x North 72% 
30 E Pentlands 78% 
31 E South 100% 




21 c Stirlingshirer Clackmannan and East Stirling 96% 
22 C Stirlingshire West 100% 
23 c Stirling, Falkirk and Grangemouth 97% 
24 C Dunbartonshire West 87% 
25 C Dunbartonshire Cdntral/East (formerly East) 100% 
26 C West Lothian 100% 
27 c Midlothian 100% 
Lanarkshire 
36 L Bothwell 86% 
37 L Coatbridge and Airdrie 100% 
38 L Hamilton 81% 
39 L Lanarkshire North 87% 
40 L Motherwell and Wishaw 97% 
41 L Rutherglen 90% 
42 L Lanark/East Kilbride (formerly Lanark) 100% 
Renfrewshire and Ayrshire 
x Greenock and Port Glasgow 76% 
43 R Paisley 100% 
44 R Renfrewshire East 81% 
45 R Renfrewshire West 76% 
46 Y Ayr 99% 
47 Y Ayrshire Central 92% 
48 Y Ayrshire South 100% 
49 Y Kilmarnock 92% 
50 Y Bute and North Ayrshire 100% 
Glasgow 
x Cathcart 71% 
x Central (formerly Bridgeton) 62% 
51 G Craigton 90% 
52 G Garscadden (formerly Scotstoun) 86% 
53 G Govan 84% 
54 G Hillhead 79% 
x Kelvingrove (formerly Woodside) 68% 
55 G Maryhill 85% 
56 G Pollok 100% 
57 G Provan 76% 
58 G Shettleston 85% 
x Springburn 71% 
Numbers on left refer to Reference Plot for Figure 2, 
letters to Figure 2. Constituencies not included in 
constituency level scaling marked X. 
The figure for continuity "represents (on the basis of the 
1970 registers) the percentage of the electorate in an old 
seatp or the percentage of the electorate in an old seat 
who are now in a new seat (whichever percentage is the 
lower). " (Butler and Kavanagh, 1974j, p282) 
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exercise. There is also the point that although differences 
due to parties fighting or not fighting seats are not the 
same as differences reflecting the sharing of votes between 
parties actually standing, they are still real differences, 
and should find some reflection in the overall trends. 
Finally, disqualifying some of the party/inter 
election period components from the calculation so that 
they are not added in to the overall dissimilarity measure 
will itself reduce the magnitude of the overall measure. To 
compensate, the dissimilarity measure was 'standardized' by 
dividing by the number of components actually included. 
At this point, having completed the methodological 
preliminaries we can turn to Figure 2 
(10) see what message 
it has for us. 
The most important interpretative principle is that 
the closer a constituency is scaled to the centre of the 
plot (marked by a cross) the nearer that constituency was 
to following the national trend (or more precisely the mean 
trend of the 58 constituencies scaled) of voting change 
between 1964 and 1979. Conversely,, the -further away a 
constituency is from the centre of the plot, the more 
voting change in that constituency deviated from the 
national or average trend. 
The first point to be made is the graphic illustration 
of the extent to which seats which the SNP actually won 
(marked with a 'thistle') whether at a General Election or 
not, tended to deviate from national patterns of voting 
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change. The seats which the SNP have won at any time are 
scattered towards the edge of the plot. What Hamilton and 
Govan have in common of course is that they were the SNP's 
two most famous byelection victories. What differentiates 
them is týat Govan (1973) was six years (one General 
Election) after Hamilton (1967). What pushes them towards 
the 'North-East' of the plot is that although the SNP share 
of the vote held up well (if not enough for the SNP to 
retain the seats at the subsequent General Election) until 
October 1974, it collapsed in 1979. It is this collapse 
which differentiates these two SNP 'post-byelection' 
successes in the Central belt from the SNP successes which 
lie more towards the 'South East' of the plot. These more 
peripheral SNP successes showed a much greater 
consolidation of the vote between October 1974 and 1979. In 
Govanr the SNP share of the vote fell by 27 percentage 
points between October 1974 and 1979 and in Hamiltony 22 
percentage point s. In the Western Isles the equivalent 
figure was 9 and in Galloway 2. In general then the timing 
of the S. N. P. Is success is represented by the plot in terms 
of an'anti-clockwise rotation around the centre. 
In contrast to the SNP successes which are scattered 
round the edge of the plot? it is the urban, and in 
particular the city constituencies which cluster most 
closely towards the centre of the plot. This parallels the 
finding earlier that the non-peripheral regions tended to 
move in parallel whereas the peripheral regions had less 
predictable tracks. This is mirrored by the extent to which 
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the peripheral constituencies are relatively widely 
scattered on the plot compared with the tight clustering of 
urban constituencies round the mean. 
Even within this relatively crowded 'urban' cluster at 
the centre however there is identifiable regional 
separation. Most obviously the constituencies classified 
into the Central Scotland region (marked ICI) cluster to 
the 'North' of the origin. This position oriented towards 
the positions of Hamilton and Govan reflects the fact that 
they share with Hamilton and Govan the rapid collapse by 
1979 of a once sizable SNP vote. Similarlyr the four 
Edinburgh constituencies retained in the analysis cluster 
very closely round the origin. Such detailed interpretation 
could be carried on ad infinitum. Take any cluster of seats 
and it is usually fairly easy, armed with the actual 
resultst to discover what it is that they have in common. 
However,, the main point of the plot is to give some 
graphic expression to the operation simultaneously of two 
quite distinct patterns of variation. 
On the one hand,, and especially in urban and 
industrial areas$, changes in voting patterns at both 
regional and constituency level showed a sometimes uncanny 
parallelism. 
On the other hand, in many peripheral seats and in 
seats which the SNP have actually wonr there being a good 
deal of overlap between these two categories, such national 
trends appear to have been overlain by constituency 
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specific -factors. 
Ages, sex and S. N. P. voting. 
In this preliminary empirical chapter I do not propose 
to explore the socio-economic correlates of S. N. P. voting, 
leaving such analysis until it can be firmly grounded in a 
discussion of patterns of social change in modern Scotland. 
Nevertheless, the two most basic variables, sex and age, 
were so strongly correlated with S. N. P. voting at the 
S. N. P. 's peak General Election in October 1974 that these 
relationships should be presented as indispensable 
background material. The analysis in this section is based 
on data from the Scottish Election Survey of October 1974. 
Details of the survey and the use I have made of it are 
given in Appendix 1. 
Table 1.7. Voting for f our main parties as percentage of 
four-party vote by sex. October 1974. 
male Female 
Conservative 22.2 28.4 
Liberal 4.7 10.8 
Labour 38.9 37.9 
S. N. P. 34.2 22.9 
100% 100% 
N 473 528 
excludes - Other 3 1 
Did not vote 66 71 
D. K. or refused 14 22 
41 
As can be seen from Table 1.7F a much higher proportion 
of male voters (34%) supported the S. N. P. than of female 
voters (23%). As far as I know, this differential has 
received remarkably little attention (11) and remains 
highly puzzling. Towards the end of the study I will make a 
highly speculative attempt to begin to account for the 
differential but until then the least we can do is to keep 
this sex difference clearly in mind whenever we are looking 
at any relationship between S. N. P. voting and another 
variable. 
As far as the other main parties are concernedl the 
deficit of women voting for the S. N. P. was matched by an 
approximately equal surplus voting for the Conservatives 
(28% of women versus 22% of men) and the Liberals (11% 
versus 5%). 
Even more clearly marked than this sex difference in 
voting S. N. P. is the variation in S. N. P. support by age. 
Table 1.8 gives the relationship between party voting and 
age and sex. 
The relationship between voting SNP and age is clear - 
a steady decline with increasing age which is very close to 
5 percentage points per decade of age, with around 40% of 
those aged under 35 voting S. N. P. compared with 16% of 
those over 65. 
The Conservative pattern is almost an exact mirror 
image of that of the SNP - approximately a5 percentage 
point increase in the proportion voting Conservative for 
every ten years of age. Neither Labour nor Liberal voting 
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Age Con -Ibr 
CLý 
Lab SNP N NI 
18 to 24 10.4 10. 37.4 41.7 115 35 
25 to 34 20.5 7.1 33.3 39.0 210 39 
35 to 44 21.3 8.5 41.0 29.3 188 25 
45 to 54 31.5 4.8 39.0 24.7 146 25 
55 to 64 29.1 9.5 41.3 , 20.1 179 16 
65 or over 38.1 7.5 38.1 16.3 160 33 
All 25.5 7.9 38.3 28.4 998 177 
MALE VOTERS 
Con Lib Lab SNP 
18 to 24 9.7 8.1 32 3 r-- -, -- -ý) 50.0 62 16 
25 to 34 19.6 3.9 31: 4 
-45.1 
102 24 
35 to 44 24.7 6.7 32.6 36.0 89 12 
45 to 54 24.1 0.0 39.7 . 36.2 58 11 
55 to 64 25.8 5.2 46.4 22.7 97 5 
65 and over 27.4 3.2 53.2 16.1 62 14 
FEMALE VOTERS 
up to 24 11.3 13.2 43.4 32.1 53 19 
25 to 34 21.3 10.2 35.2 33.3 108 15 
35 to 44 18.2 10.1 48.5 23.2 99 13 
45 to 54 36.4 8.0 38.6 17.0 88 14 
55 to 64 32.9 14.6 35.4 17.1 82 11 
65 and over 44.9 10.2 28.6 16.3 98 19 
* NI: not included predominantly did not vote cf Tab. 1.7 
varied significantly with age. 
Although the whole story is undoubtedly extremely 
complex, it could be that these 'mirror-image' associations 
between S. N. P. and Conservative voting and age contain the 
key to the dynamics of why the balance in Scotland swung so 
strongly from Tory to Labourp in a sense via the S. N. P. j, in 
the course of the 1970s. 
From the separate male and female tabulations in Table 
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1.8, it can-be seen that the age/voting relationships are 
by no means the same for the two sexes. 
First, with respect to voting S. N. P.,, the age gradient 
is much less steep for women than it is for men. The same 
percentage (16%) of the 65 and over age group of both sexes 
voted S. N. P. whereas in the youngest age groupp 50% of men 
compared with 32% of women voted S. N. P. 
Perhaps most intriguing of all rhoweverr is that the 
association between age and voting Labour shows an opposite 
trend for the two sexes, voting Labour tending to increase 
with age for men and decrease with age for women. Although 
Conservative voting tended to increase with age for both 
men and women, the gradient was much steeper among women. 
Conclusion. 
Briefly,, there are two main points to be carried 
forward from this preliminary empirical survey. 
The first is that regional trends in voting in Scotland 
at General Elections in the period 1964 to 1979 divide 
clearly into a national component concentrated into urban 
and non-peripheral areas and more idiosyncratic trends 
concentrated in the more rural and peripheral areas to the 
North and South of the central industrial belt. Of course 
it is always possible to achieve such a separation into 
national and local components in a statistical sensep but 
in this case there are grounds for believing that the 
separation reflects a real, social structural difference 
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between the fully 'nationalized' politics of the central 
industrial belt (this including for these purposes 
Aberdeen) and the maintenance of more parochial mechanisms 
in rural and peripheral areas. Being a general analysis at 
the national levell this study will obviously have much 
more to say about the former rather than the latter - 
always remembering that even in the seats with the most 
idiosyncratic patterns of voting changer the national 
forces are never entirely obliterated by local mechanisms 
but rather interact with them to produce local complexity. 
The second point concerns the association between 
S. N. P. voting and age. One could almost say that this 
suggests that the meaning of S. N. P. voting is largely to be 
found in the experience of a generation -a generation that 
came to political maturity in the thirty years after the 
Second World War. However,, the rate of fluctuation of the 
S. N. P. vote itself - from 11% in 1970 to a peak of 30% in 
October 1974 and back down to 17% in 1979 - was far too 
great for it to be explicable in terms of the differing 
political beliefs of successive cohorts of voters. In order 
to understand how the experience of a generationt or to put 
it more preciselyr the pattern of long term social change, 
was related to the electoral rise and fall of the S. N. P., 
we have to introduce an intermediate level of analysis. In 
shortr certain aspects of social change in its widest sense 
in post-war Scotland created the conditions for the 
emergence of a particular orientation towards politics, a 
taken-for-granted framework specifying what politics is 
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about, which itself constituted the political environment 




Marxism and the national level of analysis. 
Introduction 
The last chapter consisted of a description of the 
voting trends involved in the electoral rise and fall of 
the Scottish National Party over the last twenty five 
years. In many respects, voting is the realm of ideology 
par excellence and the immediate determinant of such voting 
change was ideological change. The shape of the rest of 
this study is to move down to deeper levels of social 
change and to work up from them back to the level of the 
events outlined in the first chapter. 
In one sense the delimitation of the social changes 
involved is quite simple. Self-evidently we are concerned 
with social change in Scotland. 
In another sense, this same obvious national 
delimitation of the social and political changes involved 
presents problems because of its very obviousness. 
The fact that we are talking about the social changes 
which und-erpinned the electoral success of a nationalist 
party should not be allowed to distract us from the fact 
that these social changes should not be dealt with in 
principle any differently from any other set of social 
changes occurring within a given territorially delimited 
social unit. 
In this chapter then I will be dealing in a general way 
with how social change at a national level is to be 
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analysed. Putting the problem this way - social change at a 
national level - begs a lot of questions and it is with 
these questions that I will be concerned. The argument will 
be that what this 'national level' is and implies should 
emerge from the analysis rather structuring it from the 
beginning as a taken-for-granted frame of reference. 
This is especially important in trying to explain the 
success of a nationalist movement because taking the 
'national' frame as unproblematic means that one is 
sharing, to some extentr the ideological framework of 
nationalism itself. To the extent that an explanatory 
strategy shares the cognitive framework an increase in the 
ideological and political salience of which is precisely 
what is to be explained, that explanatory strategy will 
fail - although it won't necessarily know it. One needs a 
solid grounding framework other than the nation in order to 
be able to understand either the nation or nationalism. The 
goal of the analysis in short is to understand the nation 
without reifying the nation - or in the present case, to 
understand Scotland without reifying Scotland. 
This chapter in particular contains much more digging 
among the theoretical foundations than is strictly 
necessary for an analysis of social change in Scotland or 
even an analysis of the social determinants of the growth 
of Scottish nationalism. The principal justification for 
this is that accounts of Scottish society and of the 
emergence of Scottish nationalism have in particular been 
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structured by precisely the kind of taken- f or-granted 
assumptions about Scotland as a unit and Scotland as a 
nation which I have just outlined. Although the main theme 
of this study is to account for the electoral success of 
the Scottish National Party,, it has been neither possible 
nor desirable to avoid this second more theoretical issue 
whichr to the extent that academic and political debate has 
overlapped in Scotland - as it should, cannot be separated 
from the first. 
The discussion of Marx and Marxism's treatment of the 
national level of analysis(') serves several related 
purposes. First I wanted to situate myself as firmly as 
possible for the more empirical work which follows. 
Secondly, I wanted to trace some of the sources within 
Marxism and within Marx's own thought which have helped 
make highly plausible the set of assumptions which have 
served to structure and distort a good deal of the analysis 
of modern Scotland. Finally and most generallyr the 
discussion might shed some needed light on the issue of 
Marxism's failure to deal adequately with the national 
level of analysis and with nationalism in particular. 
I ho pe that this makes clear that although my critique 
focusses upon Marxist ideas this is because it is primarily 
on the basis of these ideas that I see the possibility of 
advancing the debate on the national level of analysis. 
When one turns to how non-Marxist social science has tended 
to handle the national level of analysis or the nation, 
there is very little with which to argue or on which to 
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build precisely because so much of this non-Marxist 
analysis is unreflexively structured by the national 
framework itself. (2) 
The debate within Marxism 
The complex of questions surrounding the national level 
of analysis can be introduced in terms of what has been 
perhaps the most widely ramified debate within Marxism of 
recent years. The two main sites of the debate have been 
'dependency theory' and the discussion of the mechanism of 
the transition from feudalism to capitalism. 
The question of what to call tfie two sýdes of the 
debate is not particularly important. Probably: the simplest 
solution is to call the two approaches the classical 
Marxist and the neo-Marxist. For convenience I will also 
refer to them as the linternalist' and lexternalist' 
approaches. 
The table of oppositions set out in Table 2.1 is an 
attempt to list the main analytical categories which are 
given differential emphasis by the two sides of the debate 
and to give an idea of the reach of its interlocking 
ramifications. There is no attempt at a logical ordering of 
the oppositions or any consistency in their conceptual 
status. The only ordering principle is that each member of 
an opposing pair occupies a broadly corresponding position 
to that of its opposite number in the overall theoretical 
architecture of the respective sides of the debate. 
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'Vertical' social structuration 
Capitalist mode of production 
Social formation as articulation 
of modes of production 
Linear, evolutionary 
development 
Stages, modes of production 
Exploitation within labour 
process 





World system of capitalism 
Territorial or national unit 
as 8ub-system of global system 
Structural trajectories 
Structural positions within 
world economy 
Transfer of surplus value 
It should be clear that I am talking about an 
opposition of positions, an opposition of of emphasis, 
rather than identifying two clear cut schools of Marxism. 
Some writers can be classified fairly unambiguously on one 
side or anotherr for example,, Althusser,, Dobb and Brenner 
on the internalist side and Sweezy, Wallerstein and Nairn 
on the externalist side. Other writers have made quite 
considerable shifts of emphasis in the course of their 
careers. It is probably true to say that Frank has moved 
away from a fairly extreme externalist Position in his 




In presenting the emphases of the two sides of the 
debate in such a crudely schematic f orm as Table 2.11 1 am 
acutely aware that I am ignoring more recent and 
sophisticated contributions which have moved the debate 
onto more fruitful ground. My purpose is to contribute 
neither to dependency theory nor to an understanding of the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism but rather to get 
some leverage on some of the perverse theoretical origins 
of much of the dominant imagery and emphasis applied to 
Scotland as a unit of analysis. For this purposer I have 
relied primarily on some of the early 'classics' of the 
dependency debate and on some of the useful surveys of the 
f ield. (4) 
Given the plethora of existing critical commentary, all 
I propose to do here is to set out as briefly as possible 
the implications of the two respective positions, for what 
I have been calling the national level of analysis. 
A crude schematic representation such as that. presented 
above has the merit that it reveals how such a rigid 
separation of the two sets of emphases produces two 
caricatures rather than two theories. A 'pure' version of 
either side is not to be found in the writing of any one 
writer. The purest versions are probably to be found in the 
form of the straw men which are erected to represent the 
position of one side by its opponents. 
Presenting the two poles side by side in a stripped 
down form is enough in itself to show the absurdity of the 
proposition that either nsde could stand alone as an 
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exemplar of the Marxist problematic. At the most elementary 
level, one needs only to accept the centrality to Marx's 
thought of the axiom that production and circulation are 
inseparable moments of the same process of capitalist 
accumulation and reproduction. The very structure of 
Capital as a whole is witness to the folly of 
overemphasizing one side to the neglect of the other. 
Each side offers a different mode of approaching the 
national level (or the level of the territorial unit). Each 
side can be regarded as involving in principle a different 
method of Ideconstructing the nation'. 
According to the purely linternalist' mode of analysisr 
a given national unit would be analysed as a social 
formation consisting of a combination or articulation of 
modes of production each defined on the basis of the 
relations of production involved. 
According to a purely lexternalist' mode of analysist 
the given national unit would be regarded as a sub-unit of 
a broader global system with the emphasis on its position 
within the global system rather than on its internal 
structuration. 
In principle,, the national unit is in both cases 
analysed as a second order construct - built up in the one 
case from internal structural elements and situated in the 
other case as an element in a global system. This is to be 
contrasted with the position in non-Marxist social science 
in which the nation-state tends implicitly to be the first 
53 
order construct which grounds the analysis. 
The danger within the Marxist problematic arises not so 
much from the deconstruction that is done in either mode 
but from the neglect of the other mode. 
In a purely linternalist' formulationt the failure to 
situate the given national unit within the global system 
means that the external environmentr the 'outside' becomes 
a black box. 
In the opposite case the national unit becomes a black 
box looked at f rom the outside. 
In both cases what could be called a fetishization of 
the national level takes place. In the linternalist' case 
the national unit defines the universe of analysis and 
cannot itself be defined - it tends implicitly to become 
the global system of which the modes of production and 
their instances are sub-elements. In the external case, the 
nation-state becomes the internal boundary of 
analysability. 
To the extent that the nation-state or other 
territorially defined collectivity is not theorized either 
from the inside or the outside, i. e. is not theorized on 
the basis of a problematic which can account for 'inside' 
and 'outside' in its own termsr the boundaries of the unit 
becoming the defining conceptsp the grounding categories 
for the analysis. 
The debate under discussion has been conducted within a 
self-consciously Marxist problematic and considerable use 
has been made of citation from Marx in justification of 
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both positions. 
However, before moving on to a discussion of the 
relation between Marx's own work and the emphases and 
imagery of the two sides of the debate, I want to address 
an even more fundamental question - Marx's own treatment of 
the national level of analysis. 
Marx and the national level of analysis. 
The main purpose of this section is to explore some of 
the factors which lay behind Marx's neglect of the national 
level of analysis. I will approach the issue in two ways. 
First I want to look at the problem in terms of Marx's 
mature methodology, primarily as exemplified in the 
Grundiisse and Capital. 
Then I want to make some observations on the way in 
which Marx's immediate intellectual and political 
environment, especially in the period of the formation of 
his thought, operated to systematically downgrade in Marx's 
eyes the significance of the national level. 
Before proceeding however it is worth pointing out that 
the single most important factor underlying Marx's lack of 
interest in the national level, and of which the above two 
points are largely specificationst was the historical 
period in which he was writing. 
This point has been made most cogently with respect to 
Marxism in general by Tom Nairn. it is important to remind 
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ourselves, however that Nairn is talking about the Marxist 
theory of nationalism ('The theory of nationalism 
represents Marxism's great historical failure' - Nairnr 
1981,, p329) whereas I am talking about the more general 
issue of the national level of analysis. 
"Their 'failure' (Leninr Luxemburg, Bauer etc. - SWK) was not a simply conceptual or subjective one. The fact isl that if they could not put together a tolerable theory about nationalism, nobody could, or did. Historical development had not at that time 
produced certain things necessary for such a 'theory'. 
The time was not ripe for it, or for them. Nor would it be ripe until two further generations of trauma had 
followed 1914. There is nothing in the least 
discreditable to historical materialism in the fact, 
although it is naturally lethal to 'Marxism', in the 
God's eye sense. 
The philosophical failings lead us back in turn 
to real history. They lead us back to the material 
conditions under which the enigma of modern nationalism 
presented itself to these past generations. Lacking 
angelic perspicuityr they had to confront it under very 
severe limitations. Nationalism is a crucialf fairly 
central feature of the the modern capitalist 
development of world history. Time-bound like other 
systems of speculation, Marxism did not possess the 
power to foresee this developmentp or the eventual, 
overall shape which capitalist history would assume. As 
regards nationalism, the trouble is that not much less 
than this is required for approaching the problem. " 
(Nairnt 19811 p331) 
This is spirit in which I want to approach the question 
of how Marx's own intellectual and political environmente 
his own conjuncturej, affected his approach to the complex 
of questions surrounding the national level of analysis, 
including nationalism. If Marx had a blind spot with 
respect to these issuesp the only alternative to throwing 
out the baby of his methodology with his concrete 
prognostications concerning the national level, is to try 
to come to an understanding of how and why the blind spot 
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came about. Nairn has identified Marxism's blind spot with 
respect to nationalism and uneven development in general 
with the European Enlightenment's 'idea of an even and 
pr. ogressive development of material civilisation and mass 
culture' (Nairnr 1981j, p336). Not only did Marx share 
elements of this Enlightenment vision but the immediate, 
German, environment in which his thought developed acted in 
a particularly powerful manner to reinforce in his case the 
general Enlightenment stress on rationality and Progress 
and to downgrade the significancer or rather permanence, 
of F and here we run the risk of anachronism, 
"the complex of ref ractoryp unassimilable 
phenomena linked to nationalism and its many 
derivatives (racism, anti-semitismi etc. ) which time 
and time again appeared to undermine and thoroughly 
discredit Western rationality. " (Nairn, 1981, p337) 
In trying to understand Marx's approach to the national 
level of analysis, I firstly want to explore some aspects 
of his mature methodology as exemplified primarily in the 
Grundrisse and Capital. 
Before proceeding the general and perhaps obvious point- 
has to be made that Marx, even in his early and broadest 
outlines of what was to become his theoretical life-work, 
never went beyond the intention of producing a work 
focussing primarily on political economy - as witnessed by 
the title of his proposed six book magnum opuss, 'Critique 
of Political Economy' (Nicolaust 1973, p54) 
In methodological terms, Marx did not leave behind a 
systematic theorization of the national (and international) 
level because it did not belong at the level of abstraction 
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at which Marx was working in the volumes of Capital which 
he was able to complete. 
Marx's original 1857 outline for what was eventually to 
emerge as Capital consisted of six books: 
I on capital 
II on landed property 
III on wage-labour 
IV on the state 
V on foreign trade 
VI on the world market and crises 
(Rosdolskyrl980p p12; Nicolaus, 1973, p54) 
The material intended for the first three books 
according to this outline was eventually incorporated in a 
modified form and with varying degrees of comprehensiveness 
into the first three volumes of Capital as published. The 
last three books which would have brought Marx much closer 
to providing a theorization of the national and 
international levels were precisely the books that Marx did 
not write. As Rosdolsky puts it: 
"We believe that we can conclude from our 
examination of the Capital manuscripts that the last three 
books of the six originally planned were never definitely 
'abandoned' by Marx but rather destined for the 'eventual 
continuation' of the work. " (Rosdolsky, 1980p p53) 
The principles underlying the order of priority implied by 
Marx's original conception of Capital emerge more clearly 
in the proposal contained in the 1857 'Introduction': 
"The order obviously has to be 
(1) the general,, abstract determinants which obtain in 
more or less all forms of society, but in the above 
explained sense 
(2) The categories which make up the inner structure of 
bourgeois society and on which the fundamental classes 
rest. Capital, wage labourr landed property. Their 
inter-relation. Town and country. The three great 
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social classes. Exchange between them. Circulation. 
Credit system (private). 
(3) Concentration of bourgeois society in the form of 
the state. Viewed in relation to itself. The 
'unproductive' classes. Taxes. State debt, Public 
credit. The colonies. Emigration. 
(4) The international relation of production. 
International division of labour. International 
exchange. Export and import. Rate of exchange. 
(5) The world market and crises. ' 
(Marx jGrundr isse j p108) 
Here the dominant principle clearly at work organizing the 
proposed order of presentation is the ascent 'from the 
simple relations such as labourp division of labourt need, 
exchange valuer to the level of the state? exchange between 
nations and the world market' which Marx had defined as 
'obviously the scientifically correct method' several pages 
earlier. (Grundrisser pl0l) 
The picture which emerges is not so much, as Frank puts 
it, simply that 
"Marx's preoccupation with the productive process in 
the metropolis leads him to relegate our problems to a 
volume that he never came to write" (Frankf 1978,, p3) 
as that, given the methodologically determined order of 
priority for the topics which the 'Critique of Political 
Economy' was originally intended to theorizer it was those 
topics or levels which could only be theorized as "a rich 
totality of many determinations" (Grundrisse, plOO) and 
which lay furthest from the abstract constitutive 
categories of 'capital in general' which were sacrificedr 
partly as a result of the appalling pressures of illness 
and poverty under which Marx worked. 
It must be stressed that what is under discussion here 
is the order of presentation of the proposed 
books of what 
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became Marx's life work. This order of presentation does 
not correspond at a more detailed level with the order of 
conceptual derivation. Just because the order of 
presentation at the level of whole books of Capital was 
dominated by the ascent from the abstract categories to the 
concrete determinations does not mean that analytically 
there would have been a one way process - that the later 
books would have been merely mechanical applications of the 
categories developed at the level of capital in general. 
The reverse passage was also seen as necessary - the 
complex totality which has been dissected and reconstituted 
in terms of the previously developed abstract categories 
then becomes the basis for a fuller comprehension of the 
categories themselves. This almost inexpressible,, and 
perhaps methodologically Utopianr circularity is well 
expressed in the passage in Volume III in which Marx 
mentions the eventual continuation of Capital. 
(5) 
"The phenomena under investigation in this chapter 
assume for their full development the credit system and 
competition on the world marketr the latter being the 
very basis and living atmosphere of the capitalist mode 
of production. These concrete forms of capitalist 
production, however, can be comprehensively depicted 
only after the general nature of capital is 
understood. It is therefore outside the scope of this 
work to present them - they belong to a possible 
continuation. Yet the phenomena listed in the title to 
this section can still be discussed here in broad 
terms" (Capitalj, Vol 111, p205) 
Here is an example of Marx explicitly stating that the 
theoretical analysis at the level of capital in general is 
only one moment of a complete analysis and that the 
analysis of the constitutive elements of the capitalist 
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system with which Capital deals should eventually be 
completed by analysis at the level of the capitalist system 
in its real, concrete totality,, at the level of the world 
economy* 
In practice however, Marxr simply in order to get 
written what he did had to 'bracket out' the full 
development in terms of (in this case) the credit sY. stem 
and the world market. 
However, it seems clear that in addition to the final 
three books being at the end of the queue in terms of 
practical and methodological priorities, Marx did not 
envisage the need to devote as much time or attention to 
these final three books as he envisaged for the first 
three. 
As Nicolaus puts it: 
"Marx did not at any point intend to make each of the six books of equal size. In a letter written even before the completion of the seven workbooks, he said 'It is by no means my intention to work out evenly all 
six of the books into which I divide the whole, but 
rather, -in the last threer to give mostly only the basic strokes; whereas in the first three, which 
contain the basic developments proper, elaboration of 
details is not always unavoidable. I" (Nicol aus, 
1973, pp54-55) 
Thus there is some justification for looking at another set 
of factors which go beyond simple practical exigencies in 
accounting for Marx's relative neglect of the national and 
international levels in terms of systematic theorization. 
They have to do with the combined implications of the role 
of competition in Marx's general theory and the specific 
historical period in which he wrote Capital 
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A discussion of the conceptual role of 'competition' in 
Marx's work leads into a frighteningly complex area. A 
passage from the Grundrisse gives a reasonable summation at 
a general level of both the centrality and conceptual 
status of competition in Marx's analysis of capitalism. 
"Competition generallyr this essential locomotive 
force of the bourgeois economy, does not establish its 
lawsr but is rather their executor. Unlimited 
competition is therefore not the presupposition for the 
truth of the economic lawsp but rather the consequence 
- the form of appearance in which their necessity 
realises itself. For the economists to presupposer as 
does Ricardo, that unlimited competition exists is to 
presuppose the full reality and realization of the 
bourgeois relations of production in their specific and 
distinct character. Competition therefore does not 
explain these laws; rather, it lets them be seen, but 
does not produce them. " (Grundrisse, p555) 
The central point to be made here is that the main 
mechanisms which we would now see as operating to regulate 
or interfere in market mechanisms at the international 
level - and in particular the action of the national state 
- whatever their real impact was at the time Marx was 
writing, could not, by definition, be systematically 
analysed at the level of generality at which Marx was 
operating. To the extent that the operation of the laws of 
capital is seen as imply ing/presupposing 'unlimited 
competition', the' national levely in terms of making a 
difference, is in principle irrelevant. 
And here, of course, the date of the writing of 
Capital, the 1860st is highly significant. By almost any of 
the array of broad periodizations of the international 
capitalist economy Marx wrote Capital towards the end of 
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what we would now regard as a 'window' of relatively free 
trade (often termed, significantly enough, the era of 
competitive capitalism) in the sense of a relative absence 
of explicit intervention in international market mechanisms 
by national states. What we now see as a 'window' preceded 
by 'mercantilist' state intervention and succeeded by V 
'imperialist' state intervention, Marx saw as historical 
confirmation of the move towards the unfettered operation 
of the laws of capitalism. 
(6) 
Marx discusses many of the features which pertain to 
the national level of analysis in the context of the 
'historical significance' of competition: 
"ooe competition-appears historically as the 
dissolution of compulsory guild membership, government 
regulation, internal tariffs and the like within a 
countryl as the lifting of blockades, prohibitions, 
protection from the world market ... it appears historicallyr in shortj as the negation of the limits 
and barriers peculiar to the stages of production 
preceding capital ... " (Grundrisser p649) 
and goes on to contrast this mere historical appearance 
with the tight structural unity between capitalism as a 
mode of production and free competition: 
... competition is very far from having only this historic significancep or merely being this negative 
force. Free competition is the relation of capital to 
itself as another capital,, i. e. the real conduct of 
capital as capital. The inner laws of capital - which 
appear merely as tendencies in the preliminary historic 
stages of its development - are for the first time 
posited as laws; production founded on capital for the 
first time posits itself in the forms adequate to it 
only in so far as and to the extent that free 
competition develops, for it is the free development of 
the mode of production founded on capital; the free 
development of its conditions and of itself as the 
process which constantly reproduces these conditions. 
... The predominance of capital 
is the presupposition 
of free competition. " (Grundrisser p651) 
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In an even tighter formulationr the association of 
fully developed capitalism with free competition is shown 
to be so close that restrictions on competition can only be 
seen as harbingers of the end of capitalism: 
"As long as capital is weakr it still itself 
relies on the crutches of past modes of production, or 
of those which will pass with its rise. As soon as it 
feels strongr it throws away the crutchest and moves in 
accordance with its own laws. As soon as it begins to 
sense itself and become conscious of itself as a 
barrier to developmentr it seeks refuge in forms whichr 
by restricting free competition, seem to make the rule 
of capital more perfect,, but are at the same time the 
heralds of its dissolution and of the dissolution of 
the mode of production resting on it. Competition 
merely expresses as real, posits as an external 
necessity, that which lies within the nature of 
capital... " (Grundrisse, p651) 
However,, when Marx is working at his highest level of 
abstraction, at the level of 'capital in general' in Volume 
of Capital, even 'free' competition must itself be 
abstracted out of the model. As Rosdolsky puts it: 
"What all capitals have in common is their 
capacity for expanding their value - the fact that they 
appropriate (directly or indirectly) the surplus-value 
created in the capitalist production process. The 
analysis of 'capital in general' mustt thereforer begin 
with the investigation of the production process. This 
must show how money, goes beyond its simple quality of 
being money' and becomes capital, how it then produces 
surplus-value through the consumption of human labour 
and finally how the production of surplus-value for its 
part, leads to the reproduction of both capital and the 
relation of capital itself. All this can be developed 
without our having to pay attention to the presence of 
several capitals and the differences between them ... 
So if the basic presupposition of the capital 
relation is to be understoodr i. e. the relation of 
capital to labour and the role of surplus-value as the 
driving force of capitalist productionj we must begin 
not with 'many capitals',, but with .... 'capital in 
general'. " (Rosdolskyr 1980, pp44-45) 
Only in Volume III when a level of analysis is reached 
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which does involve assessing the implications of the 
interactions of different capitalsf must competition must 
be brought in as a component mechanism of the explanation 
of,, to take the most important example, the determination 
of the average rate of profit. 
In Rosdolsky's words (referring to the same transition 
in the Grundrisse) 
the establishment of a general rate of profit 
and the transformation of values into prices of 
production which corresponds to ite presuppose 
competition and hence occur at a level which is 
excluded from the study of 'capital in general', 
according to Marx's original outline. 
It must be evident here that in the sentences we 
have just quoted that Marx is already speaking about 
the capital of the entire capitalist classr the 
'aggregate social capital'... " (Rosdolsky,, 1980, p46). 
Marx has already used the category 'aggregate social 
capital' in Volume I to counterpose to that of 'individual 
capital' (Rosdolsky, 1980, p65) and it plays its most 
central role in the section on 'The Reproduction and 
Circulation of Total Social Capital' in Volume II. Howeverr 
it is only in Volume III that the use of 'aggregate social 
capital' must be c6mbined with the introduction of 
competition as a mechanism. It is this juxtaposition which 
perhaps crystallises more than anything else the 
untheorized nature of Marx's usage and discussion of 'the 
national level'. 
The unit of 'aggregate social capital' in terms of 
which Marx tended to carry out the analyses of Volumes II 
and III of Capital tended to coincide with the nation- 
state. The boundaries of the state tended to be adopted by 
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Marx as demarcating the total system of capitalist 
production and reproduction. 
Claudia von Braunmuhl discusses this issue at greater 
length and comes to an even stronger conclusion when she 
points out that Marx 
speaks of the process of the equalization of 
the rate of profit 'in a given national social 
formation' and thus applies the concept of 'total 
social capital' in a concrete manner only within a 
national framework. In fact he cannot conceive of the 
world market as anything other than an aggregation of 
national units. " (von Braunmuhl, 1978, p165) 
As will have become apparentr this area of Marx's 
methodology is rather paradoxical. The full development of 
capitalism is expressed in the development of free 
competition which involves the tearing down of national 
barriers. However, in order to analyse 'total social 
capitallp a totality within. which competition as an 
expression of the relations between individual units of 
capital is a mechanism, the unit adopted "in moments of 
empirical concretization" (von Braunmuhl, 19781, p165) is 
primarily that of the internal market of the bourgeois 
nation-state. If capital is fully developed there are no 
barriers around this internal market (apart perhaps from 
physical ones) and thus the differentiation of the unit of 
analysis is to that extent merely abstract - and does not 
represent any real economic unit. And of courser for Marx, 
this is precisely what the use of the 'national unit' 
precisely was -a heuristic abstraction. An abstraction 
necessitated bythe ambitiousness of his project and the 
essential elements of circularity in his method i. e. a full 
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grounding of this assumed national unit would require 
precisely the analysis of the state and the world market,, 
the foundations of which he saw himself as engaged in 
building. 
So far I have concentrated on accounting for Marx's 
neglect of the national level in terms of his fully 
developed methodological priorities. 
The other approach can be summed up as exploring the 
implications of the fact that Marx's thought was formed in 
early nineteenth century Germany(7). The import of this can 
be seen both in terms of Marx's reactions to the 
development of German economic policy and in terms of the 
intellectual environment provided by Germany at this time - 
an environment dominated by Hegel and saturated with 
Romantic nationalism and an environment against which Marx 
struggled to define his own position. Not for nothing was 
Marx's spleen against the Young Hegelians vented under the 
title of 'The German Ideology' 
First, a passage-from the young Marx shows how the 
emergence of the idea and reality of national protectionism 
in Germanyr a protectionism which foreshadowed the end of 
the era of free-trader was seen by Marx as a ludicrous 
anachronism. 
"The relation of industry, of the world of wealth 
generallyr to the political world is one of the major 
problems of modern times. In what form is this problem 
beginning to engage the attention of the Germans? In 
the form of protective dutiest of the prohibitive 
system, of national economy. Germanomania has passed 
out of man into matter, and thus one morning our cotton 
barons and iron champions saw themselves turned into 
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patriots. People are therefore beginning in Germany to 
acknowledge the sovereignty of monopoly within the 
country by lending it sovereignty abroad. People are 
thus about to begin in Germany with what people in 
France and England are about to end. The old corrupt 
condition against which these countries are rebelling 
in theory and which they only bear as one bears chains 
is greeted in Germany as the dawn of a beautiful future 
which still hardly dares to pass from cunning theory to 
the most ruthless practice. Whereas the problem in 
France and England is: Political economy or the rule of 
society over wealth, in Germany it is National economy 
or the mastery of private property over nationality. In 
France and England, then, it is a case of abolishing 
monopoly that has proceeded to its last consequences; 
in Germany it is a case of proceeding to -the last 
consequences of monopoly. There it is a case of a 
solutiont here as yet a case of collision. This is an 
adequate example of the German form of modern problemst 
an example of how our historyl like a clumsy recruitr 
still has to do extra drill in matters that are old and 
hackneyed in history. " (Introduction to the Critique of 
Hegel's Philosophy of ýLaw; Collected Works; Volume 31 
p175) 
Although such an early outburst on the issue can in no 
way be taken as representing Marx's mature thought, it does 
give us an idea of how Marx saw*the dominant historical 
trend in the years preceding the formulation of Capital. 
Marx tended in general to use words such as nationalp 
local and patriotic as terms of abuse directed against his 
opponents and to associate the terms with the outmodedr the 
soon to be swept away. His attitude to German romantic 
nationalism is gloriously expressed in the following 
"Good-natured enthusiasts? Germanomaniacs by 
extraction and free-thinkers by reflection ... seek our 
history of freedom beyond our history in the primeval 
Teutonic forests. But what difference is there between 
the history of our freedom and the history of the 
boar's freedom if it can only be found in the forests? 
Besidesr it is common knowledge that the forest echoes 
back what you shout into it. So let us leave the 
ancient Teutonic forests in peace. " (Introduction to 
the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Lawr Collected 
Works, Vol 3, p175) 
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The context of this passager the Introduction to the 
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, points us towards a 
context which cannot be disregarded in taking stock of the 
conceptual status of the 'nation' in Marx's thought - 
Marx's relation to Hegel and to German idealism in general. 
The nation, the Volk or in particular the Volksgeistj, 
was a central category in Hegel's philosophy of history. 
Hegel saw the nation as the form in which spirit manifested 
itself in history and although citation from Hegel is a 
tricky business, in this case he does express the matter 
concisely enough. 
"The rational is that which has being in and for 
itselft and from which everything else derives its 
value. It assumes varying shapes; but in none of them 
is it more obviously an end than in that whereby the 
spirit explicates and manifests itself in the endlessly 
varying forms which we call nations. " (Hegelp 1975, 
p28) 
"The spirit in history is an individual which is 
both universal in nature and at the same time 
determinate: in short, it is the nation in general, and 
the spirit we are concerned with is the spirit of the 
nation. (Volksgeist)" (Hegel, 1975, p5l) 
It is not unlikely that inherent in Marx's early 
battles against idealism was a battle against the nation, 
the spirit of the nationp and certainly against the spirit 
of the Geruan nation, as an organizing categoryt as an 
essential determinant. 
Behind Hegel's concept of the stater the attack on 
which provided an early context for the crystallization of 
Marx's materialist outlookr - lay implicitly the concept of 
the Volk. For Hegel the Volksgeist was the spiritual 
underpinning for the more rational armature of the state 
69 
and the constitution. 
To move out even further onto somewhat thin ice, the 
nation can be seen as playing a role in Hegel's philosophy 
of history analogous to that of the class in Marx's, with 
of course, the order of derivation between ideas and 
material reality reversed, but the nation and the class 
each playing a mediating role within this derivation. 
For Hegel the movement is from idea to reality: the 
spirit 'realizes' itself in the consciousness of the 
nation. By a dialectical progression the spiritr through 
its repeated realization in the form of nations, advances 
to the transcendence of the nation: 
the essence of the spiritp its supreme 
imperativer is that it should recognize, know and 
realize itself for what it is. It accomplishes this end 
in the history of the world; it produces itself in a 
series of determinate forms and these forms are the 
nations of world history. Each of them represents a 
particular stage of developmentp so that they 
correspond to epochs in the history of the world. Or on 
a more fundamental levelf they are the principles in 
which the spirit has discovered itselfr and which it is 
impelled to realise. There is therefore an essential 
connection between them in which the nature of the 
spirit alone is expressed. ... The principles of the 
national spirits in their necessary progression are 
themselves only moments of the one universal spirit, 
which ascends through them in the course of history to 
its consummation in an all-embracing totality. (Hegel, 
1975, p64) 
To the extent that Marx, in his intellectual 
apprenticeshipt was defining himself both in terms of and 
against Hegelr the nation will have seemed a particularly 
dangeroust nebulous and misleading coricept precisely 
because it played in Hegel's system a role highly analogous 
to that of class in his own. For Hegel,, the nation was the 
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locus wherein the spirit did manifest itself in the realp 
historical world, the very terrain on which Marx was to 
ground his system. For Marx, the nation as a category will 
have primarily appeared in contexts in which it was to him 
at least as epiphenomenal as religionj, if not more so - and 
just as distant from the conceptual foundations which he 
was to carve out in the Grundrisse and Capital. 
In this section then I have outlined two sets of 
considerations which could be said to have shaped Marx's 
treatment of the national level of analysis. The first set 
concerned the level of abstraction at which Marx was 
working in the published volumes of Capital. The second had 
to with features of Marx's early intellectual environment 
which could be said to have helped set his later 
theoretical priorities. Both were closely related to the 
historical period in which Marx's thought developed, The 
point is not whether or not Marx was a nationalist. He 
tended to take a highly (but not entirely) pragmatic 
approach to the national movements of his time. The point 
is. rather that in his vision of long term historical 
development, national factors were destined to play a role 
of declining significance. 
Nowhere does this emerge more clearly and consistently 
than in Marx's attitude to the historical role of free 
trade. In his "Speech on the Question of Free Trade" of 
1848, the inevitably intertwined economic and ideological 
role of free-trade is spelled out clearly: 
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"To sum upf what is Free Trade under the present 
conditions of society? Freedom of Capital. When you 
have torn down the few national barriers which still 
restrict the advance of capital, you will merely have 
given it complete freedom of action. So long as you let 
the relation of wage labour to capital exist, no matter 
how favourable the conditions under which you 
accomplish the exchange of commoditiest there will 
always be a class which exploits and a class which is 
exploited. It is really difficult to understand the 
presumption of the Free Traders who imagine that the 
more advantageous application of capital-will abolish 
the antagonism between industrial capitalists and wage- 
workers. On the contrary. The only result will be that 
antagonism of these classes will stand out more 
clearly. 
Let us assume for a moment that there are no more 
Corn Laws,, no more customsp no more town dues; that in 
a word all the accidental circumstances which today the 
workingman may look upon as a cause of his miserable 
condition have vanishedp and we shall have removed so 
many curtains that hide from his eyes his true enemy. 
He will see that capital released from all trammels 
will make him no less a slave than capital trammelled 
by import duties. ... generally speakingj, the Protective system in these days is conservative, while 
the Free Trade system works destructively. It breaks up 
only nationalities and carries the antagonism between 
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie to the uttermost 
point. In a word, the Free Trade system hastens the 
Social Revolution. In this revolutionary sense alone, 
gentlement I am in favour of Free Trade. (Collected 
Works, Vol 6, pp463-465) 
Finallyp to confirm that this conviction was not just 
an early aberrationt we can turn to Marx's "Critique of the 
Gotha Programme" of 1875. In rebuttal of what he saw as the 
merely abstract internationalism of Lassalle's 
(8) 
proposalsr Marx concluded 
"In fact, the internationalist avowal of the 
programme stands infinitely below even that of the Free 
Trade Party. The latter also asserts that the results 
of its efforts will be "the international brotherhood 
of peoples. ". But it also does something to make trade 
international and by no means contents itself with the 
consciousness - that all peoples are carrying on trade 
at home. " (Critique of the Gotha Programmer Selected 
Works, Vol IIIf p22) 
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There has been a consistent tendency for subsequent 
Marxists to downgrade the significance of this 
'universalizing theme' in Marx. Most obviously because the 
era in which Marx wrote was succeeded by an era of rising 
tariffs and the 'national' features of what came to be 
termed monopoly capitalism and imperialism. 
It would seem to me that for the purposes of learning 
from Marx,, it is better to accept that Marx meant exactly 
what he said about the 'world-historical' role of free 
trade in universalizing and even simplifying capitalist 
economic relations and about the ideological effect of free 
trade in making the exploitative nature of these relations 
all the more transparent. Only in this way can we give 
ourselves a solid methodological basis for exploring the 
implications of the fact that the significance of the 
national level has not diminished since Marx's day. Rather, 
as the role of the state has expanded, the national level, 
economic and ideologicalp has increasingly interposed 
itself between the consciousness of and the reality of the 
capitalist system. 
Marx and the origins of the debate 
So far I have been discussing why Marx left largely 
untheorized the space around what I have been calling the 
national level of analysis and the 'transition from 
feudalism/dependency theory' debate. 
In this section,, I want to make a limited exploration 
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of the sources in Marx's central theoretical works of the 
imagery used by the two sides of the debate. 
Much of the contrast in emphasis laid out in Table 2.1, 
and in particular the contrasting emphasis given to 
relations of exchange as opposed to relations of production 
and to 'external' causation as opposed to 'internal' 
causation can be traced back to two different phases of 
Marx's argument, phases which have a different 
methodological structure and which correspond to different 
phases in the development of capitalism. The two phases are 
the generally recognized ones of the phase of the pre- 
conditions or the genesis or the 'becoming' of capitalism 
on the one hand and of developed industrial capitalism on 
the other. The contrast and much of its methodological 
import is well expressed, albeit in rather Hegelian 
terminology, in a passage from the Grundrisse. 
"The conditions and presuppositions of the 
becomingp of the arising, of capital presuppose 
precisely that it is not yet in being but merely in 
becoming; they therefore disappear as real capital 
arises, capital which itselft on the basis of its own 
reality, posits the conditions for its realization. 
Thus ... while the presuppositions under which money becomes capital appear as given external 
presuppositions for the arising of capital - 
(nevertheless) as soon as capital has become capital as 
such, it creates its own presuppositions,, i. e. the 
possession of the real conditions of the creation of 
new values without exchange - by means of its own 
production process. These presuppositionst which 
originally appeared as conditions of its becoming and 
hence could not spring from its action as capital now 
appear as results of its own realizationr reality? as 
posited by it - not as conditions of its arising# but 
as results of its presence. It no longer proceeds from 
presuppositions in order to become, but rather it is 
itself presupposed, and proceeds from itself to create 
the conditions of its maintenance and growth. " 
(Grundrisse, pp459-460) 
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A fundamental distinction between the two phasest or 
more preciselyr Marx's analysis of them, is in what could 
very loosely be called the relationship between theory and 
history. As Zelenyi put& it 
"Marx's analysis operates simultaneously on two 
levelst on the level of theoretical development (Marx 
sometimes speaks of 'logical development') and on the 
level of real historical events. " (ZelenyiF 1980, p35) 
Between Marx's discussion of the pre-conditions of 
capitalism and his discussion of developed industrial 
capitalism there is a necessary difference in the relation 
between the two levels. (9) We could almost see this 
difference as defining two modes of analysis in Marx 
depending upon which phase is under discussion and which 
level has priority. For the sake of simplicityr I will call 
the mode Marx applies to the preconditions phase, the 
historical mode and the mode he applies to fully developed 
capitalism, the logical mode. 
In the period of the genesis of capitalism, specific 
historical conditions are necessary for the emergence of 
capitalism but by definition, these historical developments 
cannot be driven by the logic of capitalist accumulation in 
the way in which once 'accumulation, the gradual increase 
of capital by reproduction' (Capital, Vol I, p78O) is under 
way, subsequent historical development is predicated on the 
logic of this accumulation. In Marx's words 
"This historic process is not the product of 
capitalf but the presupposition for it" (Grundrisse, 
P505). 
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Probably the clearest juxtapositions of Marx's two 
approaches occur in the context of his discussions of the 
role of merchant's capital or commerce in general. And of 
course depending upon whether Marx is treating merchant's 
capital as a historical precondition for the emergence of 
capitalism or as one moment in the overall reproductive 
process of industrial capital, the relative priority of 
relations of exchange as opposed to relations of production 
could be said to be different. 
If Marx is treating merchant's capital as a 
historically necessary precondition for the emergence of 
industrial capitalism, then relations of exchange in this 
historical sense could be said to have causal priority. 
When Marx is developing the concept of commercial capital 
in the context of capitalist reproduction on the other hand 
it is defined simply as one cog in the mechanism of the 
overall process but in no way as a driving force. For 
example 
"Commercial capitall thereforej is absolutely 
nothing more than the commodity capital of the producer 
which has to go through the process of transformation 
into moneyr to perform its function as commodity 
capital on the market; only instead of being an 
incidental operation carried on by the producer 
himself, this function now appears as the exclusive 
operation of a particular species of capitalist, the 
merchant, and acquires independence as the business of 
a particular capital investment. " (Capital, Vol III, 
p382) 
Only having accomplished a derivation of commercial 
capital in terms of its role within the reproductive 
process of capitalist reproduction does he feel free to 
deal with "Historical Material on Merchant's Capital. " 
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"Up to now we have considered merchant's capital 
from the standpoint of the capitalist mode of 
production and within its limits. And yet not only 
trade, but also trading capitalp is older than the 
capitalist mode of production, and is in fact the 
oldest historical mode in which capital has an 
independent existence ... 
In all earlier modes of production ... commercial 
capital ... appears as the function of capital par 
excellencer and the more so, the more production is 
directly the production of the producer's means of 
subsistence. 
Thus there is no problem at all in understanding 
why commercial capital appears as the historic form of 
capital long before capital has subjected production 
itself to its sway. Its existencer and its development 
to a certain level, is itself a historical precondition 
for the development of the capitalist mode of 
production ... 
In the context of capitalist productiont 
commercial capital is demoted from its earlier separate 
existence, to become a particular moment of capital 
investment in general, and the equalization of profits 
reduces its profit rate to the general average. It now 
functions simply as'the agent of productive capital. " 
(Capital, Vol III, pp442-444). 
The theoretical circle is turned again. 
(101 Now,, if 
everything were kept in its placer the existence of one 
mode of analysis for one set of events and another mode of 
analysis for the rest would cause few problems - except for 
the problem of determining which class of events is in 
question and thus which mode of analysis is appropriate. 
However, what would seem to have happened is that the two 
modes of analysis in Marx have provided contrasting sets of 
imagery - which stress either the primacy of production 
relations and internal causation etc. on the one handr or 
the primacy of exchange relations and external causation on 
the other. 
With respect to what has been referred to as the 
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national level of analysis the problem is compounded by two 
connected features of the published form of Capital which 
have already been noted. The structure of the 1857 plan at 
the level of whole books can be seen to follow what we have 
been calling the logical mode as opposed to the historical 
mode. This is precisely what Marx says in yet another of 
the famous methodological precepts contained in the 1857 
Introduction: 
"It would therefore be unfeasible and wrong to let 
the economic categories follow one another in the same 
sequence as as that in which they were historically decisive. their sequence is determined, rather, by 
their relation to one another in modern bourgeois 
societyr which is precisely the opposite of that which 
seems to be their natural order or which corresponds to historical development. The point is not the historic 
position of the economic relations in the succession of different forms of society. Even less is it their 
sequence 'in the ideal .... Rather, their order within modern bourgeois society. "(Grundrisse, p107) 
If the final three books on the stater foreign trader 
and the world market and crises had been written then this 
'logical'. mode of analysisr appropriate to developed 
industrial capitalismr would have been extended to the 
international level. However, becausel proceeding as he 
didr Marx had to 'bracket out' this international level as 
not yet theorizedr and because the unit available to him 
within which the logic of the capitalist accumulation and 
reproduction process could most conveniently be worked out 
was the existing nation-stater Marx's 'internal' analysis 
of capitalist accumulation and reproduction was carried out 
'internally' in another sense, internally to the modern 
nation-state. 
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Converselyr because the last three books were not 
writtent almost all the concrete imagery and analysis of 
the international level and a high proportion of the 
analysis of a capitalist system which transcended the 
boundaries of the nation-state, referred to the pre- 
conditions of industrial capitalism or the period of 
primitive accumulation rather than its full development. 
Thus was laid down the pattern for the kind of mirror- 
image formulations which have bedevilled Marxism in its 
attempt to deal with the international level. 
In very simple fashionr the templates which are 
discernible within Marx's work which have made the 
subsequent construction of one-sided formulations so 
feasible were: 
1. In the analysis of the pre-conditions of industrial 
capitalism according to the historical moder commercial 
relations are given an independently causal role in 
capitalist development. Commercial relations can operate at 
the international level and thus impinge 'externally' on a 
national or territorial unit. 
2. In the analysis of fully developed capitalism 
according to the logical modej, commerce. is analysed as an 
integral but subordinate moment of the overall process of 
capitalist reproduction. This process of capitalist 
reproduction tends to be shown operating within the 
national unit. 
The derivation is made explicit in an early statement 
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of his position by Andre Gunder Frank 
"To understand underdevelopmentr I suggestr it is 
important to realize that the underdeveloped countries 
are still living in whatp for themp is essentially a 
mercantilist system (I would revise that formulation in 
1969). It may be that in the metropole with the 
development of industry and of capitalism, the 
determination of productive considerations by merantile 
ones gave way to the determination of mercantile 
considerations by productive ones as Marx and others 
suggest. The same did not happen in the underdeveloped 
countries. " (Frank, 1967p p53) 
Samir Amin is even more explicit 
"Since Capital is the theory not of socio-economic 
formations in general but of the capitalist mode of 
production - being, as its subtitle indicates, a 
critique of political economy - Marx does not provide 
us with a fully developed theory of accumulation on a 
world scale. This theory appears only in connection 
with primitive accumulation, considered as the 
prehistory of the capitalist mode of production. But 
this prehistory is not over and done with: it goes on, 
through the extension of capitalism on the world scale. 
Parallel with the mechanism of accumulation 
characteristic of the capitalist mode of productiont 
namely expanded reproduction, a mechanism of primitive 
accumulation continues to operate and to be 
characteristic of relations between the centre and the 
periphery of the world capitalist system. " (Amin, 1974r 
p38) 
The 'development of underdevelopment' then is seen in 
both these cases as a freezing of structural development so 
that peripheral regions remain trapped in historical 
circumstances for which the mode of analysis developed by 
Marx as appropriate to the phase of primitive accumulation 
or the pre-conditions of developed industrial capitalism 
remains appropriate. 
Just as, as we have seen from Marx's analysis, the 
priority of the logical or historical modes of analysis, 
the importance of internal and external factors and the 
weight to be given to relations of production compared with 
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relations of exchanger depends primarily upon the period of 
history in question - pre-conditions as compared with full 
development of industrial capitalism - sor to the extent 
that whether or not a given country does or does not 
achieve developed industrial capitalism depends upon its 
structural position in the world economyr the kind of 
analysis appropriate to that country will itself depend 
upon that country's structural position in the world 
economy. 
In these termst whether or not a particular country 
undergoes the transition to the capitalist mode of 
production (or in the original case - where in the world 
this happened) would be analysed primarily In terms of a 
mode of analysis analogous to Marx's historical mode. It 
would be absýird to analyse the situation in a nation where 
the transition to industrial capitalism has not taken place 
according to a logical mode of analysis whose applicability 
depends upon the prior dominance of industrial capitalism. 
Conversely (and here Scotland is in mind), it would be 
absurd to analyse a society which par excellence has been 
dominated by the logic of industrial capitalism for well 
over a hundred years in terms of a mode of analysis whose 
applicability is premised on the fact that the transition 
to industrial capitalism has not yet taken place. 
To the extent that this section has been laying 
methodological groundwork (or at least clearing away 
methodological rubble) for the analysis of Scotlandr the 
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message is loud and clear and points away from modes of 
analysis developed with reference either to the emergence 
of the capitalist system or to the impact of capitalism on 
the world periphery. 
Scotland and Dependence 
Despite this basic theoretical point, however, if we 
try to situate analyses of Scotland which have been 
produced over the last fifteen to twenty years in terms of 
their position with respect to the broad polarity of 
positions we have been discussingy they have tended to be 
heavily weighted towards the external ist/dependency pole. 
If this had been done on the basis of an lexternalist' 
theory which was capable of handling any structural 
position within the world economy as well as any other, 
then the distortion introduced by remaining within this 
lexternalist' mode would have been limited to the implicit 
Ifetishization of the nation' discussed earlier. There 
would at least have been the possibility of coming to an 
adequate location of Scotland as a unit within the world 
economy. 
A holistic approach is implicit in any form of 
dependence theory and in principle, the framework should be 
adequate for the analysis of any of the partial structures 
which make up the global system. To the extent that the 
whole of the global system - the capitalist world economy - 
has to be theorized in order to understand any segment of 
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it, any segment should in principle be analysable within 
the framework. 
But of coursej, as the name impliesr the concepts 
developed as dependence theory apply precisely to the 
dependent parts of the system. The 'independent' centre was 
left relatively untheorizedjunless of course one goes back 
to the more orthodox theories of imperialism). For a while, 
the vocabulary developed within what might now be called a 
'world system' perspective was restricted to the analysis 
of the dependent parts of the system. Of course,, the Inon- 
dependent' parts of the system had to be referred to- as 
'metropolis' or 'core' - but these were negative 
definitions, defined primarily in opposition to that which 
was the real focus of attention, the 'satellites' or the 
'periphery'. And of course,, given the peripheral context of 
the development of dependence theory this was inevitable. 
It is only very recently and very partially that this 
asymmetry has begun to be balanced outr primarily through 
the work of Wallerstein and the mushrooming world system, 
'school' which in the United States is rapidly acquiring 
all the depressingly predictable accoutrements and 
orthodoxies of any successful academic fashion. This 
exercise itself of course cannot be carried through as a 
simple 'reverse application' of the concepts developed to 
deal with dependency. As emerged in the previous section it 
is quite likely that modes of analysis applicable to the 
periphery of the world economy are not equally applicable 
to the core. So far, Wallerstein's detailed account of the 
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development of the world system (1974,, 1980) has not gone 
beyond 1800 - whent in Marx's terms,, we are still in the 
period of the genesis of capitalism rather than that of its 
self-sustaining dynamic, and whent thereforep because of a 
certain symmetry between the two loutsides' (the 'before' 
and the 'still outside') of capitalism, there is more 
plausibility in the interchange of approaches between 
depen dence theory and the analysis of the emergence of the 
capitalist world economy than there is between dependence 
theory and the analysis of developed capitalism. It will be 
interesting to see whether and how Wallerstein's framework 
changes as his analysis moves closer to modern times. 
However, in the crucial period of the late 1960s and early 
1970st the theoretical vocabulary which was available# 
newly minted, for situating Scotland was that of dependence 
theory. This vocabulary allowed only one aspect of 
Scotland's position to be analysed - the extent to which 
Scotland was 'dependent'. To the question 'What is wrong 
with Scotland' came the overwhelming chorus 'Scotland is 
dependent'. Of course this wasn't just, or even primarily, 
because there was only one theoretical vocabulary 
available, but this one had the right radical aura and 
chimed in beautifully with the prevailing political mood. 
The reasons underlying this enthusiastic application of 
concepts developed to answer the question of why Latin 
American countries had not been able to industrialise to a 
country which had been among the first in the world to 
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industrialise had far more to do with the prevailing 
political mood than with any empirical considerations. 
In the processr any real structural element in 
dependence theory had to be jettisoned, leaving little but 
the rhetoric. The application of any 'strongly structural' 
Marxist theory which saw the crucial aspect of dependence 
as being, for example, the-disarticulation of the dependent 
society Le the maintenance and reproduction of a pre- 
capitalist sector alongside the capitalist sector precisely 
so that a process of primitive accumulation could be 
maintained, would have shown up the absurdity of the 
parallel between Scotland and the Third World. Samir Amin 
provides a clear account of the structural differences 
between a developed capitalist and a peripheral economy. 
"The concrete socioeconomic formations of 
capitalism of the centre bear this distinctive feature? 
that in them the capitalist mode of production is not 
merely dominant but, because its growth is based on 
expansion of the internal markett tends to become 
exclusive. These formations therefore draw closer and 
closer to the capitalist mode of production, the 
disintegration of precapitalist modes tending to become 
complete and to lead to their replacement by the 
capitalist moder reconstituted on the basis of the 
scattered elements issuing from this break up process. 
The concrete socioeconomic formation tends to become 
identical with the capitalist mode of production. This 
justifies Marx's analysis, and his assertion that this 
analysis, as set forth in Capital, is that of the system 
toward which the most advanced capitalist country of his 
time, Britain, was developing. The socio-economic 
formations of the periphery, however, bear this 
distinctive featurer that though the capitalist mode of 
production does indeed predominate, this domination does 
not lead to a tendency for it to become exclusive, 
because the spread of capitalism is here based on the 
external market. It follows that precapitalist modes of 
production are not destroyed but are transformed and 
subjected to that mode of production which predominates 
on the world scale as well as locally - the capitalist 
mode of production. " (Amin, 1974, p37) 
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There is no question as to which side of this divide 
Scotland lies. It is hardly surprising that application of 
dependence theory to Scotland has tended to rely on the 
less structural versionsp such as Frank's early 
formulations, 
. orr even more convenientp non-Marxist 
dependence theory. 
An early and especially blatant example was Buchanan's 
application of a loosely Frankian framework to Scotland and 
Wales (the temptation to lump together Scotland and Wales 
and even Ireland is especially strong within applications 
of the dependence framework). In Buchanan's work there is 
no attempt to justify the application of the dependence 
framework - Scotland and Wales are assumed to be dependentr 
wholly dependent and nothing but dependent from the start. 
After 'a discussion of Culloden and the Highland Clearaficesr 
Buchanan continues: 
"This exploitation, as John Prebble has written, 
'was within the same pattern of colonial development - 
new economies introduced for the greater wealth of the 
few, and the obstacle of a native population removed or 
reduced'. It was a pattern of exploitation subsequently 
repeated by Britain in her overseas colonies suited to 
settlers of British stock, and in a more sophisticated 
form it is this process of exploitative development 
that still governs the relationship between Scotland 
and her more powerful English neighbour. 
This relationship was - and still is -a 
satellite/metropolis relationship of the type described 
by A. G. Frank; within it no real and balanced 
development of the satellite could take place. And as 
the Welsh and Scottish nationalist movements realizer 
it is only by breaking this pattern of dependence that 
the various manifestations of underdevelopment in the 
Celtic countries can be eliminated and real development 
- economic, sociall cultural - be initiated. This is 
the awareness which lies behind the nationalist 
resurgence in what are today England's largest 
remaining colonies. " (Buchanant 1968j p39) 
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Then follows the listing of a series of indicators - 
unemploymentr per-cent of workforce receiving industrial 
injury benefits, expenditure per mile on roads, per capita 
planned motorway mileage, expenditure on railways 
electrification, per cent of households with telephones, 
andp most bizarre of allr percentage of UK total defence 
expenditure - for Englandt Scotland and Wales. Dependence 
is reduced to being a characterization oft or rather its 
existence can be proved by, the existence of differences in 
the level of a series of socio-economic indicators. 
Similarly the application of a non-Marxist dependence 
framework to Scotland leads to a dead-end. Bryden found on 
the basis of his own attempt to apply dependence theory to 
Scottish problem. ýr or rather to the industrial West and the 
Highlandsr that 
"It is difficult to escape the conclusion that 
when one talks about 'dependence' in the Scottish 
context one is for the most part talking about the 
problems of Nationhood and Centralism" (Bryden, 
1979lp271) 
Bryden's account can be seen as demonstrating that if 
you want to apply the term 'dependence' to Scotland it is 
quite feasibler but if you do, the term will end up 
implying little more than that Scotland is integrated into 
the world economy and is part of the United Kingdom. 
By far the most sophisticated attempt to apply a 
theoretical framework developed in a Third World-context to 
Scotland is that of Michael Hechter which is again anchored 
firmly at the externalist end of the analytical spectrum. 
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The 'internal colonialism' thesis received its first 
theoretical refinement in Latin America, acquired an ethnic 
and cultural twist in applications to the U. S. racial 
structure and was finally brought across the Atlantic by 
Hechter as the grid through which to examine the Celtic 
fringe of Britain. The saddest thing about Hechter's work 
is that much the impressive statistical sophistication of 
the book is little more than an expression of the 
methodological gymnastics required to force the historical 
material into the form of testing the internal colonialism 
model against a straw man diffusionist null hypothesis. 
Hechter has subsequently admitted in any case that 
"Scotland may not have experienced internal 
colonialism to any degree. " (Hechter, 1982, plO) 
Finally, we can look at the most influential 
theorization of Scotland. In no way has Tom Nairn fallen 
into the 'Third Worldism' trap of seeing Scotland's 
relation to England as structural identical to the relation 
of dependent Third World countries to the core. 
However his resolutely externalist paradigm does lead 
him into difficulties. The most straightforward example has 
been the way in which he has been f orced into giving two 
versions of Scottish nationalism depending upon whether 
Scotland is seen as being relatively underdeveloped or 
relatively (or potentially) overdeveloped. 
In the first versiont Scotland is seen as an exemplar 
of neo-nationalism which itself consists of the political 
reaction to' 'relative deprivation' 
(as opposed to the 
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absolute deprivation of the original 'development gap') of 
areas on the fringe of the new metropolitan growth zones. 
"The impact of the oil industry on Scotland and of 
the U. S. multinationals on the French Midi is provoking 
a new Scottish and Occitan separatism; but, to a 
greater extent than is realized, this is a sui generis 
phenomenon which should not be assimilated to classical 
European or Third World 'nationalism' at all. 
It is the devastating rapidity and scale of the 
impact of these new conditions that has made Scotland 
into the exemplar of neo-nationalism in this sense. " 
(Nairn, 1981, p130) 
The second version is that Scotland, again because of 
oil,, belongs to the class of areas 
"whose problem is that they developed more rapidly 
and successfully than the territory surrounding them" 
(Nairnp 1981,, p203) 
"The two types of nationalist dilemma in Western 
Europe arer respectively: under-developed or pillaged 
regions that have finally begun to react against this 
treatment; and quite highly-developed epicentres of 
industrialization, middle-class cultures who are for 
one-reason or another out of phase with the ruling 
nation-state and want separate development to get ahead 
faster" (Nairnjl981j, pp204-205) 
I suppose there is no reason why Scotland should not 
exhibit both types of nationalist dilemma at the same time 
but the necessity of having to posit their simultaneous 
operition does point up the difficulties inherent in 
characterizing nationalisms purely on the basis of the 
relative position of the relevant unit in the capitalist 
system. 
Immanuel Wallerstein's model of 'the world system of 
capitalism' can be regarded as one of the most complete and 
consistent operationalization of the categories and 
emphases listed on the lexternalist' or Ineo-Marxist' side 
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of Table 1. 
The irony of Wallerstein's formulation of the world 
system perspective is that although he consistently makes a 
strong methodological case (11) for shifting the 
appropriate unit of analysis for the explanation of social 
change up from the nation state to the level of the 
capitalist world economy, in his application of the 
framework (looking down from this world level as it were), 
the units he tends to see as occupying structural positions 
in the world economy are nati on- states. (12) 
Given Wallerstein's exemplif ication of the 
lexternalist' style of analysis derived largely from the 
moment of Marx's analysis relating to the pre-conditions of 
the emergence of industrial capitalism, the applicability 
of 'Waller stein's framework to Scotland would seem to be 
greatest with reference to the period when Scotland itself 
was at the stage of the pre-conditions of industrial 
capitalism. 
In other wordst in the early stages of the 
incorporation of Scotland into the world economy - or to 
use Wallerstein's terms, of Scotland's move from external 
arena to periphery to corer it was Scotland's favourable 
conjunctural position which was decisive(13). Here a model 
appropriate to the genesis of capitalism would be likely 
to be more appropriater with the generative role of 
exchange relations - of primitive accumulation - being 
particularly important, notably in terms of the 
significance of Scotland's participation in England's 
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colonial trade which was the most significant and immediate 
fruit of the Union for Scotland. 
The mid- and late nineteenth centuryt however, when 
Scotland most unambiguously enjoyed core status, was 
precisely the period when one could have expected the 
relative weight of the inner logic of industrial capitalism 
to have been at its greatest. Marx, for example, made no 
differentiation between England and Scotland as sources of 
material illustrative of development in terms of this 
logic. The irony is that at this time and especially 
towards the end of the nineteenth century, when Scottish 
economic and social change was most directly subject to the 
'inner logic' of capital, and when in fact Scotland should 
have been most lautocentric' (to use Amin's phrase for the 
condition opposite to 'dependent') both Eýritish and 
Scottish 'self-interest' was defined primarily in terms of 
the free unfettered operation of market forces. Marx's 
phrase that capital knows no frontiers had its purest 
historical exemplification in late-nineteenth century 
Britain. Scotland's potential lautocentrism' turned out to 
be no such thing in the hands of the Scottish bourgeoisie, 
who expressed their control in the form of a massive 
outflow of capital. 
The very period in which Scotland had its nearest 
approximation to 'its own' capitalism - in institutional 
terms such as the existence of firms based in Scotland and 
forming a relatively differentiated Scottish industrial 
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complex (14) _ was the very period in which this fact was 
F 
likely to make least difference. This was not because 1; 
Scotland was England's 'junior partner' but because 
Scottish capital was conforming to the international logic 
of capital. 
In a very direct sense, the seeds of Scotland's and 
Britain's decline were sown precisely in this period of 
core status. Thus although Wallerstein's imagery, which 
allows us to conceptualise decline as well as 'development' 
is useful, the conclusion should not be drawn that the 
'dependence' or 'peripheralityl towards which Scotland and 
Britain are moving can be analysed in the same terms as 
what might be called pre-capitalist or semi-capitalist 
dependence or peripherality. 
The irony of Scotland's present 'dependence' is that it 
is largely a result of Scotland's period of core status 
being dominated by the operation of a logic of capital 
unaffected by national frontiers, a logic which steered 
ýd- 
capital towards high profit ventures in the Empire and 
elsewhere rather than towards investment in Scotland. rton4ýw 
Conclusion. 
The implications of this chapter for the rest of the 
study are primarily negative. It has been a perhaps 
overelaborate exorcism of the theoretical temptations to 
take 'Scotland' as an unproblematic unit of analysis. 
In one sensej, Marx's vision of the ability of the 
process of capital accumulation on a world scale to ride 
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roughshod over national boundaries has applied particularly 
to Scotland. Whether it is a matter historically of the 
pattern of investment of 'Scottish' capitalf or of the 
pattern of investment of 'British' capital. orp with more 
contemporary relevancef of the pattern of investment of 
multi-national capital,, the pattern of industrial 
development in Scotland has been determined by a global 
pattern of capitalist accumulation which allowed the border 
of Scotland to interfere relatively little with the 
operation of market forces. 
And yet#, the state at both British and Scottish levels 
has assumed a level of economic intervention, and perhaps 
even more importantly of economic responsibility, well 
beyond Marx's expectations. 
These two considerations together constitite a paradox. 
It could be this paradox which contains the secret of the 
puzzling dynamics of Scottish nationalism and the analysis 
from now on will diverge to pursue separately its two 
terms. 
Chapter 5 will take up a line of analysis which begins 
with an empirical exploration of patterns of social change 
in modern Scotland. One of the major driving forces behind 
social change in Scotland has been industrial change. A 
fully adequate analysis of industrial change in Scotland 
would ground it in the rhythms of Scotland's m. ode of 
insertion in the global system of capitalist accumulation. 
Practical considerations of time and resources preclude any 
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attempt at the long slog f rom the abstract to the concrete 
which such a procedure would entail. Instead the aim will 
be to build up a reasonably systematic picture of social 
change in Scotland, taking especial care not to allow this 
national framework to distort the conclusions. 
Chapters 3 and 4 follow a different thread which could 
be summed up as an attempt to ground the dynamics of 
support for Scottish nationalism in terms of the changing 
experience of the state. 
The main short-cut involved here is not to attempt any 
derivation of British and Scottish state forms from the 
global process of capital accumulation, and in many ways 
the British state*is one of the least likely candidates for 
such a derivationt but rather to accept that the state has 
real, material 'effects - economic or otherwise - and that 
these material effects have effects on consciousness. 
Having resolved to cut that Gordian knot, the first- 
pre-requisite is to develop a conception of ideology which 
will allow us to look at these effects on consciousness. 
Then we can look at how the continuingr and increasing, 
economic role of the state has affected coniciousness of 
the state and of the nation. 
94 
Chapter 3. 
The state, ideology and national consciousness. 
Introduction 
In this chapterl, I want to set out some general 
considerations on the relationship between ideologyr the 
state and national consciousness in late capitalist 
society. In no way is it an attempt to lay down a rigid 
problematic but should simply serve as a reminder of some 
of the theoretical connections which have in part guided 
and in part arisen from the subsequent more empirical 
analysis. In particular it should serve to make the 
analysis sensitive to the implications of long term changes 
such as the increase in state intervention in the economy 
and the advent of television. The importance of such kinds 
of changer precisely because they occur at such a general, 
sodietal level often tend to be missed by analyses with a 
narrower focus. In particular because they constitute a 
change in the environment which is in an important sense 
shared by everyone their causal role cannot be picked up in 
terms of correlational techniques. Yet as I will arguer 
these two shifts, although they cannot be correlated 
directly with the electoral success of the Scottish 
National Partyl are probably the two most significant 
factors involved in creating a political and communications 
environment in the absence of which the kind of rapid 
electoral rise and fall experienced by the Scottish 
National Party in the late 1960s and the 1970s would have 
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been incomprehensible. In many ways the Scottish National 
Party was an embodiment of these environmental changes. 
Because they are such 'deep background' factors it is easy 
to forget'them and although in themselves they were by no 
means sufficient to explain the success of the S. N. P. they 
were certainly necessary. 
Ideology. 
The object of this section is not to justify one 
'valid' meaning of the term 'ideology' but rather to bring 
together in a coherent but inevitably crude framework the 
more common usages of the conceptl especially, though not 
entirely, in Marxist social theory. The discussion is 
primarily oriented towards setting out how these differing 
usages of the term ideology each point towards different 
lines along which ideological change can be traced back to 
the effects of changes in other levels of the social 
structure. 
As a first step, three usages of the term 'ideology' 
or 'ideological' can be identifiedt with a tight structural 
linkage between the three meanings. They can most simply be 
termed general, negative and positive. 
(a) general - ideology as a level of social reality, 
as in the trilogy: economic, political and 
ideologicall often associated with the notion of 
'superstructure' 
(b) negative - ideology as Ifetishismlrllreification', 
'false consciousnessIp illusion 
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(c) positive - ideology as world-viewe often with 
the implication that the more ideological is a 
world-view the more it is structured#, rationall 
totalising i. e. ideology as 'penetration' 
The relations between these three usages are extremely 
simple. The negative and positive senses are exact 
complements. To the extent that consciousness is 
ideological in sense (b) it is not ideological in sense (c) 
and vice versa. 
Following on f rom thist (b) + (c) = (a) , or 
conversely, ideology in general can be divided into (b) and 
(c). 
In his discussion of Marx's own usager Jorge Larrain 
is primarily concerned to differentiate within Marx 
meanings (a) and (b), the general and the negative. 
"In effectr occasionally one has the impression 
that the term 'ideological' is used to make general 
reference to all forms of consciousnessr theories and 
intellectual representations corresponding to a 
certain economic base. From here various interpreters 
derive the term 'ideological superstructure'. But in 
the majority of cases ideology refers to a particular, 
distorted kind of consciousness which conceals 
contradictions. " (Larrain, 1979, p50) 
Larrain's prescriptive emphasis is to limit the use of 
the term ideological to the negative senseo, reserving the 
term 'idealistic superstructure' for the general meaning. 
However he does recognize the existence of 'non-ideological 
consciousness' if only to the extent that 'Marx envisaged 
his own thought as non-ideological' (Larrainr 1979, p52) 
and this would correspond in our terms to sense (c) - the 
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positive. 
Whereas the use of the term 'ideology' in senses (a) 
and (b) does have some precedent in Marx's own writing, the 
same is not true of sense (c). However the use of the term 
ideology in a positive sense has a long tradition behind 
it. As Alvin Gouldner puts it: 
"Marx and Engels emphatically condemned 
ideology' as a system of ideas made with a false 
consciousness that inverted social reality and that 
was subservient to the interests of the bourgeoisie, 
helping them dominate society. To some extent, thenr 
Marx and Engels' judgement on ideology was continuous 
with Napoleon's condemnation of it. It isr therefore 
ironic that certain subsequent Marxists should have 
reversed Marx's usage, reverting to a view of ideology 
as positiver andl indeed, as almost synonymous with 
rational social theory or science. " (Gouldner, 1976, 
p13) 
Perhaps it is not so much a matter of irony as of 
dialectics. To*use another image,, if the ideological sphere 
is defined as a field of strugglef then the dividing line 
between the positive and negative senses of ideology is 
precisely what defines the sides of that struggle and the 
stake of that struggle. The Marxists mentioned by Gouldner 
(Althusserr Lukacs, Lenin) also used in their theories 
concepts corresponding to Marx's original usage - think 
only of Lukacs development of the concept of reification. 
In other wordst the main point is not to legislate for a 
particular usage of the term ideology but to understand the 
field of theoretical relationships of which it is a 
condensation. 
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The Sources of Ideological Change. 
The next step is to use the aspects or moments of the 
concept of ideology as pointers towards the k-inds of 
changes in other levels of social structure which are 
likely to produce ideological change. 
1) ideology as fetishism - the negative concept of 
ideology. 
This aspect of ideology points us back to the social 
structure in two directions. 
The simplest way of looking at this is to f ollow back 
the implications of the fact that to conceive of ideology 
as fetishism is to recognize that consciousness is a 
reflection of reality but that this is a limited or 
distorted or superficial reflection. (The imagery of the 
'warped mirror' stretches back to Bacon cf Larraint 
1979, pl9). 
Marx's construction of the negative concept of 
ideology was developed most fully in his analysis of 
commodity fetishism. This moment of Marx's analysis of 
consciousness in capitalist society was primarily concerned 
with consciousness of and in a capitalist market economy,, 
whereby society was seen to be governed by the natural- 
seeming laws of the market. To the extent that Capital was 
a critique of the categories of bourgeois political 
economy, it was an analysis of this consciousness. 
Bourgeois political economy took the laws of the market, as 
relations between commoditiest as the natural basis for the 
science of economics and the understanding of society as a 
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whole. In liberal capitalist society, relations between men 
appeared, and were understood as, relations between things. 
However, the main point to be made here is that for 
Marx, commodity fetishism was not 'mere illusion'. 
nThe categories of bourgeois economics ... are forms of thought which are socially valid, and 
therefore objective, for the relations of production 
belonging to this historically determined mode of 
production, i. e. commodity production. " (Capital, Vol 
I, p169). 
With respect to this particular moment of the relation 
of reality to consciousness, it is clear that it is the 
objective reality of commodity production which produces 
this relation between consciousness and reality. (1) it is 
a passive, reflection theory of consciousness which is 
involved here - which makes it all the more important to 
insist that this is only one moment of the relation of 
consciousness to objective reality. If one is talking about 
a direction of causality, then here the diiection is all 
one way - reality determines consciousness., 
As Geras puts it: 
"In every case wher& Marx presents us with an 
example of fetishization, he goes to great pains to 
indicate the roots and raison dletre of the resulting 
illusions in the reality itself. .... If ... the 
social agents experience capitalist society as 
something other than it really is, this is 
fundamentally because capitalist society presents 
itself as something other than it really is. " (Geras, 
1972, p296) 
He goes on to cite Godelier's concise statement of the 
locus of causality, which in more extended form reads: 
"for Marxr the model constructed by science 
corresponds to a reality concealed beneath visible 
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reality. But he goes further: for him this concealment 
is not due to the inability of consciousness to 
'perceive' this structure, but to the structure 
itself. .... It is not the subject who deceives himself, but reality which deceives him, and the 
appearances in which the structure of the capitalist 
production process conceals itself are the starting 
point for individuals conceptions. " (Godelier, 1972, 
p337) 
As Marx himself makes the point: 
the "fetishism of the world of commodities 
arises from the peculiar social character of the 
labour which produces them. 
Objects of utility become commodities only 
because they are the products of the labour of private 
individuals who work independently of each other. The 
sum total of the labour of all these private 
individuals forms the aggregate labour of society. 
Since the producers do not come into social contact 
until they exchange the products of their labour, the 
specific social characteristics of their private 
labours appear only within this exchange. In other 
words, the labour of the private individual manifests 
itself as an element of the total labour of society 
only through the relations which the actof exchange 
establishes between the products, andr through their 
mediation, between the producers. To the producers, 
thereforer the social relations between their private 
labours appear as what they are, Le they do not 
appear as direct social relations between persons in 
their work, but rather as material (dinglich) 
relations between persons and social relations between 
things. (Capital#, Vol I,, p166). 
To sum up, the model of commodity fetishism proposed 
by Marx can be seen as consisting of 
1) a social reality dominated by commodity production with 
relations between producers taking place solely through the 
market 
2) fetishistic consciousness of this social reality being a 
passive reflection of it 
In terms of this model then ideological change must be 
seen as resulting from a change in the nature of objective 
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reality itself. The change upon which our attention will 
focus will be interference in the market by the state. To 
the extent that such state-intervention takes placer the 
market no longer presents itself as governed by natural 
laws. Commodity fetishism must break down to the extent 
that the 'natural laws of the market' are replaced by 
conscious political decision-makingr no matter how limited. 
However this is only one moment of ideological 
generation. One has to turn to the other momente the 
positive concept of ideology, in order to understand the 
emergence or regression of the social conditions which 
shape the possibilities of consciousness penetrating behind 
the fetishized appearance, or in other words the disruption 
of the 'passive' determination of consciousness by reality. 
This possibility cannot be derived f, rom the 'fetishism, 
mo. del and in fact contradicts it. 
(2) 
2) Ideology as penetration - the positive concept of 
ideology. 
The 'positive' concept of ideologyr ideology as 
penetration (3) can, as we have seen, be regarded as a 
simple opposite to the Inegativelr to ideology as 
fetishism. We can easily posit a dimension running between 
the two. A belief system is ideological in the positive 
sense to the extent that it is structuredi coherent, 
totalizing in scope and reflexive. This is obviously a very 
brutal condensation of and inevitable distortion of a wide 
range of sources. 
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what is much more crucial than the implicit 
dimensionality itself however is an insistence in these 
sources that the development of ideology in this positive 
sense is crucially dependent upon the communicative 
contexts (4) in which belief systems are generated. At one 
end of the scale are communicative contexts in which a 
person's thinking about the world is formed in an active 
process of involvement and debate while at the other 
extreme information is received passively in a manner 
involving little active effort to integrate* it with the 
existing stock of knowledge. 
The underlying insight is that the consciousness of 
each individual is formed within an array of communicative 
contexts in which he participates or to which he is exposed 
and which in large part determine how he interprets his 
real conditions of existence. In contemporary society these 
communicative contexts would include, in a rough order from 
the micro- to the macro-, from the personal to the 
impersonaly the family, peer-group, school, neighbourhood,, 
work, trade-union, political party and finally the mass- 
media. 
An important theme in what follows will be the tracing 
of how social change affected both the immediate material 
circumstances in which people -lived and the communicative 
contexts which served to generate the frameworks in terms 
of which they would interpret these material circumstances 
and relate them to wider political questions. 
Given that the raw material of such patterns of 
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ideological generation are the material circumstances in 
which people live,, it would be fruitless to spend time on a 
general discussion. Instead the analysis of communicative 
contexts will be interweaved with the analysis of more 
material aspects of social change - first, at a 'macro-' 
level in terms of the impact of state interventionr and 
secondly as part of a more conventional analysis of social 
change in Scotland. This is particularly important in the 
case of the communicative context which plays probably the 
crucial role in the discussion which follows - television, 
analysis of the effects of which has fallen too often into 
generalisation. 
One general point should be made however. The dangers 
of over-estimating the extent to which 'Red Clydesidel of 
If if ty or sixty years ago could be generalized as a model of 
the state of working-class consciousness in Scotland as a 
whole are now generally well-recognized. This should not 
blind us to the fact however that in many areas of Scotland 
- Clydeside itself, the Vale of Leven, the mining areas of 
Fife - there did exist a working class which in many ways 
was one of the most politically advanced the world has ever 
seen. A working class which was a real embodiment of the 
'Positive' pole of the ideology dimension and one which 
equally embodied the close tie up between communicative 
context and the generation of ideology as penetration. Now 
this is a very pretentious way of expressing well known 
historical facts. I only express them in this way in order 
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to make the point that the social processes involved in the 
generation of support for the S. N. P. lay at the other end 
of the spectrum, both in terms of communicative context and 
ideology. The analysis which follows is very much an 
analysis of 'the dynamics of fetishism' or the 'dynamics of 
alienation'. 
. 41 
The state and ideology. 
Marx's conception of commodity fetishism hinges on the 
fact that in a capitalist market economy,, the perception 
that the economy is governed by natural laws is a valid 
reflection that,, within the limits of such an economy, the 
economy is governed by the laws of the market. 
Now we have to ask what happens to 'ideology as 
fetishism' when the market begins to lose its appearance of 
the natural operation of economic laws because something 
else - something beyond 'natural laws' - begins to 
intervene in the economy. That something else being of 
course the state. 
In other words, what are the implications of applying 
what we have been calling the negative concept of ideology, 
ideology as fetishism, to the shift from liberal to 
monopoly or late capitalism. Most simply, the 'natural 
appearance' of the economy loses its real basis to the 
extent that economic events become the object of political 
decision-making on the part of the state. The appearance of 
naturalness is lost moreover to the extent that economic 
105 
events appear to be the result of state action, whether or 
not that state action actually does what it appears to. To 
the extent that the state involved is a national statel the 
unit of 'economic naturalness' shifts upwards from the 
level of the individual or the competing capitalist unit to 
the level of the nation-state. 
(5) 
In the discussion of the kinds of social change which 
had to be taken into account in understanding ideological 
change, it was suggested that to the extent that ideology 
is a reflection of reality change in that reality has to be 
taken into account. This in itself sounds so obvious that 
it is almost tautological. However in speaking of changes 
in state activity as having to be treated as changes in 
reality, again obvious enough, we are going against that 
rarely explicit strand of thinking in Marxism which would 
regard the state as superstructural, as in a sense illusory 
- as not being real in the sense in which the economy is 
real. 
In part this imagery arises from seeing the state as 
some thing external to the economyr which affects it from 
outside. 
As Poulantzas points out, however, the state cannot be 
regarded as 'mere' superstructure. To the extent that the 
state has always been 'present in the constitution and 
reproduction of the relations of production't the State 
cannot be regarded as 'a mere appendage or reflection of 
the economic sphere, devoid of its own space and reducible 
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to the economy'. (Poulantzas j, 1978, p15) 
Much of Poulantzas' last work is devoted to an 
exposition of the 'institutional materiality of the state' 
which is his expression for what underlies the realityr the 
non-illusory naturer of the effects of state action. To put 
it at its simplestp the state 'makes a difference' that is 
not reducible, that has to be taken into account. Or as 
Poulantzas puts it, the State must be seen as acting 'in a 
positive fashionr creatingr transforming and making 
reality'. In objecting to the limitations of seeing the 
State's role restricted to the exercise of organized 
physical repression and to the organization and inculcation 
of the dominant ideologyr Poulantzas continues 
"... it is quite simply wrong to believe that the 
State-only acts in this manner: the relation of the 
masses to power and the State - in what is termed among 
other things a consensus - always possesses a material 
substratum. I say 'among other things'l since in 
working for class hegemonyr the State acts within an 
unstable equilibrium of compromises between the 
dominant classes and the dominated. The State therefore 
continually adopts material measures which are of 
positive significance for the popular masses, even 
though these measures represent so many concessions 
imposed by the struggle of subordinate classes. *e* The invariable presence of ideological allurement does not 
therefore change the fact that the State also acted by 
producing a material substratum for mass consensus -a 
substratum which, while not the same as its ideologipal 
presentation in state discourse, was not simply 
reducible to propaganda. " (Poulantzas,, 1978, pp30-31) 
It is within the context of this mass consensus and in 
full recognition that it does not consist of baseless 
illusions about the nation that we must situate the 
analysis of the S. N. P. Not that such a mass consensus is 
relevant to the S. N. P. in a way in which it was not 
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relevant to the other political parties in the thirty years 
after the war. What such mass consensus consisted oft and 
to an extent still consists oft was a generally shared but 
rarely explicit set of assumptions about what politics was 
about. To the extent that politics was about the British 
state delivering the goodies at a national level, that 
framework was implicitly nationalist. Apart from the fact 
that it had a different national referentr the Scottish 
National Party was in the dead centre of the mainstream of 
this framework. Its distinctiveness lay less in the fact 
that it was Scottish than in the fact that it was the first 
to make the framework explicitly nationalist. 
This can perhaps be made to sound somewhat less 
paradoxical by anchoring the analysis in relation to that 
of Tom Nairn (1981). What is most important is the. 
conclusion which Nairn did not come to in his analysis of 
Scottish Nationalism in the twentieth century but which 
would seem to me to be implicit in his thoroughly 
convincing discussion of why there was no significant 
Scottish national movement in the nineteenth century. 
Nairn emphasizes how Britain's early start in the 
industrial revolution meant that the state could play a 
less interventionist role in fostering capitalist 
development than was the case for states which were later 
starters in the capitalist developmental process. This he 
puts forward as one of the primary reasons why Scotland did 
not develop a political nationalism in the 19th century 
while all over Europe other proto-nationalities were doing 
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so* 
According to Nairn what really counts 
is that this was the first such 'bourgeois 
revolution' proceeding on a sufficient territorial 
basis. Just because it was first, it developed 
gradually, and in a highly 'empirical' and 
decentralised fashion. All those societies which 
developed laterr in its wake, could not help doing so 
more competitively, through a much more intense 
political and state organisation. After the first huge 
strides forward England had mader after here Agrarian 
and Industrial Revolutions and her colonial and 
commercial triumphs over France, other lands were 
forced to be in some sense 'late-comers' - forced 
therefore to compensate for their backwardness by a 
more conscious, a more state contrived and militant 
type of development" (Nairn, 1981p p138) 
The main implication of this for Scotland is that 
Scottish civil society was in a sense left alone in terms 
of mobilization for political development. The lowland 
Scots were able to 'escape the normal dilemma of 
"development" and its cruel consequences. ' (Nairnt 1981, 
p17 9) 
What is of interest here however is what happens when 
such relative state non-intervention is no longer possible 
in a world of late capitalist nation states. The strange 
separation between Scotland's civil society and government 
in Westminster is no longer possible. Nairn uses 'the 
strange separation' as an explanatory factor behind the 
warped forms of Scottish national identity - cultural sub- 
nationalism and the tartan monster. The end of the story of 
the relation between state and civil society in Scotland is 
not spelled out in such detail. Nairn relates it in this 
way: 
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"I suggested originally that two factors in 
combination had created the conditions for nationalist 
resurgence: the multi-national petroleum business, and 
the degeneration of British politics. But the failure 
of socialism is surely another way of regarding the 
second of these. It is the failure of the left to 
advance far enough, fast enoughr on the older State- 
nation platform which history had provided, it is the 
inability of great nation socialism to tackle advanced 
contradictions properly, that has made this 'second 
round' of bourgeois nationalisms inevitable" (Nairn, 
1981, p179) 
Without denying the validity of that formulationr 
there is a more global and unifying implication of his 
analysis of the earlier phases. Which is that as Britain 
moved into the late capitalist phasel the separation of 
state and civil society has disappeared. This is-not a 
process peculiarly characteristic of Britaint although of 
course it has British peculiaritieso, but is a process 
characteristic of late capitalist societies in general. It 
is this process which must provide the framework within 
which to view both the impact of oil and the failure of the 
British left along with the decline of British politicsf as 
explanatory of the growth of Scottish nationalism. 
In another context Nairn identified a major aspect of 
the central development involved. 
"The Attlee government ... closed and sealed the 
epoch of British 'national socialism',, by the 
formation of a new totality in which reforms of the 
State effectively regained the allegiance of the 
proletariat and so subordinated the class struggle to 
the 'national interest'" (Nairn, 1971,, p17) 
Nairn sees this process of 'nationalization' 
associated with changes in the type and level of state 
action as relevant solely at the British level, as relevant 
to British nationalism. What I hope to establish is that 
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this same set of developments at the state level were the 
most important factors in determining the nature of 
Scottish nationalism. 
Nairn's argument could be said to centre upon the 
implications for developments at the ideological levelf at 
the level of national consciousness and nationalism, of the 
nature and degree of the articulation between the state and 
the economy. Britain's unique historical and structural 
position meant that very little direct internal 
intervention was necessary for economic development. It was 
primarily by means of externalp imperialist intervention 
that the British state helped create the conditions for its 
internal economic development. We must now try to grasp the 
implications for national consciousness of what happened 
whenr in the course of the twentieth century, and in 
particular in the years surrounding the second world war, 
the British state was forced to intervene much more 
explicitly in internal economic affairs. 
The analysis must dealt in a nutshellr with how the 
increasing intervention of the state in the economy 
affected the way the state was experienced. It is in terms 
of how changes in intervention by the British state - 
operating at both British and Scottish levels have been 
experienced, that the emergence of Scottish nationalism as 
an effective political force is to be understood. 
If there is a secret to the power of national 
consciousness in late capitalist society it could be said 
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to lie in the area of the twofold nature of the state. On 
the one hand the state has had increasingly important 
effects at the economic level. On the other hand it plays a 
central role at the ideological level - as the 
representative state"). In is in terms of this crucial 
conjunction - of the reality of the economic effects of the 
state with the ideological role of the state - that changes 
in how the state is experienced can be understood and 
materially grounded. 
Nairn recognizes the extension of state activity, and, 
to some extent, its ideological implications. 
"The war effort itself signified a huge 
development in state intervention, upon lines already 
present in the Liberal Party's reform programme of 
Edwardian times: public enterprise and control of the 
economy and social welfare. As was to happen also in 
the second world conflict, the ideological 
reinforcement of British patriotism co-incided with 
important structural developments favourable to working 
class interests. These developments took the form of 
the constant extension of state activity and influence, 
and ultimately - after World War II - of the pioneer 
'welfare state' which for a brief period served as a 
model for other capitalist countries. " (Nairnr 1981, 
p47) 
Nairn recognizes that these developments might be seen 
as contradicting his general characterization of the nature 
of the British state but goes on to say that it is the 
latter which counts not the former. The extension of state 
activity doesn't much matter. 
11... the growth of the state ... has never 
seriously changed its underlying nature. This has been 
demonstrated by the character of the growth itself: 
random, ad hoc formation of new agencies and functions, 
which rarely question the basic principles of 
government. This amoebic proliferation has merely 
surrounded and preserved the essential identity of the 
British Constitution. " (Nairn,, 1981p p48) 
112 
Nairn has already clearly laid down what he sees as 
being the central factor in explaining (as part of the 
general process of the disintegration of the British state) 
the rise of modern Scottish nationalism. 
"The way things have actually gone poses two 
related questions. Firstlyr why has the old British 
state-system lasted so long, in the face of such 
continuous decline and adversity? Secondly, why has 
the break-down begun to occur in the form of 
territorial disintegration rather than as the long 
awaited social revolution - why has the threat of 
secession apparently eclipsed that of the class- 
struggle in the 1970s? 
In my view the answer to both these questions 
depends mainly upon one central factort unfortunately 
neglected in the majority of discussions of the crisis. 
This central issue is the historical character of the 
British state itself. " (Nairnr 1981,, p14) 
The implied syllogism in Nairn's analysis is as 
follows. The first premise is that the central factor 
behind the upsurge of modern Scottish nationalism is 'the 
historical character of the British state itself'. Add to 
this the second premise that 'the growth of the state ... 
has never seriously changed its underlying nature' and the 
implication would seem to be that the growth of the state 
in itself- is largely irrelevant to explaining the rise of 
modern Scottish nationalism. 
Here in a nutshell would seem to be the reason why 
Nairn cannot draw the conclusion that, although in the 
nineteenth century the lack of state intervention explains 
why there was no Scottish national movementr the presence 
of state intervention in the twentieth century does explain 
the emergence of a Scottish national movement, For Nairn#, 
it is not what the state does which matters but what the 
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state is. 
Another way of looking at the relative weight of the 
factors involved is that the British state after the second 
world war was a British state with a number of archaic 
peculiarities which were deeply entwined with the nature of 
the British class system, but it was also a late capitalist 
state whose pattern of activities closely paralleled that 
of other late capitalist states such as Germany, France and 
the United States. In terms of its activities the post-war 
British state had more in common with these post-war states 
than with the pre-war British state. 
The plan of the following analysis is to take changes 
in what the state does as a basis for understanding changes 
in the way the state is experienced, a changing experience 
which is the primary matrix within which the nature of 
national and nationalist consciousness is determined. 
But, the question will be asked, how can experience of 
the British state account for Scottish nationalism? At this 
stage, the only answer is that it is very hard to imagine 
where else Scottish nationalism in the form in which it has 
manifested itself in the last twenty years could have come 
from other than from the experience of the post-war British 
state. Where else did the people who voted S. N. P. get their 
idea of what a state action at. a Scottish level could or 
cold not do other than from their experience of living in 
the British state? I'm not sure whether this is an 
overwhelmingly obvious point or a dangerously provocative 
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one. Perhaps the most telling point is that of all the neo- 
nationalist Imovements'l the Scottish national party has 
been the one to take on most fully and comprehensively the 
institutional form of a mainstream political party. Rather 
than being a challenge to the conventional pattern of 
British political activity, the S. N. P. succeeded in part 
because it was so successful in assuming the mantle of a 
'normal' and lunthreatening' political party. (7) To a 
greater degree than any other neo-nationalist movementr in 
modern Scottish nationalism the party dominated the 
movement rather than vice versa. 
The onwards path then is to trace changes in state 
action and the effects of these changes on consciousness. 
The experience of the state is one which is inevitably 
highly mediated. We also need to trace changes in the 




State action and the media. 
Introduction 
In the last chapter I presented a fairly abstract model 
of how ideological change can be related to change in the 
level of economic intervention by the state. In particular, 
I suggested that in the absence of critical perspectivest 
or ideology in the positive senser increased economic 
intervention by the state would tend to shift the level of 
'fetishism' or 'obviousness' from the level of the market 
to the level of the nation-state. The most concise 
expression of these changes was in terms of the experience 
of the state. 
In the broadest terms, the present chapter seeks to 
establish the conditions of possibility for the electoral 
success of the S. N. P. in terms of the changing experience 
of the state at both a British and a Scottish level. 
It is this changing experience which has served to 
define the parameters within which mainstream electoral 
debate has taken place. It has served to define what 
politics are generally held to be all about. 
The central dimension of change has been in 
expectations of what government action is capable of 
achieving in economic terms. My broadest generalization is 
that these expectations have been determined in the main by 
the perception of how effective previous government action 
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has been. 
The kind of time-scale involved is best expressed in 
terms of a fifty year rise and fall in belief in the 
effectiveness of state action. This cycle takes off from 
the generally accepted powerlessness of the state in the 
1930s(l). Faith in the power of government then received an 
incalculable boost from the experience of war-time 
mobilization, a faith which was prolonged by the favourable 
conditions of the post-war boom. Finally comes the long 
downward curve of disillusion of the last twenty years 
culminating in the uncanny parallel in the 1980s of the 
mood of the 1930s. 
This is of course a caricature. This chapter will be 
concerned with tracing in rather more detail but still at a 
very general level the 'upward curve'. In other words, the 
aim is to trace the coming together of the elements of the 
British post-war political consensust highlighting those 
aspects which make it possible to see the electoral success 
of the S. N. P. not as a fracturing of this consensus but as 
an expression of it. 
The British Level. 
A fairly obvious distinction will be useful in tracing 
the developments which converged to produce the 
relationship between the individual and the national state 
in the years following the Second World War. 
As Winch puts itr we can distinguish between 
"... measures designed to provide increased 
protection and security to workers or citizens through 
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collective provision of welfare servicest and those 
measures which have in view the improvement in the 
overall economic performance of society. " (Winch, 1969, 
p17) 
In short we can distinguish between a welfare or social 
and an economic management strand of intervention. 
It is the emergence of the second strandr that of 
economic management, which is central to the present 
analysis. Most fundamentally the emergence of economic 
management is inseparable from the emergence of a national 
economy which can be to some extent managed. The 
constitution of such a British national economy is a 
central concern of Tomlinson's work on British economic 
policy from 1870 to 1945. For this reason I will use his 
work as the main framework for my account although Winch 
(1969) deals with the same processes from a rather 
different point of view. 
The historical base line for the emergence of a managed 
national economy can be taken as Britain's dominant 
position in the nineteenth century world economy and in 
particular Britain's adherence to the three closely 
associated policies of the gold standard, free trade and 
low central government expenditure. Tomlinson's account of 
the determinants of this tight web of orthodoxies and its 
breakdown is necessarily complex and the following summary 
does it scant justice. 
However, the main point to be made is that adherence to 
both free-trade and the gold standard ruled odt the 
possibility of moving beyond the 
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"general subordination of national economic policy 
to international economic events" (Tomlinsonp 1981j 
p32) 
"The 'solidity' of Britain's adherence to the gold 
standard ... meant the almost total absence of a 
problem of national monetary policyr because adherence 
to gold implied the subordination of domestic monetary 
policy to international flows of gold. " (Tomlinsonr 
1981, p43) 
It was not that there was no conception of the national 
interest, it was simply that the national interest could 
not be expressed in terms of a national economy to be 
managed: 
"the whole conception of a national economy to be 
managed did not exist at this time#, and such a 
conception was ... partly predicated on the absence of the gold standard. " (Tomlinson, 1981p p32) 
In terms of the free-trade position 
"what was best for the British economy ... was 
seen as indissolubly linked to the prosperity of the 
world economy (as well as world peace). The principle 
of buying in the cheapest market and selling in the 
dearest can, if one desiresr be seen as an effect of a 
clear calculation of where the British national 
interest lay at a particular period. But it did imply a 
particular conception of Britain's insertion in the 
world economy, an insertion in terms of the free 
movement of commodities and capital across national 
boundaries. This kind of insertion meant that British 
prosperity would be best guaranteed by an absence of 
policy at the level of the national economy. This 
conception was of course fully consonant woth free 
trade and the gold standard. Free trade meant that the 
national origin of commodities would not be grounds for 
regulation by the state. The gold standard meant that 
there could be no domestic monetary policy as such, 
because domestic monetary conditions would be 
subordinate to international gold flows" (Tomlinson, 
1981t p49) 
The final abandonment of the gold standard in 1931 1 
constituted a first condition for the emergence of the kind 
of national economic policy which characterised the post- 
war decades. 
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departure from gold in the British conditions 
of the 1930s gave space for a number of conceptions of 
a national economy to grow upt becauser with the 
insulation from the world economy, manipulation of an 
economy at the level of the nation state became much 
more plausible. Thus in the 1930s there were a large 
number of commentators who tried to outline how the 
British economy could be improved in a variety of 
directions, ... what was innovative was the focus on internal conditions, and the decline in interest in 
external. ... Articulated with these arguments are the beginnings of 'management' of the economy in the modern 
sense. " (Tomlinson, 1981, p124) 
More generallyr Tomlinson argues that the post-war 
pursuit of Keynesian policy (in the sense of "the use of 
budget deficits to regulate employment within fairly narrow 
parameters" (pl2l)) was premised on "a range of specific 
factors without which such aa policy change would have 
been inconceivable" (P124). 
The first, as already discussedr was the move off the 
gold standard. 
The second was the existence of a large, controlled and 
manipulable central government budget. 
"By 1945j the growth of public expenditure and the 
changes in its composition and control had, in 
principler made plausible the manipulation of the 
budget to affect the economy in a way inconceivable at 
the beginning of the 1930s. " (Tomlinsont 1981j, p127) 
The third precondition had to do with the technical means 
for the management of a national economy i. e. 
"an elaborated system of national accounts. Only 
with these can the likely effect of budgetary changes 
on the economy of the nation be assessed. " (ibidjp129). 
Although Tomlinson concentrates on national accounting 
as a technical pre-condition for the management of national 
economy, this development can more generally be seen as one 
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aspect of an increase in the availability of economic 
indicators in general - be they of the balance of paymentst 
unemployment, inflationp or economic growth - all of which 
for the first time combined to produce a quantitative 
language in which national economic performance could be 
discussed, and in terms of which the performance of 
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governments could be assessed. This language only emerged 
during and after World War II. 
The three factors mentioned so far fall into the 
category of technical preconditions for the emergence of a 
national managed economy. The fourth pre-condition 
identified by Tomlinson is rather different and concerns 
what Tomlinson calls the radicalisation of the population. 
The combination of the experience of the depression with 
the necessity for the mobilization (ýf popular support for 
the war effort meant that expectations of what the state 
could do and should do were greatly expanded. The 
combination of the exigencies of wartime mobilization and 
increased popular demands and expectations provided the 
political motivation for putting into effect what the more 
technical developments already discussed made feasible. 
By the end of World War IIF then, the preconditions 
were present for the type of economic management-of the 
national economy,, with the government taking explicit 
responsibility for employmentr pricesf balance of payments 
and, somewhat laterr economic growtht which came quickly to 
be taken for granted as what politics was about in the 
post-war years. 
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Parallelingr and in mutual interaction with# these 
developments in the management of the economyj were the 
developments in social policy which culminated, again with 
much of the momentum deriving from the experience of the 
Second World War, in the welfare state. 
The two strands had different implications for the 
relation between the individual and the state. 
The welfare state strand implied a direct link between 
individual- economic well-being and state policy primarily 
in the form of more or less adequate guarantees of cash 
benefits or services when needed. There was a long-term 
tendency however for the welfare state, and this implied 
direct relation between the individual and the stater to 
disappear from the explicit political agenda once the 
initial commitment had been made by the post-war Labour 
government. 
Political discourse came increasingly to centre upon 
the otherl more indirect, relation between state action at 
the national level and individual economic well-being. This 
relation involved the state taking responsibility for the 
performance of the national economy as a whole, with this 
national economic performance then having repercussions on 
individual incomes and jobs (although for the first twenty 
years after the warp relatively full employment,, like the 
welfare state, tended to be taken for granted. ) 
This gradual shift in the political agenda was 
reflected in popular consciousness. Although precise 
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comparison is impossible because of changing question 
wordings the shift can be traced in terms of opinion poll 
responses to questions of the form 'What is the most 
important/urgent problem facing the nation/government at 
the present time'. The discussion will be restricted to 
domestic issues since as we have recently seen in the case 
of the Falklands, foreign military adventures such as Suez 
and Cyprus provoke rapid short term swing in responses to 
such questions. In the immediate post-war years responses 
focussed on immediate material shortages - foodr fuel, 
housing. The fifties produced a relatively mixed bag of 
responses with 'the cost of living' or 'economic affairs' 
emerging as a major factor but not tending to be massively 
more significant than issues such as housing or pensions. 
only in the nineteen sixties did responses begin to focus 
overwhelmingly on 'economic affairs' - this connoting 
precisely the strand of national economic management as 
opposed to more social or welfare issues which were tending 
to fade out of the responses. (2) These responses were 
largely a reflection of the fact that this image of what 
politics was about - national economic management - was one 
which was shared and promulgated by the government,, 
politicians in general and the media. 
To sum upt the period of the Second World War and the 
post-war Labour government saw the constitution of a 
relationship between the individual and the state 
significantly different from that which had obtained in the 
years before the war. 
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Once this reciprocal configuration of individual 
expectations and state responsibilities had been set up, 
electoral competition served to keep up the pressure. 
Once it became plausible that the government could 
'control' the economy, it was in the parties' interests to 
make promises in opposition about what they could achieve 
and to hold those in power responsibility for whatever 
happened under their 'control'. The long post-war boom 
provided the objective economic conditions within which it 
was at least plausible that government policies were in 
part responsible for rising standards of living. 
From*a pre-war situation in which the dominant 
orthodoxy was that the government could do very little, 
there was a move in the post-war years to a general belief 
that government could controlf and thus -be held responsible 
fort the general performance of the economy. 
It was only within this newr post-war universe of 
political discourse dominated, for the first timej, by the 
conception of Britain as a national economic unit which 
could be managed and with the fate 6f which the economic 
well-being of the individual was directly implicatedp that 
the emergence of a conception of Scotland as an analogous 
type of national economic unit can be comprehended. 
The Scottish Level. 





prej, vu I. 
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can also be separated into two strands, with a certain 
parallelism with those defined at the British level. 
The first consists of the piecemeal growth over the 
last century of administrative functions centred around the 
Scottish Office to do wfth the supervision of such areas as 
health and education. Much of this expansion has been a 
corollary of the general growth of the welfare functions of 
the British state. 
The impact on Scottish political consciousness of this 
strand of expansion in state activity at the Scottish level 
appears to have been relatively slight. As Kellas puts itp 
n*o* the degree of decentralisation to Scotlandl 
however great it might appear to bet has little effect 
on the consciousness of mass public opinion in 
Scotland. Scots know very little of itt and what they 
know they probably regard as a subsidiary part of 
British government having few independent powers of its 
own. " (Kellas, 1975, pp 37-38) 
The state of ignorance of the mass of the Scottish 
population as to the 
'functions of the Scoýtish Office was 
revealed in particular by the painstaking survey carried 
out for the Kilbrandon Commission. 
(3) 
The corollary of this lack of awareness is that the 
growth of this administrative apparatus owed very little 
directly to mass political demands expressed at the 
Scottish level. The process rather presents a picture of 
almost absent-minded accretion in the face of new 
responsibilities defined at the 
British level and delegated 
administratively to the Scottish. 
The second strand of state action at the 
Scottish level 
is that concerned with economic development - either 
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through regional policy implemented from Westminster or 
through specifically Scottish institutions. The 
plausibility of this kind of intervention was particularly 
dependent upon the background shift from perceived 
government powerlessness to control the economy before the 
war to a perceived quasi-omnipotence after it. Pre-war 
regional policy was closer in philosophy to a welfare 
approach than to a dirigister what elements there were of 
the latter consisting largely of an emphasis on 
transferring surplus workers out of the depressed areas. 
The emphasis was one of combatting unemployment but hardly 
one of promoting regional economic development. 
The complex series of developments in this second 
strand of state activity in Scotland in the twenty years 
after the war were important not primarily in terms of 
their rather limited concrete effects on Scotland's 
economy,, but rather in terms of their contribution to the 
creation of'a frame of reference in which the unit of 
economic development became not Britaint or a particular 
region of Scotlandr but Scotland as a whole -a unit whose 
economic position could be easily and numerically compared 
with others, usually England. In short, these developments 
provided an institutional embodiment of 'the Scottish 
economic dimension'. 
Developments which contributed to the crystallization 
of this frame of reference in the post-war decadest and 






developments in regional economic theoryr the activities of ( 
non-governmental bodies such as the Scottish Council 
(Development and Industry) and the S. T. U. C. j the 
development of economic planning functions within the state 
apparatuss, the appearance of widely publicized 'Plans' for 
the Scottish economy and the availability of increasingly 
comprehensive economic and social indicators at a Scottish 
level. (4) 
To some extent there was an inbuilt dynamic to this 
process. It was in the interests of every organization 
institutionalized at the Scottish level - and this is 
before taking into account the political parties - to make 
demandsp to formulate proposals and to increase 
expectations. There were few penalties for doing sop since 
the failure of the many grandiose schemes could be blamed 
on wider factors and on Westminster in particular. 
The discrepancy between expectations and the 
possibility of their fulfillment within the existing (or 
even an expanded) institutional structure was much greater 
at the Scottish level than at the British. The instruments 
of economic control which had even a possibility of making 
an impact - in particular those which influenced the level 
of demand - were all at the British level. The instruments 
available at the Scottish level could have marginal effects 
at the best. 
By the early 1960s these contradictions were at their 
sharpest. At a British level, growthmanship was in the air 
with Wilson an ardent evangelist for the 'white-hot 
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technological revolution'. Although Scottish unemployment 
was relatively high compared withr say,, the South of 
England, compared with the nineteen thirties or the 
eighties the position can only be seen as one of relatively 
full employment. There were manifestations of a Scottish 
'growth project' such as the Toothill Committe Report on 
the Scottish Economy in 1961 and and the embodiment of an 
economic planning function within government in the form of 
the Scottish Development Department in 1962. In 1964 the 
opening of the Forth Road Bridge was a particularly potent 
symbol of a dynamic future. 
Expectations which in England focussed primarily on 
Westminster were soon dashed by the fumbling and 
'pragmatic' policies of a Labour Government which were in 
sharp contrast to the rhetoric of long-term planning for 
growth on which it had been elected. In Scotland the 
failure of the Labour government could be regarded simply 
as that and no more, with no implications for the 
plausibility of the Scottish project. Failure at 
Westminster in fact was the perfect explanation for the gap 
between expectations at the Scottish level and the means 
available for fulfilling them. 
So far I have been discussing factors underlying the 
generation, within the general framework of high 
expectations of what governments could achieve at the 
British levelF of a parallel frame of reference at the 
Scottish level. Whether or not this frame of reference 
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would have had any effects outside the world of government 
departmentsy quangoes and University Departments of 
Economics or Regional Planningy depended primarily upon two 
institutions - the Labour Party and the mass media. 
Restricting the focus to the first half of the 1960s we can 
rule out the impact of the S. N. P. as a major transmitter of 
the frame of reference except on a fairly localized basis. 
Only after their success in the Hamilton by-election of 
1967 would the S. N. P. emerge as the main articulator of the 
themes involved in the Scottish growth project and Hamilton 
must be seen primarily as the result - or more precisely 
the embodiment of -a frame of reference which had been 
given credibility elsewhere. 
The role of the Labour Party in establishing and 
disseminating the Scottish economic frame of reference in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s has been well documented and 
its impact cannot be overestimated. As Miller puts it 
"Between 1959 and 1964 Labour made much of the case for 
a reviving S. N. P. " (Miller,, 1981r p35) 
The fullest study of the relation between the Labour party 
and the Scottish national dimension is that by Keating and 
Bleiman (1979). In terms of the period 1959-1966p they 
summarize the Labour strategy as follows 
"Labour's attitude to the Scottish question was 
based upon the assumptions that the basis of any 
discontent was economic and that the electorate were 
more concerned about the economic goods which they 
received than with the constitutional mechanism by 
which they were delivered. "(pl5l) 
Labour based its electoral appeals on 
"its ability to gain material benefits for 
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Scotland. This would be achieved partly through the 
beneficial effects which Labour's overall U. K. strategy 
would bringr but partly through the ability of Labour's 
Scottish representatives to gain special 
concessions. "(Keating and Bleiman, 1979r p153) 
Labour can be seen as being a major vehicle for the 
simple transfer of the mode of discourse dominant at the 
British level - government policies will ensure economic 
growth - to the Scottish level. 
In this context it is worth noting that in one of the 
early studies of the electoral impact of television - 
Blumler and McQuaills (1968) analysis of the 1964 General 
Election - one of the very few issues to have increased 
measurably in salience during the campaign and the one to 
have shown by far the largest increase in salience, was, 
precisely,, that of economic growth. The percentage naming 
'Get fast and steady growth of the economy' as one of the 
five issues it was most important 'for the next (new) 
government to tackle rose from 21% to 33%, the increase 
being most marked among skilled manual workers (14% to 29%) 
(Blumler and McQuaill 1968j Tables 10.1 and 10.2). The 
authors felt that the evidence suggested that 
"in contrast to earlier electionsp the 1964 
campaign was remarkable for having directed the 
attention of many voters to certain issues which had 
not previously seemed important to them - notably that 
of economic growth but to a lesser extent that of the 
nuclear deterrent as well ... In the years that 
followed the General Election of 1964F economic growth 
in particular'may have provided a criterion by which a 
growing number of voters were prepared to judge the 
merits of rival parties. " (Blumler and McQuail, 1968, 
pl8l) 
The emergence of the 'Scottish growth project' then in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s can be seen as a result both 
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of an increase in the political salience of the Scottish 
economic dimension and in that of the economic growth 
dimension, which combined to produce the frame of reference 
in terms of which political and economic events were 
increasingly interpreted. Only in the context of this 
widely accepted framework does the rapidity of the rise in 
voting for the S. N. P. become comprehensible. Voting S. N. P. 
did not involve a change to a different and new type of 
political thinking - voting S. N. P. was just onep and in 
many respects the least contradictory, manifestation of one 
underlying frame of reference. The ingredients of this 
frame were simply that (1) governments could influence and 
largely control national economic performance - and this 
was the bedrock assumption of British post-war politics 
although it was only in the early 1960s that it took on the 
more explicitly technocratic form of fostering economic 
growth and that (2) this could take place at a Scottish 
level - and as we have seen this was very much the 
conventional wisdom in elite circles in Scotland in the 
early 1960s. These assumptions were sufficiently 
'apolitical' or technocratic not specify any particular 
political party as being the one necessary for the 
implementation of the implied project. The choice was 
simply a matter of credibility. Labour soon lost that at 
the British level - hoist on its own pragmatic (by your 
results shall you be judged) petard - and a vote for the 
S. N. P. allowed expression of dissatisfaction along with 
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continuing faith in the Scottish growth project. In terms 
of rapidity and magnitude, the shif t in voting to the 
S. N. P. was unprecedented in British politics. Rather than 
invoking the transformation of basic politic orientations 
to explain such a massive shif tp it would seem to. make more 
sense to see it as reflecting a shift within a political 
f rame of ref erence. This was af rame of ref erence shaped by 
the experience of British politics since the Second World 
War,, involving particular expectations of the statel and 
the emergence within this frame of what I have been calling 
the 'Scottish growth project'. 
However, the rapidity with which all the developments 
already cited could have an ideological effect was 




The mass media. 
ýe-, 
The fact that Scotland had in the post-war period a 
daily and Sunday press with an even greater degree of 
autonomy than is the case at present meant that there was 
an inbuilt tendency to emphasize the Scottish dimension. 
This is a banal point but an important one. There is no 
need to posit any change in the situation or interests of 
the Scottish press for it to act as an amplifier for the 
emergence of the Scottish economic dimension. As Kellas 
puts it 
"All Scottish papers are part of the economic log- 
rolling of the Scottish interest groups (among them the 
trade unions, employers associations and the Scottish 
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Council (Development and Industry)), who seek further 
government- aided development in Scotland. The 
political affiliation of the papers then becomes 
somewhat irrelevant. " (Kellas, 1975p p175) 
Again the point has to be made that such an emphasis 
presupposes a situation in which there are logs to be 
! 
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rolled i. e. in which government intervention and demands 
for government economic intervention are at least plausible 
ways of generating economic goo*ýiesr and again the 
comparison is with the situation before the war 
Just as was the case for any other institution whose 
membership or custom was Scottish, there was very little to 
lose by stressing the Scottish dimension - and in such an 
emerging climate, quite a bit to lose by not stressing it. 
The existence of a largely separate Scottish press can 
be taken as a relatively constant background factor, The 
same could probably be said of Scottish radio in the 1950s. 
The Scottish Home Service broadcast just under 10 hours 
per week of Scottish made material, The Broadcasting 
Council for Scotland claimed that between 20 and 25% of the 
Scottish population were tuned into the daily early evening 
Scottish News bulletins in the mid-nineteen fifties (Annual 
Report and accounts of the B. B. C. 1955-56j, 1956-57). 
If changes in the structure of political communication 
can be held to have played a role in generating a 
widespread consciousness of the Scottish economic 
dimension, there is only one change in that structure which 
is a candidate - the arrival of television. 
The B. B. C. began television transmission in Central 
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Scotland from Kirk o'Shotts in 1951. By 1956 one third of 
Scottish families had T. V. licences. S. T. V. began 
transmission from Black H ill in August 1957 and the next 
few years saw a rapid move towards a situation in which the 
vast majority of homes had television. (Table 4.1) 
Table 4.1. T. V. licences per 100 families. 
1952 1954 1956 195811960 1962 1964 1966 
Scotland 3 10 23 40 59 67 73 78 
England 14 23 39 53 66 72 76 79 
English Midlands 19 28 45 55 69 76 80 84 
Wales 5 is 32 46 63 72 79 81 
N. Ireland 02 10 20 33 40 48 51 
(Source: B. B. C. Annual Reports) 
Even more important than this simple growth of the 
television audience in Scotland however was the expansion 
of specifically Scottish news and current affairs coverage. 
The immediate impetus behind this development was the 
arrival of S. T. V. which had a regional focus (15% of its 
output to be Scottish) written into its contract (I. T. A. 
Annual Report, 1956). Throughout the early and mid-1950s,, 
the B. B. C. broadcast no specifically Scottish news 
programme on television. It was no coincidence that the 
B. B. C. introduced 'a Scottish news service for viewers in 
Scotland - the first of its kind in B. B. C. television' 
(B. B. C. Annual Report 1957-58F p9) on August 30th 1957F the 
day before S. T. V. began to transmit from Black Hill. This 
was only part of a general response by the B. B, C. to 
S. T. V. 1s Scottish focus. In the year ending 30th March 1957 
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only 25 hours of programmes were produced in Scotland for 
transmission only in Scotland by the B. B. C. By 1958, the 
figure had reached 148 hours and by 1961 208 hours - not 
earth-shattering figures but enough to encompass a 
significant expansion in Scottish news and current affairs 
coverage. (B. B. C. Annual Reports) 
By the early 1960s, the pattern of television news and 
current affairs coverage had settled into the shape which 
it has maintained, in broad outline, ever since. The focal 
time-slot was beween 6 and 6.30 p. m. taking the form of a 
news magazine incorporating a Scottish news summary 
immediately following the national (British) news on both 
channels. In addition there were 5 minute lunchtime 
Scottish news bulletins. Current affairs coverage was 
completed by a weekly 'in-depth' programme such as S. T. Vls 
'Dateline Scotland' and more infrequent specialist 
programmes such as those spotlighting parliamentary 
af f airs. 
The most sustained impact however was undoubtedly that 
of the main evening news magazines. Their week-day monopoly 
of the 6 to 6.30 p. m. time-slot on both channels may have 
helped maintain their audiences although this is by no 
means certain. That they did have very high viewing figures 
- at least for news-oriented programmes - is more certain. 
In the two weeks ending 31st March 1963t the average 
percentage of television homes (i. e all those with 
television sets) logged as being tuned into the nightly 
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'Here and Now' programme was 49% - the same proportion as 
were tuned into the main I. T. N. news. 'Dateline Scotland' 
in a 6.30 pm on Friday evening slott notched up an even 
higher figure of 54%. (I. T. A. Annual Report, 1962-63p p52). 
These figures apply to just one, admittedly by far the more 
popular#, channel. 
These programmes in addition had a relatively strong 
economic and particularly industrial focus. Both the B. B. C. 
and S. T. V. had Scottish Industrial Correspondents. This 
focus was given explicit recognition and approval in the 
Annual Reports of both networks. 
The Broadcasting Council for Scotland reported in 1963 
that 
"The industrial and economic crises in Scotland 
had steady attention in the B. B. C. 's current affairs 
programmesr notably in a series broadcast for T. V. and 
the Scottish Home Service entitled 'Pattern for 
Prosperity'" (B. B. C. Annual Reportr 1962-63,, p108) 
and in 1964 that 
"The economic situation and the White Paper on Central 
Scotland were the subject of special programmes on the 
Scottish Home Service and in 'Checkpoint', the weekly 
television programme on Scottish affairs. The Secretary 
of State and others gave interviews on this subject in 
the News and 'Six-Ten' and it was discussed in 
'Scotland in Parliament" (B. B. C Annual Report, 1963-64, 
P109) 
while at the British levelf the general review of the year 
pointed out that 
"A third aspect of Regional broadcasting which is 
less obvious to the audience but is of particular 
importance in a year which has seen growing interest in 
Regional planning in the economic, social and cultural 
spherest is the contribution made by Regional experts 
to current affairs programmes on the national networks. 
The B. B. C. s Regional Industrial Correspondents in 
particular have made notable contributions to such 
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programmes as 'Panorama' and 'Gallery' when they have 
been dealing with Regional aspects of the country's 
economic life. " (B. B. C. Annual Reportr 1964r p65) 
On the other side it was pointed out that 
"of special note was the development of a greater 
interest in and coverage of industrial and 
technological matters, particularly by Scottish 
Televisiont Tyne Tees Television and Grampian 
Television. " (I. T. A. Annual Report,, 1964-65) 
Now it is the nature of such documents for much of 
their content to consist of self-satisfied and self-serving 
waffle. Howeverl in addition to their informative value, 
these citations are evidence of the extent to which the 
regional and Scottish economic dimensions were 'in the air' 
at the time - particularly among the broadcasting 
establishment -a fact which would not be slow to filter 
down to more executive levels. The citations might appear 
fairly trivial in themselves,, especially from the 
standpoint of the present, when an even heavier focus on 
the Scottish economic dimeniion is taken for granted. The 
point to be made is that these themes had not appeared 
before 1963 in the annual reports of the television 
networks with anywhere near the degree of prominence or 
explicitness that they were subsequently to enjoy. 
We have then, three levels of rapid change in the 
amount and type of television to which Scots were exposed 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s. First was the rapid 
expansion of television itself. Second was a relative 
expansion of specifically Scottish news and current affairs 
coverage. Third was a strong economic and industrial slant 
within this news and current affairs coverage. Taking the 
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three together, it is hardly an exaggeration to speak of a 
qualitative shift in the degree of exposure of the Scottish 
people to the 'Scottish economic frame of reference'. 
. From establishing the degree of this exposure we have 
to turn to establishing what its likely effects will have 
been. What I will'argue is that the kind of effect likely 
to have been produced by such exposure is precisely the 
kind of effect which recent thinking in media studies has 
come to see as most important - not an effect in terms of 
specific attitudes or opinions but an effect in terms of 
the frame of reference in terms of which people make sense 
of political reality. 
Discussion of the effects of television on political 
attitudes and behaviour was for a long time imprisoned 
within a focus on the kinds of short-term opinions and 
effects which could be operationalised in terms of survey 
methodology and it was in these terms that the orthodoxy 
grew up in the 1950s and 1960s that political effects 
attributable to the mass communications media - and in 
particular television - had been greatly overestimated. 
It is only when we step back from the kind of effects 
which can be identified on the basis of survey techniques, 
that we can move towards a more realistic assessment of the 
long-term effects of the arrival of television in Scotland. 
The first point to be made is that television is 
generally accepted to have quite rapidly become the primary 
source of political information for the majority of the 
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population (see e. g. Blumler and Gurevitchr 1982, p247; 
Blumler, 1977, p5; Seymour-Urer 1974, p105). Even this 
simple fact implies that the late 1950s and early 1960s saw 
a shift in the structure of political communication matched 
only by that associated with the emergence of the popular 
press in the late nineteenth centuryl the latter taking 
place over a much longer time period. 
The second point is that media research in general is 
coming increasingly to recognize that television's main 
effects are not to be found in the area of changing 
attitudes or opinions but rather in the imposition or 
reinforcement of the frames of reference in terms of which 
the world is understood. In the context of a broad survey 
of trends in research into the political effects of the 
media#, Blumler and Gurevitch see the emergence of the 
agenda- setting I strand of research as reflecting 
"a shift from preoccupation with attitude and 
opinion change in the earlier stages of media effects 
research towards a concentration on the contributions 
of the media to the formation of frameworks through 
which people regard political events and debates" 
(Blumler and Gurevitch, 1982, p262) 
Similarly they characterise the 'construction of social 
r-ealityl vein of effects studies as seeing the media 
playing a pivotal role in 
n not merely in conveying discrete information to 
people about social and political eventsp but in 
shaping the background canvas of meanings and preferred 
ways of seeing the socio-political arena, within which 
such events will placed n (ibid. j p263) 
In the same volume Curran, Gurevitch and Woollacott 
point to the contribution of Marxist critiques 
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"to a growing recognition within empirical 
communications research that more attention needs to be 
paid to the influence of the media on the ideological 
categories and frames of reference through which people 
understand the world" (19821 p16) 
In terms of the present study, the most important point 
to make with respect to the kind of framework which the 
media, and in particular televisionr are likely to transmit 
involves linking the discussion to the previous chapter. (5) 
As Morley points out 
"If we look at the news media, and their role in 
providing for the audience an account of developments 
in society which is largely restricted to reflecting the 
surface level of social relations ... we see that the 'common sense' understanding of events which they 
provide, precisely because of its ahistorical, 
Iforegrounded' nature, is the crucial locus of 
ideology. It is at this level that the media operate so 
as to reinforce the ideological structure and content 
of 'what everybody knows' about our social world. " 
(Morley, 1976, p264) 
I have hypothesized that the effect of the arrival of 
television, and of television coverage with a particular 
economic and political focus, in Scotland was to facilitate 
the transmission to the mass electorate of a frame of 
reference which I. have called the 'Scottish economic 
dimension' or 'the Scottish growth project'* It would seem 
to me that this is precisely the kind of ef f ect which media 
research is increasingly seeing as likely to occur. It must 
be remembered that what is involved here is not a case of 
television conjuring up a version of political reality out 
of thin air. We need only see television accepting, 
transmitting and reinforcing a framework of assumptions 
about what politics was all about - the economic management 
of a national unit - which was already established and 
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taken for granted. The only framing assumption that 
specifically Scottish television news and current affairs 
coverage did not share with national (British) television 
news and current affairs coverage was the identity of'the 
national unit in question. This equivalence of national 
unit which made the transfer all the more plausible can 
itself be seen as grounded in certain important forms of 
obviousness. Firstlyf- if it is not primarily in terms of 
specific attitudes or items of information. that the media 
has its ideological effects but is rather in terms of the 
categories in terms of which news coverage itself is 
organized, the most fundamental category in terms of which 
television news coverage in Scotland is organized is 
precisely the Scottish/British distinction - as shown most 
'obviously' in the nightly six o'clock switch from the 
national (British) to national (Scottish) news. Secondly, 
the most obvious grounding is the sense of Scottish 
national identity (and despite its long latent political 
effects#, the existence of such national identity has never 
been in doubt) on the part of the audience. 
(6) 
The inferences drawn here are admittedly indirect. We 
do not have direct evidence that the arrival of television 
in Scotland and its soon acquired 'Scottish economic 
perspective' influenced the way people looked at politics 
in Scotland. All that can be said is that the framework 
through which television presented Scottish political and 
economic affairs was increasingly likely to be# for those 
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viewers lacking solidly grounded alternative frameworkst 
the framework in terms of which they interpreted Scottish 
political and economic affairs. After allp we are talking 
quite literally about a change in the way people saw 
Scotland. 
Conclusion. 
This chapter can be seen as an account of the 
successive satisfaction of a set of nested conditions of 
possibility which culminated in the acceptance of a widely- 
shared political framework of which voting S*N. P* was a 
readily-comprehensible expression. 
To recapt- the successiVe conditions of possibility 
were: 
1. the preconditions necessary for the emergence of a 
national British economy to managed - departure from the 
gold standard, a large central government budgeto national 
accounting procedures and, less technical, popular 
expectations. 
2. the general acceptance that British politics was about 
the management of this national economyr with an increasifig 
emphasis on the generation of economic growth 
3. the transfer of this framework, initially at an elite 
level, to Scotland as the relevant national unit of 
economic growth 
4. the transfer of this 'Scottish growth project' from an 
elite to a mass level - the primary agents here being the 
Labour Party and television 
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Now,, no matter how many nested conditions of 
possibility are satisfied, one is still left with no more 
than the establishment of a possibility. All we can say at 
this stage in the analysis is that at the 'macro-level' - 
the level of the state and the media - the conditions were 
present by the early 1960s for the message of the S. N. P. to 
chime naturally with prevailing dominant perceptions of 
what Scottish politics was about - the generation of 
economic growth for Scotland. 
The next task is to specify who it was that responded 
to the message of the S. N. P. sufficiently to vote for them. 
A precondition for this is a description of the patterns of 
social change in Scotland which paralleled the developments 
at the macro-level outlined in this chapter and which were 
transforming the everyday lives of the Scottish people. It 
is in terms of the experience of these changes in 
occupational and family lifer that differential responses 
to the appeal of the S. N. P. can be understood. And it is 
only by relating the impact of television to this level of 
differential experience that its effects can be more 




Social change in modern Scotland. 
Introduction. 
Since the bulk of this chapter consists of a fairly 
dense empirical examination of some of the basic processes 
of social change in modern Scotland, it is worth spending 
some time outlining how the chapter fits into the logic of 
the study as a whole. 
What I hope to show in this chapter is that it is 
possibl e to establish some fairly solid causal connections 
between different aspects of -social change in modern 
Scotland. The next chapter will show how patterns of S. N. P. 
voting can be related to the impact on different categories 
of voters of these patterns of social change. Howeverr and 
demonstrating this will be the second main concern of the 
present chapter, these patterns of social change in 
Scotland differed very little from those which occurred in 
Britain as a whole. 
Establishing this similarity in patterns of change in 
such basic characteristics as industrial structure, 
occupational structure and patterns of social mobility 
serves two important functions for the study as a whole. 
The less significant such differences are shown to be, 
the weaker becomes the case for attributing differences in I 
electoral behaviour, specifically the success of the it 
Scottish National Party in Scotlandr to such social 
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structural divergences. 
Howeverr as I hope to show, these patterns of social 
change are important in understanding the nature of S. N. P. 
support. In order to relate the nature of S. N. P. support to 
these 'objective' aspects of social changer it is necessary 
to invoke, as an intervening level of explanationr more 
'subjective' aspects of social change to do with changing 
and inter-related orientations towards work, family and 
politics. This level of analysis then shades into 
discussion of the changing context of political 
communication. Whereas information on industrial and 
occupational change comes primarily from official 
statisticsf information on these 'softer' aspects has to be 
derived primarily from standard sociological survey work. 
Since the amount of such work undertaken in Scotland has 
been relatively small and has been far exceeded by that 
undertaken in Britain as aýwholej it is helpful to be able 
to invoke the parallelism in basic patterns of social 
change as a justification for bringing the implications of 
'Britain-wide' survey work to bear on processes of social 
change in Scotland. 
This chapter then has two jobs to do 
The first is an empirical mapping of some basic aspects 
of social change and in particular the mapping of the 
causal connections which can be established between them. 
The second is an assessment of what weight to assign to 
the specificities of Scotland's experience compared with 
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patterns of change which it has shared at one level with 
the rest of Britain and at another level with the advanced 
industrial world in general. 
Both these aspects require a minimum of further 
introduction. 
Cause and interdependence. 
This chapter as a whole is organized according to what 
could be called a very elementary 'model of determination'. 
Each se ction will describe the main patterns of change in a 
particular aspect - such as industrial structure or 
occupational mobility - of the social structure but I will 
also try to map the main pathways along which change in one 
area has af f ected or been af f ected by change in the other 
areas. 
This 'causal chain' will begin with patterns of 
industrial change. A full explanation of the pattern of 
industrial change in Scotland would need to be grounded in 
an analysis of the complex interaction between Scotland's 
changing position in the international division of labour 
and mechanisms of change more generally operative in 
advanced industrial society. I will only be able to deal 
with this problem in a very general way. 
The discussion then moves on to deal with occupational 
change and involves an attempt to distinguish between those 
aspects of occupational change caused by changes in the 
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industrial structure and those which have consisted of 
changes in occupational distributions within industries. 
Patterns of change in the remaining three areas can be 
traced back more or less directly to paiterns of industrial 
and occupational change. The high levels of upward 
occupational mobility since the war have been primarily a 
reflection of the expansion of non-manual employment while 
the most important single factor behind the massive entry 
of married women into paid employment in the nineteen 
sixties and nineteen seventies was the expansion of 
employment in the service sector. Finally it seems likely 
that a major factor underlying the fall in fertility from 
1964 to 1977 was the change in familial economic parameters 
associated with increased employment opportunities for 
married women. 
In terms of time-scaler I am primarily concerned with 
the period leading up to the S. N. P. 's electoral peak in the 
mid-nineteen seventies and do not deal in any detail with 
what are likely to have been significantly different 
patterns as Britain and Scotland have moved into slump in 
more recent years. 
The idea of the interdependence of the parts of a 
social system - that a change in one element will cause 
changes in at least some of the others - is hardly new. 
The two major systems of thought for which the idea of 
such interdependence has played a particularly central role 
have been Marxism andt in non-Marxist social thought, 
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functionalism and especially structural functionalism. 
Perhaps the most valuable aspects of the 'functionalism 
debate' have been the attempts to distil from the more 
grandiose pretensions of structural-functionalism a more 
precise formulation of the nature of the causal mechanisms 
and structural dependencies implicit in the structural- 
functional model. (1) 
From the other sider the main concern of the 
Althusserian project can be seen to have been to push to 
the limit the ideas on structural causality and 
determination implicit in Marx. 
The parallels between structural-f unctional ism and 
Marxism in terms of their common emphasis on the causal 
interdependence of parts have often been remarked and it 
comes as little surprise that the work of specifying the 
causal mechanisms involved in social change can draw 
fruitfully on either tradition. On the non-Marxist side*the 
most thoroughgoing attempt to specify social theory - 
Marxistr functionalist or whatever - in terms of causal 
mechanisms has been that of Arthur Stinchcombe (1968t 
1978). On the Marxist sidep Erik Olin Wright acknowledges 
his debt to Stinchcombe for stimulating Wright's project of 
"trying to formulate a systematic language for 
capturing the causal imagery of Marxist theory. " 
(Wright, 1978t p14) 
In all these enterprises the emphasis has been upon 
developing a systematization of the causal logics of social 
theory. Inseparable from this of course is the problem of 
specifying the links between the theoretical categories and 
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the available data. 
Since Wright's discussion reaches down from theoretical 
abstraction to social reality in an explicit fashion? 
further presentation of his. approach will be useful in 
situating the present enterprise. 
Wright clearly formulates the nature of the gap to be 
bridged: 
"It is ... important to develop a more systematic way 
of understanding the causal relations between the 
structural categories of marxist theory and the level 
of appearances tapped in empirical investigation. That 
is, historical investigation gathers data at the level 
of appearances (by definition): eventst personal ties, 
manifest economic variables, institutional 
arrangementsp demographic distributions and so on. In 
some sense these phenomena constitute "effects" of 
structural relations, The problem is to define more 
systematically what "effects" means. If empirical 
investigation is to be directly linked to the logic of 
the theory itselff then much greateý rigour in 
understanding the logic of causality implicit in the 
theory is necessary. " (Wrightj, 1978,, pl4) 
Wright limits himself, in hid initial exem. plification 
of the six 'modes of determination' or types of structural 
causality which he identifies as implicit in Marxist 
theory# to the relations between four broadly defined 
'structural categories' - economic structurej state 
structurer state policies/interventions and class struggle. 
Even at this level of generalityj, four structural 
categories between which can operate five modes of 
determination plus the mode of mediation which operates on 
relations rather than categories, quite a complex 'model of 
determination' is built up. However his characterization of 
the role such a model should play does match quite closely 
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the role which our own 'model of determination' played in 
structuring the research. 
"Models of determination ... should not be thought of 
as the end product of a serious historical 
investigation. Rather they are a prelude to such 
research. They are designed to lay out explicitly the 
logic of relations to be explored in a particular 
historical investigation. A model of determination 
charts the terrain of an investigation; it does not 
provide the answers for that investigation. Concrete 
historical studies are essential to spell out how 
limitation and selection processes operater how class 
struggle transforms and mediates those relations, how 
the transformation of social structures generates non- 
reproductive relations and so on. The model helps to 
clarify the questions to be asked in research, and it 
may help to facilitate the theoretical integration of 
different research projectst but the actual historical 
research is still essential for any genuine 
understanding of historical development. " (Wright, 
1978, pp25-26) 
In terms of the bridge between theory and datar Wright, 
in this discussiont is very much operating from the theory 
end. he is concerned with specifying howt in ideal 
conditionsj, 'the gap between theory and data should be 
bridged, primarily by gathering the data in a formt or 
modifying the data to fit a forml which is tightly 
specified in theoretical terms. 
The cost of attempting to apply categories developed in 
accordance with a rigor-ously defined model - be it 
theoretical or mathematical or both - is the loss of the 
information contained in any data which is not defined in 
terms of such categories. 
The most important consideration in the present 
enterprise was to extract the maximum amount of relevant 
information from existing data. If the starting point is 
that the social totality is a constantly shifting web of 
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causes and effects and that any categorization, however 
meticulously developedr is only going to capture one aspect 
of what is going on, then the emphasis moves towards 
getting as many triangulations on that totality as possible 
- especially if they can be mutually related in however 
crude a form - and away from expending all one's energy on 
developing one particular triangulation. 
From an exploratory standpointr where the emphasis is 
on an initial harvesting of data and on extracting th. e 
maximum of information with the minimum of effort, it 
almost becomes an advantage to operate with categories that 
are 'rough' in that there is less temptation to regard them 
as providing answers in themselves (as being 'the answers') 
- their very 'roughness' is a constant reminder that they 
are not the be all and end all but very preliminary and 
very partial viewpoints. 
A much more concrete advantage of staying with 
conventional categorizations has to do with the form in 
which data is availablej particularly in the Census. Take 
the example of an attempt to construct an occupational 
classification based on Marxist categories such as the 
divisions between manual and mental labour or productive 
and unproductive labour. Such an enterprise would have to 
go down at least to the level of individual occupational 
codes and at best would want these codes cross-classified 
by employment status and industry. This is all reasonably 
feasible. However, if one then wanted to cross-classify the 
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new classification with other classifications in order to 
explore for example the linkages between occupation and 
industrial structure problems would be likely to appear. 
This is for the simple reason that cross-classifications in 
the Census tend to be at a much cruder level than the 
simple distributions. With a recategorization on the basis 
of individual occupation codes one would be restricted, in 
linking occupation to other parameterst to those cross- 
classifications published at the level of individual 
occupation codes which are few and far between. If one is 
working on the basis of a widely used classificationj such 
as socio-economic groupst on the other handr the categories 
might not be 'theoretically pure' but there is little 
problem in linking them up to other parameters in the 
Census and even in a good deal of survey data. One can thus 
get many more triangulations on how socio-economic groups 
link up with other aspects of the social structure than is 
possible with a theoretically better classification which 
requires for its construction data at a much finer level of 
differentiation. This is not to say that one approach is 
always better than the other. The decision has to be made 
pragmatically on the basis of available time and resources. 
In the context of the astonishing lack of research on 
macro-social change in Scotlandl an initial survey of 
social change on the basis of conventional categories does 
have a degree of practical justification. 
(2) 
Of course, the mapping of the causal connections which 
can be established on the basis of available quantitative 
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and largely 'official' data provides a picture of only one 
aspect of social change, This brings us to that vast area 
of debate surrounding the relationship between 'structure' 
on the one hand and the realm of social reality 
characterized in such terms as 'agency', Ireflexivityll 
'meaning' or 'class struggle' depending on the theoretical 
framework involved (3). 
Rather than attempt any more ambitio0s clarification of 
these issues, suffice it to note that the direction of the 
next two chapters will be to move from macro-structural 
shifts which determine the objective circumstances of 
peoples' lives to their own experience of and responseý to 
these changes - one outcome of which is the way they vote. 
Scotland as a unit of analysis. 
In Chapter 21 dealt theoretically with some of the 
issues surrounding the 'national level of analysis'. In 
this section I want to deal with some of the same issues as 
they relate to the more empirical concerns of the present 
chapter. 
In the earlier discussion it was noted that much of the 
analysis of social change and nationalism in Scotland has 
been dominated by an lexternalist' perspective. In this 
chapterr I am more concerned with tracing structural 
articulations internal to Scotland. 
Speaking of 'internal' or 'external' approaches as 
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absolutes however implies falling into precisely the trap 
of reifying the national level which was the topic of 
Chapter 2. In this section I want to make some brief 
remarks, in causal termst which should serve to help keep 
an open mind about the weight of external influences 
relative to internal articulations in accounting for social 
change in Scotland. 
The first points concern the degree of 'boundedness' - 
the degree to which it makes sense to speak of an 'inside' 
and an 'outside' - of the Scottish social system. 
The safest initial assumption is that only when there 
has been an exploration of the extent to which social 
change in Scotland is determined by processes or mechanisms 
which are themselves part of a wider system can there be 
any attempt at an assessment of the extent to which social 
change in Scotland is the result of structural connections 
internal to Scotland. 
The most important route for the exercise of external 
influence on social change in Scotland is that leading from 
Scotland's external economic environment, the world 
economy#, to Scotland's indus . trial structure. To call this a 
causal route is of course misleading. This 'pathway' is a 
condensation of the fact that the Scottish economy is 
highly integrated with the rest of the world economy. 
Only to the extent that the Scottish border marks a 
discontinuity in the web of causal forces which is the 
capitalist world system, does it make sense to speak of a 
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'Scottish economy' in a real sense. 
(4) 
The same consideration applies in principle to all the 
other webs of determination of whatever form of which 
different aspects of the Scottish social structure are 
c ompone nts. 
(5) 
At the most abstract level, what must initially be 
regarded as an open question in order to avoid reifying 
'Scotland' is the degree to which the Scottish social 
system is in fact a separable sub-systemp orp to put 
exactly the same point another way, the degree to which the 
Scottish social system is bounded in the sense that the 
Scottish border corresponds to a causal discontinuity. 
In these terms, one could define three abstract 
conditions in terms of the relative weight or importance 
of 'across the border' interdependencies as compared with 
'internal' interdependencies. 
At one extreme, if all the interdependencies are 
internal to the border and there are none across it, there 
is not a sub-system but rather a self-contained system. 
At the other extreme, if all the interdependencies are 
across the border and there are none within the borderp 
there is no sub-system. 
In an intermediate situationp if the border 
corresponds to no change in the density of the web of 
interdependenciest then the border defines a sub-system 
only in an arbitrary sense. The border defines what would 
better be regarded as a 'slice' or 'segment' of the global 
system rather than a sub-system with its own 
logic. 
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The real world systemic status of Scotland is likely to 
lie somewhere between this latter position and the first - 
a higher density of interdependence within the border than 
across it but also a relatively high degree of 
interdependence across the border. 
The dimension complementary to that of the relative 
weight of cross-border as opposed to internal 
interdependencies is that of the directionality of these 
determinations. One pole of this dimension could be taken 
as perhaps the most abstract possible definition of one 
aspect of 'dependence' - whereby all cross-border 
influences flow inwards. 
I have set out these points simply to clarify an 
abstract logic for dealing with 'the national level'. In no 
way does the following discussion fully operationalize this 
logic. One is caught in the bind that in order to fully 
situate social change in Scotland, one would ultimately 
have to deal in full with all the global systems in which 
different aspects of the Scottish social structure are 
enmeshed (in other words the 'history of the world' 
approach). On the other handt the explanandum is Scottish 
nationalism and the immediate determinant of that level of 
social reality is what happens in Scotland. 
As a half-way house, an extremely simple analytical 
division has been very useful when looking at empirical 
material. The division aims at categorizing the mechanisms 
which produce social change or the factors underlying 
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social change as they relate to the nationalt or in this 
case the Scottish# level of analysis. 
Briefly it is useful to distinguish between 
a) differential mechanisms - mechanisms which express the 
impact on Scotland's social structure of Scotland's 
particular structural position within a global system. 
By far the most important of such globiil systems is the 
world economy. Consequently the most important 
differential mechanism of social change is that which 
operates via the industrial structure to the extent 
that the latter is an expression of Scotland's changing 
position in the international division of labour. 
b) common mechanisms. These would be mechanisms whichr for 
whatever reason, operate in Scotland in parallel with 
their operation in other societies which can be 
classified in some respects as ak. in to Scotland. Forl 
example Scotland is an advanced industrial society 
having certain kinds of social change in common with, 
other advanced industrial societies. A type of change 
which one would have to attribute to such commoný 
mechanisms was the massive fall in the birth rate from 
the mid 1960s to the late 1970s shared by all the 
countries of Western Europe. Although the underlying 
factors have not been precisely identifiedi one would 
have to postulate a high degree of coincidence for 
similar factors not to have been at work. In this 
study, however, the most important level of commonality 
is the British. 
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C) specific mechanisms. These are the mechanisms 
underlying patterns of social change which can be 
attributed neither to the differential impact on 
Scotland of its position in a global structure nor to 
factors common to other advanced industrial societies 
or to Britain as a whole. 
This third category is residual and deliberately so. It 
is only by making every ef fort to link up what is happening 
in Scotland to more general mechanisms that it is possible 
to establish what is in fact caused by specifically 
Scottish factors. 
The taking of such precautions is necessary because 
much of the distortion which has resulted from adopting 
Scotland as a topic has been due to a tendency in 
discussing social change in Scotland to define as 
noteworthy only those aspects which are specific to 
Scotland. The logic seems to be that in looking at the 
Scottish social structure in order to explain events 
specific to Scotland - and here Scottish nationalism is in 
mind - the only aspects of the social structure of Scotland 
which need to be taken into account are those which are 
themselves specific to Scotland or in some way 'different' 
(often, implicitly, to the British or English pattern). 
It is worth briefly setting out the causal logic of the 
remainder of this study in terms such as those just 
outlined. Suppose one had identified ten causal factors 
whose combined effect could be held to account for the 
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electoral success of the S. N. P. 
In this situation, the f irst point to be borne in mind 
is that it is quite possible for only one of these factors 
to be specific to Scotland (as opposed to being common to 
Scotland and the rest of Britaint for example) in order to 
adequately explain the divergence of Scotland's political 
behaviour from that of the rest of Britain. 
Although at least ohe specific factor has to be 
identified to explain the divergence,, this does not imply 
that the other nine factors are superfluous. The nine 
common factors may be just as important to the overall 
explanation as the single specific factor. 
What might seem especially perverser particularly to a 
Marxistj is that there is no need for the specific factor 
in question to be at all 'basic' - in the sense of base and 
superstructure - for the overall explanation to accord a 
primary role to 'basic' or material and economic factorst 
all of which could,, in this case,, be common to Britain as a 
whole. In other wordsp in order to provide a materialist 
explanation for the success of Scottish nationalismt it is 
not necessary to ground such an explanation in material 
(economic,, objective) differences between Scotland and the 
rest of Britain. 
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Industrial structure. 
In terms of the general logic of this chapterj, a 
discussion of Scotland's changing industrial structure has 
two related functions to perform. 
The first is to set out the pattern of change in the 
industrial structure of employment in Scotland as the first 
link in the 'causal chain' which leads on to change in the 
occupational structure, social mobility and so on. 
The other is to examine how the pattern of industrial 
change in Scotland has compared with that of other regions 
of Britain and in particular to assess the degree and 
nature of Scotland's industrial specialization. 
This second strand of analysis is of special relevance 
to a discussion of the social basis of Scottish nationalism 
because of a common belief that Scotland's 'dependent' 
relationship with England has worked to distort Scotland's 
pattern of industrial development thus providing a readily 
understandable and material basis for nationalist protest. 
A simple presentation of trends in the industrial 
structures of Scotland on the one hand and England and 
Wales or Britain on the other will not solve the debate 
about the precise nature of the structural articulations 
between the economies of Scotland and England and Wales and 
the mode of their insertion into the world economy. 
However,, the work of C. H. Lee in making the attempt to 
reclassify the industrial and occupational data in the 
Censuses from 1841 to 1971 according to the 1968 Standard 
Industrial Classification provides an opportunity to come 
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to a more precise estimation of the degree of specificity 
of Scotland's pattern of industrial development since the 
middle of the nineteenth century. (See Appendix 2 for a 
full specification of Lee's data series and Appendix 3 for 
the socio-economic classifications employed. ) 
Among the methodological pitfalls in constructing and 
using such a series are those resulting from changes in 
principles of enumeration and classification between 
successive censusesito say nothing of the wider issues 
raised by real changes in the nature of the industrial 
groups themselves - the textile industry in 1971 is a far 
cry from that of 1841,, this qualitative change making any 
quantitative comparison over such a long period something 
to approach with caution. However until someone attempts 
the task of constructing a series on the basis of less 
time-bound and theoretically more -firmly based categories 
than those of the 1968 Standard Industrial Classification, 
Lee's series is the best we haver and is incomparably 
better than what was available before. There are fewer 
pitfalls however in ; aking inter-regional comparisons at a 
given point in time. In this caser all that one is 
depending upon is the use of the same procedures by the 
census-takers in the different areas. Although there may 
well have been some variation in practicest there seems 
little reason to believe that major inter-regional 
distortions resulted. 
For this initial comparative exercise the category 
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TABLE 5.1 
Industrial Employment by Industrial Order. 
Pritaint Scotland and Wales. 1851 to 1911 
Britain Scotland Wales 
Industrial 
Order 1851 1911 1851 1911 1851 1911 
2. Mining 9.5 14.8 9.3 16.6 36.9 51.9 
3. F. D. T. 10.0 13.6 9.0 13.2 8.1 10.2 
S. Chemicals 1.2 2.1 0.9 1.9 0.6 1.1 
6. Metal manuf. 7.2 7.1 6.3 9.3 17.3 11.9 
7. Mechanical eng. 1.9 6.2 1.7 7.8 0.9 3.0 
8. Instrument eng. 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 
9. Electrical eng. - 1.4 - 0.8 - 0.7 
10. Ships/mar. eng , 0.8 1.9 0.8 5.1 0.9 1.1 
11. Vehicles 1.2 2.3 0.6 1.1 0.9 1.1 
12. Oth. metal gds 2.4 4.9 1.0 1.9 1.0 1.5 
13. Textiles 32.2 18.1 44.4 19.3 7.1 2.9 
14. Leather etc. 1.5 1.5 0.9 0.8 1.2 0.4 
15. Clothing/ftwr. 22.3 15.0 18.3 11.0 20.3 9.7 
16. Bricks etc. 2.4 2.2 1.0 1.3 0.8 1.1 
17. Timber/furn. 4.7 3.8 3.5 3.8 3.1 1.6 
18. Paper etc. 1.8 4.8 1.9 4.9 0.7 1.4 
19. Other manuf. 0.5 1.1 0.2 1.1 0.1 0.2 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(Source: Lee series) 
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'industrial employment' -includes the sixteen manufacturing 
orders plus mining and quarrying (See Appendix 3). Table 
5.1 gives the structure of industrial employment for 
Britain as a whole and for Scotland and Wales in 1851 and 
in 1911. (Wales is included for comparative purposes in 
view of the practice of lumping together the 'Celtic 
peripheries' in many discussions. ) It can clearly be seen 
that although there are differences between Britain and 
Scotland, they are not dramatic and are dwarfed by those 
between Britain and Wales. 
To get a more precise estimate of degrees of similarity 
we can use the simplest measure of similarity between 
percentage distributions like these industrial employment 
structures - the positive percentage difference, often 
simply referred to as the index of dissimilarity. For 
example, to calculate this index for the dissimilarity 
between the industrial structures of Britain and Scotland 
in 1851,, one simply adds together the differences between 
the British and Scottish percentages for those industries 
for which the British figure is higher. If the structures 
were idpntical, the index would be zero. If there were no 
overlap at all the value would be 100. The index thus has a 
nicely intuitive meaning in percentage terms. In 1851 the 
index of dissimilarity between Britain and Scotland was 
12.3 and in 1911,10.2. This may be compared with an index 
of dissimilarity between the industrial employment 
structures of Britain and Wales of 37.6 in 1851 and 41.9 in 
1911. 
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For comparative purposes the same index was calculated 
for the other eight standard regions of Britain (See 
Appendix 4 for composition of regions) as shown in Table 
5.2. 
Table 5.2. Indices of dissimilarity between regional 
industrial employment structures and British structure. 
1851 1911 
South East 32.3 32.4 
East Anglia 29.6 28.4 
South West 20.8 20.3 
West Midlands 29.9 30.7 
East Midlands 13.8 13.8 
North West 28.1 25.3 
Yorks/Humberside 24.1 16.8 
North 25.8 36.9 
Wales 37.6 41.9 
Scotland 12.3 10.2 
As can be seen, in both 1851 and 1911 Scotland had the 
industrial structure which was closest to that of Britain 
as a whole while Wales was the most differentiated of all 
the regions. 
The generally accepted image of the situation is well 
expressed in a passage from a standard work on Scottish 
economic history 
by the nineteenth century Scotland had 
developed a very specialized regional branch of the 
British economyr heavily oriented towards the 
manufacture and export of capital goods and coarse 
textiles" (Lenman, 1977, p204) 
The data would seem to offer no support for the 
conventional wisdom. The significant specialization was 
that which Scotland shared with the rest of Britain, and 
that which took place, as we shall seep within Scotland. 
Kirby offers a convenient snapshot of the nature of 
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British industrial specialization 
"The distinctive nature of Britain's industrial 
structure was in fact one of the most outstanding 
features of the pre-1914 economy. In 1907 the old- 
established staple trades of textilest coalmining, iron 
and steel and general engineering accounted for 
approximately 50 per cent of net industrial output and 
employed 25 per cent of the working population. Most 
were heavily dependent upon an increasing narrow range 
of export markets located mainly within the British 
Empire, South America and Asiar and coalmining, 
textiles and iron and steel alone contributed over 70 
per cent of the country's export earnings. " (Kirby, 
1981, p3) 
If Kirby's characterization is compared with Table 5.1 
it can be seen that Scotland had a higher proportion of 
industrial employment in all four of the industries named 
by Kirby as British specialisms reflecting Britain's 
control over Imperial markets. In other words? Scotland's 
industrial structure was more "British" than that of the 
rest of Britainp and in terms of the structural basis of 
this industrial pattern of specialization could be said to 
have been more 'imperialist' than the rest of Britain. 
Scotland was simply better adapted to take advantage of 
Britain's highly advantageous structural position within a 
world economy itself shaped around Britain's interests. 
This rapid and thorough adaptation of Scottish industry 
to Britain's imperially guaranteed niche in the world 
economy is clearly brought out in the account of Scotland's 
economic development given in "Scottish Capitalism" 
(Dickson (ed. ), 1980). The authors point out for example 
that 
"In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the 
leading sectors of British industry were concentrated 
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to a remarkable degree in Scotland and above all in the 
Clydeside regionr based upon a unique combination of 
raw material resources, fuell geographical convenience 
and labour skills" (Dicksony 1980r p248) 
and later 
"no region in Britain was better integrated than 
Scotland into the structure of the imperialist economy" 
(ibid. r p254) 
However,, intertwined with this account of how this 
situation developed is a characterization of Scottish 
capitalism as a "client capitalism" which adds nothing to 
the explanatory power of the main argument and to a certain 
extent contradicts it. The term "client capitalism" 
receives no theoretical definition other than its relation 
to the distinction between - 'complementary' and 
'competitive' capitalismj, this implying a distinction 
between complementary and competitive patterns of economic 
specializ . ation. 
"In relation to Britain as a whole, what were to 
emerge in Scotland were complementary rather than 
competitive forms of capitalism, their interdependence 
being regularized under the political domination of 
Westminster. Such were the roots of the dependent or 
client status of the Scottish bourgeoisie. " (Dicksont 
1980f p90) 
What is involved in this distinction between 
complementary and competitive capitalism is never spelled 
out. What seems to be implied, and what would be a 
plausible way of implementing the distinctionp would be to 
define competitive specialization as resulting from the 
operation of market forces (competitive capitalism) whereas 
complementary specialization would result from non-market 
forms of Scotland's dependence on England. When it comes to 
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accounting for particular manifestations of Scotland's 
pattern of economic specialisation in concrete terms 
howeverp all that are referred to are market mechanisms. To 
take three examples, the factors set out as underlying 
Scotland's dominance in the eighteenth century tobacco 
trade, mid-nineteeth century 'hot blast' iron manufacture 
and late nineteenth century shipbuilding, are as follows - 
geographical position (tobacco trader plOO; shipbuildingr 
pl9l)f labour costs (tobacco trader plOO; hot blast iron, 
p189; shipbuilding, pl92)f raw materials (shipbuildingr 
pl9l)r banking facilities (tobacco trade, plOO; hot blast 
iron, pl88)j technical expertise (hot blast ironp p188; 
shipbuilding, pl9l) (All referencesp Dicksonj 1980). And 
yet despite an inability to pinpoint any mechanisms at work 
other than the operation of comparative advantage within 
the context of British imperialism, there is an insistence 
that these developments demonstrate complementarity rather 
than competitiveness with respect to English development. 
The usage is not even as consistent as this would imply. 
For exampler the development of the Scottish textile 
industry is shown as illustrating 
"how the changing product mix of the Scottish 
economy shifted rapidly along complementary lines in 
response to competitive pressures from England". 
(Dicksonr 1980t p185) 
In shortj in the account given in "Scottish capitalism" 
the terms 'client capitalism' or 'Complementary 
development' would seem to be entirely superfluous to an 
adequate account of the pattern of Scotland's industrial 
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development. Such an account could be couched entirely in 
terms of the process of capital accumulation in the context 
of Britain's structurally dominant position in the world 
economy and the bulk of "Scottish Capitalism's" account is 
couched in these terms. It is unfair to single out this 
analysis in particular in that it is one of the more 
balanced accountsr but this only goes to show the ubiquity 
of the temptation to pull in theoretically unnecessary 
terms in order to suggest the operation of a mechanism 
analagous to dependence between Scotland and England. What 
seems to be happening in such an account is a kind of 
conceptual slippage, Because Scottish industry was highly 
integrated into the international economyp it was in a 
sense 'dependent' on developments in this economy. If 
England is then seen as dominating this international 
economy it is easy to take the next step of seeing Scotland 
as dependent on England. We can see this happening in the 
following passage from "Scottish Capitalism". 
"The prominence of the Indian-market for the 
turkey red-dyersi centred in the Vale of Leven, 
illustrates Scotland's dependence upon an English 
dominated trading system" (Dicksonj 1980j, pl. 87) 
We are almost at the bizarre stage of seeing Scotland 
being 'dependent' upon occupying a dominant position in the 
world economy, a position which (in this case) is 
predicated upon the prior destruction of the Indian textile 
industry. it isasif England having created the British 
A 
Empirep Scotland was forced into a position in which it had 
to exploit - was dependent upon exploiting - the British 
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Empire 
There was one category of English capital which might 
be said to have had a relation of structural dominance with 
Scottish capital and that was finance capital centred on 
the City of London. Even here however Scottish capitalism, 
to the extent that it did have its own financial 
institutions was in a better position than many English 
manufacturing regions. Paradoxically, of coursel to the 
extent that Scotland's financial network exhibited a 
greater tendency to channel investment funds abroad than 
was the case elsewhere in Britain (Lenman,, 1978, p192) it 
was precisely Scottish autonomy which contributed to the 
lack of investment in Scottish industry which itself made 
the impact of the post-World War I collapse of the 
international economy so much more of a catastrophe for 
Scotland. Even more ironically, through this greater 
tendency to invest abroad in search of higher profitsr 
Scottish capitalism was more classically 'imperialist' in 
the sense used by Hilferding and Lenin than was the case 
south of the border. Yet againr the roots of Scotland's 
decline are to be found in a 'surfeit of imperialism' 
rather thant as is so often made outr in a position of 
clientage or dependence with respect to England. 
To return to the rapid survey of the development of 
Scotland's industrial structure, the First World War and 
the brief post-war boom served to make even closer the 
adaptation of Scotland's and Britain's industrial structure 
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to their imperial niches in a world economy of a particular 
form. The inevitable corollary was however that when this 
international order collapsedp Scotlandj, given its greater 
adaptation to it, suffered all the more. 
The extreme localisation of the effects of this 
collapse within Scotland in the 1920s and 1930s stemmed 
from the degree of regional specialization which had 
occurred within Scotland. In 1851j, the mean inter-regional 
positive percentage difference between the industrial 
employment structures of Scotland's twelve principal 
industrial regions was 26.4. (See Appendix 4 for the 
defintion of the regions on which this calculation was 
based). By 1911j, this index of dissimilarity had risen to 
43.0. From a shared emphasis on the production of textiles 
in 1851, industrial specialization rapidly took place along 
two main axes. The firstr focussed in particular on 
Renfrewshire and Dumbartonshire (more precisely on 
clydeside) was into engineering and shipbuilding. The 
second was into coal and steel. By 1911 there was thus a 
roughly tripartite pattern of regional industrial 
development formed by these two axes and that formed by the 
regions which had maintained their specialization in 
textiles - primarily around Paisley, Dundee and the 
Borders. 
To anticipate a little, it has been this pattern of 
specialization - reflecting Scotland's rapid adaptation to 
the market opportunities resulting from the Empire - from 
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TABLE 5.3 
Industrial employment by Industrial, Orderg Britain and 
Scotland. 1931y 1951# 1961 and 1971. ' 
Britain Scotland 
1931 1951 1961 1971 1931 1951 1961 1971 
2. Mining. 14.9 9.5 7.9 4.6 16.4 11.4 10.8 '5.0 
3. F. D. T, 9.1 8.4 7.7 8.7 11.6 11.1 10.4 13.7 
4. Coall pet . 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 
prods. 
5. Chemicals 2.8 4.5 4.8 5.4 2.1 3.9 3.9 4.2 
6. Metal man . 5-2 6.4 6.9 6.5 7.2 7.2 7.9 6.8 
7. Mech. eng. 6.4 10.5 12.4 13.2 8.0 12.2 14.6 14.0 
8. Inst. eng. 0.7 1.3 1.6 1.7 0.5 1.0 1.4 2.5 
9. Elec. eng. 3.5 6.3 8.3 9.9 1.2 2.1 4.0 7.2 
10. Sh & ME 2.2 3.1 2.6 2.1 4.9 8.8 7.9 5.6 
11. Vehicles 5.8 8.3 9.2 9.3 3.3 4.2 4.0 5.1 
12. Other MG 4.6 5.7 5.8 6.9 2.2 3.4 2: 8 4.1 
13. Text. 15.5 11.1 8.7 6.9 17.8 13.5 12.3 10.4 
14. Leather 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.5 
15. C+F 11.8 7.6 6.0 5.5 6.3 4.6 3-. 5 4.5 
16, B*P. G 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.6 2.0 2.5 2.6 3.0 
17. Timb/fn. 3.9 3.7 3.3 3.5 5.5 4.5 3.5 3.8 
18. P. P. P 6.2 - 5.8 6.7 7.2 6.8 6.0 7.1 7.3 
19. Oth. man. 2.5 3.0 3.2 3.8 2.7 2.4 2.4 2.2 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(Source: Lee series) 
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which Scotland? and particular regions of Scotlandt have 
found it difficult to break in the course of the twentieth 
century. 
Due to changes in Census procedurest and in particular 
a switch from an occupationally based to an industrially 
based classification in the Population Census,, it is much 
more difficult to trace industrial employment changes over 
the crucial years from 1911 to 1931. Campbell (1980f Tables 
5 and 7) has carried out calculations based on the Censuses 
of Production of 1907 and 1924 which cover roughly the same 
industries (with the addition of public utilities). Again 
the general picture is one of parallel change (the positive 
percentage difference between the Scottish and United 
Kingdom industrial employment structures according to 
Campbell's somewhat different categorization moves from 
12.0 to 10.5). 
Table 5.3 gives the pattern of industrial employment 
for Britain and Scotland from 1931 to 1971. Over this 
periodr the industrial employment structure of Scotland 
appears to have been marginally more differentiated from 
that of Britain as a whole than was the case in the 
nineteenth century - at least to judge from the indices of 
dissimilarity given in Table 5.4. This table also gives two 
versions of what could be called an index 'of specialization 
of the ten British Standard regions, The first is the mean 
index of dissimilarity between all pairs of regions, The 
second is the mean index of dissimilarity between the ten 
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regions and the British structure. These indices show that 
there was a process of convergence at a regional level in 
which Scotland did not take part. This must be seen in the 
context of the fact that in 1931 and 1951 Scotland was 
still the region with the industrial structure closest to 
the British mean and in 1961 and 1971 only the North-West 
of England was closer. In other wordst there was a tendency 
for the other regions of Britain to converge on Scotland. 
Table 5.4 
Index of dissimilarity 
between Scottish and Indices of British 
British industrial emp- regional specialization 
loyment structures. (I) (II) 
1931 15.4 29.1 30.2 
1951 16.1 24.5 26.0 
1961 18.2 24.1 24.9 
1971 14.6 21.1 20.0 
An idea of the relative pace of industrial 
transformation in these years can be gained by simply 
calculating the positive percentage difference between the 
industrial structures at successive Census dates: 
Period Britain Scotland 
1931-1951 15.5 13.7 
1951-1961 7.4 6.6 
1961-1971 6.6 12.0 
This gives the interesting result that industrial 
change at this level of aggregation would appear to have 
proceeded at a relatively constant rate in Britain as a 
whole but to have shown a marked acceleration in Scotland 
in the 1960s. 
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A major aspect of this relatively accelerated rate of 
industrial change in Scotland in the 1960s was that 
Scotland caught up to some extent in terms of Industrial 
Order 81 electrical engineering. Scotland's historically 
low proportion of employment in this order had long been 
held to be perhaps the major symptom of Scotland's failure 
to change over from the highly vulnerable 'nineteenth 
century' industries to the 'next wave' of industries - 
vehicles,, consumer goods and electrical engineering (with 
an increasing electronic component) - whose growth in the 
English South and Midlands in the 1920s and 1930s had been 
the main factor behind these regions surviving the 
depression in much better shape than areas still reliant on 
the olderr heavier industries. Table 5.3 shows the extent 
to which Scotland had indeed lagged behind Britain as a 
whole in terms. of employment in electrical engineering. By 
1971 however the gap was much smaller - particularly if one 
includes the closely related industrial order of instrument 
engineering. By then 9.7% of Scotland's industrial 
employment was in these two orders compared with 11.6% of 
British. Most of the higher British figure can be accounted 
for in terms of the concentration of employment in these 
two orders in the two regions of South-East England (18.3%) 
and East Anglia (14.0%) with all but two of the other 
Britisn regions lying in a band between 8.9% (Wales) and 
11.4% (South-West England). 
Althoughl as we have seent there was a general process 
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of convergence in the industrial structures of the British 
regions in the course of the twentieth century, this had 
not occurred - at least up to 1971 - within Scotland. The 
industrial employment structures of the main Scottish 
industrial areas (See Appendix 4 for definitions) I 
although they have tended to move away from some of the 
more extreme traditional specializations r have tended to 
remain broadly within the main lines of specialization 
bequeathed by the high tide of Victorian industrial 
expansion. The index of specialization for these areas 
(mean positive percentage difference between all pairs of 
these regionsj, over all industries) showed little change: 
51.1 in 1931; 52.7 in 1951; 55.5 in 1961 and 49.4 in 1971. 
This stability seems to have been the result of two 
processes working in opposite directions. One the one hand 
the decline in employment in some of the more localised 
traditional industries - in particular, mining and 
shipbuilding - worked to reduce the degree of regional 
specialization. On the other hand, much of the more recent 
industrial development - in particular chemicals and motor 
vehicles - was also extremely localized and thus worked to 
increase specialization. Localization in the latter case 
had less to do with historical factors such as deep-water 
or raw materials and much more to do with the increase in 
the minimum size of individual production units. As the 
fate of Linwood and Bathgate showed much of this 'new' 
investment was just as vulnerable and eventually produced a 
new pattern of localized unemployment in its wake. 
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So far I have been presenting the main trends in the 
structure of 'industrial' employment only, since this has 
tended to be the main focus of discussions of 
Scotland's 'dependence'. Industrial structure in this 
narrow senser and in particular the specificities of 
Scotland's industrial structurer has had a great deal of 
symbolic significance, outwith its technical relationship 
to economic developmentp particularly in the crucial period 
of the 1960s when the Scottish 'projectlo, based on the 
emergence of Scotland as a unit of economic policy, took 
shape. This concern has often spilled over into academic 
discourse on the success of nationalismr and has indeed 
provided much of the imagery for this discussion. The usual 
line, implicit or explicitt has been that because Scottish 
nationalism is a specifically Scottish phenomenon, it must 
have had its origins in the specificities of Scottish 
economic development. Scotland's industrial structure has 
been a primary area in which to look f or these 
specificities. What I have tried to do in this extremely 
superficial survey is to put the specificities of the 
development of Scotland's industrial employment structure 
into proportion. The main point which is clear is that in 
terms of industrial change what Scotland has shared with 
the rest of Britain far outweighs what has differentiated 
it. Orr to make the point another wayr far from being a 
specialized region of Britainr an image which is much 
closer to the truth is that Scotland is a miniature version 
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of Britain as a whole (there are many parallelst one of the 
most obvious being that Edinburgh's employment structure in 
relation to the rest of Scotland is very similar to that of 
London as compared with the rest of England). Another 
conclusion is that in terms of industrial structurep 
Scotland is the wrong unit. Industrial differentiation 
within Scotland has been of a much higher order of 
magnitude than the industrial differentiation of Scotland 
from the rest of Britain. 
In order to lay a foundation for an understanding of 
occupational change in terms of the changing employment 
structure, we need to widen the focus to encompass all 
employment and not just industrial employment narrowly 
defined. 
The sectoral structure of employment. 
In terms of understanding occupational changer change 
at the broader sectoral level has been much more important 
than change in the industrial structure of mining and 
manufacturing. Again I will operate with common-sensically 
de-fined sectors based on the simple aggregation of 
industrial orders. (See Appendix 3) 
Table 5.5 shows the long term trend in sectoral 




Sectoral employment structure. Scotland and Britain. 
1851 to 1981 
Scottish figures in bold 
Sector* 
A. F. F. M+Q Manuf Const Inter Service p9p. d 
1851 26.0 4.4 43.2 5.5 5.0 15.9 5.2 
23.2 4.3 40.9 5.7 5.8 20.1 
1871 23.6 5.6 40.9 6.6 6.5 16.8 8.0 
16.7 5.1 40.3 6.8 7.0 24.2 
1891 15.3 6.3 43.2 6.4 9.3 19.6 6.5 
11.7 5.8 40.8 6.8 10.1 24.8 
1911A 11.4 8.7 43.9 6.0 10.3 19.8 6.8 


















8.7 -6.6 33.5 6.6 19.6 25.0 
1931 10.1 6.0 30.3 4.2 25.4 24.0 5.5 
6.4 5.6 32.1 5.0 24.0 26.8 
1951 7.4 4.5 35.1 6,9 21.9 24.1 4.3 
5.1 3.8 36.3 6.3 21.4 27.2 
1961 5.8 3.9 32.5 7.9 23.7 26.2 5.0 
3.7 3.1 36.1 6.9 22.6 27.7 
1971A 4.1 1.7 32.2 8.2 21.0 32.8 2.5 
















1.9 1.8 36.4 5.6 20.6 33.5 
1981 2.3 1.9 25.4 7.5 19.8 43.1 4.3 
1.7 1.6 28.6 5.3 20.9 41.9 
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The master trends can be fairly briefly outlinedr 
although such a rapid survey will inevitably gloss over 
deviations due to cyclical fact ors (in particular the 
effects of the depressions of the 1870s and 1930s to say 
nothing of the present one) and also some quite fundamental 
changes in the composition of the sectors themselves (for 
example the service sector has swung over from consisting 
predominantly of domestic service categories to consisting 
predominantly of categories associated with the expansion 
of the state apparatus such as the education and health 
sectors) 
The long term decline in the proportion of employment 
in agriculturer forestry and fisheries proceeded very much 
in parallel for Scotland and Britain. This decline has also 
reduced the contribution of this sector to the overall 
difference between the sectoral employment structures of 
Britain and Scotland. The long term rise and fall of 
employment in mining and quarrying has also proceeded in 
parallel at the Scottish and British levels. 
The main explicit classificatory shift in the data 
series occurred between Lee's Series A (up to 1911) and his 
series B (1911 onwards - see Appendix 2). The major 
substantive recategorization involved at this date was the 
transfer of the employment categories now include'd in 
industrial order 23, Distributive Tradesp from the 
respective manufacturing orders to this order. At the 
sectoral level this involves moving these categories from 
179 
the manufacturing to the intermediate sector. As can be 
seen by comparing the Series A distribution for 1911 with 
the series B distribution for the same yearp this 
recategorization involved around 8% of employment for both 
Scotland and Britain. Miking allowance for this 
reclassification (either by adding on 8% to the figures for 
manufacturing for the years after 1911 or subtracting 8% 
for the years before) what stands out is the quite 
remarkable stability in the share of manufacturing 
employment#, for both Britain and Scotlandp in the hundred 
years from 1851 to 1951. 
Up to 1911, Scotland's proportion of employment in 
manufacturing was around 3 percentage points higher than 
that for Britain as a whole. The greater impact of the 
depression in Scotland however pushed Scotland's share 
below that for Britaint where it has since remained. 
The main implication of the hundred year stability in 
the share of manufacturing employment is that, contrary to 
the most commonly held image of long term sectoral changel 
the decline in employment in agriculturer forestry and 
fisheries was accompanied not by an increase in the share 
of manufacturing employment but by a growth in the shares 
of the intermediate and service sectorst plus, in the 
nineteenth centuryr mining and quarrying. 
In the second half of the nineteenth centuryt the 
corollary of Britain's lower share of employment in 
agriculturej forestry and fisheries was a higher share of 
f 
employment in the service sector than was the case in 
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Scotland. This imbalance was the largest component of the 
difference between Scotland and Britain's sectoral 
employment structures in the years up to 1911. This 
difference in service employment between Scotland and 
England was almost entirely due'to the contribution of 
South-East England to the British figure. In 1851, the 
percentage employed in the service sector in England and 
Wales outwith the South-East was 17% - just one per cent 
above the Scottish figure - compared with 31% in the South- 
East itself. In 1911, again, the figure for England and 
Wales outwith the South-East was just one percentage point 
highert at 21%r than that for Scotland, compared with a 
figure for the South-East of 38%. 
To put the degree of differentiation of the Scottish 
sectoral employment structure from the British into 
perspective, in both 1851 and 1911 Scotland's structure was 
the closest to the British of all ten standard regions - as 
we saw was the case for industrial employment above. 
In comparison. with the relatively clear cut trends and 
differentiations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuriest the patterns from 1931 on are somewhat more 
complext although there is a slight trend towards a 
convergence of sectoral employment structures both between 
Scotland and Britain and between the standard regions in 
general. 
It is only from 1951 onwards (at least in terms of 
Census dates) that what is usually regarded as the dominant 
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trend of the 'occupational transition' in advanced 
industrial societies - the switch in employment from the 
manufacturing (secondary) sector to the service (tertiary) 
sector - can be said to have gathered steam. Even by the 
1960s however, the by now rapid relative expansion in the 
service sector was accompanied by an uneven pattern of 
decline across all the other sectors rather than by a 
decline in the share of manufacturing alone. Only in the 
1970s was the pattern predominantly one of a straight 
switch from manufacturing to services under the impact of 
an ominous combination of processes common to other 
advanced industrial societies as well as Britain's specific 
loss of industrial competitiveness. 
As can be seen from the positive percentage differences 
between the Scottish and British sectoral employment 
structures given in the last column of Table 5.5F by 1971 
Scotland's sectoral structure of employment was extremely 
close to that of Britain as a whole. This can be seen as an 
aspect of a general process of convergence. between the 
sectoral employment structures of the British regions. By 
1981, only three of the standard regions had an index of 
dissimilarity from the British sectoral structure greater 
than 6- the South-East (8.1) with a disproportionate share 
of service employment (though by no means to the extent 
that this was true of the nineteenth century) and the East 
(10.7) and West (11.1) Midlands which had managed to hold 
out longer against the drop in the share of manufacturing 
employment. 
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The accelerating increase in the share of the service 
sectorr from 24% in 1951 to 26% in 1961 to 33% in 1971 and 
finally to 43% in 1981 -a jump of 19 percentage points in 
30 years, or 17 percentage points in twenty years - has 
been by far the greatest single shift in the sectoral 
employment structure which Scotland has experienced in a 
comparable time span - certainly in the period covered by 
the datap and probably ever. 
Compared with the sheer brute fact of this shiftr the 
specificities of Scotland's pattern of change - even the 
fact that the comparable shift at the British level was 
only 15 percentage points compared with Scotland's shift of 
19, so that Scotland moved f rom having a lower to a higher 
share of service employment - pale into relative 
insignificance. 
This shift into service employment has been a powerful 
motor of social change in Scotland since the Second World 
War. Major aspects of changes in occupational structure, 
social mobility and patterns of female employment can be 
said to have been determined by it. 
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Occupational Structure. 
The main task of this section is to set out the main 
trends of occupational change in modern Scotland. However? 
given the interlocking nature of this chapter as a whole,, 
it is also necessary to look 'backwards' along the causal 
sequence by assessing the extent to which occupational 
change can be attributed to changes in the industrial 
structure. We also need to look 'forwards' in that 
occupational change has been a major determinant both of 
patterns of social mobility and patterns of female 
employment. These two aspects of social change will be 
dealt with specifically in the sections which follow. 
The problems involved in constructing a long term 
series based on the Census showing changes in the 
occupational structure are even more daunting than those 
involved in constructing an iýdustrial series so much have 
the bases of classification changed. However, as background 
work to the Scottish Mobility Study, an attempt was made to 
reclassify the occupational distributions published in the 
reports of the 1921,1931 and 1951 Censuses of Scotland 
according to the Socio-economic Group Classification used 
in the 1961 and 1971 Censuses (Payne 1977a). 
No detailed description of the classification 
procedures used is available and the status oft or even the 
possibility oft such a series has been questioned. 
(6) 
However if we bear in mind that recategorization of 
distributions built up on different bases can never 
completely bridge the gap between them and that the 
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constantly changing nature of individual occupations 
undermines the continuity-of reference between any 
categorization built up f rom these individual occupations, 
Payne's series i's probably the best possible short of 
access to the data at the individual level. The Census 
reports themselves, particularly in 1921 and 1931t tried to 
assess change in occupational structure correcting for 
changing bases of classification and their conclusions back 
up the trends revealed by Payne's series. If one does not 
try to squeeze too much out of itr the series can be 
accepted as as giving, in broad outline, a sketch of the 
evolution of the Scottish occupational structure between 
1921 and 1971. Payne did the same recategorization for 
England and Wales and these figures are juxtaposed with the 
Scottish in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. The discussion will focus 
initially on the trends in Scotland. 
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 present a reworking of the series 
initially presented by Payne and will provide the basis for 
the discussion of long term trends from 1921 to 1971. 
Commentary will be primarily in terms of Table 5.7 showing 
socio-economic groups as a proportion of the non-farm non- 
armed forces workforce. (See Appendix 3 for fuller 
definitions of the socio-economic groups). 
Apart from the relatively unproblematic decline in 
agricultural occupations, two marked uni-directional trends 
stand out over the period as a whole. Firstlyj, there was a 
long term decline in skilled manual workers (socio-economic 
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Table 5.6. 
Socio-economic groups as percentage of total economically 
active population. Scotland/Engl and and Wales. 1921-1971. 
S. e. g. 1921 1931 1951 1961 1971 
1 and 2 Emps. Scot 5.4 5.2 5.7 6.4 7.5 
and mgrs. E+W 6.6 5.9 6.7 7.6 9.1 
3. Professional Scot 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.6 
self emp. E+W 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.6 
4. Professional Scot 1.2 1.0 1.5 1.7 2.6 
employees E+W 0.9 0.8 1.4 2.2 3.0 
5. Intermediate Scot 2.7 2.8 4.0 5.7 7.6 
non-manual E+W 2.9 2.7 3.7 5.8 7.6 
6. Junior Scot 13.0 14.6 17.8 20.4 20.1 
non-manual E+W 11.8 14.3 18.0 20.3 21.3 
7. Personal Scot 6.9 8.1 5.2 4.4 5.3 
service E+W 8.1 9.1 5.4 4.7 5.2 
8. Foremen and Scot 1.3 1.4 1.8 2.4 2.4 
supervisors E+W 1.2 1.2 1.7 2.4 2.5 
9. Skilled Scot 31.2 28.8 26.5 26.3 22.6 
manual E+W 30.8 28.0 26.1 23.7 21.1 
10. Semi-skilled Scot 13.7 12.9 13.6 14.8 12.9 
manual E+W 15.3 13.5 13.7 15.0 12.7 
11. Unskilled Scot 9.1 12.8 12.6 9.0 9.6 
manual E+W 8.3 12.3 11.1 7.8 7.3 
12. Own account Scot 3.5 3.9 2.3 1.7 1.9, 
workers E+W 5.1 5.0 4.1 3.1 3.7 
13. Farmers - Scot 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.4 0.7 
emps. and mgrs E+W 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.5 
14. Farmers - Scot 1.2 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 
own account E+W 0.7 0.6 0.9 0.7 0.6 
15. Agricultural Scot 6.1 4.8 4.2 2.9 1.9 
workers E+W 4.3 3.4 2.8 1.8 1.1 






Socio-economic groups 1 to 12 (non-f arml non-armed f orces) 
as percentage of total in s. e. g. s I to 12. Scotland/England 
and Wales. 1921 to 1971. 
S. e. g. 1921 1931 1951 1961 1971 
1 and 2. Emps Scot 6.1 5.6 6.2 6.8 8.0 
and mgrs. E+W 7.2 6.3 7.3 8.2 9.7 
3. Professional scot 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.7 0.7 
self emp. E+W 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 
4. Professional Scot 1.3 1.1 1.6 1.8 2.8 
employees E+W 1.0 0.8 1.6 2.4 3.2 
5. Intermediate Scot 3.1 3.1 4.4 6.1 8.2 
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group 9) as a proportion of the non-farm workforce from 
35.3% in 1921 to 24.3% in 1971. Secondlyr there was a 
continuous rise in non-manual employment - although it is 
worth noting that no single non-manual socio-economic group 
shows an increased share for all four intercensal periods. 
From Table 5.7 it can be seen that the decline in 
skilled manual workers was concentratedinto two inter- 
censal periods - 1921 to 1931 and 1961 to 1971. 
It seems fairly clear that the decline in the period 
from 1921 to 1931 was primarily a reflection of the decline 
in Scotland's traditional heavy industries. The occupations 
showing the greatest numerical decreases between 1921 and 
1931 bring this out clearly - mining and quarrying 
occupations were down 18% to 124jOOO and metal workers down 
23% to . 189pOOO (Census of 
Scotland 1921 and 1931p 
occupational Tables). 
Similarly the relative stability in the proportion of 
skilled manual workers from 1931 to 1961 is probably 
explicable in terms of industrial structure. As was seen in 
the previous sectiont the increase in employment in 
mechanical engineering just about compensated for any 
declines in employment in coalf steel and ships (cf Table 
5.3). 
For the period from 1961 to 1971 we can move onto 
rather more solid ground in assessing the sources of change 
in the occupational structure in general and the decline in 
skilled manual workers in particular. The fact that the 
socio-economic group and industrial classifications were 
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only slightly changed between 1961 and 1971 makes it 
possible to carry out a form of shift-share analysis to 
separate shifts in the occupational structure which can be 
attributed to changes in the industrial structure of 
TABLE 5.8A. 
Socio-economic groups I to 12.1961t 1971 and change. 
MEN IM EMPLOYMERT All numbers thousands. 
S. e. g. 1961 1971 Change 
1. E+M Lge. ests. 41 3.0% 50 4.0% +10 +24.1% 
2. E+M Sm. ests. 79 5.8% 86 6.8% +7 +8.5% 
3. Prof. s. e. 15 1.1% 13 1.0% -1 -9.9% 
4. Prof. emp. 34 2.5% 53 4.2% +19 +54.5% 
5. Interm. n. m. 53 3.9% 71 5.7% +18 +33.8% 
6. Junior n. m. 185 13.5% 152 12.1% -33 -17.8% 
7. Pers. serv. 14 1.0% 14 1.1% 0 -0.5% 
8. Forem + sup 51 3.7% 49 3.9% -2 -3.5% 
9. Skilled man. 545 *39.7% 445 35.4% -100 -18.3% 10. Semi-sk man. 193 14.0% 173 13.7% -20 -10.2% 
ll. Unsk. man. 133 9.7% 118 9.4% -15 -11.5% 
12. Own account 30 2.2% 34 2.7% +3 +11.4% 
Total segs 1-12 1372 100% 1258 100% -114 -8.3% 
(Source: as in shift share analysis. See App. 5) 
employment and shifts which reflect changes in occupational 
structure within industries (Technical details of the 
shift-share techniques employed are given in Appendix 5). 
The patterns tend to be completely different for men and 
women so that they will be discussed separately. Changes in 
the socio-economic group structures of men and women in 
employment in 1961 and 1971 are shown in Tables 5.8A and 
5.8B. 
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The number of skilled manual male workers in employment 
fell by almost exactly 100,, 000 or 18.3% between 1961 and 
1971. Both the occupational nature of the skilled jobs lost 
and the shift-share analysis would suggest that over half 
TABLE 5.8B. 
Socio-economic groups 1 to 12.1961F 1971 and change. 
WOMEN IN EMPLOYMENT All numbers thousands. 
S. e. g. 1961 1971 Change 
1. E+M Lge. ests. 4 0.5% 9 1.1% +5 +126.6% 
2. E+M Sm. ests. 22 3.1% 25 3.1% +3 +14.1% 
3. Prof. s. e. ' 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 0 +43.1% 
4. Prof. emp. 4 0.6% 6 0.8% +2 +53.5% 
5. Interm. n. m. 76 10.9% 104 13.0% +28 +10.0% 
6. Junior n. m. 276 39.4% 304 38.1% +28 +10.0% 
7. Pers. serv. 83 11.9% 104 13.1% +21 +25.8% 
8. Forem + sup 3 0.4% 5 0.7% +2 +68.4% 
9. Skilled man. 67 9.6% 49 6.1% -18 -27.0% 
10. Semi-sk man. 104 14.9% 107 13.4% +3 +2.5% 
ll. Unsk. ' man. 52 7.4% 76 9.5% +24 +46.2% 
12. Own account 9 1.2% 9 1.1% 0 +4.4% 
Total segs 1-12 700 100% 798 100% +98 +14.0% 
(Source: as in shift share anal ysis. See App. 5) 
the decline can be attributed to the fall in employment in 
Scotland's traditional heavy industries - in particular 
coal-mining, steel-making and shipbuilding. Numericallyr 
the main occupational contributors to the decline are 
easily identifiable. The number of underground workers in 
coal mines shrank dramatically from 55rOOO to 23,, 000. The 
number of skilled workers in metal production fell by 91000 
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to 12j, 000 and the number of metal plate workers and 
riveters by 5rOOO to 11FOOO. These three occupational 
groups alone then accounted for 46jOOO of the total decline 
of 100"000. 
Table 5.9. Manual socio-economic groups. Industrial and 
occupational components of change. 1961 to 1971. Thousands 
Total Men Women 
Ic oc Ic oc Ic oc 
8. Fmen. and sup. -5 +5 -5 +3 0 +2 
9. Skilled manual -63 -55 -57 -42 -5 -13 
IO. Semi-skilled man. -11 -6 -13 -8 +2 +1 
11. Unskilled manual +3 +6 -3 -12 +6 +18 
The shift share analysis shows that in net terms 
industrial change could be held to account for 57,, 000 of 
the total loss of skilled male manual jobs (Table 5.9). The 
most important individual industrial components of change 
wereattributable to the shrinking of total employment in 
the mining (35,000) and shipbuilding and marine engineering 
(14,, 000) industries. 
Apart from this decline due to industrial change the 
shrinking proportion of skilled manual jobs for men within 
industries accounted for 43,000 of the total. Almost all 
manufacturing industries ended the decade with a lower 
proportion of male skilled manual workers and almost all 
the skilled manual occupational groups shrank in size. The 
only exceptions were plumbers, skilled electrical workers 
and lorry drivers. 
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It is worth noting that in sectoral terms,, less than 
half of all male skilled manual workers were employed in 
the manufacturing sector in both 1961 and 1971, with, in 
1971 just under 20% working in construction, 20% in the 
intermediate sector and just under 10% in the service 
sector. 
Skilled manual jobs for women suffered an even sharper 
decline of 27% from 67,000, to 49,, 000 (Table 5.8B) The 
greatest single factor was a simultaneous contraction of 
total employment in the textile industry and a reduction in 
female skilled manual workers as a proportion of total 
employment in the industry. The number of skilled manual 
women employed in the textile industry declined from 26,000 
to 16,000 - 6j000 of this reflecting the decline of total 
employment in the industry, the rest reflecting the fact 
that proportion of workers in the industry who were skilled 
female manual workers fell from 27% to 21%. There was an 
even sharper fall in female skilled manual workers as a 
proportion of total employment in the clothing and footwear 
industry - from 24% to 16%. In manufacturing in general, 
the proportion of women workers classified as skilled 
manual fell from 40% to 29%. Only one occupational group of 
women workers classified as skilled showed a significant 
increase - from 500 to 11200 - and this hardly compensated 
the general picture of an even more savage squeeze on 
skilled work by women than was the case for men. 
As can be seen from Table 5.7 the long term trends for 
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semi- and unskilled manual workers (socio-economic groups 
10 and 11) were much less clear-cut. The semi-skilled group 
is especially heterogeneous in occupational terms - only a 
relatively small proportion conforming to the accepting 
image of a worker standing at an assembly line - and 
without better details of the classification procedures 
used for the earlier Censusesp it is probably safest to 
regard the long term picture as one of relatively stability 
for both these groups. 
From 1961 to 1971 however there was one especially 
marked change and that was the 46% increase in the number 
of female unskilled manual workers. This increase could be 
largely accounted for in terms of two quite different 
occupational categories. The number of charwomen and office 
cleaners went up from 38rOOO to 52rOOO and this increase 
was associated particularly with the education and health 
apparatuses. It should also be noted that 85% of women 
workers in this occupation group worked part-time in 1971. 
The other female unskilled category to expand dramatically 
was Ilabourers and other unskilled workers' from 6,000 to 
161,000. The expansion of this group did reflect a 
deskilling process within manufacturing - the proportion of 
women's jobs classified as unskilled manual rose from 7% to 
11.5% in the food, drink and tobacco industries and from 
3.5% to 8.7% in textiles. 
To sum up the general pattern of change in the patterns 
of manual employment, although much of the decline in the 
number of skilled workers could be attributed to industrial 
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change, there was an equally powerful pressure at work 
within industrial orders which could be summarized as 
producing a relative shift away from male labour towards 
female labour and away from skilled labour towards 
unskilled labour. This is most simply expressed by the fact 
that of the six categories formed by cross-cutting male and 
female and skilled, semi-skilled and unskilledr it was the 
skilled female group which declined fastest and the 
unskilled female group which increased fastest. 
Apart from the decline in skilled manual employmentr 
the other major long-term trend was the growth in t he share 
of non-manual employment. The trend in the share of non- 
farm employment in broader groupings of the white collar 
socio-economic groups is as follows: 
1921 1931 1951 1961 1971 
S. e. g. s 1 to 5 11.1% 10.2% 12.6% 15.4% 19.7% 
S. e. g. s I to 6 25.8% 26.1% 32.1% 37.3% 41.3% 
It would be unwise to generalise about the factors 
underlying this overall increase in the share of white- 
collar employment, since as can be seen f rom Table 5.7 the 
timing and magnitude of the increase varies greatly between 
the individual white-collar groups. 
Most obviouslyr it was the junior non-manual group 
which accounted for the bulk of the increase up to 1951 and 
for almost half of total white-collar growth in the period, 
from 1951 to 1961. There was no further increase in the 
share of this group in the 1960s however. In this decade 
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the running was made by the intermediate group (s. e. g. 5), 1 
employed professionals (s. e. g 4) and the employers and 
managers (in fact the growth was entirely in the managerial 
category) of s. e. g. 1 and 2. 
For the years before 1961 we can only make a tentative 
assessment of the sources of these changes in terms of 
industrial change and occupational change within 
industries. However, from the simple fact that between 1931 
and 1961 the share of the service sector only rose from 24% 
to 26.2% it is likely that the bulk of the growth in white- 
collar employment was due to occupational change within 
Table 5.10. Non-manual socio-economic groups. Industrial 
(IC) and occupational (OC) components of change. 1961 to 
1971. Thousands 
Total Men Women 
S. e. g Ic Oc Ic Oc Ic Oc 
1. E and m, 1ge ests 0 +14 0 +10 0 +4 
2. E and mr sm ests -3 +13 -2 +10 -1 +4 
3. Prof. self-emp. +6 '-7 +5 -6 0 0 
4. Prof employees +7 +14 +6 +13 +1 +1 
S. Intermediate +33 +12 +9 +9 +24 +4 
6. Junior -2 -7 +3 -36 -1 +29 
industrial orders rather than to a change in the sectoral 
structure of employment. 
Again the shift-share analysis allows us to specify 
more precisely the sources of growth in white-collar 
employment in the period f rom 1961 to 1971. The net 
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industrial and occupational components of change for the 
six white-collar groups are given in Table 5.10 
Looking first at the Junior non-manual groupr the 
stability in the size of the group concealed a sizable 
shift in its sex composition. This process had been well 
under way long before 1961. For exampler the number of 
males in occupation order XXIII (clerkst typists etc. ) 
increased by 12% from 63,000 to 70rOOO between 1931 and 
1951 whereas the number of female clerks and typists rose 
by 84% from 76fOOO to 139,000 in the same period. In the 
decade-1961 to 1971 the number of men in the junior non- 
manual group as a whole fell from 185,000 to 152,000 while 
the number of women in the group rose from 276,000 to 
304FOOO. 
As its name suggests, s. e. g. St intermediate non- 
manualj, is relatively heterogeneous in occupational terms. 
However it is dominated in numerical terms by the two 
occupations of nurses and teachers - both of these, nurses 
in particularp being predominantly female. This 
occupational composition is reflected straightforwardly in 
the pattern of change revealed by the shift-share analysis. 
Since nurses and teachers are concentrated overwhelmingly 
into one industrial order - Professional and Scientific 
Services - which encompasses both the health and education 
establishments#, the rapid increase in total employment in 
this order - an increase of 44% from 134fOOO to 193,000 - 
was the main factor underlying the increase in the numbers 
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of women in s. e. g. S. The expansion of this one order alone 
accounted for 22,000 of the total increase of 28jOOO in 
intermediate non-manual women. Intermediate non-manual 
males are rather more occupationally diverse - including 
civil service executive officerst social welfare workers 
and and an increasingly significant component of lab 
assistants and technicians and other technical and related 
workers. The number of workers in these latter "technician" 
groups increased from 11,000 to 20,000. This increase of 
9,000 thus accounted for around half of the total increase 
of l8jOOO in the number of male intermediate non-manual 
workers. In terms of the sources of this changer about half 
was due to occupational change within industrial orders and 
about half to industrial change - again primarily the 
expansion. of professional and scientific services. 
The first point to make about the professional groupst 
s. e. g 3j, self-employed and s. e. g 4, employed professionalst 
is the' extent to which they were male dominated in 1961 
with the patterns of change in the sixties only making 
feeble inroads on this imbalance. In 1961j, women made up 4% 
of self-employed professionals and in 1971F 7% (this 
increase consisting almost entirely of a growth in the 
number of women doctors). Among employed professionals 10% 
were women in both 1961 and 1971. 
The total number of self-employed profesionals declined 
from 15,000 to l4jOOO whereas the number of employed 
professionals went up from 38,000 to 59, rOOO. This 
difference in trend between self-employed and employed 
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professionals partially coincided with a change in the 
balance of the professional group as a whole away from the 
older professions - doctors, dentists,, lawyers etc. - and 
towards the more technologically oriented professions - 
engineering in particular. The number of doctorsf dentists 
and lawyers remained relatively stable at a total of just 
under 14,000 and the number of clergy fell by 36% to 4,500. 
The number of engineers on the other hand more than doubled 
from 7,000 to 151,000 and the group of 'other technologists' 
increased from 3r400 to 81300. The next fastest rising 
professional groups were surveyorst architects and town 
planners up 54% to 10,000 and university teachers up 58% to 
41,000. If we regard the professional groups as making-up 
the heart of the middle-classes the sixties saw a quite 
massive shift in the internal balance of the group. 
There is no simple pattern to the sources of these 
changes in terms of industrial and occupational components 
of change. Approximately a third of the rise in the number 
of professional employees could be attributed to change in 
the industrial structure of employment - primarily, again, 
in the form of the expansion of Professional and Scientific 
Services. This leaves two thirds of the increase to be 
attributed to an increase in the proportion of 
professionals within industries. Half of this positive 
occupational component took place in manufacturing - the 
engineering and electrical goods industries (Industrial 
Orders 7 to 9) alone taking on 3,800 extra professionals. 
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Finally we come to the apex of the socio-economic group 
-hierarchy - socio-economic groups 1 and 2, employers and 
managers. As might be expectedr from their very definition 
in terms of position in the intra-organisational hierarchy 
- ownership and control in fact - the increase in the 
numbers in these groups was dominated by an increase in 
their 'proportions within industries. 
Although the 1961 Census of Scotland did not publish a 
breakdown of the two socio-economic groups into their 
employer and manager components, it is possible to come to 
a reasonable approximation on the basis of the employment 
status by occupation tables with the following results. 
The number of employers (overwhelmingly in small 
establishments i. e. employing less than 25 people - there 
were only 1060 employers of more than 25 people in 1971) 
fell by 26% from 65,, 000 to 48rOOO.. the number of managers 
in large establishments (25 or more workers) rose by 33% 
from 43,, 500 to 58,000 while managers in small 
establishments increased by almost 5b% from 43,000 to 
64rOOO. 
It can be seen from this already very condensed 
analysis that the sources of the two dominant trends in of 
occupational change in Scotland in this century cannot 
easily be summarized even at the level of the most simple 
analytical step of differentiatingr for a single decade# 
between shifts due to change in the industrial structure of 
employment and shifts taking the form of occupational 
change within industries. 
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Having covered the more important trendst we can now 
turn to the rather more problematic area of assessing the 
significance of the Scottish deviation from the patterns in 
England and Wales. The general impression given by Tables 
5.6 and 5.7 is one of parallel development. The positive 
percentage difference between the two non-farm structures 
showed some convergence from 5.1 in 1921 to 3.0 in 1951 
followed by some divergence back to 5.2 by 1971. England 
and Wales tended to move ahead in terms of the proportion 
of non-manual workers whereas Scotland maintained. its 
relative preponderance of skilled manual workers. By 1971, 
howeverr the biggest discrepancy was Scotland's larger 
proportion of unskilled manual workers. 
(7) 
It is interesting at this point to look at the way 
Payne initially presented this data series. (Payner 1977a) 
This is not for any additional substantive informationt but 
rather because his interpretation of the data and the way 
it has subsequently entered the conventional wisdom present 
perhaps the paradigmatic example of the way socio-economic 
comparisons between Scotland and the rest of Britain have 
tended to be made. Differences are seized upon and 
parallelisms ignored. 
Payne concuded, on the basis of the data presented here 
in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 but presented in a rather more 
opaque form in his own paper,, that 
"Clearlyr Scotland has become more working class 
and its population is now less skilled, vis-a-vis 
Englandr than at any time since the First World War. " 
(Payner 1977a, p33) 
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As can be seen from Tables 5.6 and 5.71 this statement 
is true of some aspects of the comparisonj is not true of 
others and in general refers to what could be regarded as 
fairly trivial differences. What is perhaps even more 
interesting is the way in which Payne's general conclusion 
has been acceptedp ofjýen in the form of citation of this 
particular passage, as an adequate characterization of the 
relative trends of the Scottish and English occupational 
structures. 
For examplej(8) in discussing the effects on the 
occupational structure of the penetration of the Scottish 
economy by multi-national firmst "Scottish Capitalism" 
states: 
"... in importing production line branch plants 
requiring, in the main, semi-skilled workers and a 
disproportionately low number of technical and skilled 
workers as against indigenous employerst US firms 
reinforced the de-skilling processes already at work in 
the economy. This deskilling led one writer to conclude 
that by the mid-1970s Scotland was 'more working class 
and its population ... less skilled, vis-a-vis Englandl 
than at at any time since the First World War'" 
(Dickson,, 1980p p296) 
It is not even clear that what "Scottish Capitalism" 
is referring to as de-skilling, primarily a swing away from 
skilled manual to semi-skilled manual, is the same as what 
Payne is refers to as de-skilling. The most common usage of 
de-skilling in Payne's paper refers to the increasing 
deficit of non-manual workers (including skilled manual 
workers) as compared to manual workers in Scotland as 
compared with England and Wales. It would seem that by the 
time Payne's conclusion has reached the state of being 
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quoted in isolation its assumed meaning bears almost no 
relation to the data patterns which it originally purported 
to summarise. 
Finally, Payne himself draws the conclusionp on the 
basis of the comparative series as a wholer that 
"Hechter's ideas of internal colonialism, or the 
models of dependency and exploitation of the periphery 
seem better suited to the explanation of the 
impoverishment of Scotland's manpower than the grand 
but unworkable theories of convergence and 
technological determinism. " (Paynep 1977ar p35) 
Now I have no more sympathy with 'grand but unworkable 
theories of convergence and technological determinism', 
whatever they arer than Payne. Who would? But if an analyst 
needing evidence of parallelism in long term patterns of 
occupational change in order to support a pet theory were 
to look at Payne's datar that analyst would be rubbing his 
hands in glee. In the real world they don't come much more 
parallel. But again, that would perhaps be another case of 
seeing in the data what you want to see. 
As one small contribution towards identifying where the 
main territorial discontinuities in occupational structure 
in Britain in fact liep Table 5.11 gives the socio-economic 
group structures (unfortunately only the data for men are 
available) for the ten standard British regions. 
We have already seen that in terms of the structure of 
industrial employment and the sectoral structure of 
employment,, Scotland has been closer to the British pattern 
than any other region of Britain. On this basis we would 
not expect Scotland's occupational structure to be 
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particularly deviant. As can be seen from the indices of 
dissimilarity from the British structure at the foot of 
Table 5.11 this is in fact the case. only the North-West of 
. 
England had in 1971 an occupational structure closer to 
that of Britain than Scotland's (remember that the North- 
West was the only region to have an industrial structure 
closer to that of Britain in 1971). 
In terms of white-collar employmentr the divide is not 
between Scotland and the rest but between the South-East of 
England and the restj with East Anglia and the South-West 
also having relatively high proportions of white-collar 
employment. This will be partly a reflection of the fact 
that the service sector makes up a relatively high 
proportion of employment in these regions. For all the 
white collar groups, Scotland occupies a fairly median 
position. In terms of skilled and semi-skilled workers the 
division is again between the three 'southern' regions, 
this time with low proportionsr and the rest. Scotland in 
1971 did have the highest proportion of unskilled manual 
workers (socio-economic group 11). In this case#, the major 
divide was between the Southern and Midlands regions and 
the rest. Scotland also had a relatively low proportion of 
the two groups with a 'petty-bourgeois' tinge - owners and 
managers of small enterprises (s. e. g. 2) and own account 
workers (s. e. g. 12). 
The overall message of this section on occupational 
structure is analogous to the conclusion of the section on 
industrial structure. Just as it was then concluded that in 
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terms of impact on the overall process of social change in 
Scotlandr the expansion of the service sector was by far 
the single most important transformation, so in terms of 
occupational change, the expansion of white-collar 
employment has been by far single most important 
transformation since the war and one which Scotland has 
shared with the rest of Britain. 
occupational mobility 
To anticipate the findings of the next chapter,, upward 
social mobility, or more precisely the experience of inter- 
or intra-generational occupational mobility from the manual 
to the non-manual categoryp was the socio-economic 
characteristic most unambiguously associated with voting 
S. N. P. at the General Election of October 1974. 
For this reason it becomes especially important to 
specify the sources of upward occupational mobility in 
Scotland in the period from World War II to the mid-1970s 
qnd to situate Scotland's experience in terms of other 
advanced industrial societies and in comparison with 
England and Wales in particular. Given the dearth of 
systematic data on patterns of female social mobilityl the 
discussion in this section will be entirely in terms of 
male occupational mobility. 
The level of occupational mobility or changes in this 
level can be said to have two sets of determinants. 
The first is change in the occupational structurer the 
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topic of the previous section. Occupational structure lays 
down the distribution of origins (occupational backgrounds 
or fathers' occupations) and occupational destinations (cf. 
Halsey, Heath and Ridge, 1980). 
The second consists of the institutional mechanisms 
which operate to determine how the mapping of origins onto 
destinations actually takes place. Of these mechanismst 
the educational system is the most important. Since the 
conclusions relating to education as the principal mapping 
mechanism are essentially negative, I will deal with it 
first. The most important trendl throughout this century 
has been the increasing centrality of the education system, 
primarily in the form of the increased importance of 
academic certification in determining job status. 
Two examples, both of which have been extremely 
important in Scotland, should illustrate how this is 
occurring. 
The first concerns the role of fee-paying education in 
Scotland. There could be said to be two kinds of motivation 
for sending children to school outside the state system. 
The first relates to a belief in the intrinsic value of 
attending a fee-paying school. Attendance at such a school 
is itself seen as a marker of belonging to the privileged 
stratum and this intrinsic significance - together with 
non-academic corollaries of such attendance such as social 
skills, contacts and accent - and the level of academic 
qualifications attained is a relatively secondary concern. 
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The second is that fee-paying schools give a better chance 
of achieving academic qualifications, it being the latter 
which are the principal determinants of subsequent job 
status. What seems to have been happening over the last 
fifty years has been a swing away from the former 
motivation towards the latter (cf Highet,, 1969, p201). In 
other wordst the role of the fee-paying school has changed 
from being a method of signalling membership of the upper 
class to being a method of converting a privileged 
background into the increasingly common coin of academic 
qualifications. 
The more widely significant way in which the education 
system has become increasingly central in determining job 
status has been the expansion of school-leaving 
certification. In the immediate post-war years school 
leaving certification was relevant only to the small 
minority of school-leavers-who were trying for university 
entrance. Certification expanded inexorably thereafter so 
that by the 1970s the majority of school leavers were 
attempting to obtain some form of school leaving 
certification. 
As formal certification expanded to cover a much larger 
proportion of the school-leaving populationr there occurred 
what David Raffe (1981, p7) has, termed a widening bond 
between educational qualifications and occupational level. 
Now this increasing centrality of the educational 
system, and in particular paper qualificationsr to the 
process of mapping origins onto destinations, has in itself 
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no implications for the level of inter-generational 
occupational mobility. What these implications are depends 
increasingly however upon the link between origin and 
academic success. If the link between social background and 
academic success remained relatively unchangedr then the 
increased centrality of academic qualifications for 
occupational level had at best neutral and at worst 
negative implications for the level of occupational 
mobility. In one of the most sophisticated exercises of its 
kindp the Centre for Educational Sociology compared the 
relationship between social background and a wide range of 
indicators of academic success for those children in 
Scotland who transferred from primary to secondary school 
in 1948 with the same relationship for those children who 
transferred in the years 1970/72. The authors felt able to 
conclude that 
".. the general level of class inequality in 
Scottish education has remained remarkably constant 
since the war" (Gray, McPherson and Raffer 
1983, p226) - 
What this means is that for the purposes of understanding 
occupational mobility patternsin Scotland since the warg, 
the educational system as well as other mechanisms for the 
transmission of inequality such as inheritance patterns can 
be accorded a relatively subsidiary explanatory role in 
comparison to the the main causal factor involvedr 
occupational change. As was seen in the last section, by 
far the most important aspect of occupational change has 
been the expansion of non-manual jobs since the war. 
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Before moving on to looking at how occupational change 
has affected mobility patterns we can briefly place 
Scotland's mobility pattern into a broad comparative 
context. Anthony Heath (1981) has collated mass mobility 
rates (inter-generational moves across the manual/non- 
manual line for the non-farm population) calculated on the 
basis of surveys carried out in the ten years around 1970 
for 19 industrial societies including most of Western 
Europer the U. S. A.,, Canada,, Japan,, Polandr Hungary and 
Yugoslavia. The range was from 37.5 for Canada to 25.5 
for Italy (Heathr 1981# Table 7.1). When we calculate the 
same rate for Scotland on the basis of the Scottish 
Mobility Study (see below), Scotland's mass mobility rate 
of 31.7 comes almost precisely in the middle of the range, 
two percentage points lower than the rate for England and 
Wales. 
Tables 5.12A and 5.12B are the inflow and outflow 
tables for Scotland and England and Wales for Hope- 
Goldthorpe classes presented by Goldthorpe on the basis of 
the Oxford (9) and Scottish (10) Mobility Studies and are 
to date the only relatively fine-grained basis for 
comparison we have. Comparison of such tables is extremely 
tricky, primarily because of the effects of the differing 
marginal frequencies (distributions of fathers' and sons' 
occupations) of the two areas on the mobility patterns. 
For this reason it is not immediately apparent from these 
tables that much of the difference in mobility patterns 
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across the manual/non- manual line between Scotland on the 
one hand and England and Wales on the other consists of a 
greater tendency towards self-recruitment in the three 
'middle-class' Hope-Goldthorpe classes. This can be shown 
most clearly in terms of what could be called the self- 
recruitment odds ratios for these classes - these are shown 
in Table 5.13. Take the example of Hope-Goldthorpe Class I. 
TABLE 5.13 
Self-recruitment odds ratios by class: Scotland, England and 
Wales 
Scotland England and Wales 
Tota l Non-farming Total Non-farming 
Class 1 8.4 (8.1) 6.6 (6.4) 
Class 11 3.5 (3.2) 2.5 (2.4) 
Class 111 1.1 (1.1) 1.5 (1.5) 
Class IV 9.0 (5.3) 4.3 (3.8) 
Class V 1.6 (1.6) 1.5 (1.5) 
Class VI 2.1 
. 
(1.9) 2.0 (2.0) 
Class VII 1.8 (1.7) 2.2 (2.1) 
Source: Calculated from Table 5.12. 
The self -recruitment odds -ratio of 8.4 this Class in 
Scotland means that the chances of the son of a Class I 
father ending up in Class I are 8.4 times the chances of 
the son of a father who is not in Class I ending up in 
Class I. A more general comparison of inter-class 
reciprocal odds ratios between Scotland and England and 
Wales confirms that whatever greater rigidity there is in 
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mobility patterns within Scotland is concentrated around 
Hope-Goldthorpe Classes I and IV - precisely the classes 
for which as Goldthorpe points out 
*the transmission of economic resources may be 
expected to be particularly important. ... Class I 
comprises a minority of large proprietors and 
independent professionals who will often be in a 
position to pass on businesses or practices to their 
sons; and furthermore, they, and also members of the 
majority groupings in this class, are likely to be able 
to aid their sons' occupational chances substantially 
by the use of their relatively large incomes and 
accumulations of wealth - for example, by buying them a 
privileged education, extensive training, or indeed ,a business or practice of their own. In Class IV we then 
have all other 'independents' ... not covered by Class I. While their capitals will certainly vary 
considerably in size and form, one may suppose that a 
majority within this class will still have the 
potential to transmit capital to some extent. So far as 
the likelihood of intergenerational transmission of 
class position is concerned, we would therefore wish to 
regard these two classes as being sui 
generis. "(Goldthorpe, 1980, plOO) 
The available evidence would s-uggest therefore that these 
processes of the intergenerational transmission of class 
position are relatively more powerful in Scotland than 
south of the border, contrary to Scotland's egalitarian 
mythology. 
Making the contrast even starker, is the fact that the 
evidence points towards greater social fluidity within the 
working class and between the working class and routine 
non-manual occupations than is the case in England and 
Wales. 
As always, these differences must be seen in the 
perspective of the sheer scale of occupational mobility j 
generated since the war by the expansion of of white-collar 
occupations since the war - an expansion common to Scotland 
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and England. We can get some limited leverage on how the 
pattern of occupational change translated into patterns of 
occupational mobility on the basis of the findings of the 
Scottish Mobility Study. 
To date, the most detailed information published on the 
basis of the Scottish Mobility Survey has related to the 
pattern of recruitment to first jobs 
Among respondents who started work in the 1930s the 
proportion of first jobs which were non-manual was under 
20%. This non-manual proportion of first jobs then rose to 
around 25% during and immediately after the war, falling 
back to a level of 22 to 23% in the early 1950s. Then 
followed a steady rise to a level of over 40% in the late 
1960s. 
The implication of this trend in terms of upward 
occupational mobility depends of course on how many of the 
non-manual first jobs were filled by men with manual 
backgrounds. In fact,, if we assess the contribution of the 
rise in the proportion of first jobs which were non-manual 
to upward mobility as the proportion of all first jobs 
which were non-manual and filled by men from manual 
backgrounds, this proportion was relatively stable. It rose 
erratically from a level of just under 10% in the 1930s to 
around 15% in the mid-1950s stabilizing at this level 
thereafter. The demand created by the rapid rise in the 
Proportion of non-manual first jobs from the mid-1950s 
onwards was satisfied overwhelmingly by an increase in 
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recruiting from non-manual backgrounds. 
Why this happened - why the surge in non-manual 
employment does not seem to have been accompanied by a 
surge in recruiting to non-manual first jobs of men from 
non-manual backgrounds - can be explained in terms of two 
related considerations. First#, when the non-manual first 
jobs are broken down into the component social grades, it 
seems to have been true over the whole period that the 
higher up the status spectrum, the lower a proportion of 
first jobs were filled by men from non-manual backgrounds. 
In other words, movement up over the manual/non-manual line 
had conformed to the well-known pattern of being 
disproportionately into the lower non-manual grades. What 
happened in the nineteen sixties was that an important 
section of these lower non-manual grades - routine clerical 
- began to be increasingly filled by women. 
This should not overshadow the main finding however 
that from the mid-fifties to the late nineteen sixties, 
fifteen per cent of all non-manual first jobs were filled 
by men with manual backgrounds. 
The trends discussed so far have related primarily to 
only one step in the full mobility pattern - that between 
father's occupation and respondent's first job. Information 
on intra-generational career mobility is rather more patchy 
- allowing glimpses rather than an overview of the whole 
pattern. To date the data on intra-generational mobility 
presented by the Scottish Mobility Study is too ambiguous 
to present briefly. Much more serviceable is the snapshot 
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of early career patterns presented by the follow-ups to the 
Scottish Mental Survey (12). 
What should first be pointed out is the probability of 
a high overall level of job movement in the early years of 
work. Maxwell (1969,, p58) showed that the average number of 
jobs held by the male respondents to the 1963 follow-up to 
the Scottish Mental Survey during their first ten years of 
potential employment was between 3 and 4. 
The implications of this rapid job changing in terms of 
early career occupational mobility can be seen in terms of 
the straight manual/non-manual dichotomisation of Table 
5.14. 
TABLE 5.14 Scottish Mental Survey. Mobility patterns at 
ages 18 and 27'.. 
Age 18 (1954) 
Son 
Father Non-manual Manual 
Age 27 (1963) 
Son 
Non-manual Manual 
Non-manual 49 (9.6%) 54 (10.5%) 75 (16.4%) 23 ( 5.0%) 
Manual 29 (5.7%) 381 (74.3%) 102 (22.3%) 257 (56.2%) 
(Source: calculated from Macphersone 1958, Table LXIII and 
Maxwell, 1969, Table 18) 
At age 18,, over half of the sons with non-manual 
backgrounds were in manual jobs. Conversely only 29 (or 7%) 
of the 410 sons with manual fathers were in a non-manual 
category (which here includes most full-time education). 
Thus at this stage in the sons' careersr there was an 
overall bias towards downward mobility with a particularly 
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low incidence of upward mobility. 
With the passage of a further 9 years however, by which 
time the respondents were aged 27, the situation had been 
entirely transformed. The number of downwardly mobile had 
halved, while the number of upwardly mobile had trebled. In 
the latter case, more than twice as many men were upwardly 
mobile between the ages of 18 and 27 as had experienced 
inter-generational mobility before the age of 18. Nearly 
17% of the entire sample were men with manual backgrounds, 
who had been doing a manual job at age 18 yet who had moved 
into the non-manual group by the age of 27 in 1963. 
Thus the general message of the available data on 
patterns of occupational mobility in Scotland in the thirty 
years after the war is thatl although there is no evidence 
of any weakening of the mechanisms maintaining inequality 
of opportunity, this fact was camouflaged by the existence 
of a considerable degree of upward occupational mobility 
across the manual/non- manual line due almost entirely to 
the expansion of the white collar sector. 
Discussion of the implications of these mobility 
patterns for social and political perceptions will be left 
for the next chapter. Here the aim has been simply to 
establish the source of the pattern of upward mobility and 
to confirm that Scotland was very much in line with the 
rest of Britain in experiencing these patterns. 
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Women in the workforce. 
So far this chapter has dealt with aspects of social 
str_uctural change in modern Scotland - industrial changer 
occupational change and patterns of social mobility - whose 
relevance to an understanding of political change has 
generally been recognized. 
This section and the next will deal with aspects of 
social change - changes in the pattern of female economic 
activity and changes in patterns of child-bearing - which 
have rarely been explicitly linked with patterns of 
political change. I include a brief discussions of these 
aspects of social change not because I have been able to 
establish any explicit and direct linkage between them and 
the pattern of S. N. P. success but for rather more general 
and indirect reasons. 
Most generallyi, any discussion of social change which 
omitted them would be highly partial. In the years of the 
S. N. P. 's electoral advance - say from the early nineteen 
sixties to the mid nineteen seventiest quantitative shifts 
in these areas were greater than any quantitative shifts of 
an equivalent generality in industrial or occupational 
structure. Between 1961 and 1971, the proportion of married 
women who were economically active rose from 23 to 40 per 
cent and this trend continued into the nineteen seventies. 
Between 1964 and 1977, the Scottish birth rate fell from 20 
births per thousand population to 12. As we have seen, the 
only aspect of general employment patterns to have come 
near to matching this rate of change was the expansion of 
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employment in the service sector. This was no coincidence 
in that the expansion in service employment was the most 
important single factor in the general expansion of 
employment opportunities for women, the latter in turn 
being probably the main driving force behind the fall in 
the birth rate (see the discussion in the next section). In 
terms of the general causal logic of this chapter then? a 
long causal chain is completed by a discussion of changing 
women's work patterns and patterns of child-bearing. 
Whereas changes in the industrial and occupational 
structure are macro-socially determined shifts over which 
individuals have little if any controlt changes in 
fertility can be seen as responses to these macro-social 
trends in the one domain in which people (or rather 
couples) have been able to exercise some degree of control 
- that of planning af amily. 
In the next chapter the focus is on changing 
orientations towards work and the family and the meshing of 
these orientations with political perspectives. The 
increase in the paid employment of married women and 
falling marital fertility can be regarded as being among 
the most significant objective correlates of such changing 
orientations. 
The greatest single shift in the labour market since 
the Second World War has been the large-scale entry into 
paid employment of married women. 
As far as can be made out on the basis of Lee's series 
219 
of employment data (See Appendix 2 for description of the 
data) women as a proportion of the Scottish labour force 
slowly declined in the course of the second half of the 
nineteenth century. They made up 34% of those whose 
occupations were enumerated in 1851, a figure which fell to 
29% by 1911. This seems largely to have been associated 
with a shift in the balance of industrial employment away 
from textiles (53% of employment in textiles was female in 
1851) and clothing and footwear (50% female) towards the 
heavier industries of Scotland's 'second wave' of 
nineteenth century industrialization- coalf steel, 
shipbuilding and engineering - in which employment was 
almost exclusively male. 
By 1931p women made up 30% of those classified as 
'gainfully occupied' (r-oughl-y equivalent to the current 
term 'economically active') or 32% of total employment. 
This represented a female 'economic activity rate' of 
34.5%. 
Tables 5.15 and 5.16 give the distribution of economic 
activity by age,, for all women and for married women 
respectively, from 1921 to 1971. 
Throughout this period, variations in the total level 
of economic activity by women and in age-specific female 
activity rates have been the outcome of shifts in the age- 
specific economic activity rates of married and unmarried 
women and in the age of marriage. 
From 1951 to 1971 there were three master trends, with 
different relative strengths for the different age groups. 
'1 
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1. Among the two youngest age groups an increase in the 
take-up of continuing full time education. 
2. A continuing rise in the proportion of women married in 
each age-group - this having the greatest impact on the 
younger age groups. 
3. A continuous increase in the proportion of married 
women of all ages going out to work or actively seeking 
work. 
Table 5.15 All women. Percentage in age group economically 
activer 1921 to 1971. 
Age group 1921 1931 1951 1961 1971 
(Age) (Age) 
44.1 (14-15) 49.1 (14-15) 
15 to 19 73.5 (16-17) 75.6 (16-17) 80.2 73.9 58.0 




(21-24) 64.7 60.1 58.5 
25 to 29 40.6 44.7 39.2 36.3 40.4 
30 to 34 27.8 30.3 29.6 32.1 42.5 
35 to 44 21.5 24.0 29.8 36.9 55.9 
45 to 54 18.9 20.3 29.7 38.6 59.6 
55 to 59 18.1 24.6 34.4 50.4 
17.4 
60 to 64 15.5 14.1 20.0 27.8 
65 to 69 13.7 10.9 7.7 9.3 12.0 
70 plus 6.2 4.8 2.8 2.7 2.8 
All aged 15 and over 34.5 
33.6 35.9 42.4 
(Sources: Census of Scotland: 1931rVol III,, p ix; 1951, Vol 
IVp Table C; 1961, Vol 6, I,, Table 3; 1971, Econ Act Table 1. ) 
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TABLE 5.16 Married vomen. Percentage in age group 
economically active. 1921 to 1971. 
Age group 1921 1931 1951 1961 1971 
16 to 19 27.3 34.9 40.6 
7.4 11.4 
20 to 24 
. 
24.9 32.2 41.7 
25 to 29 4.8 7.8 17.8 22.5 31.9 
30 to 34 4.3 6.9 15.4 22.4 37.7 
35 to 44 4.7 6.5 16.7 27.8 52.0 
45 to 54 5.1 6.0 14.0 27.0 54.5 
55 to 59 5.3 8.5 18.6 42.2 
4.4 
60 to 64 4.2 4.0 8.7 22.7 
65 to 69 3.1 2.7 2.1 3.4 8.7 
70 plus 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.8 2.1 
All aged 
16 and over 4.8 6.4 14.2 22.8 40.2 
(So urces: Census of Scotland: 1931rVol III,, Table F; 1951,, 
Vol IVp Table E; 1 961p Vol 6fIlTable 3; 1971, Economic 
Act ivity Tablest Tab le 1. ) 
Among the two youngest age groupst 15 to 19 and 20 to 
24 it was a combination of the first two trends which 
predominated in the 1950s and 1960s to produce a falling 
activity rate. 
The most complex case is the 25 to 29 year old group. 
In the 1950s, the continuing rise in the proportion who 
were married (from 70% to 80%) was sufficient to outweigh 
the effects of increased participation among those who were 
married. Thus there was a fall in the economic activity 
rate for women in this age group. In the 1960st the rise in 
the proportion married (from 80% to 84%) was having an 
222 
increasingly marginal effect so that the rise in the 
proportion of married women economically active was 
suffcient to push the total economic activity rate back up 
to 40%. 
Among the older age groups, it was primarily the 
dramatic increase in economic activity rates for married 
women which pushed up the overall activity rate. By 1971,, 
54.5% of married' women aged 45 to 54 (this age group 
representing the 'peak') were economically active compared 
with only 27% in 1961. 
By 1961, the age distributions of economic activity for 
women in general and for married women only followed a bi- 
modal pattern. This bi-modal pattern can be seen in embryo 
in the 1951 distributionj but not at all in 1931. The 
return to work after having children appears to have been 
an essentially post-war phenomenenon.. 
Although this bi-modal pattern was clearly discernible 
in 1961 and 1971, its level and shape had changed 
dramatically between these dates. In 1961f the rise from 
the low level of economic activity among married women 
(22.4% for the 30 to 34 age group) associated with having 
and bringing up children was only a matter of 5 percentage 
points to a 'post-children' peak of 27.8% in the 35 to 44 
age group. By 1971 the trough of economic activity in the 
25 to 29 age group was itself higher at 31.9% than the 
post-children peak in 1961. The 1971 peak was both later 
(age 45 to 54) and much higher (54.5%) than in 1961. 
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In general, the increase in the proportion of married 
women in paid employment outside the home can be seen to be 
the resultant of supply and demand factors pushing in the 
same direction. On the supply side was a reduction in the 
numbers of *unmarried women available for employment due to 
the combined effects of prolonged full-time education and 
the fall in the average age of marriage. On the demand side 
were patterns of occupational and sectoral change greatly 
increasing the demand for cheap and flexible female labour. 
TABLE 5.17. 
A. Sectors as percentage of total female employment. 
Sector 1931 1951 1961 1971 
Agr, for, fish. 0.7 2.3 1.6 1.5 
Mining 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 
Manufacturing 32.1 34.7 29.5 26.3 
Construction 0.5 1.0 1.2 1.3 
Intermediate 22.7 24.1 26.6 23.3 
Services 41.7 37.7 41.0 47.6 
B. Percentage of employment in sector which was female. 
Sector . 1931 1951 
1961 1971 
Agrr fort fish 8.3 9.3 8.7 13.1 
Mining 1.6 1.6 2.0 3.1 
Manufacturing 33.6 30.0 29.3 30.6 
Construction 4.0 4.3 4.9 6.1 
Intermediate 28.3 33.6 36.2 41.7 
Services 55.2 47.5 50.5 54.4 
(Source: Lee, 1980. See App. 3 for sector definitions. ) 
The close association between this general increase in 
economic activity on the part of women and the main 
directions of change in the sectoral structure of 
employment can be seen in Table 5.17. By far the most 
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significant single factor since the war has been the growth 
of the service sector which contributed to the growth of 
female employment in two ways. Female employment as a share 
of total employment in the service sector increased from 
48% to 59% from 1951 to 1976 and thist coupled with the 
expansion in total employment in the sector, increased the 
service sector's share of total female employment from 38% 
in 1951 to 55% in 1976. 
The complementary contractions in the share of female 
employment took place in the manufacturing and intermediate 
sectors. It is perhaps worth noting the stability in the 
proportion of manufacturing employment which was female. 
We have already noted some of the occupational 
characteristics of the increase in female employment in the 
section on occupational change. 
The most valid generalization is that the increase in 
women's employment took place at the lower levels of both 
the non-manual and manual skill and status hierarchies. 
In 1961,72% of women employed in the six main non- 
manual socio-economic groups (1 to 6) were in the least 
skilled -and lowest paid, junior non-manualp with another 
20% in the intermediate group (s. e. g. 5) leaving only 8% in 
the professional and managerial groups 1 to 4. For men the 
figures were 45% in junior non-manual, 13% in intermediate 
and 41% in the professional and managerial. As Table 5.18 
showso, the balance swung even further against women in the 
1960s. 
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TABLE 5.18. Economically active women and men in socio- 
economic groups 1 to 6. 
1961 1971 
Women Men Women Men 
1 to 4 Prof. and manag. 8 41 9 48 
5 Intermediate 20 13 23 17 
6 Junior 72 45 68 36 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
We have already seen how the balance of manual 
employment for women swung heavily towards work classified 
as unskilled. 
The other main category in which female employment rose 
in the 1960s was socio-economic group 7r personal service 
workers. Female employment in this group increased by 26% 
to 104rOOO, Again the expansion was greatest in the more 
menialt low-paid jobs of the category - barmaids,, 
waitressest canteen assitants and maids. 
The final point to be made with respect to the overall 
increase in female employment is that it can be accounted 
for entirely in terms of an increase in the number of part- 
time jobs. Using the standard definition of part-time 
employment as involving working less than 30 hours a week, 
a very low proportion of women's jobs were part-time in 
1951. By 1961 the figur. e was 17% and by 1971 had rocketed 
to 33.5%. Between 1961 and 1971 in fact, while the total 
number of women in employment increased by 80,000, the 
number of women part-time workers went up by 145rOOO. This 
figure includes however around 24,000 teachers, or 73% of 
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all women teachers, who were classified as part-time 
presumably because many school hours clock up to less than 
30 hours. Apart from this anomaly with respect to teacherst 
part-time employment in 1971 was overhwelmingly 
concentrated into a few low-paid occupations - 41% (37FOOO) 
of shop assistants, 68% (29,, 000) of maids and related 
workers and 85% (43,000) of chars and office cleaners were 
part-time. These three occupational categories of part-time 
workers accounted for approaching half of all women part- 
time workers in 1971. 
As we have seen throughoutr patterns of industrial, 
sectoral and occupational change in Scotland have been very 
close to those of Britain as a whole. It comes as no 
surprise then that the same is true of the level of 
economic activity among women. In 19611 the Scottish female 
activity rate was 1.5 percentage points below that of 
Britain as a whole. By 1975, r this relatively small 
difference had diminished to 0.1 percentage points. 
Finally, we can briefly sum up the implications of the 
last three sections taken together. The conclusion has to 
be that the patterns of occupational change in Scotland in 
the thirty years after the war were rather more favourable 
for men than they were for womenj with women tending to 
move into jobs at the lower levels of both the manual and 
non-manual hierarchies. One implication of this shift in 
the sexual division of labour was likely to have been that 
social mobility patterns for men were rather more 
favourable than one would have expected solely on the basis 
227 
of gross shifts in the manual/non- manual balance. 
Conversely women were increasingly taking on dual roles at 
home and at work involving heavy demands on time and 
energy. 'The next chapter will deal with what could be 
called the experience of social change as basis for 
understanding the appeal of the S. N. P. We saw in chapter 
1 that men supported the S. N. P. at the General Election of 
October 1974 in much, greater numbers than women. It could 
be that the patterns of occupational change we have been 
discussing provided the material basis for an experience of 
social change which was much less favourable for women than 
it was for men. 
Changing fertility patterns. 
In the last section it was briefly suggested that there 
might well be a connection to be established between 
patterns of change in child-bearing behaviour and patterns 
of political change. I do not pretend to be able to 
establish precisely what this connection is but before 
attempting a brief explorationr it is worth making a few 
general points whiche although they prove nothing in 
themselves, would seem to make it highly unlikely that 
changes in voting patterns and changing patterns of 
fertility occurred entirely independently of each other. 
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Firstf, as already notedr there is the simple matter of 
simultaneity. In the years 1964 to 1977t the Scottish birth 
rate fell by over a third,, the greatest sustained decline 
over a comparable period since birth regi stration began in 
the mid-nineteenth century. Give or take a couple oý years 
either way? the coincidence between this period and the 
period of sustained rise in S. N. P. support is almost 
perfect. 
The second point follows fairly obviously from the 
first. Without attempting to be too preciser the age group 
whose changing orientations such changing fertility 
patterns reflect - those getting married and forming 
families in the 1960s and early 1970s - were also the age 
group which showed the highest level of support for the 
S. N. P. at the October 1974 General Election. 
Thirdly, and to anticipate the more detailed discussion 
of the next chapter, major themes of the sociology of 
modern Britain, relating in particular to the period with 
which we are concerned, have been the couplet of 
instrumentalism and privatization. Instrumentalism denotes 
an attitude towards work whereby it is seen almost entirely 
as a means to an end, with little intrinsic sigificance, - 
and is thus downgraded as a shaper of attitudes. 
Privatization denotes a centring of life on the isolatedr 
nuclear family,, private household unit. To the extent that 
instrumentalism reduces work to a means to an endr that 
lend' is (or was) increasingly what might be called the 
nuclear family 'project' defined primarily 
in consumer 
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terms. To the extent that the Icentre of gravity' of life 
was shifting from work towards the nuclear family, likewise 
the relative balance of influence on social and political 
perceptions will have shifted away from the workplace and 
towards the home. There are no better data on changes in 
the way people have actually lived their 'Private' lives, 
have implemented their family projects than changes in 
marriage patterns and birth rates. 
A minimum of straight demographic discussion is needed 
to put the rapidly changing fertility patterns of the last 
twenty years in long term context. 
Reliable birth records based on registration go back to 
1856. From then until the mid-1870st the Scottish birth 
rate stayed fairly steady at around 35 births per 1000 of 
the population. Then followed a long and steady decline 
over the next sixty years, interrupted only by fluctuations 
during and after World War I,, to a level of 18 per 1000 by 
the mid-1930s. This relatively low level was maintanied 
thoughout World War II and then followed, the brief post-war 
baby boom in the late 1940s, taking the birth rate up 
briefly to the low twenties. By the early 1950so, the rate 
was back down to around 18 per 1000. The subsequent and 
more celebrated baby boom of the late 1950s and early 1960s 
was quantitatively a matter of a mere 2 births per 1000 
population, taking the rate up to a peak of around 20 per 
1000 in the early 1960s, and was soon dwarfed by the 
massive decline in the birth rate which followed. The birth 
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rate had dropped below the previous lowest sustained level, 
that of the 1930s, by 1971p and continued to decline to a 
low point of 12 per 1000 in 1977j, after which there was a 
marginal but extremely tentative turnround which has 
already turned down again in the face of economic 
recession. 
In broad terms, these post World War II trends have 
been typical of much of Western Europe. If anything,, 
Scotland's baby bulge of the early 1960s was somewhat more 
marked than was the norm for Western and the subsequent 
decline was also steeper than the Western European norm. 
Historically,, the trend of Scotland's crude birth rate 
has broadly paralleled that for England and Wales. For much 
of the nineteen fiftiest the Scottish birth rate was around 
2 births per 1000 or 10% above the rate for England and 
Wales. The nineteen sixties however saw a convergence so 
that throughout the 1970s the Scottish birth rate tended to 
be only one or two decimal points above that for England 
and Wales. 
One factor to marginally influence the birth rate in 
the post-war years was the changing pattern of marriage. 
The one trend in marriage patterns which has 
overshadowed all others in Scotland as in much of the 
developed world over the last fifty years has been a marked 
increase in the proportion of the population of 
marriageable age who are marriedr this being particularly 
true of younger age groups. This has been due both to a 
lowering of the average age at first marriage and a 
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decrease in the proportion of people never marrying. Only 
I 
in the 1970s were there signs of the trend coming to an 
end with a stabilisation of the average age of first 
marriage and a decrease in the numbers of marriages and the 
proportion married in the younger age groups. 
Although all Social Classes have experienced the 
decline in the average age of marriager this average is 
much lower for the manual groups and in particular the 
unskilled manual group. Table 5.19 gives an idea of the 
quite remarkable class variation involved. 
TABLE 5.19. Age of marriage by Social Class. 1971. 
Per cent who had married at age of 
Social Class Under 20 20 - 24 25 or over 
I Professional 6.9% 70.0% 22.1% 
II Intermediate n. m. 14.4% 62.9% 22.7% 
III Skilled non-man. 20.2% 64.5% 15.3% 
III Skilled manual 32.9% 54.4% 12.7% 
IV Semi-skilled man. 38.9% 47.5% 13.6% 
V Unskilled manual 44.2% 43.0% 12.8% 
All 28.9% 56.1% 15.0% 
(Source: 1971 Census of Scotland Fertility Tablesr Part 
II, Table 1. ) 
The factors underlying the general fall in the age of 
marriage have received remarkably little attention and 
changes in the pattern of class differentials even less. 
We do not have direct data on trends in class 
dif f erentials in age of marriage but on the basis of Census 
fertility tables which break down married couples according 
to age of wife at marriage and duration of marriage 
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(convertible to date of marriage) it is possible to do an 
approximate retrospective reconstruction of trends in age 
of marriage for the different Social Classes. On this basis 
it would appear that average age of marriage moved down 
very much in parallel for the different Social Classes. 
The effect of the falling average age of marriage until 
the early nineteen seventies was to damp down the effect of 
falling marital fertility on the birth rate. Thereafter the 
moderate decline in the proportion married compounded the 
effect of the still falling marital fertility rate. 
Despite the impact of these changing marriage patternst 
and of changing patterns of illegitimate fertility, by far 
the most important component of the fall in the birth rate 
between 1964 and 1977 was the falling marital fertility 
rate. This was a decline shared by all age groLups of 
married women. 
The process of understanding the determinants of this 
most significant demographic transformation since the war 
is precisely that of showing its relationship to the 
pattern of change in orientations towards work and the 
f amily. 
To date there is very little agreement about the 
factors which caused the massive fall in fertility from 
1964 to 1977F in Scotland, as in most of the advanced 
industrial world. There is no shortage of plausible 
candidates, including more reliable means of contraception, 
improved family planning services, feminism in its broadest 
sense, increased consumption aspirations and an increase in 
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the number of married women going out to work. They all 
undoubtedly played a role, the problem being to assign 
their relative importance. 
Given the complexity of the arguments in this area and 
the lack of agreement among the specialistsp all one can do 
is give a considered opinion on the most likely pattern of 
causality. Before doing this however, a highly relevant 
circumstance should be taken into consideration which is 
that the fall in fertility in Scotland coincided with 
falling differentials in fertility - in terms of both 
Social Class, and, it seems likelyr religion. 
(13) 
TABLE 5.20. Mean f auily size by year of marriage and Social 
Class. 1971. 
Year of social class 
marriage 
All I II IIInm IIIM IV V 
1966-71 0.80 0.65 0.70 0.64 0.84 0.90 1.06 
1961-66 1.98 1.89 1.87 1.76 1.99 2.03 2.41 
1956-61 2.47 2.29 2.25 2.17 2.55 2.49 2.97 
1951-56 2.61 2.33 2.37 2.21 2.66 2.70 3.19 
1946-51 2.53 2.32 2.23 2.11 2.61 2.60 3.04 
1941-46 2.52 2.19 2.21 2.15 2.54 2.67 3.07 
1936-41 2.57 2.15 2.24 2.15 2.56 2.76 3.00 
All 2.18 1.82 2.01 1.81 2.22 ý2.33 2.68 
(Source: Census of Scotland Fertility Tablesr Table 1. ) 
In charting trends in Social Class differentials, we 
are on relatively solid ground. The most detailed 
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information on Social Class differences in fertility was,, 
until 19711, given in the Census. Table 5.20 is a boiling 
down of the information in the Social Class fertility table 
bf the 1971 Census of Scotland. 
The impression given by Table 5.20 and one which is 
confirmed by more detailed analysis such as breaking down 
the data by age at marriage is that fertility differentials 
between the Social Classes changed very little in the 
in the period from World War II to the early 1960s. 
In Scotlandj, we have been fortunate in that since 1950, 
the Registrar General has published on an annual basis the 
number of births categorized by Social Classy age of mother 
and parity (i. e. numberof previous births to the mother). 
On this basis, we can see in detail annual variations in 
child-bearing patterns for the five Social Classes. 
Although we can't work out fertility rates for each Class 
on this basis (not having information on the class 
distribution of potential mothers)t we can chart in detail, 
for exampler changes in the proportion of births in eacch 
Social Class which are births of fifth or higher parity. 
on the basis of charting such changest it becomes clear 
that the 1971 Censust in terms of the information it could 
give on completed familes (information on the 1966 to 1971 
marriage cohort being information on the timing of births 
within marriage rather than on completed family size) was 
looking back on a period of relative stability in Social 
Class differentials in fertility which had come to an end 
by time of the 1971 Census Annual trends on the basis of 
235 
the Registrar General's figures show that the period of the 
falling birth rate from 1964 onwards was also a period of 
convergence in fertility patterns between the Social 
Classes. 
This is shown most clearly in terms of the parameter 
which has historically displayed the greatest Social Class 
differential, the existence of very large families. In 
terms of the Registrar General's data this can be 
operationalised as the proportion of births in the Class 
which are of parity five or greater. In the early 1960s, 
fifth and further births accounted for between 18 and 20% 
of births to Social Class V motherst 13-14% in Social Class 
IVp 10% in Social Class 111,7-8% in Social Class II and 
finally 3-4% of all births to Social Class I mothers. These 
proportions all dropped rapidly as the birth rate in 
general fell so*that by 1978 the range was from 5-6% for 
Social Class V to 1% for Social Class I. Third and fourth 
births as a proportion of total births for each Class moved 
down at a more sedate rate for all Classes. Converselyr 
first and second births increased as a proportion of total 
births for all Classes. What the trends clearly show in the 
late 1960s and throughout the 1970s is an accelerating 
trend towards the two child family shared by all social 
classes, but having its most dramatic effect in terms of 
the fertility pattern of the Social Classes who were 
initially furthest away from the two child pattern - the 
manual groups and in particulart the unskilled manual 
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group. 
Finallyl the most balanced way to assess change family 
size differences on the basis of the Registrar General's 
data is to take the average family size for all couples 
registering births. Throughout the 1950s and into the 
1960st the mean family size for Social Class I mothers 
(including the birth being registered) hovered around the 
two child mark, peaking at 2.07 in 1964. Over the same 
period, the mean family size for Social Class V mothers 
moved within the band between 3 and 2.8 with a peak of 2.97 
in 1963 and 1964. For much of the post-war period then the 
range was over 35% of the national mean. By 1977, the range 
was down to that between 1.75 for Social Class I and 2.06 
for Social Class V- or around 16% of the national mean. 
Throughout the period,, the mean family size of the Social 
Classes in between Social Classes I and V were ranged in 
order between these extreme groups. 
There are good grounds for thinking then that a sizable 
I 
proportion of the overall reduction in fertility was not 
common to all social classes but in fact consisted of 
fertility falling faster among the manual than among the 
non-manual groups. 
In addition to coinciding with falling Social Class 
differentialsi, the fall in fertility in Scotland coincided 
with a clearcut regional convergence infertility levels 
within Scotland. The main component of this was the moving 
into line with the rest of Scotland of the most highly 
Catholic areas of the industrial West of Scotland. 
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Variations in inter-regional Social Class composition were 
insufficient for the declining Social Class fertility 
differential to have made a major contribution and there 
thus seem to be strong ecological grounds for believing 
that a marked decline in the Catholic fertility 
differential in Scotland took place. 
We need an explanation then that will account for this 
coincidence between falling fertility and declining 
relative fertility differences. An extremely simple model 
which would seem to fit the bill involves a changing 
balance between economic motivations to plan families on 
the one hand and various factors which had historically 
worked against family planning on the other. 
Economic motivation to reduce fertility can be seen to 
have increased because of increased- employment 
opportunities for married women in the context of the 
higher consumption standards of a generation whose 
aspirations had developed in the nineteen fifties and 
nineteen sixties. 
These increased economic motivations had to work 
against existing obstacles to family planning among certain 
groups. Among Catholics there had been doctrinal objections 
to the most effective forms of contraception. In the case 
of manual workers, a much more complex set of obstacles 
will have been at work - ranging from fatalistic attitudes 
associated with experience of economic insecurity to 
working-class patterns of intra-familial communication 
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precluding the development of joint decision-making. 
Many explanations of the fall in fertility (14) assume 
an economically rational, consumpti on- oriented outlook as a 
framework in terms of which couples react to increased 
economic opportunities by reducing fertility. The 
coincidence of declining religious and class differentials 
with the general fall in fertility would seem to suggest a 
slightly more complex process. Although a central role can 
still be given to increased economic motivationst that part 
of the fall in fertility which coincides with declining 
differentials must be attributed to the establishment of an 
'economically rational' outlook on family building in place 
of more 'traditional' orientations which had involved 
obstacles to family-planning. The declining role of such 
obstacles could be attributed either to their being 'over- 
ridden' by increased economic motivations or more simply to 
the declining importance of the 'traditional orientations' 
which supported them. In a nutshellr if what had 
historically maintained the various religious and class 
differences had been various forms of obstacle to family- 
planning supported by various 'traditional' or 'cultural' 
orientations, the universalization of a more economistic 
orientation to family building in place of such factors 
would produce a simultaneous fall in both the level of 
fertility and the level of differentials. 
In the most general sense, we have arrived at a 
position from which can see the fall in fertilityr the 
major demographic shift of recent yearsf as representing an 
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increased level of control or decision-making within the 
family sphere. In the tritest sense of course the term 
'family planning' itself has the same implication. Howeverr 
what is more important is the virtual universalisation of 
an orientation according to which the shape of the nuclear 
family is something constructed as a result of decisions. 
This may seem like a very odd place at which to end the 
long causal chain which began with industrial changer moved 
on to occupational changer changing female employment 
patterns and finally the fall in the birth rate. What this 
final link in the causal chain represents however is one 
aspect of how people have been able to reactr in the a 
sphere in which they can hope to have some control over 
their own lives - the nuclear family, to the juggernaut of 
social change over which they have virtually no control and 
which is represented by the earlier links in the chain. 
Conclusion. 
This chapter has given an outline of some of the more 
Isocio-graphically' describable aspects of social change in 
modern Scotland and some of the more easily established 
connections between them. 
Despite the fairly high level of generality of much of 
the discussiont it emerges quite clearly that the patterns 
of industrial and occupational change have been quite 
complex. There is no way that they can easily be summarized 
in terms either of differential mechanisms to do with 
240 
Scotland's changing position in the international division 
of labour or in terms of common mechanisms such as those 
hypothesized for advanced industrial societies by 
theorizations of occupational transition. A full 
understanding of the determinants of Scotland's changing 
industrial and occupati. onal structure would involve the 
specification of the complex interaction between the two 
sets of factors. 
However, whatever the reasons and at the risk of over- 
simplifying, it does seem clear that the thirty years after 
the war constituted a period of rapid and widely ramified 
social change. in general the period can best be summed as 
one of expanding opportýnities. In particular,, it must be 
remembered that the gross shifts in industrial and 
occupational structure which formed the primary matrix of 
social change, will have had disproportionate effects on 
the opportunity structure facing those entering the labour 
market. For the generation entering the labour market in 
the nineteen fifties and nineteen sixties the nature of 
industrial and occupational change cpnstituted an 
exceptionally favourable environment. This is of course all 
the clearer looking back from the quite different 
conditions of the early nineteen eightiest when the 
cessation of post-war growth has had a much more 
immediately perceptible impact on those entering the labour 
market. 
To reiterate a theme which has been sounded throughout 
the chapter, despite the complexities of these patterns of 
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social change, their rhythms at the British level have been 
closely paralleled at the Scottish level. We are carried 
one step further along the chain of argument according to 
which although the appeal of the S. N. P. can be grounded in 
terms of the experience of this relatively favourable 
episode of social change in Scotlandr these patterns of 
social change were qualitatively no different to the 
general British pattern. In the next chapter I will try to 
make these connections more explicit by looking more 
closely at aspects of social change which take us closer to 




Social change and political orientations. 
Introduction. 
This study as a whole offers in its separate chapters a 
range of global perspectives or triangulations on a 
particular phase of the electoral history of ýhe S. N. P. 
This chapter presents a range of more tightly focussed 
triangulations aimed at deciphering the meaning of S. N. P. 
voting as one expression of the experience of social change 
in Scotland since World war II. 
The dominant experience of this period was one of 
prosperity and economic security - whether in the form of 
rising standards of living, full employmentr better housing 
or the welfare state. Section I of this chapter sets out to 
document this set of broad 'background aspects' of social 
change with an emphasis#, yet againr on establishing that 
what Scotland shared with the rest of Britain far 
outweighed what differentiated it. 
Such background factors, together with some of the more 
structural changes discussed in the last chapter, 
constituted in many ways the preconditions for the next, 
more indefinable and immediately pre-political,, level of 
social change. Perhaps the best way to think of this level 
of social change is to see it as a pattern of change in the 
relative significance of the worlds of worke family and 
community and in particular of changes in the way these 
three worlds tended to mesh together to shape political 
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perspectives. These topics are dealt with in section II. 
Given the relatively paucity of empirical research on 
patterns of social change in Scotland since the last war, 
we are largely dependent'for insight into such changes in 
what might be called the texture of social life on studies 
such as 'The Affluent Worker' and Young and Willmott's work 
on changes in family life. Part of the rationale for the 
emphasis of the previous chapter and Section I of this 
chapter on the parallelism of social change in Scotland and 
the rest of Britain was to justify bringing to bear on 
Scotland itself the implications of research carried on 
outwith Scotland. 
Section III takes us to the heart of the matter. It 
presents evidence from the October 1974 Scottish Election 
Survey on the socio-economic correlates of S. N. P. voting - 
correlates which take on their full meaning only in the 
context of the preceding sections. 
Section IV attempts to assess the role of television 
within the context of this complex of social change. The 
section also serves to link the discussion of social change 
in this chapter back to that of Chapter 4 in which the 
arrival oftelevision was presented as a historical event 
which made possible the widespread acceptance of 'the 
Scottish economic dimension' as a framework in terms of 
which politics came to be perceived. 
What the chapter sets out to demonstrate is that it was 
those groups which could be said to have most fully 
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embodied the patterns of social change to be outlined which 
tended to support the S. N. P. 
I. Background factors - affluence, full employment and the 
welfare state. 
Factors such as rising living standardsr relatively 
full employment, the existence of the Welfare State and 
improved housing standards are in a sense so mundane that 
it is easy to forget that for the thirty years after the 
second world war they were probably the most powerful 
motors of social change in both Britain and Scotland. 
For example#, most discussions of changing patterns of 
family life in post-war Britain conclude by invoking, 
sometimes almost reluctantly, these general background 
factors as the main driving forces behind such changing 
patterns. 
In accounting for the shift from the extended to the 
nuclear family pattern, Young and Willmott concluded that 
of all the contributory factorsf if forced to plump,, they 
would 
"give special prominence to the higher standard of 
life and to migration" (1973, pp92-93). 
Similarly, Anderson observes 
"Since the Second World War ... we have apparently 
seen further changes leading to some eclipse of the 
most solidary and normative kinship bonds. In terms of 
this analysis I should attribute this change on the one 
hand to some decline in the frequency of critical life 
situations as health improved, family size declined, 
and the scourge of unemployment was reducedr and on the 
other to an increase in people's ability to meet these 
crises for themselves through increased wages and 
increased benefits and services from the welfare 
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state. " (Anderson,, 1971, p178) 
Perhaps the most immediate index of the strength of the 
pressures operating in favour of the nuclear family pattern 
in the immediate post-war years was the rapid fall in the 
age of marriage. Zweig's character izati*o'n of the factors 
underlying this trend is ari early and comprehensive 
summarization of many of the themes of this section. 
"I think that the tendency towards earlier 
marriage is largely to be explained in terms of ability 
to support a family earlier; social and economic 
independence comes earlier. Full employment, 
opportunities for women's work, and good wages are 
supporting the young men who wants to build his nest 
early. Young men feel more confident about the future; 
they also feel that home life has so far much more to 
offer with all the modern amenities and gadgets, while 
family planning and the facilities of the Welfare State 
reduce risks" (Zweig,, 1961r pll) 
Given that there seems to be fairly general agreement 
that rising standards of living had been an important 
factor underlying changes in the pattern of family and 
community life, it is worth making an assessment of the 
extent of the rise in living standards since the war. This 
isr of course, a methodological minefield and I simply want 
to give some idea of the order of magnitude of the increase. 
In Scotlande the closest approach to the topic has 
tended to be that of economists with an interest in changes 
in the earnings differential between Scotland and the rest 
of Britain. Even at the British levelp accounts of changes 
in the real value of earnings are relatively few and far 
between. On the basis of published work then, the only way 
to assess the magnitude of changes in the value of real 
earnings in Scotland would seem to be via the indirect 
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route of assessing changes at the British level and then 
charting the trend of Scottish deviation. For more recent 
years it is possible to go directly to the Family 
Expenditure Survey. 
At the British levelf Brown and Browne calculated the 
real value of annual money earnings including employer's 
contributions to social security as rising from an index 
value of 84 in 1946 to one of 115 in 1960, a rise of around 
37%, this 1946 figure itself representing a rise of 22% 
compared with 1939 (1968,, Appendix 3). For the period 1949 
to 19591 they give the annually cumulated percentage change 
in real wages as 2.2. % (1968F Table 30). For the period 
1960 to 1970, Routh (1980, p180) assesses real wages as 
having risen by 30%. Finally,, Hunter and Robertson (1969, 
Table 13.3) put the rise in the real earnings index from 
1948 to 1958 as being 22%, with a further *rise of 24% from 
1958 to 1966. They also concur with Brown and Browne in 
putting the rise in real earnings from 1938 to 1946 at 23%. 
Taking these assessments together, we are fairly safe then 
in assuming that the rise in real earnings from the end of 
the war to 1970 was at least 50%r the war itself having 
contributed a previous rise of around 20%. The annual rate 
of increase appears to have been around 2% in the 1950s and 
nearer 3% in the 1960s. All the estimates so far cited 
refer to the average level of male pre-tax earnings and 
leave us well, short of an assessment of changes in spending 
power. A closer approach to real disposable income per 
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capita would involve an assessment at the very least of 
changes in taxationr changes in the proportion of women - 
and in particular married women - going out to work and 
changes in household size. However,, Scottish commentators 
have concentrat*ed on the earnings differential between 
Scotland and the U. K. and it is in the context of this long 
term rise of 50% or more at the British level that their 
findings must be interpreted. 
For the 1950s, the fullest account is that of McCrone 
(1965). He sums up the experience of the period 1951 to 
1960 as follows: 
"Income per employee starts the period at 94.6 per 
cent of the United Kingdom figure and remains 
approximately at this level until the last two years 
when it falls slightly (to 93.5% in 1960 - S11K)" 
(McCronei, 1965,, p37) 
Johnston, Buxton and kair writing in 197le assessed the 
experience of the 1960s in the following terms, 
over the past decade, average weekly earnings 
per male manual worker in Scotland, both in 
manufacturing and in all industries coveredp have 
remained constantly below those of the U. K. Yet, over 
this period, Scottish earnings have been rising at a 
faster rate, so that the gap between Scottish and U. K. 
figures has been steadily closing ... both in 
manufacturing and in all industries covered the level 
of earnings per man, in Scotland has risen from 91 per 
cent to over 97 per cent of the national average. " 
(Johnston, Buxton and Mair, 1971, pp60-61) 
Moving on into the 1970s, average weekly earnings of 
male manual employees actually overtook the British level 
from 1975 to 1978 (Scottish Economic Bulletinj Summer 1980, 
Table 5.2. ) 
These brief citations are simply intended to confirm 
that earnings in Scotland rose at a rate comparable to the 
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rate for the U. K. as a whole and somewhat faster in the 
1960s. There are no grounds in this area for saying that 
Scotland's experience was qualitatively different from that 
of the U. K. as a whole. 
To get nearer to assessing the impact of this rise in 
the value of real earnings upon the level of spending power 
we have to take into account three main factors. Working 
against an increase in spending power was an increase in 
the bite taken by taxation. 
"Over the periody 1959 to 1974-75t the average rate of 
tax paid by the bulk of the populationj the lowest 90%r 
more than doubled" (Pond, 1977, p57) 
The main factors working in the other direction, the 
increase in the number of women going out to work and the 
fall in the birth rate leading to a fall in family and 
. 
household size have already been charted. 
The simplest way to cut the Gordian knot of 
methodological problems in this area is to go to the Family 
Expeýditure Survey. Table 6.1 gives household income and 
income per person for the U. K. and Scotland from 1961-63 to 
1979-80. The rate of increase of household income in the 
1960s is broadly in line with the estimates for real 
earnings cited above. Scotland's faster rate of increase 
relative to the U. K. in terms of income per person is 
probably due to the cumulative effects on household size 
of the progressive convergence in birth rates between 
Scotland and England and Wales. Scotland's greater average 
household size however meant that income per person 
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remained at only around 90% of the U. K. level throughout 
the 1970s. 
Growth in household expenditure and expenditure per 
person proceeded at a rather more sedate pace however 
(Table 6.2) the main factor behind the difference being the 
growth in the share of direct taxation. Thust whereas in 
Scotland, household income rose by some 39% between 1961-63 
and 1973-74F expenditure rose by only 28% or 2.4% per annum 
in the same period. Again, expenditure per person shows a 
more favourable picture,, with a 42% increase in the same 
period, or an annual rate of 3.7%j approximately double the 
earlier rate of increase between 1953-54 to 1961-63. 
Table 6.3. Selected household amenitiesp U. K. and 'selected 
regions. 1 964-1966 and 1975-76. 
Percen tage of households possessing 
Tblephone Washing Refrig- Car Central 
machine -erator heating 
U. K. 64-66 23 57 40 40 10 
75-76 52 72 87 56 47 
Scotland 64-66 26 58 26 32 6 
75-76 52 78 82 45 43 
South-east 64-66 34 46 60 44 15 
75-76 64 64 94 60 51 
North 64-66 10 75 25 38 7 
75-76 39 84 81 51 52 
Wales 64-66 17 58 32 45 5 
75-76 39 77 85 58 40 
(Sources: British Labour Statistics Historica lA bstract. 
Table 195. British Labour Statistics Yearbook 19 76 Table 
138) 
The targets of much of this expenditure can be 
documented in the rising trend of ownership of consumer 
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durables. Table 6.3 should simply serve to confirm that 
Scotland was by no means atypical in the pattern and pace 
of acquisition of cars and household amenities. 
Perhaps the single most important social structural 
difference between Scotland and the rest of Britain has 
been in patterns of tenure. Scotland has historically had a 
higher proportion in local authority housing and a lower 
proportion of owner occupiers. This pattern has long been 
associated with Scots spending a lower proportion of total 
expenditure on housing. As can be seen from Table 6.4F the 
Table 6.4 Private householdst Percentage with different 
forms of tenure - 1961p 1971 and 1981. Scotlandl England 
and Wales. 
SCOTLAND Owner Local authority Privately 
occupied /new town rented 
1961 25 42 33 100% 
1971 30 53 17 100% 
1981 35 55 11 100% 
ENGLAND AND WALES 
1961 42 24 34 100% 
1971 50 28 21 100% 
1981 58 29 13 100% 
(Source: Census Housing Tables) 
years from 1961 to 1981 saw no narrowing of the gap in 
patterns of tenure between Scotland and the rest of 
Britain. However,, Scotland did f ollow the British pattern 
of rising home ownership. Equally significant however is 
the fact that in the nineteen sixties the major component 
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of change in patterns of tenure was still the shift from 
privately rented to local authority or new town housing. 
Most important to note is that these housing shifts and the 
improvement in housing standards which they represented 
will have had disproportionate effects on the experience of 
young couples setting up home for the first time. 
The two other main factors underlying the patterns of 
social change with which we are concerned are full 
employment and the post-war welfare state. Taking the 
period from the late 1940s to the early 1970st both can be 
taken as relatively constant background factors. 
The role of the level of unemployment should be briefly 
spelled out. In these years of relatively full employment,, 
the emphasis of Scottish commentary tended to be placed on 
the higher level of unemployment in Scotland than in the 
U. K. as a whole, The size of this differential has to be 
seen in the context of a general level of relatively full 
employmentp compared either with the situation in 1983 or 
the situation before the war. The corollary of the fact 
that unemployment hits the unskilled and the unqualified 
hardest, is that for the rest of the population even ýhe 
relatively low national unemployment rates of the thirty 
years after the war overstated the risk of extended 
employment. 
It is important to distinguish here two routes by which 
the level of unemployment. influences political perceptions. 
The first is that whereby the level of unemployment is 
taken as an indicator of the state of the national economy. 
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In Scotland this has primarily taken the form of concern 
over Scotland's high rate of unemployment relative to that 
of the U. K. as a whole. The second has to do with the 
impact of personal experience of unemployment or employment 
or, more precisely, with the impact of the individual's 
lifetime experience of unemployment and employment upon his 
personal, social and political outlook. It is with the 
second route that I am here concerned. From this point of 
viewr the central feature of the post-war years in Scotland 
was the experience of relatively secure employment - even 
for manual workers - with the knowledge that finding 
another job was not likely to present a major difficulty. 
From the point of view of people's personal experience of 
unemploymentr which of the following two contrasts carried 
the greater weight? That between the nineteen fifties an d 
sixties on the one hand and the nineteen twentiest thirties 
and eighties on the other,, or that between a rate of 
unemployment of 3.6% in Scotland in 1964 compared with one 
of 1.8% in the U. K. as a whole. I am not trying to belittle 
the fact that Scotland had double the national average 
unemployment over much of the period. I am just trying to 
come to an assessment of the relative weight in 
understanding social and political change which should be 
given to the Scotland/U. K. differential compared with the 
fact that the bulk of the generation which grew up in 
Scotland after the war experienced and unprecedented level 
of economic security. Full employment was part of this. 
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The other aspect was the greatly extended scope of the 
welfare state. The most important,, albeit obvious,, point to 
bear in mind is that the standard of entitlement for most 
welfare benefits and services was uniform at the British 
level. 
The main message of this section then is that to the 
extent that this range of lba: tkground factors' -a rising 
standard of living, better housing, full employment and the 
welfare state - were among the main driving forces of 
social change in the post-war yearsp their cumulative 
impact in Scotland is unlikely to have been qualitatively 
different from that in Britain as a whole. 
II. Patterns of social change: work and the family. 
In assessing dominant trends in the kind of social 
change which was in large'part the outcome of the factors 
just outlinedr we are dependent for clues primarily on 
studies with a varying and often quite specific empirical 
focus, some carried out in Scotlandf others in other parts 
of Britain. M Because of their relatively narrow focus, 
the main problem involves the degree to which their 
findings can be generalized to society as a whole or the 
working class as a whole. One is forced to operate 
somewhere between the rigour possible in the studies 
themselves and facile generalization. This section can in 
no way offer proofs in itself but should be regarded as one 
more triangulation on a complex of social and political 
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change. What follows then is an inevitably coarse-grained 
attempt to pinpoint the strands of change. most likely to 
have affected voting patterns. 
In terms of the family, the most general trend has been 
in terms of a relative drawing in of family ties to the 
confines of the nuclear family unit. At the beginning of 
the last sectioned I pointed out that such aspects of post- 
war economic security as the N, H. S. and full employment 
had tended to remove the need for extended family ties just 
as patterns of migration were removing the feasibility of 
close dependence on kin. These in a sense were negative 
reasons for the drawing in of day-to-day family ties to 
within the confines of the nuclear family unit. 
A more positive factor was simply an increase in the 
relative Attractiveness of the home both in terms of spaqe 
- better housing and fewer children - and in terms of the 
widening range of 'home-centred' consumer durables,, with 
television playing a crucial rolet compared with more 
traditional and communal sites of sociability. 
This drawing in family ties, especially if it is seen 
in terms of a wider set of processes involving the 
separation of the nuclear family unit from work-based 
patterns of sociability and from communal or neighbourhood 
patterns of interaction(2)f can be seen as creating the 
possibility of an increasing separation between the spheres 
of work-life and home life. 
In terms of patterns of consciousnessr the most 
straightforward implication of such a separation is the 
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possibility of dualistic or segmented forms of 
consciousness. This can be seen as one aspectr and in terms 
of the present study by far the most important aspectj of 
Mann's more general point that 
in several ways the worker's experience does 
not form the totality suggested by either lend of 
ideology' theorists or Marxists. Several segmentations 
- between work and non-workp between industrial and 
political -action, between the economic and social 
aspects of industrial action itself - give to class 
relations in contenporary capitalism their peculiarly 
unstable nature, their paradoxical character of 
unresolved and unresolvable dialectic" (Mannp 1973r 
p20) 
I will deal with some aspects of this central dualism 
in Section IV but here I am more concerned with the 
possibility created by the separation between work and 
family life of a change in the balance oft to use an awful 
but apt expression, 'where politics are coming from'. 
To put my general point in a nutshellp a rising 
standard of domestic consumption coupled with a work 
situation showing no signs of becoming less alienating is a 
powerful reason for viewing the world from the domestic 
standpoint rather than from that of the work-place - that 
of a consumer rather than a producer. 
A central aspect of why this can be expected to occur 
is pinpointed in The Affluent Worker(3). 
"Their existence outside of work represents for 
our affluent workers the realm of at least relative 
freedom; as consumers, as home-makers, they can 
exercise some autonomy and creativity in shaping the 
pattern of their lives. But the price of this it that 
work itself must be accepted as the realm of 
necessity. " (Goldthorpe et al., 1970, p143) 
As we will see in section IV it is these non-work 
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roles or self-images - consumer or home-maker - which 
receive confirmation in the dominant media and which mesh 
with the official version of democratic politics. 
Itý is important. to stress that such beliefs are not 
fantasiest they can be based on experience. As The Affluent 
Worker points out 
n before resorting to claims of 'false' 
consciousness, it is important to recall that the 
social experience of many of our respondents was of a 
kind that could reasonably lead then to be less 
impressed by the weakness and vulnerability of their 
class position than by the extent to which they had 
been able to achieve economic advance within the 
existing social framework. " (Goldthorpe et al,, 1969,. 
P155) 
An important aspect of increased commitment to family 
life as a source of identity is for family life to 
increasingly take the form of a 'project'r something over 
which there is felt to be control and which is seen to be 
the result. of decisions. 
Again the paradigmatic case is provided by the The 
Affluent Worker sample and again the change can be seen to 
be the result of experience of affluence and economic 
security. 
we consider our affluent workers not 
primarily as members of a given industrial organisation 
but ratherr in this case, as men whop in some more or 
less conscious way,, have 'projects' for themselves and 
their families which they seek to realise through work 
in one form or another. " (Goldthorpe et al. t 1970, 
p116) 
Before moving on to explore the 'way in which (the 
affluent workers) evaluate further possible means of 
advancing their projects and of achieving their 
259 
objectives', the authors make the point that the most 
important contextual consideration is that 
"in comparison with many workers in older age- 
groups,, or with workers in less prosperous regions of 
the countryr the men in our sample have had relatively 
little direct experience of economic insecurity thus 
far in their working lives; and furtherr that they 
appear to feel no great anxiety about their basic 
security for the future eee the degree of security 
which our affluent workers enjoyed encouraged them to 
abandon the 'fatalism' about the future which was the 
traditional worker's characteristic defence against the 
constant uncertainties of his-economic life. " 
(Goldthorpe et al. s, 1970j, ppll7-118) 
I read this in the sense that the main factor behind 
thinking about life in terms of a 'project' is past 
experience of a secure basis on which to construct it. In 
short, planning takes confidence and confidence is built up 
on a basis of security. And it is important to remember 
that this planfulness was restricted by the affluent worker 
to the consumption role. 
The political corollary of this affluent worker 
syndrome (an instrumental attitude to work for the sake of 
a consumption oriented family project) was characterized as 
an instrumental attitude to politics. 
Altlýough the group of manual workers interviewed in the 
Affluent Worker study were ý overwhelmingly Labour 
supporters, and although the concept of class still figured 
largely in their political consciousnessr 
" attitudes having to do with the 'pay-off, to be 
expected from a Labour Government in the way of higher 
living standards and better social services were also 
clearly in evidence. Indeed such considerations were 
dominant in the replies given by the Labour supporters 
in our sample when they were evaluating the 
significance of a Labour victory at the next General 
Election. " (Goldthorpe et al. r 1968r p80) 
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Politics as a whole is seen as relatively peripheral, 
"the new worker often regards politics as being of 
only marginal relevance to the concerns of his private 
life; still less than the traditional worker, one would 
suggestr does he recognise connections between his 
personal hopes and fears and public issues. " 
(Goldthorpe et al. r 1969, p190) 
of particular importance, however is the way in which 
the affluent worker does perceive what link there is 
between his own fortunes and larger political events. 
"The importance attached by the majority to the 
economic fortunes of the country as a whole or of their 
particular forms or industries reflects the fact that 
for these workers generallyr as they themselves largely 
recognizedr the influence that they could personally 
exert over their own economic futuresy though not 
perhaps insignificantr was none the less strictly 
limited. " (Goldthorpe et al.,, 1969, p123) 
and along the same lines, the optimistic majority of the 
respondents 
"envisaged their material advancement as resulting 
in some more or less automatic way from the 
continuation of economic growth, and made relatively 
little mention of the part to be played in this respect 
by collective action. In other words, these men looked 
forward to being the collective beneficiaries of a 
developmental process rather than seeing their yet more 
affluent future as dependent upon the outcome of social 
struggles in the industrial or political arenas. " 
(Goldthorpe et alp 1969,, p153) 
This discussion, which has been primarily in terms of 
the Affluent Worker Studyl has I hope operated at two 
levels. Firstlyr the orientations of the 'affluent workers, 
can be taken as exemplifying much wider patterns of social 
change. Secondly, a syndrome such as the instrumental 
privatised one of the affluent worker can be explained 
quite adequately on the basis of the experience of 
particular economic circumstances - here affluence. 
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A study which is closer to home and which,, although its 
explicit focus is far removed from politics, explores a 
similar theme is Janet Askham's study of the connection 
between fertility patterns and experience of deprivation. 
In 1970f Askham interviewed 90 women living in Aberdeen who 
had been married in Aberdeen in 1960161. The sample was 
chosen to cover four groups, divided by social class and 
number of children. The two classes were skilled manual 
(Social Class III manual) and unskilled manual (Social 
Class V). Within each Class, groups were chosen with either 
2 children or 4 or more children. 
Askham's major hypothesis was that 
"the greater the impact of situational factors 
such as economic and social deprivationt insecurity and 
powerlessnessr the greater the need for adaptation in 
terms of norms and behaviour patterns involving 
i 
no 
planning ahead and being unable to control one's own 
environment. The greater the need for this type of 
adaptation, the more likely it is that a couple will 
have a large family since such adaptation hinders both 
the motivation for small families and the ability to 
control and restrict the family size achieved. " 
(Askham, 1975F p14) 
By and large the hypothesis was confirmed over a large 
range of indicators. 
The differences between the groups were not to be found 
in terms of abstract values 
"On the contraryl it appears reasonable to conclude 
that the groups were more remarkable for their cultural 
similarities than their differences" (ibidj p125) 
The differences between the groups consisted primarily 
of differences in beliefs about what was and was not 
possible. Askham summarizes in terms of Class V respondents 
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with 4 or more children. One only has to reverse the terms 
to get a characterization of Class III and a fortiori Class 
III respondents who had limited their families to two 
children. 
"Thus those in group V4+ were more pessimistic 
than others about the possibility of looking towards 
the future, about the possibility of individuals 
planning their lives or 'getting on' in life through 
individual effort; they appeared somewhat less likely 
to believe in the individual's influence upon wider- 
events; and they were more pessimistic than others 
about the chances of their children achieving the kind 
of jobs which they would like for them. " (ibid, p125) 
Across a wide range of behavioural indicators - saving, 
getting a home of their own andl most importantp political 
attitudes, the Social Class III group exhibited a greater 
future orientationt a greater sense of control. Askham does 
not give voting figures but her observation that the Social 
Class III group showed a more instrumental approach to 
voting and were more likely to change their vote points 
very strongly, in Aberdeen, in 1970, in one direction. 
Askham presents what could be called a syndrome of 
behaviour and beliefsp aspects of which include a 
relatively future oriented outlook, a sense of control over 
one's own life and an instrumental attitude to politics. 
And just as the contrasting syndrome is based upon 
experience of economic insecurity or deprivation so this 
syndrome has to be seen as based on experience of economic 
security or affluence. 
Now the links which can further be drawn here are 
extremely tenuous. I suggested in the last chapter that on 
simple grounds of simultaneity it would be surprising if 
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there were no connection, however indirectr between the 
fall infertility and the electoral success of the S. N. P. 
On the basis of such studies as The Affluent Worker 
(4) and 
Askham's study it is at least possible to see something of 
where that connection might lie. The connection would seem 
to lie in the area of association between a family 
'project' and an instrumental orientation to politics. 
Askham concentrated on the influence of the prior existence 
of a 'future orientation' on fertility levels. She 
interviewed women who had had their children in the early 
to mid-nineteen sixties when Social Class differentials 
were still as high as they had been at any time since the 
war. Since thent as we have seenr Social Class fertility 
differentials have plummetted, a process which was 
particularly rapid in the early 1970s. Now whatever the 
reason for this fall in fertility which affected manual 
groups in particular - and increased economic motivation 
associated with increased employment opportunities for 
married women along with better methods of contraception 
and family planning services would seem the likeliest 
candidates - the fall in fertility did represent an 
increase in the level of control in the family-consumption 
sphere. And whether this is simply the expression of 
increased involvement in this sphere as a 'project' or 
indeed one of the factors which increased the plausibility 
of this sphere as a 'project' doesn't really matter from 
the present point of view. In other words, it is not 
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Askham's finding in terms of the direction of causality 
which is at issue - her aim being to show that an 
experienced based lack of future orientation was a cause of 
high fertility - but simply the likelihood that the fall in 
fertility and the increased salience of a family project go 
together. In no way am I suggesting a causal relation 
between the fall in fertility and voting S. N. P. Simply 
that further understanding of the significance of both of 
them would seem to lie in the context of the same highly 
complex set of changes in social and political 
orientations. 
The points made in this section so far have 
concentrated on changes in the pattern of working class 
life. For certain groups, the impact of economic security 
and rising standards of living fostered an outlook centred 
on the nuclear family, on what might be called the nuclear 
family project, with a corresponding political outlook best 
characterized as instrumental. 
A group which experienced similar changes in life style 
to an even greater degree were those who had been upwardly 
mobile from a manual background. Herep however the negative 
factors in the work situation, and in particular the lack 
of opportunities for career advancement, which in the case 
of 'the affluent workers' forced the 'project' exclusively 
into the family context would apply to a lesser extent. In 
the case of the upwardly mobile we can expect the 
experience of mobility itself to have encouraged a 
conception of life as a whole as 'project' both at work in 
265 
the form of a career and domestically in terms of higher 
standards of consumption. In a senser those moved up out of 
the working class 'lived' in an intense and telescoped form 
many of the changes in family pattern., s which large sections 
of the working class were experiencing over a longer period. 
The main common factor of course is relative affluence. 
The other is a privatised style of life. The privatised 
nature of the family life of the upwardly mobile has 
received little specific attention. The family life-style 
of the middle class as a whole tends to be taken for 
granted. 
For exampler in their discussion of the effect of 
affluence on the British class structurer Goldthorpe and 
Lockwood (1963) assumed the primary focus of white collar 
aspirations already to be the future position of the 
nuclear family. It was a shift on the part of the working 
class towards sharing these family-centred aspirations 
which formed one half of the process of convergence which 
they saw as being the two strata closer together. At the 
same time white collar workers were seen as moving away 
from individualistic action as a means towards this family 
centred end towards a more collective mode of action of an 
apolitical and instrumental type. (19631 p152) 
Perhaps the most straightforward reason why those who 
achieved upward mobility from manual to white-collar jobs 
in Scotland should have developed an outlook centred on the 
immediate nuclear family is that such upward mobility has 
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general involved a good deal of geographical mobility (seer 
for example, Goldthorper 1980, p152). Probably the simplest 
empirical illustration of the association between upward 
social mobility and geographical mobility comes from Colin 
Bell's sample of 120 middle class families in two new 
estates in Swansea. Of the 31 upwardly mobile families in 
the sample none came from the area (west Swansea) in which 
they were living. (Bell, 1968r p44) 
The relation of the next sectiont exploring the socio- 
economic correlates of S. N. P. votingj, to the discussion in 
this section can perhaps be best summed up in terms of 
Goldthorpe and Lockwood's suggestion that we should be 
"seeking some understanding of how the behavioural 
patterns in question are related to, and take meaning 
from, the life-histories and life-situations of the 
individual and group concerned" (1963, p142) 
A picture of very general, societal levels of social 
change - including higher standards of living, full 
employment, the welfare state#, favourable patterns of 
occupational change - has been presented primarily in order 
to assess the implications of these backgroundt macro- 
sociological circumstances for the way people - and in 
particular people coming to political maturity under these 
conditions - come to interpret their own livesp their place 
in society and thus society and politics in general. 
The experiences of two groups in particular were likely 
to have reflected most fully the impact of these general 
patterns of social change. I have suggested in short that 
the more affluent members of the working class and those 
267 
upwardly mobile from the working class have most fully 
embodied these patterns of social change and are thus most 
likely to have had their political outlook shaped by them. 
The next section will show that it was these two groups 
which were particularly susceptible to the appeal of the 
S. N. P. 
III. Socio-economic characteristics and voting. 
It has been a commonplace that the S. N. P. s vote has 
been well distributed across the social classes. 
What I want to do in this section is to probe the 
socio-economic distribution of the-S. N. P. vote on the basis 
of reanalysis of the October 1974 Scottish Election Survey 
(see Appendix 1 for details of the survey). I will 
concentrate in particular upon those features whose 
salience is suggested by the preceding discussion of broad 
trends of social change in Scotland. 
Table 6.5 gives the distribution of votes according to 
the 'social grade' classification which has so far been 
most often used for exploring the correlates of S. N. P. 
voting (see Appendix 1 for grade titles. ) 
Taking both sexes together, the pattern is indeed one 
of very little variation in S. N. P. voting across the social 
grades. The non-manual grades vary very little around the 
mean figure of 28%. The main contrast is within the manual 
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Table 6.5. Percentage of voters voting - for four main 










A B ClA CIB C2 D 
45 40 41 31 15 14 
13 13 7 10 6 2 
15 16 22 31 47 61 
27 32 29 28 32 23 
(60) (101) (112) (120) (337) (183) 









A B CIA ClB C2 D All 
Conservative 36 42 37 33 14 13 22 
Liberal 12 10 4 0 3 1 5 
Labour 12 13 22 37 44 62 39 
S. N. P. 39 35 37 30 39 24 34 
N (100%) (33) (48) (54) (43) (181) (101) (473) 
Percentage 
not voting 3 9 11 8 11 15 12 
Women 
A B CIA ClB C2 D All 
Conservative 56 38 45 30 15 15 28 
Liberal 15 15 10 16 8 4 11 
Labour 19 19 22 27 52 59 38 
S. N. P. 11 28 22 27 24 23 23 
N (100%) (27) (53) (58) (77) (156) (82) (528) 
Percentage 
not voting 7 8 9 8 10 14 11 
(Source: Scottish Elec tion Study) 
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group. Skilled manual workers (C2) had the highest 
percentage voting S. N. P. at 32% while semi- and unskilled 
workers (D) had the lowest at 23%. This last contrast was 
particularly marked among male voters. 
Voting S. N. P. showed even less variation among the 
women respondents although it should be noted that the 
tendency for fewer women to vote S. N. P. held across all 
social grades. (, 5) 
Table 6.6. Percentages voting S. N. P. m, Conservative and 
Labour by social grade and age. 
Social Grade 
Age A B ClA ClB C2 D 
Per cent Under 35 39 37 34 40 47 35 
voting 35 to 54 25 41 37 18 28 17 
S. N. P. 55 plus 8 8 17 24 17 22 
Per cent Under 35 44 22 29 25 10 2 
voting 35 to 54 33 35 42 41 16 14 
Conservative 55 plus 69 67 53 29 20 22 
Per cent Under 35 9 26 31 31 37 61 
voting 35 to 54 21 12 20 27 53 69 
Labour 55 plus 15 13 17 34 55 55 
(23) (27) (35) (48) (125) (43) 
Cell frequencies (24) (49) (41) (34) (125) (52) 
(13) (24) (36) (38) (86) (87) 
(Source: S. E. S) 
Since the S. N. P. vote varied so strongly with age, it 
is worth looking at the pattern by social grade and age 
(Table 6.6) although even at this relatively mundane level 
of cross-classification some of the cell frequencies are 
beginning to get perilously small. 
The overall patterning of S. N. P. support by social 
grade and age can be most easily seen by breaking down the 
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S. N. P. part of Table 6.6 into four quadrants. If we take the 
three 'lowest' grades, lower non-manual (ClB) and the two 
manual grades (C and D)j S. N. P. support is concentrated 
into the lowest age group. In these three grades, 43% of 
those aged under 35 voted S. N. P. compared with 22% of those 
aged 35 or more. 
Taking the three 'highest' grades however#, the skilled 
non-manual (CIA) and the two managerial grades (A and B),, 
the break in S. N. P. voting comes between the two lowest and 
the highest age groups. Among those aged under 55 in these 
three grades, 36% voted S. N. P. compared with only 12% of 
those aged 55 and over. As will be seen, this relatively 
greater penetration of S. N. P. support into the middle age 
category among non-manual voters may well have something to 
do with patterns of social mobility among the different age 
groups. 
The bastions of Conservative support are clearly among 
the older members of the non-manual groups while the level 
of Conservative support among younger non-manual voters. 
appears to be highly variable. 
Labour support remained most solid among the less 
skilled and older portions of the manual grades. only among 
young skilled manual workers did Labour support fall below 
50% in this,, the peak election for the S. N. P. 
The social grades are relatively heterogeneous in 
occupational termst especially among the non-manual grades, 
and we get closer to the occupational distribution of 
voting by looking at it in terms of socio-economic groups 
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(Table 6.7). On this basis the peaks in S. N. P. support 
stand out somewhat more clea rly. The skilled manual group 
still stands out but so does the int ermediate non-manual 
-group. trI4xt 
-al 
el Table 6.7. Per cent voting for four main parties by main 
socio-economic groups. 
Con Lib Lab SNP N 
lr2 Employers and managers. 48 8 16 27 (110) 
3r4 Professionals 44 14 12 30 (57) 
5 Intermediate 22 13 26 -78), 
6 Junior non-manual 37 9 30 26 (118) 
8 Foremen and supervisors 29 6. 47 18 
. 
(51) 
9 Skilled manual 11 5 49 (264) 
10 Semi-skilled manual 11 3 64 23 (124) 
11 Unskilled manual 16 0 61 23 (44) 
(Source: S. E. S) 
In terms of the patterns we would expect on the basis 
of the analysis of the previous section it is the contrast 
within the manual group which is most important whereby 35% 
of skilled manual voters voted S. N. P. compared with only 
23% of both the semi-skilled and unskilled groups. 
A further perspective is given by dividing the male 
manual group into some fairly common-sense groupings. 
The Scottish Election Survey sample contained 260 men 
who voted and belonged to manual occupations outwith the 
agriculturer forestry and fisheries sector. On the basis of 
a fairly ad hoc occupational categorization a much clearer 
07g! 
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division of S. N. P. support can be seen than emerged on the 
basis of social grades or socio-economic groups. Only 21 
(less than 10%) of these male manual workers could be 
placed unambiguously according to their occupation codes 
into a grouping consisting of Ilabour movement heartland' 
trades with strong union traditions. These were the minerst 
workers in metal productiont textile workers and print 
workers. Of this 21, only 4 (19%) voted S. N. P. Two other 
occupational groups also showed a low level of S. N. P. 
support - construction workers at 19% and labourers at 21%. 
All the other manual groups showed S. N. P. support at 40% or 
higher. One group was constructed to represent Scotland's 
newer industries - electrical and electronic workers and 
chemical process workers i. e., classic representatives of 
the 'new working class'. 48% of this group voted S. N. P. 
Engineering trades made up a fairly heterogeneous group 0f 
58 male voters - the most numerous occupations being 
welders, machine tool operatorst motor mechanicsp fitters 
and plumbers - and of this group 43% voted S. N. P. The group 
with the highest level of S. N. P. support were the 36 
transport and communication workerst of whom half were 
lorry drivers and of whom half voted S. N. P. Finally among 
the residual category of manual occupations which included 
butchers, bakers and if not candlestick makers then 
carpenterst glass and ceramic workers, food processors and 
warehousemen, 41% voted S. N. P. 
Given that these are fairly ad hoc groupings and that 
the numbers involved are not very high, these results can 
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only be suggestive. However, the three groups which 
appeared to be most resistant to the S, N. P. do fit in with 
what we might expect from our earlier discussion. The 
'traditional workers' precisely because that is what they 
were with traditional union and community bonds 
correspondingly more salient, construction workers and 
labourers being the two groups most exposed to economic 
insecurity. e, 4.,, -ý 
16rrj AI(VeIT FrT4J - 
Additional small scale evidence for the existence of a 
contrast in S. N. P. support between 'traditional' skilled 
working class groups and the 'new' working class is given 
by a study carried out by Howard Davist interviewing for 
which was undertaken between October 1972 and January 1974 
(Davis, 1979j p5O). Of 19 melters in a West of Scotland 
steelworks none had voted S. N. P. in 1970 (ibid, pl4l) 
whereas a quarter of 34 maintence fitters at a-Grangemouth 
petro-chemical plant had voted S. N. P. (ibidt p116). 
Thus although these occupational variations in S, N. P, 
support are not overwhelming there is a certain logic to 
them. The same turns out to be true of the relation between 
patterns of social mobility and S. N. P. voting. 
Cross-classifying by both respondents' and fathers' 
social grade gives a crude insight into patterns of inter- 
generational mobility among the respondents to the survey. 
Table 6.8 restricts itself to voters for the four main 
parties, thus giving the cell numbers on which the voting 
percentages in Table 6.9 are based. 
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Table 6.8. Fathers' social grade by respondents' social 
grade. 
Fathers social grade. 
Respondents 
social grade AB Cl C2 D 
AB Per cent 27 25 34 14 100% 
N (41) (39) (52) (21) (153) 
C1 Per cent 3 27 45 25 100% 
N (7) (62) (101) (56) (226) 
C2 Per cent 3 10 57 30 100% 
N (11) (33) (184) (97) (325) 
D Per cent 2 9, 47 42 100% 
N (3) (17) (84) (76) (180) 
Table 6.9. Per cent voting S. N. P. by respondent's social 
grade and father's social grade. 
Father's social grade. 
Respon dent's AB Cl C2 D 
social grade. 
AB 22 21 40 29 
C1 26 32 33 
C2 36 31 33 
D - 21 23 
The broad pattern of occupational mobility conforms to 
that revealed by the Scottish Mobility Study. There was a 
relatively high level of upward mobility across the manual 
non-manual line. 48% of respondents in grades A and B and 
70% in grade Cl had fathers who were manual workers. As we 
saw in Chapter 5 the national pattern of upward 
occupational mobility was mainly the result of occupational 
change and this is confirmed in terms of Table 6.8 itself. 
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Whereas 43% of the respondents to the Scottish Election 
Survey were in non-manual social grades only 24% of their 
fathers were non-manual. The counterpart of this is that 
there was relatively little downward mobility. 
Table 6.9 gives the percentage voting S. N. P. in each 
cell of the mobility table with sufficient numbers to make 
the exercise meaningful. 
Looking f irst at non-manual voters (grades AB and Cl),, 
the most immediate contrast is that all the cells for non- 
manual respondents with manual fathers show higher 
percentages voting S. N. P. than any of the cells referring 
to non-manual respondents with non-manual fathers. 
Collapsing the cells to a simple manual/non-manual 
contrast, 24% of non-manual respondents with non-manual 
fathers voted S. N. P. compared with 32% of those with manual 
fathers. If one takes only respondents in the two highest 
social grades, A and B,, the contrast is even sharper, only 
21% of those with non-manual fathers voting S. N. P. compared 
with 37% of those with manual backgrounds. 
Among male voters the pattern is roughly the same. 31% 
of non-manual male respondents with non-manual fathers 
voted S. N. P. compared with 37% of those with manual 
backgrounds. Among male AB voters the contrast was 32% for 
those with non-manual fathers as against 43% for those with 
manual fathers. The pattern holds firm for women voters. 
18% of non-manual women (see note 5 for method of assigning 
women to social grades) from non-manual backgrounds voted 
S. N. P. compared with 26% of those from manual backgrounds. 
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The greatest contrast of all is to be found among AB women 
voters. Only 10% of those with non-manual fathers voted 
S. N. P. compared with 30% of those with manual fathers. 
Among manual respondents however whether ones father 
was skilled manual or semi/unskilled manual seemed to have 
little effect. All that seemed to matter was current 
skilled status. 
With respect to the association between upward social 
mobility and voting S. N. P. j it might be imagined that it 
was the younger voters who had been upwardly mobile across 
the manual/non-manual line and that it was their youth 
rather than their mobility which produced their tendency to 
vote S. N. P. 
Althoughp as we have seen, the period between the war 
and the October 1974 Election was especially favourable to 
upward social mobility because of the growth in white- 
collar employment,, this was by no means entirely a matter 
of those with working-class backgrounds moving straight 
into white-collar jobs after completing their education. 
There was also a great deal of intra-generational mobility 
involvedp with men who had started their careers in manual 
occupations subsequently moving into white-collar jobs. As 
we saw from the results of the Scottish Mental Survey which 
gave a snapshot of early career experiences in Scotland in 
the 1950s, nearly 17% of all the men in that sample had 
been in manual occupations at age 18 but had moved into 
white-collar occupations by age 27. To the extent that such 
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processes of intra-generational mobility can be assumed to 
have been fairly typical of the years after the war, to 
that extent the older the respondent in 1974, the more 
chance he will have had of experiencing such intra- 
generational occupational mobility. Thus there was no 
simple relationship between occupational mobility and age 
and this is reflected in the Scottish Election Survey 
sample. 
Whereas all the voters in the sample as a whole were 
divided fairly evenly between age groups - 33% aged under 
35,33% aged 35 to 54 and 34% aged 55 or morel the age 
distribution of those whose fathers were manual workers but 
who had moved into the higher non-manual social grades by 
the time of the survey was much more uneven. 29% of this 
group were aged under 35f 49% were aged 35 to 54 and only 
23% were aged 55 or over. Thus although upward occupational 
mobility showed a slight overall bias towards younger 
respondents, it was not a major one. The middle age group 
had been able to reap the benefit of the increase in white 
collar employment since the war over a longer period of 
time than the younger respondents. As already suggested, 
this exceptionally favourable upward mobility experience of 
the group aged 35 to 54 could go some way to explaining the 
greater propensity to vote S. N. P. of non-manual voters in 
this age group compared with manual. 
The most important implication of this age distribution 
of upward mobility experience is that it is highly 
unlikely that the overall relationship between voting 
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S. N. P. and social mobility was a spurious one resulting 
from their common association with age. To be on the safe 
side however, Table 6.10 gives the percentage of S. N. P. 
voters among higher non-manual voters (Social Grades At BF 
ClA) categorized by age group and the manual/non-manual 
status of their fathers. 
Table 6.10. Per cent voting S. N. P. among higher non-manual 





Under 35 31 42 
35 to 54 29 39 
55 or over 21 36 
It can be seen that the association between voting 
S. N. P. and the experience of upward occupational mobility 
holds good for all age categories. 
An interesting sidelight on this patternr and one which 
almost provides an extension of it to even younger age- 
groups, is given by Bealey and Sewells observation of the 
pattern of political support among a group of 15 year old 
pupils of Peterhead Academy in 1972. They observed that 
"the S. N. P. was most successful in winning 
affiliations from the upwardly aspirant, who were 
renouncing the class of their homes while not yet 
entering the middle class" (Bealey and Sewelf 1981, 
p160) . 
Probably the greatest single index or expression of the 
existence of a family-oriented 'project' and, in Scotland 
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in particular, of moving away from a traditional working 
class life-style is the buying of a house. Again it has 
often been noted that the S. N. P. has tended to do 
particularly well among those who were in the process of 
buying a house, who had taken out a mortgage. 
Since we are looking at house-buying as an aspect of 
family oriented behaviour, the following analyses will be 
restricted to married respondents so as to rule outr for 
example, respondents living with parents who are in the 
process of buying a house. 
Type of tenurer and in particular having a mortgagep is 
closely related to the life-cycle. In addition the 1950s 
and 1960s saw something of a shift towards home ownership 
in Scotland. So mortgage holding will vary significantly by 
age group. In additionj, home ownership has a strong class 
gradient. Although it is impossible to disentangle entirely 
the complex of related effects involved here, the 
precaution should be taken of looking at age and social 
grade'variations in tenure. 
As can be seen from Table 6.11 and as expectedl 
mortgages are most common among the youngr with 36% of 
married respondents under the age of 35 being in the 
process of paying off a mortgage. The age gradient for home 
ownership as a whole however is much less steepp from 42% 
in the youngest age group to 32% in the oldest and this, 
together with the reverse gradient for council housingy is 
much closer to being a reflection of whatever long term 
trend towards home ownership there had been in the lifetime 
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Table 6.11 Percentage vith specif ied f orsis of tenure by 
age. Married respondents only. 
Age: Under 35 35 to 54 55 and over 
Owned outright 5 11 27 
Mortgage 36 27 5 
Owned (both) 42 38 32 
Rented private 12 6 14 
Rented council 47 56 54 
Rented (both) 58 62 68 
N (261) (339) (237) 
(265) (342) (238) 
Table 6.12. Percentage with spec ified forms o f tenure by 
social grade. Ma rried respondents only. 
Social grade: AB CIA CIB C2 D 
Owned outright 26 26 24 17 7 8 
Mortgage 55 52 35 19 16 5 
Owned (both) 81 78 58 36 24 is 
Rented private 12 8 17 8 7 14 
Rented council 7 14 25 56 69 73 
Rented (both) 19 22 42 64 76 . 85 
N (58) (87) (101) (77) (347) (154) 
(59) (88) (101) (77) (349) (156) 
N. B. Numbers for owned (both) and rented (both) in Tables 
6.11,6.12 and 6.13 include a small number of respondents 
classified as "owned -unspecified" and "rented - 
unspecified". Source Scottish Election Survey. 
of the older respondents. 
The gradients by social grade (Table 6.12) are much 
steeper. Probably most significant is the continued heavy 
concentration of manual workers into council housing and 
their continued low level of home ownership. That there had 
been some movement towards home ownership among skilled 
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manual workers is probably best reflected in the fact that 
27% of married skilled manual workers under the age of 35 
held a mortgage. 
The overall pattern of voting by tenure is given in 
Table 6.13. The concentration of S. N. P. voting among those 
Table 6.13. Vote by type of tenure. Married respondents 
only. 
Owned MIgage Owned Rented 
Outright (both) Priv. L. A. (Both) 
Conservative 55 33 40 33 11 15 
Liberal 5 12 10 9 4 5 
Labour 20 19 19 26 58 53 
S. N. P. 21 36 31 32 26 27 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
N (102) (171) (279) (69) (385) (456) 
N. B. See note to Table 6.12. 
with mortgages stands out clearly, although this 
concentration is not nearly so great as that of Labour 
voters in the council sector or Conservatives in the owner 
occupied. Since S. N. P. voters tended to be young,, and 
mortgage holders tend to be young, we could have a spurius 
correlation here. Breaking down the sample into three age 
groups provides a partial check and it is simplest to focus 
on the contrast between those holding mortgages and those 
in the rented council sector. 
whereas the gap in voting S. N. P. between these two 
sectors for married respondents was around 10% (36% of 
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mortgage holders, 26% of those in council housing voting 
S. N. P. ) this falls to around 7% for the under 35 (43% 
versus 36%) and 35 to 54 (33% versus 25%) age groups with 
numbers being too few in the oldest age group to allow 
comparison. A finer control for age might reduce the 
relationship even more but it seems safe enough to say that 
there was a genuine 'mortgage' effect on voting S. N. P. 
Controlling for social grade however leads to no such 
unambiguous result. The 'mortgage effect' is much stronger 
among non-manual respondents. 39% of non-manual respondents 
with mortgages voted S. N. P. compared with 28% of those in 
rented council housing. Among manual respondents,, the gap 
was only 32% to 28% and among skilled manual respon-dents 
just as many council tenants (31%) voted S. N. P. as did 
mortgage holders. The main contrast in voting patterns for 
skilled manual respondents as between mortgage holders and 
council tenants was in voting Labour or Conservative. 
Skilled manual council tenants voted 54% Labour and only 
10% Conservative whereas skilled manual mortgage holders 
voted 29% Labour and 33% Conservative. 
The simplest way to sum up the general patterns of 
association with S. N. P. voting which we have outlined would 
be to say that those people tended to vote S. N. P. who hadi 
in relative terms,, 'done well', either within the working 
class by being part of its most advantaged section or by 
moving out of the working class altogether. 
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IV. Social changer political orientation and television. 
I have suggested that the form in which such 'doing 
well' is was experienced# the everyday prism through which 
its effect on political attitudes was refractedp was that 
of a consumption oriented, family centred project. 
The guiding theme of this chapter has been that in the 
thirty years after the war, the general direction of social 
change - rising standards of livingp economic security, 
upward social mobility - has led to the instrumental 
orientation associated with such a privatised family 
project becoming a dominant attitude to politics. Some 
aspects of these patterns of change were global, affecting 
the vast majority of the population. In terms of relating 
them to patterns of voting howeverr the focus has been on 
their differential effects. And in this sense it is just as 
plausible to characterise the groups which were least 
affected. At one end of the spectrum were those whom the 
general revolution in living standards and housing 
conditions passed byr those for whom poverty and economic 
insecurity were not even temporarily banished by the post- 
war boom. At the other end of the scale were the 
traditional middle classes who already had the affluence 
and whor while adapting to some extent to a changing world, 
were primarily concerned with maintaining a bastion of 
privilege which, as we have seent was at least as 
impregnable in Scotland as in England. 
It was the groups in between, the affluent working 
class and the upwardly mobile who could be be said to have 
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shifted most radically towards an acceptance of the 
dominant instrumental attitude to politics. It was the 
Scottish National Party's good fortune and eventual fate to 
be the firstj, but by no means the lastj, political 
beneficiary of this mood, and to provide the earliest 
fulfillment, in its electoral rise and fallp of Goldthorpe 
and Lockwood's prediction that 
" the instrumental attitude to trade unionism is 
likely to spill over into politics, and his vote will 
go to the highest bidder ... calculative and 
opportunistic voting of this kind implies a very 
tenuous political linkr and one does not have to 
conjure up pictures of widespread unemployment to 
visualise how it might be severed. " (1963,, p156) 
The picture is still not complete however. We have 
still not taken account of what was probably the crucial 
mechanism in binding into a mutually reinforcing framework 
'private' projects relating to the family. and consumption 
and perspectives on the wider political world. Here we must 
return to the general theme of the importance of 
communicative context. in generating political beliefs and 
in particular we must deal with the impact of television. 
Too often attempts have been made to assess the impact of 
television in the abstract. Here I want to situate the 
impact of television in terms of the patterns of social 
change analysed in this chaptery just as in Chapter iv the 
arrival of television was situated in terms of Imacro- 
level' changes in perceptions of the role of the state and 
the emergence of the 'Scottish economic dimension'. 
Television, in other words, must be seen as 'mediating' 
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in the fullest sense of the word between two levels of 
experience. The experience of everyday life - work and the 
family - and the inevitably highly indirect experience of 
national political events. Television plays an especially 
important role here. Firstly,, because the arrival of 
television was itself a major component of the general 
shift towards a home-centred life style - apart from 
sleeping, -watching television is what people spend most of 
their time at home doing. Secondly because television is 
the most important source of political information - 
particularly for those with a relatively low interest in 
politics and thus most vulnerable to an unquestioning 
acceptance of the frameworks implicit in the television 
picture of the political world. 
The close link between the social developments which 
led to the generalization of the privatised family project 
and developments in the structures of broadcasting has been 
clearly expressed by Raymond Williams. He sees the 
emergence of radio in the 1920s as one aspect of the 
replacement of earlier more 'public' forms of technology 
(such as for example the railways or city lighting) by 
"... a kind of technology for which no satisfactory 
name has yet been f ound: that which served an at once 
mobile and home-centred way of living: a form of mobile 
privatisation. Broadcasting in its applied form was a 
social product of this distinctive tendency. " 
(Williamsr 1974t p26) 
In terms of more general aspects of social change, such 
fruits of struggle as relative improvements in wages and 
conditions and a reduction in working hours had 
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"combined in a major emphasis in improvement of 
the small family home. Yet this privatisation, which 
was at once an effective achievement and a defensive 
responsel carriedr as a consequencer an imperative need 
for new kinds of contact. The new homes might appear 
private and 'self-sufficient' but could be maintained 
only by regular funding and supply from external 
sources, and these over a range from employment to 
prices to depressions and warst had a decisive and 
often disruptive influence on what was nevertheless 
seen as a separable 'family' project. This relationship 
created both the need and-the form of a new kind of 
'communication': news from outside, from otherwise 
inaccessible sources.... 
The full investment in (television) transmission 
and reception facilities did not occur until the late 
1940s and early 1950s, but the growth was thereafter 
very rapid. The key social tendencies which had led to 
the definition of broadcasting were by then even more 
pronounced. There was significantly higher investment 
in the privatised home, and the social and physical 
distances between these homes and the decisive 
political and productive centres of society had become 
much greater. Broadcasting, as it had developed in 
radior seemed an inevitable model: the central 
transmitters and domestic sets*' (Williamst 1974, pp 27- 
29) 
It would probably not be an exaggeration to see the two 
interlinked processes of privatisation and the advent of 
television as tending to promote a change in the balance of 
importance of two primary axes of Political communication. 
One based on a matrix of workp community and 'family with 
face to face interaction playing a primary role and 
containing at least the possibility of communal solidarity. 
The other based on the home and television involving a much 
more passive process of filtering information from the 
outside. 
For illustration we can again turn to Davis's detailed 
probing of social consciousness in two contrasting groups 
of skilled workers - West of Scotland steelworkers and 
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maintenance fitters (referred to as craftsmen) in a 
Grangemouth petrochemical plant. Davis's discussion 
focusses on perceptions of trade unions but the mechanisms 
revealed have much wider relevance. 
Of the responses of the steelworkers, Davis comments 
"Notably absent from the discussion are the 
lofficiallr 'institutional' and media interpretations 
of industrial relations which coloured many of the 
craftsmen's responses in a similar context .... 
although their horizons are more bounded than the 
craftsmen'sp their occupational and self identity is 
complete and self-sufficient. It is this fixed point 
from which all elaboration of replies takes place and 
because it is so stable (historically, physically and 
socially) there is much greater homogeneity and 
consistency is the melters' social consciousness than 
among the previous sample" (Davist 1978j, p136) 
Among the craftsmen however, a distinct dualism was to 
be found. 
"If the term 'union-mindedness' is taken in the 
sense implied by respondents who used it (i. e. 
acceptance that a union is a necessary institution to 
protect workers' interests or to counter management 
interests and recognition that it demands a minimum 
loyalty in terms of membership and payment of dues) the 
number of those interviewed who could be said to 
subscribe to this view is nearly three quarters of the 
total" (Davis, 1978,, plOS). 
However 
"In the context of quite specific questions about 
the union and union membership in the plant, and 
without promptingr nearly half the workers in the 
sample began to voice complaints about the unions in 
general. This alone is significant because it reveals a 
sense of hostility or grievance not based in the work 
sphere itself but elsewhere. And, what may be even more 
important,, these externally mediated perspectives are 
appealed to a priori in judging the meaning and quality 
of group experiences at work. This must cast doubt on 
the assertion that the work situation and work 
relationships create or give rise to occupational and 
social perspectives" (Davis,, 1978t p108). 
The only way for the analyst to reconcile such 
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acceptance of the role of the union within the workers' own 
plant with widespread elements of hostility towards 'the 
unions in general' 
"is by inferring a change of reference - from the 
firm and industrial relations at the plant level to the 
state (the political sphere) .... The two views arise from distinct sources: the collective experience of the 
group of workers and the highly mediated images of 
trade union activity deriving from 'public' sources, 
especially the mass media. Discussion of trade unions 
can produce both kinds of response. 
The fittersp nearly all of whom were regular 
viewers of television and readers of the Daily Record 
or the Daily Express were quite fluent in their use of 
the arguments and frameworks of interpretation which 
dominate these media sources. " (Davisp 1978, pplO8-109) 
This last paragraph refers us back to the argument that 
the most important 'effects' of television broadcasting are 
those which are transmitted in the form of the cognitive 
framework implicit in the television output and whch thus 
operate to affect the frameworks through which the viewer 
views the world. As John Westergaard puts it 
"*so the 'frameworks of perception' which people 
bring to their viewingr listening and reading - the 
code with which they decode media messages - come from 
somewhere, are formed at some time and liable to be 
reformed over time. The problem defies solution by 
empirical measurement. But it is hardly conceivable 
that long-term exposure to the media themselves has no 
part to play among the sources for those 
predispositions by which people make sense both of the 
world andl in turnp of the particular interpretations 
of the world on offer from the media. " (Westergaardo, 
1977, plll) 
It is important to look at how the frameworks of 
perception deriving from the media mesh with frameworks of 
perception derived from everyday life. I have been arguing 
that the ground of everyday experience which was 
increasingly seen as central and on which identity was 
289 
increasingly based was that of family life and consumption. 
My argument is that the frameworks implicit in mainstream 
television brgpadcasting operate to reinforce such self- 
images -and dovetail them with a particular and congruent 
view of what politics is all about. 
The most important assumptions implicit in television 
broadcasting are assumptions about who or what the viewer 
is. In a distortion of the process invoked in Mead's 
looking glass selft the television viewer is the target of 
assumptions about who he or she - the viewer - is. The 
broadcast contains implicit definitions of the audience to 
which it is addressed. 
The assumptions implicit in mainstream television 
broadcasting about who the viewer is are predominantly that 
the viewer is a citizen, a consumer and the member of a 
nuclear family. Very rarely is there an assumption that the 
viewer is a member of a class. Now the point is not that 
these assumptions are a distortion or even a limitation of 
reality but that for many people they do mesh 
unproblematically with their own definitions of who or what 
they are. These definitions are no doubt in part a result 
of the television definitions but not entirely. 
We are moving very close here to Althusser's view of 
ideology as functioning through a process he calls 
interpellation or 'hailing'. As usual Althusser is 
operating at a very high level of generalityl his main 
point being that the secret of ideology is that it gives 
individuals the illusory conviction that they are separate 
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subjectivities by addressing them as separate subjects: 
0... all ideology hails or interpellates concrete 
individuals as concrete subjectst by the functioning of 
the category of the subject. .... I shall suggest that ideology 'acts' or 'functions' in such a way that it 
'recruits' subjects among the individuals (it recruits 
them all), or 'transforms' the individuals into 
subjects (it transforms them all) by that very precise 
operation which I have called interpellation or 
hailing, and which can be imagined along the lines of 
the most commonplace everyday police (or other) 
hailing: 'Heyp you therell" (Althusserrl971, ppl62-163) 
I am going to borrow Althusser's notiont not for the 
purpose of saying that television interpellates 
subjectivity or identity as suchr but in order to think of 
television as interpellating particular identities - Hey, 
you, the consumer; you British/English/Scottish - but very 
rarely - Hey your worker; Hey your unemployed. 
We have seen that television's crucial role is as 
mediator between everyday experience and experience of 
national politics. Perhaps the most powerful way in which 
it performs this mediation and tries to ensure a smooth 
dovetailing between the two levels is that the 
interpellations which television carries out at the two 
levels mesh. They must be plausible at the level of 
everyday experience and plausible at the level of national 
politics - hence the interpellations of the consumer,, the 
husband/wifei, mother/fathert the citizenp with no 
contradiction involved. 
At one level, the image of the consumer. is of course 
implicit in advertising. The impact of advertising here 
lies not in its specific messages but in its'implicit 
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reinforcement of the consumption oriented family centred 
project. 
Howeverf here I want to concentrate on the implications 
of the fact that the dominant image of national politics is 
entirely homologous with the interpellation 
consumer/citizen. 
The point is clearly brought out in David Morley's 
outline of the frameworks implicit in television coverage 
of industrial relations in the early 1970s -a period which 
is particularly important for our purposes in that it was 
the period just before the S. N. P. Is greatest successes in 
1974. 
"Society is seen to consist of an aggregate of 
free individuals who formt through association, a 
number of competing 'interest groups', whose differing 
interests are all subordinated to an overall shared 
'national interest'. Thus inflation is a 'national' 
problem - the concern of the whole community - so we as 
a nation need to be concerned about 'our' exports, the 
state of the pound etc. 
In times of crisis the concept of the 'national 
interest' will be articulated explicitly - for exampler 
see Mr Heath's speech at the end of the miners strike 
in 1972: "In the kind of country we live in there 
cannot be any "we" nor "they". There is only 'us'; all 
of us" 
The unions are basically presented as being 
motivated for a narrow minded concern for their own 
sectional interestp while the government is presented 
as being motivated in a non-sectarian way, by concern 
for the 'national interest'. 
The state is represented as the representative and 
defender of the 'national interest' and of the rule of 
law ... as the representative of the 
'majority of the 
people' - not of any particular class interest. As Mr 
Heath said: "If the government is defeated then the 
country is defeated, because the government is just a 
group of people selected to do what the majority of us 
want to see done. " (Speech after the miners' strike, 
Feb. 1972)" (Morleyr 1976, p248) 
The triplet "you/we the consumer: you/we the citizen: 
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you/we the nation" forms a very tight ideological matrix 
for 'the dominant interpretation of political events. (6) 
Now in Scotland of course there is another available 
interpellation - you/we the Scots. Unlike the excluded 
interpellations such as "you/we the working class", the 
interpellated Scottish identity does not threaten the 
dominant equation but involves simply a shift in one of its 
terms. 
We saw in Chapter 4 how television can be regarded as 
the most important medium by which the 'Scottish economic 
dimension' or the 'Scottish economic project' was 
transferred from an elite to a mass level. To the extent 
that 'the national interest' is interpreted in economistic 
terms - Le the appeal is not to patriotic devotion to the 
nation for its own sake but is rather that as members of 
the nation we have a common economic stake or fate so that 
national economic growth will bring us economic benefits - 
the only grounds upon which the 'two national interests' - 
British or Scottish - will be judged is in terms of their 
economic promise. As such the Scottish interpellation 
meshed no less tightly with the family consumption project 
than did the Britishr and as we have seen it was -an 
interpellation which was implicit in Scottish television 
coverage of political and economic affairs as was the 




So far I have been more concerned with establishing the 
material and communicative determinants of a particular 
kind of ideological field within which the S. N. P. could 
flourish and with shedding some light on how the meaning of 
S. N. P. voting can be derived from this context than with 
the more specific question of why it was the S. N. P. in 
particular that reaped the benefit of these broader 
processes. It is now time to focus our attention more 
closely on that question. 
A fairly exhaustive analysis of trends in industrial 
and occupational structure and in the pattern of social 
mobility in Scotland and in the rest of the United Kingdom 
showed that there no differences in fundamental parameters 
sufficient to produce the difference in voting patterns 
constituted by the S. N. P. Any argument that the rise of the 
S. N. P. was due to differential patterns of social change in 
Scotland - changes, in other words, which were not shared 
with the rest of Britain - have little empirical basis. 
It has been established in this chapter however that 
there were processes of social change which did have a 
great deal to do with the electoral success of the S. N. P. 
If then we accept that the pattern of social change 
which provided the enabling context for the rapid success 
of the S. N. P. in Scotland in the 1960s and early 1970s was 
in large part common to Scotland and the rest of Britaint 
we are still left with the $64jOOO dollar question of just 
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what it was that was different about Scotland that made it 
follow its own course in supporting the S. N. P. This 
question will form the topic of the next chapter. 
The answer which would seem to come closgst to the 
truth will be regarded no doubt as utterly banal. What was 
different about Scotland was quite simply the existence of 
'Scotland' as a category in terms of which the political 
world could increasingly plausibly be interpreted. 
In other wordsr to explain Scotland's differential 
political development there is no need to assume the 
existence of any 'objective' social structural differences. 
For most of the period since the Uniont 'Scotland' had 
not operated as the primary category through which the 
political world was interpreted. The category 'Scotland' 
would only be activated politically when it received an 
economic relevance - when people began to see 'Scotland' - 
as opposed to Britain or the Empire - as the relevant 
community whose economic fate or fortune would determine 
their own. The period in which 'Scotland' as this kind of 
economic and political unit came to be accepted as a 
central category of perception by a large part of the mass 
electorate can be precisely dated - the late 1950s and the 
early 1960s. 
The discussion in Chapter 4 can be regarded as a 
description of the establishment of a series of nesting and 
increasingly specific conditions of possibility for the 
emergence of Scotland as this kind of category at a macro- 
or societal level. 
295 
The discussion in this chapter has consisted in part of 
a similar establishment of the conditions of possibility 
for voting to be determined by acceptance of Scotland as 
this kind of political category at the micro-level, at the 
level of everyday experience. 
It was the intersection of these two sets of 
developments which created the conditions for the rapid 
shift at the ideological level which produced the meteoric 
success of the S. N. P. 
Af terword: the role of the Scottish National Party itself. 
This study has concentrated almost exclusively upon the 
social structural preconditions for the electoral success 
of the S. N. P. and has treated the S. N. P. itself - in terms 
of its organizational development, policy decisions etc. - 
essentially as a black box. Now obviously this is a 
dangerous thing to do. How can you explain the success of 
the S. N. P. without understanding what the S. N. P. as an 
organization actually did. My main point, however; is that 
whatever the S. N. P. did or did not do was generally of much 
less import that the mere fact of what the Scottish 
National Party was - namely a political party with a 
virtual monopoly of the 'Scottish' label. In a sense the 
most important thing that the S. N. P. had to do was to be 
available as a standard political party in the early 1960s. 
Probably the best account of how that came about is given 
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by Webb and Hall. They conclude that in making the 
decisions which ensured that the S, N. P. r by the early 
1960sp was in fact a reasonably united Party committed to 
an electoral strategy 
u... each issue was ultimately resolved owing to 
the nature of the political environment within which 
the nationalists were operating and their perception of 
that environment. Other outcomes were always possibler 
and at times had strong proponents, but ultimately the 
political system imposed constraints on the possible 
lines of party development if the S. N. P. was ever to be 
a viable political force. " (Webb and Hall#, 1978,, p4l) 
In other words, in order that we can say that decisions 
taken within the S. N. P. made a differencer we would have to 
seriously hypothesize a course of events whereby the S. N. P. 
permanently turned its back on the electoral process. It is 
very hard to imagine. 
However,, I will concede that the one area in which it 
is not permissible just to treat the S. N. P. as a black box 
are those processes within the party which *ensured that the 
SeN, Fe was present in Scotland in the early 1960s as a 
reasonably united party with at least some commitment to 
fighting elections. 
Beyond that proviso the weight of explanation has to 
fall on factors external to the S. N. P. itself. 
The factor which more than any other points towards the 
role of external factors is the sheer speed of the rise of 
S. N. P. support. 
The connection between the causal role of factors 
internal and external to the S. N. P. and the rapidity of the 
S. N. P. Is success cries out for metaphorical expression. 
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Many images spring to mind but the logic is nicely 
expressed in a passage from Albert Goldman's biography of 
Elvis Presley: 
"By the end of 1956, Elvis Presley was being 
universally acclaimed as the King of Rock n' Roll. The 
boy who began the year as an obscure country singer 
broadcasting from a hillbilly station at Shreveport ... 
was now, less than twelve months later, an American 
Hero. Nobody in the history of show business has ever 
made it so big so fast. ... Instead of characterizing Elvis's triumph in conventional metaphors - the long, 
billowy roadr the steep ladder, the tightly closed door 
- you are obliged to seek images that suggest speed, 
violence andr above all, the sheer inadvertence of the 
man who walks into a room filled with volatile gases, 
lights a match - and is blown through the ceilingl 
Clearly, if you want to understand the phenomenon of 
Elvis Presley or how he 'did itlp you have to start 
with the powerfully explosive vapours and not with the 
puny little match. " (Goldmani, 19821 pp256-257) 
True,, the S. N. P. took ten years rather than one to move 
from obscurity to their greatest triumphr but the parallels 
are suggestive. To paraphrase,, no party in the history of 
LJ, -, 4 // 
? OZ -1jo-7 
British politics has made it so big so fast. 
Probably the most crucial parallel lies in the nature 
of the media which made the two successes possible. For 
Elvisr it was radio. For the S. N. P.,, it was television. In 
their respective fields they were the first major 
beneficiaries of the electronic agg. It has long been 
observed that the coming of television changed politics. 
The most generally noted by-product is the increased 
volatility of the electorate. A major aspect of this was 
that the coming of television enabled a party to establish 
a powerful presence without the long march through the 
grass roots which, for example, the Labour Party had had to 
make. The S. N. P. was the first British party to take the 
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television short cutt partly because the frame of reference 
which it embodied was alsor in partr a product of 
television. 
Of course, much more recently we have had an even 
better illustration of the same process and one whose time 
scale much more closely matched that of Elvis - the rise of 
the S. D. P. j, a party created almost entirely top 
down with a 
presence and an image created almost entirely via the mass 
media and television in particular. A party moreoverr which 
is self-consciously aware, as to an extent the S. N. P. have 
been, of the particular importance of media coverage for 
sustaining its appeal. The ultimate illustration of T. V. 
politics takes us even closer to Elvis of courser to the 
United States where traditional grass-roots politics have 
by and large declined into irrelevancer particularly in 
presidential campaignst and where the television image is 
accepted as the supreme reality. 
There is even a certain parallelism in the inadvertence 
of what happened to Elvis Presley and what happened to the 
S. N. P. The Bridgeton by-election of 1961 was the first by- 
election the S. N. P. had fought since 1952. Thanks to some 
extent to the failure of the Liberals to field a candidate, 
the S. N. P. got 19% of the vote. As Miller describes what 
happened 
"... Ian McDonaldp the SNP candidate, was so 
delighted by his modest achievement that he sold his 
farm and offered himself full-time national organizer 
for a nominal salary. The S. N. P. was so used to a 
negligible performance that 19 per cent in Bridgeton 
was a cause for rejoicing. " (19811 p33) 
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The following year William Wolfe stood in the West Lothian 
by-election and gained 23% of the vote. In Webb's wordst 
there was not even a constituency association 
nor even a constitution available for oner and the 
policies the S. N. P. were putting before the electorate 
were basically those developed in 1946-47" (WebbF 1977p 
P101). 
It was only after these two pleasant surprises that the 
S. N. P. decided to go for a full scale electoral strategy. 
There is one area in particular in which it is unlikely 
that decisions taken within the S. N. P. made much difference 
to its fortunes and that is the area of policies other than 
those such as independence or devolution or North Sea Oil 
which embodied its basic Scottish stance. Keith Webb was 
able to write in the mid-1970s that "the policies they 
advocate (with the exception of their stand on Scottish 
autonomy) have not yet been picked up by most of the voting 
publid" (1977, p102) so it is highly unlikely that they 
made much difference in the 1960s. Provided of course that 
the S. N. P. did not stand for anything too extreme such as 
violence or civil disobedience. 
In factr in a paradoxical way, it is what the S. N. P. 
did most effectively which most cogently underlines their 
dependence on developments taking place at other levels. 
What the S. N. P. did most effectively in the 1960s was to 
turn themselves into an effectiver professional but 
strangely conventional electoral party. As Webb put it 
"Perhaps the greatest contribution of the new 
generation of S. N. P. leaders has been not so much what 
they have done# but how they have done it. It is also 
important to note the sort of people they were. The new 
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leaders were sufficiently close to the public image of 
what professional politicians ought to bet that the 
equanimity of the voting public was not disturbed. In 
many ways - class, occupation and education - they are 
not very different from the leadership of the 
established parties. ... The leadership style is 
moderate in tone, and tends to be more pragmatic than 
would normally be expected of a nationalist party. 
The S. N. P. ... has benefited from the type of people 
who became leadersr and the style of political attack 
they have adopted. Because of this, in spite of the 
conservatism of the electorate, the switch to the 
S. N. P. has not seemed too radical to the voter even 
though the S. N. P. is proposing a massive change in the 
organisation of British life. " (Webbt 1977j, ppl02-103) 
This was written when the S. N. P. was still riding 
fairly high in the mid-1970s and was intended as an 
explanation of that success. Looking back from 1983f it is 
the paradoxicality implied by the last sentence of the 
quote which stands out and which seems to say something 
about the quality of the ideological atmosphere within 
which such a strange creature could flourish. 
It is to an analysis of this ideological atmosphere 
that the next chapter will be largely devoted. Orj, if you 
want to understand the phenomenon of the S. N. P. or how it 
'did it' you have to start with the powerfully explosive 
vapours and not with the puny little match. 
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Chapter 7. 
Symbolism, the state and Scottish nationalism. 
Introduction. 
This chapter explores a fairly complex set of issues 
surrounding the role of Scottish symbolism in accounting 
for the success of the S. N. P. 
Section I sets the problem by presenting Miller's 
findings on the extent of the parallelism of support for 
the S. N. P. in Scotland with the taking of other third 
options in the rest of Britain. This divides the problem 
into two. Firstr why did the third option take the form of 
support for the S. N. P. in Scotland, and second why did 
support for the S. N. P. move ahead of support for the 
Liberals in the rest of Britain in October 1974* The main 
focus of the rest of the chapter is on the first problem 
with some attempt to deal with the second in the concluding 
sections. 
Section II consists primarily of a critique of the 
dominant interpretation of the-role of 'attitudes to 
devolution' as the major determinant of S. N. P. support. 
Section III attempts a limited exploration of the 
extent to which ideology - regarded as the most important 
alternative to symbolism as a framework for structuring 
political perceptions - was present in the Scottish 
electorate. Section IV then moves to the heart of the 
matter by attempting an interpretation of how Scottish 
symbolism and identity actually operated to make possible 
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the S. N. P. s electoral success. Section V shows how these 
symbolic mechanisms must be seen as operating within 
conditions of possibility determined primarily by changing 
perceptions of the state. A final section briefly outlines 
the role of 'attitudes to devolution' in the light of the 
preceding discussion. 
I. Social parallels and political parallels. 
Nowhere in in the analysis of patterns of social change 
in Scotland and the rest of Britain did we find any social 
structural differences sufficient to account for Scotland's 
differential electoral behaviour. The bulk of the evidence 
for such 'social parallelism' was empirical data on such 
aspects of social change as occupational structurel social 
mobility and real living standards. This made it reasonable 
to assume that less empirically verifiable but more 
politically relevant aspects of social change such as the 
shift towards more privatised lifestyles and the emergence 
of instrumental orientations to politics were common to 
Scotland and the rest of Britain. Whatever ideological 
differences exist at the Scottish level do not derive from 
differences in more objective aspects of the social 
structure. Such a conception of social structure obviously 
does not include institutional aspects as the legal system 
or the dominant religious denomination. 
In his analyses of electoral trends in Scotland and the 
rest of Britain, William Miller has convincingly 
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demonstrated, in the period up to and including the 
election ofOctober 1974,, precisely the kind of political 
parallelism which one would expect on the basis of such 
social parallelism. This is well expressed in Miller's 
phrase summarizing the mechanisms at work - 'British causes 
in a Scottish environment' (Miller et al. r 1977,, p95). 
The timing of S. N. P. successes led Miller led to the 
conclusion that 
"Up to and including February 1974 the SNP did 
well electorally only when Britain-wide factors 
produced a pool of potential defectors from Labour and 
Conservative. " (Miller et al., 1977,, pl0l) 
A detailed comparison of the timing of SNP successes 
with the timing of Liberal booms amd high abstention rates 
at English elections from 1944 to 1973 (Miller, 1976p p22) 
provided solid evidence for the conclusion that 
in the period up to the February election a 
powerful case can be made that SNP support in Scotland 
followed trends and achieved levels that were matched 
in England either by massive abstention as in 1966-70 
or Liberal boom in 1972-73.1' (Miller,, 1976f p32) 
The parallelism in trend can be extended to include the 
February 1974 election if it is remembered, as Miller 
points outr that 
"In Scotland the SNP took 22% of the vote with 70 
candidates in the 71 seats (the figure stays at 22% if 
we adjust for the numbers of candidates). So although 
on the raw figures the SNP in Scotland confounded the 
polls by doing better than the Liberals in Englandr the 
Liberal vote was spuriously depressed by lack of 
candidates in every seat and after adjustment for 
candidature the English Liberal vote comes out 2% 
higher than the SNP vote. " (Millert 1976F p32) 
There is evidence that British factors were still 
powerfully at work in the October 1974 General Election. 
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Miller found that the relationship between the pattern of 
trust in Labour and Conservative governments and the 
exercise of a third option in terms of voting (i. e doing 
anything but vote Labour or Conservative) was very similar 
at the British and Scottish levels. As Miller puts it 
"With more options available Scottish levels of 
third option support was generally higher. But the 
pattern relating British Liberal votes to trust was the 
same as that which applied to the SNP - the highest 
levels went with balanced distrust, balanced trust 
produced intermediate levels and unbalanced trust very 
low levels. " (Miller et al.,, 1977, r p94) 
Table 7.1 is an adaptation of Miller's f igures to 
highlight this parallelism between Scotland and Britain in 
the relationship between trust in Labour and Conservative 




Per cent taking 
'third option' 
Scot. Brit. 




Sometimes trust Lab. govts. 53 42 
Sometimes trust Con. govts. 
('Reference category') 
Usually trust both Lab. and 36 27 -17 -15 
Con. govts. (balanced trust) 
Rarely trust either Lab. or 
Con. govts. (balanced distrust) 69 65 +16 +23 
Usually trust Con. govts 20 17 -16 -20 
Rarely trust Lab. govts 
Usually trust Lab. govts 25 14 -28 -29 
Rarely trust Con. govts 
(Derived from Table III of Miller et al., 1977) 
Miller's analyses allow us to split the question 
'what 
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was different about Scotland and why' into two components. 
The first question is: why did the same set of British 
wide causes lead to support for the S. N. P. in Scotland 
rather than to support for the Liberals or abstention? 
The second question is: why did support for the S. N. P. 
move well ahead of the British support for the Liberals in 
October 1974. 
Before trying to answer these questions, it is 
necessary to undertake a fairly detailed criticism of the 
answer to them which has dominated, and in an important 
sense has been a methodological framework for, most of the 
analysis of the 1974 and 1979 Scottish Election Surveys so 
far carried out. 
II. Attitudes to devolution. 
To the question of just what it was in the Scottish 
environment. which engendered support for the S. N. P. rather 
than for some other third option, the answer which has been 
put forward in the 'official' analyses of the Scottish 
Election Surveys has been consistent and unequivocal - the 
existence in Scotland of deep-seated and determining 
attitudes towards devolution and self-government. These 
attitudes have been treated as defining a deep and 
permanent cleavage in Scottish societyr a cleavage which is 
regarded as being unambiguously prior to the electoral 
success of the SNP and which is to be regarded as the 
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causal determinant of the latter. As Miller et al put it: 
"There is something to be said for treating self- 
government attitudes as a fourth cleavage line in 
Scottish society adding it to class, religion and 
rurality. " (Miller et al. r 1977,, p95) 
The recognition of the existence of this fundamental 
cleavage and the fact that it presents 'an almost perfect- 
cross cut to the formerly dominant class cleavage# is 
interpreted as meaning that the basic two-party system is 
artificial and that the natural -p arty system in Scotland 
would include one or two parties defined on the devolution 
cleavage. 
In the path analysis which concludes the most detailed 
analysis to date of the determinants of S. N. P. voting in 
the General Election of October 1974, a variable derived 
from the standard 'attitude to devolution' question (see 
Table7.2) is entered into the model as the most 
important immediate determinant of S. N. P. voting. 
"By itself devolution had a strong effect on SNP 
voting and every other variable that influenced SNP 
support did so only in an interactive combination with 
devolution. " (Miller, 1981F p170). 
The fact that 'attitude to devolution' has played such 
a central role in much of the most influential work which 
has been carried out on the determinants of S. N. P. voting,, 
justifies a relatively detailed probing of how the issue 
has been handled. 
The place to begin the exploration is the report on the 
survey(') carried out for the Kilbrandon Commission on the 
Constitution in 1970. This report shows a sensitivity to 
the issues under discussion which has not been equalled 
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since. 
First, since the wording of questions is vitally 
important and since the 'Kilbrandon question' provided a 
model for most of the subsequently used questions aimed at 
eliciting 'attitudes to devolutiont Table 7.2 gives the 
original question which plays such a central role in this 
discussion. 
Table 7.2. Wordings of Kilbrandon survey and Scottish 
Election Survey questions on attitudes to devolution. 
1. Kilbrandon question. 
Qu. 23. For running Scotland as a wholer which of these 
five alternatives would you prefer overall? 
(1) Leave things as they are at present. 
(2) Keep things much the same as they are now but make sure 
that the needs of Scotland are better understood by the 
government. 
(3) Keep the present system but allow more decisions to be 
made in Scotland. 
(4) Have a new system of governing Scotland so that as 
many decisions as possible are made in the area. 
(5) Let Scotland take over complete responsibility for 
running things in Scotland. 
2. Scottish Election Survey devolution question 
Q. There has been a lot of discussion recently about giving 
more power to Scotland. which of these statements comes 
closest to what you yourself f eel should be done? 
(1) Keep the governing of Scotland much as it is now. 
(2) Make sure the needs of Scotland are better understood 
by the government in London. 
(3) Allow more decisions to be made in Scotland. 
(4) Scotland should completely run its own affairs. 
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The f irst point to note is the statement in the report 
that 'The five points in the scale were defined by the 
Commission. ' (Kilbrandon, 1973, p63). Thus they were laid 
down a priori and not developed in the normal way by 
piloting and pre-testing. Perhaps in part to compensate for 
this methodological drawback in the questionp the survey 
probed in considerable detail the extent of respondents 
comprehension of the issues involved. 
At the pilot stage, it was apparent that 'the issues 
covered were quite difficult for some informants to grasp' 
(Kilbrandon, 1973, p1l). Probably the most dramatic 
exemplification of this lack of understanding of the issues 
involved came in response to the question: "Is there a 
special office or organisation which helps to run 
Scotland? " The responses were: Yes, 48%; Noj34%; D. K. 18%. 
Among those replying "Yes"t the named bodies were: Scottish 
Officer 18%; St Andrew's House, 10%; The Scottish Home 
Office/Home Office; Secretary of Stater 3%; Other, 6%;. 
D. K. r 7%. The report continues: 
"About half (49%) the respondents in both 
countries were unable to say at all what these offices 
were responsible for running ... Most of the answers of Scottish and Welsh respondents are very similar and do 
not reflect any awareness on the part of the Scots of 
the wider powers of the Scottish Office relative to the 
Welsh Office. The type of answers given also suggests 
that many informants are making commonsense guesses 
rather than describing known facts ... " (Kilbrandon, 
1973, p85) 
Apart from the more general implications of such 
ignorance, it should be remembered that the first three 
categories of the devolution question refer to the present 
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system with two of them asking for opinions on rather 
nuanced changes to the current system. When over half the 
sample don't seem to have a clue what the present system 
is, it would seem dubious whether many people were thinking 
spontaneously in terms as concrete as those in the 
question. As the report notesp 
" It can be extremely misleading to ask questions 
about details of organisation of a possible future 
change as it is too difficult to provide a sufficiently 
real picture of what is involved for respondent's views 
to be a valid expression of what their reactions would 
be if the change took place. " (Kilbrandonj 1973, p85) 
This stands as a fair prediction of what did in fact 
happen when people were presentedj, not even with the 
actuality of changer but with concrete details of a 
proposed change in the Referendum of 1979. 
The report continues to maintain a healthy scepticism 
in its analysis of responses to the devolution question and 
attempts to take full account of the effects of non- or 
faulty comprehension. There was a careful lead in to the 
devolution question in the course of the interview, with 
detailed questioning about specific public services in 
relation to regional control 'to make informants familiar 
with the concept of more devolution to regional decision- 
taking'. 
Even sot 
"oeo the indications are that those with a cluster 
of characteristics which seem to go together (those 
less able to understand the questionnaire, the elderly, 
those with little education and those from households 
where the head is in a semi- or unskilled occupation) 
tend to select one or other extreme of the scale 
presented to them. Those rated as understanding the 
questionnaire, those from professionalr managerial and 
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non-manual households, the more educated and the young 
seemed to cluster their answers in the three middle 
parts of the scale. " (p66) 
with the implication that 
"at least some of the small proportion choosing 
the most extreme option on the devolution scale did so 
because they failed to understand the issue and were 
unable to to distinguish between the other options 
presented. " (Kilbrandon, 1973, p90) 
I quote at such length because the Kilbrandon question 
became a close model for opinion poll questions and for 
questions included in the Scottish Election Studies which 
have been used as pivotal variables in subsequent analysis. 
In particular, in Miller's (1981) analysis of the causal 
determinants of S. N. P. voting in October 1974 it is a 
variable derived from a variation of the Kilbrandon 
question which is modelled as the immediate determinant of 
voting SNP. The wording of this Scottish Election Survey 
devolution question is given in Table 7.2. 
One consideration which has been repeatedly cited as 
evidence for regarding 'attitudes to devolution' as deep- 
seated and determining is their relative stability, as 
measured in opinion polls, in the late nineteen sixties and 
early seventies compared with the much greater fluctuations 
in the level of support for the SNP both terms of voting 
and opinion poll responses. This stability is interpreted 
as implying that 'attitudes to self-government' are 
something more than mere attitudes. To expand the citation 
made earlier: 
"In a literal sense attitudes to self-government 
are free-choice opinions like attitudes to entry into 
the EEC and not social characteristics like class, 
311 
religion, or for that matter, country of origin. But 
attitudes to EEC entry were characterised by an 
extremely high level of volatility which extended to 
aggregate levels of support not just to individual's 
opinions and by a strong tendency for party allegiance 
to determine attitudes. Indeed many individuals must 
have changed their EEC attitude several times in 
response to party cues. We have no panel study 
information on Scottish electors' attitudes to self- 
government but all the evidence on aggregate levels 
indicates stability. There is something to be said for 
treating self-government attitudes as a fourth cleavage 
line in Scottish society adding it to classr religion 
and rurality. Like those other cleavages it helps to 
define the groups in society who can be made the target 
of party appeals. (Miller et al. j 1977,, p95) 
In a later work, Miller (1981) presents a series of 
opinion polls stretching from 1965 to 1974 which tapped 
attitudes towards devoltion and independence. If we 
restrict ourselves to the national polls which Miller 
presentst support for independence can be seen to have 
fluctuated between a high of 33% in 1968 (Gallupt September 
1968) to a low of 17% in October 1974 (System Threer 
October 1974). Backing for the status quo fluctuated 
between 26% (NOP/Record, December 1969) and 6% (Kilbrandon 
Commission Survey, Summer 1970). Of courser different 
question wordings are likely to have contributed somewhat 
to the apparent fluctuation. Using the Kilbrandon question 
itself (see Table 7.2 for wording) shows support for the 
status quo at 6% in Summer 1970 and 14% in April 19740, with 
support for 'complete responsibility' at 23% in 1970 and 
18% in 1974. (Miller,, 1981,, Table 3.1). 
The degree of stability in the aggregate distribution 
of responses is to some extent beside the point, however. 
Converse (1969) points out that the apparent relative 
312 
stability of an attitude in terms of the aggregate 
distribution of responses can point either of two ways. It 
can mean either that 
1. the attitude is deeply-embeddedr central and not 
easily subject to change - here a close parallel would be 
religious beliefs - or that 
2. the attitude is closer to being a 'non-attitude' 
characterized by Converse as 
"one polar zone on a dimension describing a 
relationship between the subject and the political 
attitude object ... For convenience, we shall call this dimension one of centrality of the attitude-object to 
the subject. " (Converse, 1969f pl8l) 
Thus stability can be seen as the concomitant of an 
attitude, here the attitude to devolution, being one of 
either high or low centrality. 
Of course, this is not an all or nothing affair. 
Centrality varies between individuals and a hard core to 
whom the issue is very central could co-exist with a 
varying degree of centrality in the rest of the population 
including some for whom the question is of no interest 
whatsoever, who have in fact, non-attitudes* 
However, in attempting to assess the centrality or 
salience or importance of the devolution issue we can turn 
to more direct evidence. 
In discussing the effects of attitudes on single choice 
expressions of political will such as voting in an election 
or a referendum, the question of the relative importance or 
centrality or salience of issues is crucial. Given that 
only one choice is allowed for the outcome it is important 
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to concentrate on the most central issues rather than a 
wide range of somewhat important issues, since in a forced 
choice situation, of which voting itself and the devolution 
referendum oi 1979 are both examples, all the issues could 
be said to be competing for salience and it is only the 
most central which will have a decisive effect. 
This is a very tricky area and great care should be 
exercised not to read into the data more than is there. 
The two sources of quantitative empirical information 
on the salience of the devolution issue relative to that of 
other issues have been opinion polls and the Scottish 
Election Surveys of 1974 and 1979. 
The main opinion poll series has been that of ORC 
published in the Scotsman. Their question has taken the 
orm 
"What do you yourself feel are the most important 
problems the Government should do something about? 
Anything else? " 
In the 1974 Scottish Election Survey there was a 
separate question for each issue of the form 
"And when you were deciding about votingr how important 
was the general question of the form of government for 
Scotland? " 
with specified response categories: 
The most important single thing 
Fairly important. 
Not very important. 
Now of course comparison between these two sources of 
information is going to be very trickyr given the different 
forms of the question and the fact that one refers to what 
the government should do while the other refers to 
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influences on voting. Howevert various analyses of the 
Scottish Election Surveys have tried to make the comparison 
and have attempted to show that 'devolution' was much more 
important for voting than it was in terms of being seen as 
a problem for government. 
In reporting the findings of the October 1974 Scottish 
Election Survey in the context of the ORC series, Miller 
reports as follows: 
"While opinion polls which asked about the most 
important problems for government action never found 
more than 10 per cent of Scots choosing devolution, 
those that asked which issues had been important when 
deciding about voting found much higher percentages 
stressing the importance of home rule. In our 1974 SESp 
for example, it ranked fifth: 81% said prices were 
importantr 72% wage controls, 70 per cent strikesr 68 
per cent unemployment, and 61 per cent Scottish 
government. Home rule was not regarded as a major 
problem facing the government but was reported to be 
one important factor in deciding how to vote. "(Millerp 
1981, p103) . 
If we refer back to the question formats we can see 
that Miller is comparing a 'most important' category in the 
opinion polls with a combination of 'most important' and 
'fairly important' in the Scottish Election Study. To 
assess the fuIl extent of the distortion involved we need 
to take a closer look at the patterning of responses to the 
'salience' questions in the Scottish Election Study. (Table 
7.3) What is probably the main reason why the reports on 
the SES have not reported the categories 'most important' 
and fairly important separately is the fact that the 
the percentages of 'most important' issues sum to 126 
rather than to the 100 which would have been the case if 
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Table 7.3 Responses to 'importance' questions. Scottish 
Election Survey October 1974. 
Percentage responding The most Fairly Not very 
Important Important Important 
Prices 29 54 18 
Strikes 12 59 30 
Ufiemployment 9 60 31 
Pensions 11 51 38 
Housing 7 44 49 
North Sea Oil 7 51 42 
Common market 6 51 43 
Nationalisation 6 44 50 
Social services 6 49 45 
Wage controls 12 62 27 
Scottish government 16 47 38 
Coalition 5 37 58 
all the respondents had complied strictly with the 
requirement of naming only the most important issue as 
specified in the questionnaire. 
The resp'gnses can be put into a still more complete 
perspective if we give the 1974 SES responses by vote in 
the October 1974 election. 
Table 7.4 Percentage responding 'most important' and 'not 














Con Lab SNP 
26 32 28 
11 12 11 
7 13 8 
7 18 7 
5 9 7 
3 5 14 
3 8 7 
11 3 7 
3 8 5 
11 15 7 
4 5 43 
7 5 3 
Not very important 
Con Lab SNP 
17 15 21 
29 30 33 
38 26 32 
40 29 48 
51 41 57 
50 51 24 
45 42 42 
37 64 47 
43 40 57 
32 25 26 
52 45 14 
42 68 62 
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As can clearly be seen 'Scottish government' is the 
issue whose salience is most closely associated with party 
support. 
The discussion becomes even more baroque in 'Oil and 
the Scottish Voterr 1974-791 (Miller, Brand and Jordanf 
1980). First a series of results from the ORC 'importance' 
series is presented. It is reported that in response to the 
"What do you yourself feel are the most important problems 
the Government should do something about? " question "they 
found large numbers naming prices, inflation and 
unemployment. Very few mentioned oil or devolution. " 
The full distributions are not given, only the 
percentages naming devolution and oil. Between April 1974 
and October 1976F four surveys found between 6 and 11% 
naming devolutionr while between February 1979 and November 
197 9a further four surveys showed between 3 and 6 per cent 
naming devolution. 
Millerr Brand and Jordan then go on to deny that the 
ORC question has any relation to the factors influencing 
voting. 
"The faults with this question are that it 
concentrates attention on "problems" and "Government". 
Inevitably that means it invites replies which are to 
do with Government outputs and moreoverr government 
outputs where the Government is currently having 
difficulties solving its "problems". There is nothing 
wrong with asking questions on that topic. The fault 
is 
one of context and interpretation. many of those who 
have tried their hand at interpreting this "importance" 
question, and not a few of those involved in setting 
the question, have treated it as a measure of the 
issues most likely to have an impact on party support 
and ultimately on party votes in a general election. 
For that purpose the ORC importance question is worse 
than no question at all since it provides actively 
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misleading information. " (Miller, Brand and Jordan, 
1980, p34) 
That is to overstate the case. Of course questions 
about government problems and factors influencing voting 
are not the same. But they are closely related. If 
elections are about anything they are about governmental 
outputs. In 'answering "importance" questions people do not 
make such fine distinctions. They plump for the issues 
which are most important to them in either case. 
Much later in the paper, the authors return to the 
self-perceived importance of issues, primarily with respect 
to oil, but also including some discussion of devolution on 
the basis of the two Scottish Election Surveys. Presumably 
because of the difficulty experienced in the October 1974 
survey of making respondents stick to a single most 
important issuer the 'most important' category was replaced 
by an 'extremely important' category. The question in the 
1979 Scottish Election Survey was of the form: 
"When you were deciding about votingr how important was 
the question of (named issue) - extremely important, 
fairly importantr or not very important. " 
Despite this modification having solved the problem of 
multiple 'most important' responses however, the same 
elision is made as was made by Miller in the earlier 
discussion i. e. the 'extremely' and 'fairly' important 
responses are lumped together and at no point are these 
categories given separatelyr as in 
"Both in 1974 and 1979 about 61% quoted devolution 
as an important factor in determining their vote while 
81% quoted prices and inflation. Unemployment was 
quoted by 68% in 1974F rising to 76% in 1979. North Sea 
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oil was quoted by 56% in 1974, falling to 42% in 1979. Amongst SNP voters Scottish government came top with 86% in 1974 rising to 89% in 1979. Howeverr oil was 
named by only 76% of SNP voters in 1974 and still less, 
60%,, in 1979. " (Miller,, Brand and Jordant 1980j, 
1980, p99) 
This is followed by another sideswipe at the ORC question. 
" In contrast to the media pollsters "most 
important problem facing the government? " questionj 
which has no obvious, direct logical relation with 
voting choice these figures confirm that Scottish 
issues were important to the Scottish voters in making 
up their mind how to vote; and confirm also that they 
were self-consciously aware of this fact. The figures 
suggest that devolution rivaled prices and unemployment 
as a criterion for party choice in general and was the 
most important factor in the decision to vote SNP ... (Miller, Brand and Jordant 1980# p99) 
In short#, throughout the analyses of the Scottish 
Election Study there was a consistent tendency to present 
the data in a way which overstated the salience of the 
devolution issue. On the one hand the implications of 
opinion polls which showed devolution being named as one of 
the most important issues by less than 10% of respondents 
were dismissed. On the other hand, there was a tendency to 
overstate the significance of the fact that over 60% of 
respondents# when asked whether devolution was 
'most/extremely important'r 'fairly important' or 'not very 
important' in determining their vote,, plumped for one of 
the first two categories. This of course sounds like 
reasonable evidence for a high level of salience. Howeverr 
if there is one unwritten law which should be applied to 
the interpretation of salience questions of the form "How 
important was x to your doing y" with three response 
categories of the form most/very/extremely important', 
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'quite/fairly/somewhat important' and 'not at all/not 
very/slightly important'#, it is that the middle category 
will tend to be the modal response and that respondents 
will only assign to the bottom category those factors which 
had never entered their head as having anything to do with 
the issue at hand or which are actually repugnant to the 
respondent. Conversely people will put into the middle 
category everything which they consider could reasonably 
have had an effect (and the taking into consideration of 
which contributes to the image of a well-informed political 
actor which is what many political interviewees are trying 
to present). That is precisely why salience questions have 
three categories - to separate the wheat from the chaff. 
And this separation is achieved at the boundary between the 
highest and the middle category - not at the boundary 
between the middle and the lowest which is more akin to a- 
boundary of awareness. Far from the opinion poll responses 
on devolution being meaningless in this contextr it is the 
use of the 'fairly important'/'not very important' boundary 
which is meaningless. 
The foregoing discussion has been critical of claims 
that 'attitudes to devolution' have been sufficiently 
stable,, deep-rooted or salient to have played the 
fundamental role in determining S. N. P. voting. Now of 
course I do not deny that 'attitudes to devolution and 
self-government' have 'something to do with' voting S. N. P. 
What is less legitimate is the notion that 'attitudes to 
devolution and self-government', as measured by a response 
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to a single, perhaps ill-comprehended question, can be 
meaningfully plucked out from the whole complex of how 
people think about politics in Scotland -a complex which 
is constantly changing and within which the meaning and 
significance of 'attitudes to devolution' is itself 
constantly changing - to constitute an independently 
defined factor which can be assigned its own 'causal 
weight'. 
The dangers of taking 'attitude to devolution' as an 
independently definable entity stand out most clearly in 
the context of Miller's use of attitude to devolution as an 
element in a causal model which is complex but in which 
'attitude to devolution' (as measured by responses to the 
S. E. S. devolution question given in Table 7.2) is made to 
play the fundamental causal role in determining S. N. P. 
voting. In constructing such a causal model it is important 
to be explicit about the assumptions involved. Miller is 
explicit about his assumptions and it is these which are 
problematic. By far the most important claim which is made 
in a recursive causal model in which an arrow is drawn 
pointing away from 'attitude to devolution' and towards 
'voting SNPI is that the causal influence is all one way. 
However, the irony is that whether or not the causal 
influence is all one way is the one thing that the causal 
model itself cannot determine. The analyst has to assume 
and specify beforehand that the direction of causality is 
all one way. The validity of the model depends entirely 
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upon this assumption being true. 
As Miller himself puts it: 
"the essence of a 'recursive' model is that there 
are no loops or circuits of causation in it: that we 
can assign all the variables to groups and assume that 
variables in one group may be influenced by those in 
earlier groups but not by those in the same or later 
groups. " (Millerr 1981, pp218-219) 
Most of the assumptions that Miller makes - primarily 
that social structural variables such as ruralityr age, 
occupational classr religion and house tenure are causally 
prior to such subjective variables as class identification; 
'trust in governments; attitudes on oil and devolution'; 
and vote - are relatively unproblematic. 
It is the assumption that the relationship between 
attitude to devolution on the one hand and voting S. N. P. on 
the other is all one way which is much more problematic. 
"Now any analytical assumptions are likely to be 
only approximately true.. Some people may feel such a 
sense of identification with the working class that 
they go straight from university to an unskilled manual 
occupation and a council house. But if we admit such 
reciprocal influences then it becomes very much more 
difficult in theoryt and perhaps impossible in 
practice, to quantify the degree of influence in each 
direction along such reciprocal causal links. The 
weight of influence is, I thinkj from the earlier 
groups to the later groups in the model and the 
assumption of a recursive structure is. a reasonable 
analytical assumption. " (Millerf, 1981j, p219) 
These considerations apply just as much to the 
relationship between attitude to devolution and voting 
S. N. P. as to any other. The implication of the statement 
that 'if we admit such reciprocal influences then it 
becomes veiy much more difficult in theoryt and perhaps 
impossible in practicer to quantify the degree of 
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influence' is that if there is any reciprocal influence of 
voting S. N. P. on attitude to devolutiont the model is#, in 
effect, meaningless. 
It is not even necessary to postulate that voting 
S. N. P. has an influence on 'attitude to devolution' for the 
causal edifice to collapse. That the model assumes no 
reciprocal causation between attitude to devolution and SNP 
voting is only a minimum specification of what the model 
assumes. The model in fact assumes that there is no other 
connection between attitude to devolution and voting 
S. N. P. than that by which attitude to devolution is causally 
prior to voting S. N. P. 
Within the bounds of causal imagery, such a connection 
could be any factor which operated to affect both 'attitude 
to devolution' and voting S. N. P. It could be that slippery 
beast 'Scottish identity',, it could be a belief that 
independence or devolution would be economically beneficial 
to Scotland? it could be resentment against Westminsterr it 
could any combination of these or it could be a host of 
other factors. If such factors were operating to determine 
both 'attitude to devolution' and 'voting S. N. P. 1 then to 
that extent the correlation between 'attitude to 
devolution' and voting S, N. P. would be spurious and any 
causal relation based upon it would be meaningless. It -is 
not up to the critic of the causal model to specify what 
these factors are, it is up the the constructor of the 
causal model to prove that they are not relevant. 
So far the criticism has stayed within 'causal 
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imagery'. The most fundamental objection however is whether 
such imagery is appropriate in an area such as this. As 
soon as we recognize a symbolic relationship between 
'attitude to devolution' - and remember that this is 
measured by a response to a question about Scottish 
devolution options - and voting for the Scottish National 
Party, this symbolic relationship itself begins to pull the 
props from under the causal model. And as the emphases make 
clear, there is a rather obvious semantic relationship 
between the two variables - they are both about Scotland. 
Here we are approaching an area which must be explored 
in order to come to a more realistic assessment of the 
determinants of S. N. P. voting and the role of attitudes to 
devolution. The main issue to be addressed will be the 
central but devilishly tricky question of the role of 
'Scottish symbolism' and 'Scottish identity' in Scottish 
politics. Before this topic can be dealt with however, it 
is worth making a limited exploration of what could be seen 
as the major alternative to 'symbolism' as a basis for the 
structuring of the political perceptions of the electorate 
- ideology. 
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III. Ideological thinking in the electorate. 
In Chapter 3j I outlined a dimension of ideological 
structure according to which belief systems could be 
regarded as ideological in a positive sense to the extent 
that they were coherent, totalizing in scope and reflexive. 
The 'rather brief discussion in Chapter 3 also emphasized 
the extent to which the development of ideological 
structure was critically dependent upon the nature of the 
communicative context within which a particular political 
belief system was built up and especially upon the degree 
of active involvement concerned. It is quite a leap from 
such theoretical formulations to the empirical studies 
which have attempted to assess the degree of ideological 
structuration revealed by responses to attitude items in 
standard electoral surveys. 
Phillip Converse's paper 'The Nature of Belief Systems 
in Mass Publics' can be seen as a locus classicus which on 
the one hand serves to link analysis of ideological 
structuration with analysis of the communicative contexts 
in which belief systems are built up and on the other hand 
served as the theoretical basis for much of the subsequent 
empirical analysis of attitude structure in mainstream 
electoral analysis. A presentation of Converse's argument 
is probably the simplest way then to link up these separate 
strands in the present discussion. 
Converse defines a belief system as 'a configuration of 
ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound 
together by some form of constraint or functional 
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interdependence' (1964, p207) - this constraint being a 
matter of degree. The constraint present in political 
belief systems is presented in terms of a stratification of 
'levels of conceptual i sation' based on 'the breadth of 
contextual grasp of the political system' that each seems 
to represent. In simple terms,, his model is that the more 
involved one is in politics - and in communicative terms 
this means the more one deals withl debates or even thinks 
about politics - the more political information one is 
exposed to and the more pressure there is to order the 
information in a coherent, or 'ideological' manner. 
It is a distinction that Converse makes between-two 
types of information - and the ease of their transmission - 
that is most. useful for our purposes. 
"Where transmission of information is at staker it 
becomes important to distinguish between two classes of 
information. Simply putt these two levels are what goes 
with what and why. Such levels of information logically 
stand in a scalar relationship to one another, in the 
sense that one can hardly arrive at an understanding of 
why two ideas go together without being aware that they 
are supposed to go together. On the other handr it is 
easy to know that two ideas go together without knowing 
why. For examplep we can expect that a very large 
majority of the American public would somehow have 
absorbed the notion that 'Communists are atheists'. 
What is important is that this preconceived correlation 
would for most people represent nothing more than a 
fact of existencet with the same status as the fact 
that oranges are orange and most apples are red. If we 
were to go and explore with these people their grasp of 
the 'why' of the relationshipt we would be surprised if 
more than a quarter of the population even attempted 
responses (setting aside such inevitable replies as 
"those Communists are for everything wicked"), and, 
among the responses received we could be sure that the 
majority would be incoherent or irrelevent. 
The first level of information, thent is simple 
and straightforward. The second involves much more 
complex and abstractive information, very close to what 
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Downs has called the 'contextual knowledge' relevant to 
a body of information .... The general premise is that the first type of information will be diffused much 
more readily than the second because it is less 
complex" (Converse, 19641 p212) 
Converse then combines this contrast in ease of 
transmission between the two types of information with a 
pyramidal,, 'trickle down' model of information transmission 
to explain the different types of belief system which exist 
at different levels of the 'conceptual stratification'. 
"It is our primary thesis that,, as one moves f rom 
elite sources of belief systems downwards on such an 
information scale, several important things occur. 
Firsty the contextual grasp of 'standard' political 
belief systems fades out very rapidlyr almost before 
one has passed beyond the 10% of the American 
population that in the 1950s had completed standard 
college training. Increasinglyr simpler forms of 
information about "what goes with what" (or even 
information about the simple identity of objects) turn 
up missing. The net resultl as one moves downwardt is 
that constraint declines across the universe of idea 
elementsr and that the range of relevant belief systems 
becomes narrower and narrower. Instead of a few wide 
ranging belief systems that organise large amounts of 
specific information, one would expect to find a 
proliferation of clusters of ideas among which little 
constraint is feltr evenr quite often, in instances of 
sheer logical constraint. 
At the same time#, moving f rom top to bottom of 
this information dimensionp the character of -the 
objects that are central in a belief system undergoes 
systematic change. These objects shift from the remoter 
generic and abstract to the increasingly simpler 
concreter or "close to home". Where potential political 
objects are concerned, this progression tends to be 
from abstract ideological principles to the more 
obviously recognisable social groupings or charismatic 
leaders and finally to such objects of immediate 
experience as familyr job, and immediate associates. " 
(Converser 1964, p213) 
The main word of caution which is in order is that 
Converse is operating very much with an 'elite-mass'. model 
with the political involvement which produces ideological 
structure seen as being limited largely to elite levels. On 
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the one hand, to the extent that the pattern of information 
flow in Scotland is one of transmission from central 
sources to a mass audience - and television is the obvious 
example - Converse's model does apply. On the other hand#, 
there is nothing to stop us extending the implications of 
political involvement for ideological structuration to 
popular and oppositional levels of political activity to 
give us an alternative non-elite source of ideology. 
Converse's contrast between 'abstract ideological 
principles' and 'the more obviously recognizable social 
groupings or charismatic leaders' as potential political 
objects in belief systems serves to alert us to the 
implications of his analysis for understanding the role of 
symbolism in structuring political belief systems - 
implications whichr strangely enought Converse himself does 
not seem*to have followed up. 
Converse has earlier contrasted two classes of 
political information - "what goes with whatt and why". 
Attitude constraintr the degree to which the response to 
one attitudinal question can be predicted from the response 
to anothero, is seen to result from the depth to which the 
respondent is aware of the connecting 'whys',, this 
ideological awareness thus serving to structure the 
responses. 
In what is very much an extension of Converse's 
analysis specifically designed to explore the role of 
symbolism, Bennett (1975,, p80) points out that ideological 
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coherence or logical constraint is not the only way in 
which political belief systems can receive structure - 
belief systems can also be structured symbolically. Ifi 
Converse's terms,, political symbolism is a powerful means 
of providing information on "what goes with what" and as we 
shall see in the next section this is precisely what 
symbolism does - it provides meaning or makes semantfc 
connections. At the risk of oversimplificationt we could 
say that lideology'r in the positive sense that we have 
been using, and 'symbolism' provide alternative means of 
structuring political belief systems i. e. of structuring 
how the political world is perceived. Now the two are not 
totally incompatible but it is true that to the extent that 
someone has a well worked out ideological belief system,, 
that person is relatively unlikely to be swayed in his 
political perceptions or actions by purely symb. olic 
definitions of reality. Before moving on to look at how 
symbolic mechanisms might well have operated in the 
Scottish case, it is worth making a limited empirical 
assessment of the extent to which political attitudes were 
structured 'ideologically' at the General Election of 
October 1974. 
Mainstream empirical electoral analysis has (following 
Converse) used three main methods of assessing the degree 
of ideological thinking revealed in responses to election 
surveys. 
The first is the only one not to, be based upon the 
analysis of fixed choice responses to attitude items. The 
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method involves classifying respondents into 'ideological 
levels' on the basis of the presence or absence of 
'ideological' or quasi- ideological terminology in open 
ended responses elicited with respect primarily to party or 
candidate images. 
The second method requires panel data and concentrates 
upon the degree of response stability at an individual 
level as an index of attitude stability. 
The third method, and the one which has been most 
elaboratedp as well as being the most controversial, is the 
assessment of the degree of ideological structuration on 
the basis of the relationships between responses to 
questions on different issues(2). This is the only method 
which can be employed on the basis of quantitative results 
from a single cross-sectional survey - here the 1974 
Scottish Election Survey. 
At its simplest, the ruling assumption is that 
"correlations between attitudes that are visible 
in aggregates are reliable evidence of some structuring 
of attitudes on the part of the individual members" 
(Campbellp et al, 1960r pl9l) 
Butler and Stokes tend to use the term 'the organisation of 
issues': 
"what really distinguishes those who think 
ideologically is the extent to which their attitudes to 
several issues are organized into a clear structure" 
(Butler and Stokes, 1969, p2ll) 
In the extensive American literature on attitude 
structure, the survey items used have primarily been of the 
form 'Should the Federal government (take a specific 
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action) I e. g. 'The government ought to help people get 
doctors and hospital care at low cost. Do you have an 
opinion on this. or notV with response categories forming a 
five-point Likert scale running from 'agree strongly' to 
'disagree strongly'. (Nie and Andersent 1976, Appendixr 
p133) 
In the discussion of attitude structure in 'The 
American Voterlt the domestic items used are characterised: 
"In primary content these items all have to do with the 
desirability of governmental action in areas of social 
welfare" while the foreign items concerned "the desirable 
degree of United States' intervention in international 
affairs. " (Campbell et al, 1960p p195) 
Although there were no exact equivalents of such 
questions in the 1974 Scottish Election Surveyl it does 
contain a series of questions which tap attitudes towards 
aspects of governmental action. 
The format of these questions (see Table 7.5 below) is 
rather more slanted towards tapping the perceived salience 
of the issues than is the case with a response format 
running from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree' - 
although any question asking for information of strength of 
feeling will inevitably pick up an element of salience. 
Given this limitation of the data it is all the more 
important to present the data in as transparent a way as 
possible so that the precise derivation of the summary 
numerical coefficient can be clearly seen. 
In the American literaturer the standard measure of 
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association between items has been gamma. This coefficient 
has the advantage in terms of interpretability of being 
derived directly from the cross-classification of ordinally 
categorised variables. 
This derivation means that gamma can be directly 
related to the cross-tabulation from which the coefficient 
is calculated. This brings the advantage of being able to 
see a relationship both in terms of the numerical value of 
the gamma coefficient (for comparative purposes) and in 
terms of the actual cross-tabulation. 
This relative 'transparency' of the coefficient bears 
the cost that the value of the coefficient is sensitive to 
the number of categories used (other things being equalt 
the more categories, the lower the value of gamma) and is 
distorted by unbalanced marginal distributions. 
The Scottish Election Survey contained fourteen items 
amenable to this kind of analysis. Of this fourteenp I 
excluded five from the analysis because responses were 
heavily weighted towards agreement (should the government 
take tougher measures to prevent crimer get rid of 
pollutiont take tougher measures to prevent Communist 
influence in Britain, spend more money to get rid of 
poverty in Britain, make more efforts to protect the 
countryside and our finest buildings). The question as to 
whether the government should maintain separate schools for 
Roman Catholics was omitted from the analysis because it 
introduces the obvious complication of the religion of the 
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respondent. Finallyr the question as to whether the 
government should shift power from London to the regions 
and local authorities was put aside to be discussed in the 
context of attitudes to devolution. 
This left seven items (full text in Table 7.5) on the 
basis of which to make a first probe into the degree of 
policy-related attitude structure in the Scottish 
population. 
Table 7.5 Full text of questions used to elicit policy- 
related attitudes. Scottish Election Survey October 1974. 
Qu 27.1 am going to read out a list of things that some 
people believe a Government should do. SHOW CARD. For each 
one can you say whether you feel it is: 
1. Very important that it should be done 
2. Fairly important that it should be done 
3. It doesn't matter either way 
4. Fairly important that it should not be done 
5. Very important that it should not be done 
Now, using one of the answers on this cardr what is our y 
view about: 
27A putting more money into the health service? 
27B establishing comprehensive schools in place of 
grammar schools throughout the country? 
27C sending coloured immigrants back to their own 
country? 
27D increasing state control of land for building? 
27E giving more aid to poorer countries in Africa and 
Asia? 
27H giving workers more say in the running of the 
place where they work? 
27K redistributing income and wealth in favour of 
ordinary people? 
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In order to minimise the effect of unbalanced marginal 
distributions on the size of the coefficient measuring the 
relationships between the items, standard American 
procedure was followed. The five response categories for 
each item were collapsed into three. In this recoding the 
main guideline was to try to make the three resulting 
categories have as even a number of respondents as possible 
in each category. (cf Nie and Andersen, 1976j p99) 
The variables were recoded to run in the same direction 
so that throughout the discussion a positive gamma between 
two variables means that 'right-wing' replies on one item 
have tended to go with 'right-wing' replies on the other. 
(See Table 7.6 for the distribution of responses according 
to the original categories and how these categories were 
collapsed). 
Positive gammas can thus be interpreted as indicating 
the degree of consistency in terms of the conventional 
right-left dimension and negative gammas as indicating 
inconsistency. 
Before moving on to a discussion of the patterns of 
attitude structure r-evealed by the gammasr it is worth 
looking in detail at a couple of examples of the cross- 
tabulations, to get an idea of how much consistencY or 
Istructuration' a particular numerical value of gamma 
reflects. 
By far the highest gamma between a pair of the seven 
selected issues is 0.49t between items 27H, should the 
government give the workers more say in running their place 
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of work and 27K, should the government redistribute income 
and wealth. The cross- tabulation is given in Table 7.7 with 
the actual survey cell numbers given in bold. 
Table 7.7. Cross-classif ication of responses to items 27H 
and 27K. Scottish Election Survey. 
Redistribution of income. 
Workers 
Control Left Centre Right Total 
Left 135 43 30 208 20.6% 
66 66 77 
Centre 119 158 141 418 41.4% 
132 132 154 
Right 66 117 201 384 38.0% 
122 121 141 
320 318 372 1010 
Total 
-31., 7% 31.5% 36.8% 100% 
Of the 1010 non-missing cases, it can be seen that 
135+158+141=494, or around a halfj are on the main diagonal 
i. e. are in the same category on both variables. Conversely 
only 96 (66+30) are right-wing on one variable and left- 
wing on the other or vice-versa. For the rest, the 
situation is not quite as clear cut. Although these cases 
are in the centre category on one variable and in the right 
or left category on the other, some of this mis-matching is 
inevitable given that the marginal distributions of the two 
variables are unequal. Given that only 20.6% are in the 
left category of variable 27H (workers control) compared 
with 31.7% in the left category of 27K (redistribution of 
wealth) it is impossible for all of this 31.7% to be in the 
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left category on the other variable as well. Only if the 
marginal distributions were exactly the same would it be 
possible for all the cases to lie on the main diagonalr to 
be in perfect agreement. Thus some of the disagreements 
between centre and right or left are due to the position of 
the cutting points - hence the emphasis in recoding the 
variables so that the marginal distributions are as even as 
possible. 
However, one way of getting some leverage on the degree 
of structuration independent of the marginal distributions 
is to compare the observed frequencies in each cell with 
those which would be expected if there were no relationship 
between the variables i. e. knowing the reponse to one item 
would provide no information on the likely response to the 
other. These 'expected' frequencies are given below and 
offset from the actual figures. 
For exampler comparing the numbers actually giving 
'left' responses on both items with the number of 'left- 
left' matches which would have been expected had responses 
been unrelated gives a very intuitive idea of the degree of 
structuration. Over twice as many responded 'left-left' as 
would have been expected given unrelated responses. 
We can combine this approach with a comparison between 
the number who actually responded 'left-left' with the 
maximum possible (given the marginal distributions on each 
variable) who could have responded 'left-left'. Given that 
320 people responded 'left' on the 'giving workers more 
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say' item and 208 responded 'left' on the 'redistributing 
income' variabler the maximum number who could have 
responded left-left is 208. So we now have three figures 
for the 'left-left' cell: 
- assuming no relationship gives us an expected numberof 66 
- the actual number was 135 
- the maximum possible number is 208 
Thus a very simple measure of structure at the 'left' 
end of the relationship is how far along the line from no 
structure (66) to maximum Possible structure (208) is the 
actual number of 135. (135-66)/(206-66) gives a figure of 
0.49 - coincidentally the same as the gamma for the whole 
table. Thus one can say that the number o-f people 
responding 'left' on both items was about half-way between 
a position of zero-structure and a position of maximum 
possible structure (or constraint or ideological 
consistency). 
Carrying out the same procedure for the 'right-right' 
cell, we get a figure of 0.26 i. e. the number of people 
responding right-right represented a situation about a 
quarter of the way from no structure to the maximum 
possible structure. Similarly, the two other corner cells 
can be looked at in the same wayl with the actual cell 
totals being assessed in terms of the number to be expected 
assuming no relationship and the number in these cells 
(zero) which would represent a perfect relationship. 
Carrying out these simple calculations gives an 
intuitive check on what the gammas mean. Looking at only 
the corner cells of the table cuts out some of the 
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distortions introduced when gamma is calculated on 
variables with differing marginal distributions. 
In general, such values calculated for the corner cells 
tend,, over all pairs of items,, to vary around the value of 
gamma with the mean being somewhat below the mean gamma. 
Thus in terms of such relationships gamma can be seen as 
giving a rough indication of the degree of structure, with 
little tendency to underestimate what structure is there. 
The point of this exercise is that too often in the 
discussions of gamma as an indicator of 'attitude 
constraint' or 'ideological consistencyll all one is 
presented with is a profusion of gammas without these ever 
being traced back to the data patterns on which they are 
based. 
Table 7.8. Cross-classification of responses to items 27H 
(workers control) and 27B (comprehensivisation) 
Workers control 
Compre- 
-hensives Left Centre Right Total 
Left 115 164 123 402 41.7% 
82 167 152 
Centre 44 113 107 264 27.4% 
54 110 100 
Right 39 124 . 135 298 30.9% 61 124 113 
198 401 365 964 
Total 
20.5% 41.6% 37.9% 100% 
To return to the examples, we have just looked at the 
the most closely related variables, with a gamma of 0.49t 
and even these could be seen to be less than half way along 
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the line from no relationship to the best possible 
relationship given the marginal distributions* 
Much more representative, however, 
above the mean for all pairs of varii 
between item 27Hr 'giving workers more 
27B,, concerning the introduction 
schooling. The table is laid out in 
before. 
is a gamma, slightly 
ablest of 0.24p that 
say'r again and item 
of comprehensive 
the same format as 
This time, the number responding Ilef t-lef t' (115) is 
just over a quarter of the way between a situation of no 
relationship (in which 82 responses would be expected in 
the left-l*eft cell) and the maximum possible relationship 
(which would put all the 198 left responses to 27H in the 
left category of 27B. ) In the opposite corner the number 
responding 'right-right' (135) is only one eighth of the 
way from zero structure (113) and maximum possible 
structure (298). 
It is not worth presenting the table for a low gamma 
such as that of 0.02 between item 27BF comprehensivisAtionj 
and item 27C, the repatriation of immigrants. For all 
intents and purposes there is no relationship - actual and 
expected figures being virtually the same. 
Now that we have got some concrete grounding for 
interpreting gamma,, we can look at the general level of 
inter-item correlations. (Table 7.9) 
The mean gamma is 0.22. In itself, this is probably as 
near as one can get to an index of the degree of 
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ideological structuration revealed by responses to this 
fairly representative set of policy-related issue 
questions. 
Table 7.9. Inter-item gammas. Scottish Election Study 
ABCDEH 
N. H. S. Comps Immig Land Aid Workers 
B Comps 0.271 
C Immigrants 0.133 0.017 
D Land 0.332 0.294 0.022 
E Foreign aid 0.156 0.139 0.301 0.154 
H Workers 0.218 0.237 0.106 0.372 0.220 
K Wealth 0.324 0.417 -0.018 0.390 0.120 0.486 
Comparison with other similar analyses is extremely 
hazardous. A major feature on the debate which has raged in 
American electoral analysis has been the focus on the 
extent to which changes in question wording can 
dramatically change the value of gamma(3). So one should 
not build too much on the f act that this value of 0.22 lies 
somewhere between the values, calculated with respect to a 
similar range of issues on the basis of the major American 
electoral surveysi, of around 0.15 in the 1950s and early 
1960s and of between 0.3 and 0.4 in the 1960s and early 
1970s. 
Table 7.9 does nothing however to contradict the 
general impression of those studies whichr following 
Converse, have revealed a relatively low level of 
ideological structuration in the population at large. In 
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Britain#, Butler and Stokes carried out a similar analysisr 
over a slightly wider range of issues, based on their 
surveys in the mid-1960s. Despite the fact thatt working on 
the basis of a panel surveyr they were able to eliminate 
all respondents whose responses were not stable over three 
interviews spanning three years - thus discarding 70% of 
their respondents - the pattern of correlations which they 
found was very similar. They concluded that 
"there is no strong pattern linking the attitudes 
even of those who do have stable attitudes. Compared 
with the expectation that any reader of the Economist 
or New Statesman, say, would have about political 
positions that naturally go together, the actual 
correlations are strikingly low. " (Butler and Stokest 
1969t p198) 
Thus what we are talking about is at best minimal 
evidence of ideological structuration. Despite this 
however, when we move on to comparing the degree of 
structuration shown within different groups of the 
populationj differences do emerge. 
Women's responses showed marginally more structuration 
than men's with a mean inter-item gamma of 0.235 among 
women compared with 0.215 among men. 
If we divide the sample into three age groups however a 
clearer pattern. emerges. Among those aged under 35,, the 
mean gamma is 0.185; among those aged 35 to 541 the mean is 
0.198 while for those aged 55 or over the mean is 0.280. 
In the main American studies there has been very little 
discussion of changes in the degree of issue consistency 
with age - especially in comparison with the extensive 
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discussion of the general observed increase in partisan 
identification with age. In the major study of trends in 
attitude structure in the U. S., covering the period from 
1952 to 1972, it is simply stated 
"There is no appreciable age difference among age 
groups in the degree of attitude consistency at any 
point in the time period we are investigating" (Nie, 
Verba and Petrocikr 1976, pl5l) 
Looking at the degree of structuration among voters for 
the different parties in the October 1974 election also 
reveals some differences - some explicable in terms of ager 
some not. 
Before looking at the value of these gammas however we 
should check on the distribution of 'left-right' responses 
by party to see that they are not so unbalanced that they 
would seriously distort the gammas. (Table 7.10) 
Table 7.9. 'Left' and 'Right' responses by party. 
Per cent responding 'Left' 'Right' 
Vote: Con SNP Lib Lab Con SNP Lib Lab 
N. H. S. 40 47 55 59 20 10 3 11 
Comprehensives 20 41 35 60 58 30 44 14 
Immigrants 40 39 64 42 34 28 17 29 
Control of land 14 24 24 38 60 42 40 31 
Foreign aid 37 36 52 45 51 53 34 40 
Workers control 6 19 16 31 53 37 37 29 
Redistribution 12 31 22 48 61 39 42 17 
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The responses of the SNP voters in particularly are 
fairly well balanced and for none of the other parties is 
the pattern of responses sufficiently unbalanced to produce 
major distortions in the value of gamma. 
In general the responses of SNP voters are patterned 
somewhere in between the values f or Labour and Conservative 
and with a varying but not particularly close relation to 
the pattern of Liberal responses. The minorexception is 
that SNP voters provided the fewest 'left' responses to the 
'comprehensives' question. The major exception is that SNP 
voters were marginally more against foreign aid than even 
the Conservative voters. 
To return to the question of attitude structurationt 








Thus S. N. P. voters would seem to have had the least 
coherent pattern of attitudes although to a certain extent 
this is to be expected given their relative youth. 
Conservative voters have only a marginally more coherent 
set of attitudes - this running against the expectation 
based on the relative age of conservative voters. 
It might be argued that the exercise has been biased 
against revealing coherence in the attitudes of SNP voters 
because I have not included items relating to devolution or 
independence - which being relatively more salient to SNP 
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voters might be thought to be the main site of coherence in 
the attitude structure of SNP voters. Assessing the 
significance of gammas between those items in the survey 
which relate directly to devolutiont and which are of 
different formatst is even more hazardous than doing so for 
the more general items we have been discussing. 
Four questions in the survey can be said to relate 
fairly directly to devolution. The first is a modification 
of the Kilbrandon question, the second asks respondents 
whether or not they are in favour of a Scottish Assemblyj, 
the third asks how important was the issue of Scottish 
government in deciding how to vote while the fourth taps 
attitudes to decentralisation of power from London to the 
regions and local authorities. These four items were 
recoded to three categories of as equal a size as possible. 
Among SNP voters the mean value of gamma between these four 
devolution related questions was 0.46. Among non-SNP voters 
the mean value was 0.46. So we could say that although 
S. N. P. voters did not show any greater structuration on 
items relating to devolutionr this structuration 
constituted a higher proportion of the total amount of 
structuration present in their responses. 
However, the main point to be drawn from this analysis 
of inter-item correlation as a whole is that there is very 
little evidence of ideological structuring in the Scottish 
electorate in October 1974. 
Now obviously such fixed-choice responses have grave 
limitations as means of measuring the existence of 
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'ideology'. I do not intend to get into the vast debate on 
whether. such 'artificial' forms of question do not produce 
'artificial' and meaningless responses. The only point 
which should perhaps be made is that what we are trying to 
understand is how people vote and in many ways the act of 
voting is itself a fixed-choice response to a series of 
options. If attitude questionnaires simplify the world so 
does voting. 
In addition to the findings of electoral survey 
analysis with respect to generally low levels of 
ideological structuring of political issues, a wide range 
of studies have shown relatively low levels of structure in 
less directly political aspects of belief systems such as 
class consciousness or 'images of society'(4). It would 
perhaps be better-to see the foregoing limited empirical 
exploration of the issue as-illustration of a condition 
whose existence has been established much more convincingly 
elsewhere rather than as proof. 
Howeverj, the fact that levels of ideological coherence 
were lowest zýmong young voters and S. N. P. voters is 
certainly consistent with what we would expect on the basis 
of the analysis of patterns of social change in the last 
chapter. In many respects, young votersf and in particular 
those categories which supported the S. N. P. most stronglyt 
could be said to have most fully embodied a pattern of 
social change involving a move to a more privatised life 
style, with a political orientation characterised by 
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instrumentalism and low involvement and with political 
information derived primarily from the mass media. Our 
discussion of the impact of communicative context on the 
generation of ideological structure would lead us to expect 
that these same social changes would not be conducive to 
the development of ideological thinking. 
In terms of the present chapter however, the most 
important implication is that if ideological thinking is 
seen as a source of meaning which provides an alternative 
to or even a defence against common-sense ('fetishistic') 
and symbolic definitions of reality, as relayed by the 
media in particular, then it is not too much of an 
exaggeration to say that among younger voters in October 
1974F such defences were extremely weak. They were in a 
condition not far short of ideological vacuum. 
This-, in itself, was an important pre-condition for the 
success of the S. N. P. message, an important aspect of which 
was that the commonsensically obvious and symbolically 
loaded category 'Scotland' should provide the dominant 
framework according to which votes should be cast. 
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IV. The role of Scottish symbolism and identity. 
Given the close parallels in patterns of social and 
political change in Scotland and the rest of Britain which 
have been charted,, it becomes important to try to specify 
as closely as possible the operation of the category 
'Scotland' at an ideological level - since it is on the 
basis of such ideological distinctiveness that support for 
the Scottish National Party must be explained. Although 
this section explores the role of Scottish symbolism and 
Scottish identity it is especially important to set this 
'symbolic dimension' in the context of the patterns of 
social change and conditions of possibility already 
established in order not to overestimate its own specific 
role. 
In Chapter 4F the emergence was charted of a particular 
frame of reference in Scottish politics,, af rame 
characterised as 'the Scottish economic dimension' or 'the 
Scottish growth project'. The acceptance of this frame of 
reference on a mass basis can be seen as a result of the 
satisfaction of three successively narrower conditions of 
possibility. The first was the emergence at a British level 
in the years af ter World War II of a conception of politics 
as being about government management of the economy, this 
management being increasingly seen as productive of 
economic growth. The second condition of possibility was 
the emergence of Scotland as a relevant unit of economic 
management. The third was the transfer of this conception 
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from an elite to a mass level, the primary agents of this 
transfer being the Labour Party and the mass media, in 
particular television. 
The establishment of this Scottish economic dimension 
provided the terrain for the early success of the S. N. P. 
Once the S. N. P. had achieved media prominence its task was 
to consolidate the framework. It had the additional task of 
presenting itself as the vehicle through which the Scottish 
growth project could be fulfilled. 
In this way, the developments which made possible the 
success of the S. N. P. can be seen as changes in the 
definition of political realityr changes in the categories 
in terms of which the political world is judged. A 
conception of politics as competing definitions of reality 
allows us to come closer to appreciating the role of 
Scottish symbolism and Scottish identity. 
In treating this issue I have been aided especially by 
the work of two theoristsf Murray Edelman and W. Lance 
Bennettj who are in a tradition which could loosely be 
described as 'politics as symbolic action' 
(5) My use of 
elements of their framework will inevitably be highly 
selective and somewhat simplified. 
The most general point is that symbolism provides a 
powerful reservoir of meaning which can be used in the 
transformation of the definition of political reality: 
"Symbolic terms in political definitions serve as 
contexts in which meanings are provided for political 
issues and events. ... It is important that we do not 
think of symbols as devices that simply or crudely 
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mask, cover up, or distract attention from political 
issuesp events and conflicts. We cannot gratuitously 
"trick" people (even the members of "mass publics") 
into not seeing the facts of the matter by simply 
throwing symbols around in a hand-waving fashion. 
However, the careful use of symbols in constructing a 
plausible scenario for political conflict, actions and 
events can alter the meanings of such political "data" 
in quite profound ways. 
Indeedr the successful construction of a 
political scenario may transform the terms of political 
conflict into images with significantly different 
meanings. " (Bennett, 1975, p74) 
In what follows I will try to outline how Scottish 
symbolism may have contributed to that transformation of 
the definition of Scottish political reality upon which the 
success of the S. N. P. was predicated. 
The first point to make is that 'Scotland' itself - as 
an ideological category - should not be regarded as an 
isolated, free-standing and self-sufficient entity but 
rather as the central term of a symbolic network. Anything 
which is felt to have a Scottish resonance forms a 
ramification of this network. The salience of each term 
will vary enormously from person to person but for most 
people in Scotland some aspects of the network will evoke a 
Scottish resonance - in terms of football, Hogmanayr drinke 
poetry, music, literature, landscape - to mention only some 
of the more obvious non-political subsets of meaning. 
'Scotland' or IScottishness' is what gives the network its 
symbolic or ideological unity but conversely 'Scotland' or 
IScottishness' are not unities but are as complex - and 
unquantifiable - as the symbolic web of which they form the 
central terms. 
Similarly, 'Scottish identity' can be regarded as 
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neither simple nor unitary. As du Preez puts it 
"We sometimes talk as though identity were a mask 
to be put on, as though it were something 'found' in an 
already finished state. This is not the case. Each 
person has to make something of the identity elements 
he f inds in his own community. He has, to use an 
analogyr to speak his own Ii denti ty- sentences I" (Du 
Preez, 1980, p3l) 
In other words, in thinking about 'Scotland' or 
'Scottishness' we should not think about them as simple 
'things' but as ways of making semantic connections. As 
Edelman points out 
a symbol can be understood as a way of organizing 
a repertory of cognitions into meanings" (Edelmant 
1971, p34) 
This of course is precisely how we have seen ideology 
in the positive sense operating - as providing structure or 
organization for a belief systemr as providing categories 
thr6ugh which the political world is perceived. Symbolism 
and ideology (in this sense) can be regarded as competing 
means of structuring definitions of political reality and 
to that extent a condition for the success of the S. N. P. 
was an absence of ideology. National symbolism shares with 
the other pole of ideology, ideology as fetishism, an 
important attribute - its everyday obviousness. The most 
important condition for the effectiviness of political 
symbolism is that it is culturally familiarp or obvious. To 
the extent that the shift from liberal to late capitalist 
society inherently involved a shif t towards the. nation of 
the level of 'obviousness' or 'fetishism' national 
symbolism provides an additional layer of obviousness to 
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the way the world presents itself. 
Now of course all the elements of 'Scottishness' I have 
mentioned existed and exist at a sub-political level. The 
question is - what effect did the Scottish symbol system 
have when , largely because of developments at a state 
level, 'Scotland' as a category became 'energized' 
politically,, when Scotland became relevant as an economic 
and political unit? Put this way the question answers 
itself. To the extent that 'Scotland' became a category 
through which the political world was perceived then all 
the Scottish symbolism spiralling around the central 
category 'Scotland' was bound to play a role. The question 
then becomes what role did all this symbolismi all this 
stuff of Scottish identity play. To recast the question 
slightly further: if what was crucial was the establishment 
of Scotland as a category through which the political world 
came increasingly to be perceived, what was the role of the 
associated symbolism in this change. 
In trying to understand how Scottish symbolism came to 
help structure political perceptions it is worth taking a 
look at what might be called two levels of the Scottish 
symbol system. At a 'macro-' level we can look at ideas 
about Scotland or the image of Scotland - the material of 
Scottish mythology. At a more everyday level we can look at 
ways in which 'Scottishness' or Scottish identity is lived. 
The topic of Scottish mythology has received a good 
deal of rather baffled attention 
(6) Its existence is 
widely recognized (it is obvious) but what is less certain 
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is whether or how it makes a political difference. In what 
follows I have no intention of expanding our knowledge of 
the intricacies of Scottish mythology for the simple reason 
that the discussion is aimed at exploring the impact of 
'Scottish mythology' on popular political perceptions. The 
more obscure or specialized is an aspect of the Scottish 
myth,, the less relevant it is likely to be in influencing 
the voting decision. 
Edelman's definition cannot be bettered: 
"The word 'myth' signifies a belief held in common 
by a large group of people that gives events and 
actions a particular meaning; it is typically socially 
cued rather than empirically based. " (Edelmant 19711 
p34) 
We can include in Scottish mythology any and all taken 
for granted ideas about Scotland. We would have to include 
popular - and such a term by no means excludes academics - 
versions of Scottish history and characterizations of the 
nature of Scottish institutions, the Scottish character, 
ethosp way of life or whatever. What is common to most of 
these characterizations of Scotland is that they involve 
an implicit counter-referent - England. Scottish history is 
seen primarily as a struggle for freedom and democracy 
against English oppression. Scottish society is seen as 
inherently more democratic and egalitarian than an English 
society which is characterised as relatively snobbish and 
elitist. The Scottish character is more down-to-earth and 
straightforward than the relatively effete character of the 
the English. Not all aspects of Scottish mythology are 
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structured by this Scottish/English axis but it is by far 
the dominant one. 
The extent to which the assertions of Scottish 
mythology are empirically true is in this context largely 
irrelevant. The myth operates to structure perceptions of 
reality with little opportunity for reality to react back 
on it. The framework operates in large part to selectively 
pick up on those aspects of reality which are congruent and 
to screen out those which contradict it(7). Although 
Scotland is a relatively small countryj, 'Scotland' as an 
ideological catgeory cannot be empirically experienced. The 
transmission and modification of the concept 'Scotland' and 
its connotations has always been dependent upon the media 
of cultural transmission and the nature of their 
audiences(8). Such mythological material' is at least 
available as a framework for organizing perceptions of 
political reality -a 'reality' which at the national level 
is experienced predominantly in a mediated fashion. 
At this point#, the concept of the political scenario, 
developed by Lance Bennett on the basis of the work of 
Kenneth Burke, is helpful 
an important element of political success 
involves the ability to construct a compelling public 
definition out of the problematic set of events 
surrounding any political conflict. In this lightf we 
will explore the ways in which we structure and 
interpret political reality. We will look at ways in 
which fragmentary data can be organized into compelling 
stories or accounts of political reality. 
As members of a political culture we seek to 
isolate or construct familiar "story lines" out of the 
problematic data that enter our perceptual field. 
Whether or not an account of a political event is 
compelling, arousing, or even believable depends on our 
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perception that certain familiar and plausible 
relationships exist among the set of actions, actorst 
motives, instrumental itiest and scenic qualities that 
belong to the characterization of the event" (Bennett, 
1975, p48). 
If there is one particular 'story line' which is highly 
familiar to the Scots it is that of Scots versus English. 
The role of the S. N. P. in this context can be seen to have 
been one of dramatizing the Scottish economic dimension by 
overlaying it with a less materialistic but highly familiar 
scenario according to which Scotland's ills were the result 
of neglect or oppression by England/Westminster. In shortj 
the Scottish symbol system worked to make plausible the 
S. N. P. 1s definition of political reality because the 
symbolic raw materials of the S. N. P. 1s definition were 
already culturally familiar. 
If the level of the Scottish myth pertains to ideas 
about 'Scotland'#, then the level to which we must briefly 
make reference concerns 'being Scottish' in everyday life 
or the salience of Scottish identity. If Scottish mythology 
operates as a framework in terms of which the political 
world may be perceived, then Scottish identity provides the 
basis for the relevance of that framework for the 
individual. ' 
This is an even more tricky and touchy area which it is 
difficult to deal with without trivializing it or adding 
yet another layer of mystification. 
A particular reason for noting it however is that the 
area of 'the Scottishness of everyday life' seems to me to 
be the most likely context for an understanding of the 
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higher level of support for the S. N. P. at the October 1974 
General Election among men as compared with women. As was 
seen in Chapter I (Tables 1.7 and 1.8), the Scottish 
Election Survey showed 34% of men voters voting S. N. P. 
compared with only 23% of women voters, with the percentage 
difference in support at an even higher level for all age 
groups up to the age of 54. 
If we do not regard a sense of Scottish identity. as 
something innate or instinctive but as a self-image which 
is maintained in the context of particular patterns of 
sociability, then we are directed towards those areas of 
sociability which have the highest emphasis on 
'Scottishness'. In terms of mass pursuits there are two 
main candidates - sport and drinking. 
The Scottish dimension of watching sport - and in 
particular football and to a lesser extent rugby - needs no 
elaboration. In football especially, the Scottish/English 
axis is particularly strong. 
The 'Scottishness' of drinking is a bit more 
problematic. Perhaps the best testimony to the close tie-up 
between them is the strong Scottish emphasis of television 
drink - and in particular beer - commercials. It might also 
be added that Scotland's two most important national 
festivals - Hogmanay and Burn's night - both have a fairly 
high alcohol quotient. 
In other words, if we are looking for the areas of 
everyday life in which Scottish symbolism has the highest 
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profiler those areas are watching football and drinking. 
They both involve patterns of sociability with a male biasr 
to say the least. If we do accept the role of Scottish 
symbolism and identity in channelling support for the 
S. N. P. , these considerations might be a factor in 
accounting for the greater tendency of men to support the 
S. N. P. 
To sum up the preceding discussion then, we have seen 
'Scottish symbolism' operating at three levels. The most 
immediate is the level of Scottishness in everyday life and 
comes closest to the notion of 'Scottish identity'. 
The second level of operation of Scottish symbolism is 
that of 'Scottish mythology' - the complex of beliefs about 
Scotland as a nation. These make up the culturally familiar 
terms in which Scotland is conceivedy the image of 
Scotland. Whatever personal relevance Scottish mythology 
has will in a sense have flowed up from the previous level. 
What both these levels of symbolism do is to provide 
the raw material for the 'political scenario' assumed and 
projected by the S. N. P. Although Bennett specified the 
conditions for the successful operation of such a 
'political scenario' in terms of American politics, 
Scottish conditions would seem to fit the bill uncannily. 
"It is crucial that the flexible terms of political 
scenarios trigger certain transitions or "inference 
structures" to contextualise the fixed terms in desired 
ways. This suggests at least three necessary features 
of the sorts of political symbols used as flexiblel 
definitional terms. 
First, these symbols must be broadly familiar to 
the audience for which the scenario is 
constructed. 
357 
Secondly, the symbols should suggest a set of 
paradigms, models or examples (commonly known to 
members of the political culture) that could serve 
as the desired inferences between scenic terms. 
Finally, the flexible symbolic terms of scenarios 
must be symbols whse inference paradigms are both 
numerous and personally relevant for members of 
the culture. This assures that members of a 
heterogeneous audience can establish personally 
meaningful (experiential or emotional) links among 
definitional terms. 
In shortr the inferences drawn between symbol and 
context are likely to be most durable when they 
are based on a blend of culturally grounded 
significance and emotional appeal. " (Bennettp 
1975,, p67) 
So far this brief discussion of the political role of 
Scottish symbolism has been couched in very general terms 
in order to put across as simply as possible some 
suggestions as to how the Scottish symbolic system could 
have operated to structure political perceptions. 
It is only when we link the discussion to some of the 
main themes already developed in this study that the role 
of Scottish symbolism can be specified more precisely 
In particularl the discussion can be cast in the form 
of specifying some of the pre-conditions for the Scottish 
symbol system to structure political perceptions. 
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V. Attitudes to the state and symbolic mobilization. 
As already mentionedr Chapter 4 outlined the emergence 
of 'the Scottish economic dimension' as a taken-f or-g ranted 
structure of Scottish political and economic discourse. It 
combined an assumption about what politics was about 
(economic management, economic growth) and an assumption 
that Scotland was the relevant unit for such economic 
management or economic growth. 
Scottish symbolism or Scottish mythology as discussed 
above can likewise be said to make up a set of taken for 
granted assumptions about Scotland, its place in the world 
and in particular its relationship with England. 
Both these sets of assumptions constituted what we 
could call 'pseudo-inference structures' (cf Bennett, 
1975, rp72) - models of what goes with what in the political 
world - centred on the category 'Scotland'. The first 
'inference structure' linked Scotland to the concept of 
economic growth in a context in which politics was largely 
judged in terms of the implications of national economic 
performance for individual well-being. it could perhaps be 
said that this inference structure linked Scotland into an 
instrumental or utilitarian framework, This inference 
structure was likely to be particularly effective with 
people judging politics from a largely instrumental 
viewpoint as discussed in Chapter 6. The second inference 
structure linked Scotland on the one hand to a range of 
culturally familiar historical and political myths and on 
the other to everyday life via the symbolic stuff of 
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Scottish identity. 
It is in the powerful meshing of these two meaning 
systems that we can perhaps get closest to understanding 
the rapidity with which the S. N. P. rose and fell. Together 
they produced a single meaning system which defined what 
politics in Scotland was all about and which combined the 
emotional rush of national identification with more 
material goals. Neither was new but their combination was. 
The strategy of the S. N. P. worked very effectively to 
bring about the combination. On the one handr in terms of 
its organization and electoral approachp the S. N. P. was a 
'normal' British party. Voting for the S. N. P. was an act 
which was no more extreme thanp and could be justified in 
the same instrumental terms asr voting for any of the other 
mainstream parties On the other hand the S. N. P. took full 
advantage of the array of national symbolism and mythology 
which was available. If we wish to make a final assessment 
of the extent to which the activities of the Scottish 
National Party itself have to be taken causally into 
account in explaining its electoral success, it must be in 
these terms. It adapted extremely effectively to the logic 
of the situation which had made it possible. 
If we see S. N. P. support as dependent upon the meshing 
of these two separate ideological preconditions - Scottish 
symbolism and identity and belief in the Scottish growth 
project - then we can look at the dynamics of these 
ideological preconditions separately in order to identify 
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the factors underlying the rise and fall of support for the 
S. N. P. 
There is no evidence to show any significant ebbing and 
flowing over the period in the level of cultural 
familiarity with the stuff of Scottish symbolism or in the 
centrality of Scottish identity in everyday' life(9). In 
order to show that changes in support for the S. N. P. were a 
result of changes in such symbolic factors,, we would have 
to show that such cultural changes occurred independently 
of and preceded changes in support for the S. N. P. No 
evidence has been brought forward to suggest that cultural 
changes of the required magnitude did take place. This is 
not to rule out of course changes in the salience of 
Scottish symbolism and the strength of Scottish identity 
associated with or more precisely resulting from support 
for the S. N. P. - but that is not what is at issue. All in 
all, in terms of the mass electorate at least we probably 
stay closest to the truth by regarding the level of 
familiarity with Scottish symbolism and the strength of 
Scottish identity as relatively constant background 
factors. 
Given that the required mixture for S. N. P. success was 
the co-existence of such symbolic background factors and 
the credibility of the Scottish growth project, it becomes 
obvious that to understand the ebb and flow of S. N. P. 
success, the explanation is to be found in terms of changes 
in the factors underlying the credibility of the Scottish 
growth project, plus the credibility of the S. N. P. itself 
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as a vehicle for that project. 
In order to understand the changes in factors 
underlying the credibility of the Scottish growth project 
we can return to the device of describing pre-conditions at 
different levels of generalityr each with its own separate 
rhythm. We have already used this procedure in accounting 
for the initial emergence of the Scottish economic 
dimension in the period between the Second World War and 
the mid-1960s. 
At the most general level is the belief that state 
action does in fact make an economic difference. Only in 
the context of a general belief that governments can 
deliver the goods does a belief that government at a 
Scottish level can deliver the goods make any sense. At 
this most general levelr looking back- from the midst of 
economic depression in 1983 over the last fifty years we 
can see a long term rise and fall in the electorate's 
belief that governments are capable of controlling the 
economy, 
In the depths of the depression of the 1920s and 1930s, 
as discussed in Chapter 4,, there was very little faith in 
the ability of government to manage an economy most simply 
because the concept of the economic management of a 
national economy in a modern sense had yet to emerge. It 
was the experience of World War II and the subsequent 
thirty years of economic growth which lent credibility to 
the belief that governments were responsible for and thus 
t 0C., Cd 
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could be held responsible for the economic fate of the 
country. This faith could be said to have reached its peak 
with the election of the Labour Government in 1964 with its 
promises of the technocratic creati. on of economic growth. 
In other words, if we ask where people 4et their 
beliefs about government effectivenessr the answer must be 
that they get this belief from their own experiencer 
however highly mediated, of what governments have been able 
to do in the immediate past. The currently apparent belief 
that a British government can do very little to influence 
the level of British unemployment, although partly due to 
governmentally inspired framing of the issues, has much 
deeper roots in the experience of government failure over 
the last twenty years. 
It is this general, experience-based decline in the 
belief that governments can achieve what they promiser 
which can perhaps be seen as the most general reason for 
the decline in support for the S. N. P. in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. The S. N. P. is especially vulnerable to 
this long term logic becauser as we have seenr much of its 
support has been of a predominantly instrumental kind and 
instrumental support is defined in terms of the belief that 
its object can deliver the economic goods. 
we must also take account here of another long term 
shift in attitudes to governmentp a shift in the balance 
between expectations of what government can do and 
perceptions of what government costs. Over the last twenty 
years by far the most materially relevant factor underlying 
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this has been the rise in the level of direct taxation. 
In this respect, it is important to take account of the 
influence of the framework implicit in governmental 
pronouncements on the way in which government is perceived 
and the expectations held of it. In such terms it was the 
monetarist language of the Labour Government in the late 
1970s, which focussed public attention on the previously 
barely mentioned issue of the level of public expenditure. 
The general level of belief that state action can have 
beneficial economic effects has to be seen as the most 
general condition for the credibility of the Scottish 
growth project and thus for the success of the S. N. P. 
Given this gdneral faith however, the most important 
factor underlying support for the Scottish growth project 
was the relative balance between economic expectations and 
perceived opportunities at the Scottish level and economic 
expectations and perceived opportunities at the British 
level. It would seem quite likely that in 1974, the peak of 
the S. N. P. 1s electoral successir both these factors were 
maximally favourable to the S. N. P. 
Alt (1979, Fig 3.3) has plotted at a British level 
trends in responses to Gallup's annual New Year questions 
on personal and national economic (British) expectations 
throughout the 1960s up to 1975. The two trends were to all 
intents and purposes parallel. From the early 1960s to the 
mid-1970s both series described two broad cycles of 
optimism and pessimism within a long term falling trend. 
364 
Both personal and national economic optimism peaked in 
1964, fell fairly steadily to a trough around 1968t climbed 
to another peak in 1970F wobbled downwards in the early 
1970s and then fell sharply from 1973 to 1974 to 1975. 
The most obvious point is that the two deepest 
lows - the years around 1968 and the mid-1970s both 
coincided with the periods of the SNPIs greatest electoral 
success and support in the opinion polls. Without a 
separate Scottish series howeverr we cannot assess the 
relative balance of expectations at the Scottish and 
British levels. 
However, Alt carried out an extremely pertinent 
analysis based on the October 1974 British Election Survey. 
He performed a factor analysis of responses to the 15 items 
in the survey which could be said to relate to aspects of 
economic outlook or expectations. The first two factors 
which were derived could reasonably be described as 
separating out personal and national (British) economic 
outlook. Alt concluded that 
"at least in October 1974, people had two entirely 
separate economic outlooks: one dealing with their own 
personal circumstances, and the other dealing with the 
national economy. " (Alt,, 1979p p99) 
On the factor which was loaded on items of 
personal economic outlook, Scots scored much higher than 
the rest of Britain and higher even than the South of 
England. On the factor loaded on items of national 
(British) economic outlook, Scots scored much lower than 
the rest of Britain. There is at least some evidence then 
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that in October 1974,, at the peak of the S. N. P. Is electoral 
success, there was an imbalance between how Scots saw their 
own economic prospects and how they saw the economic 
prospects of Britain as a whole. 
The hardest evidence on the real factors which might 
have underlain this pattern comes f rom the household income 
and expenditure data for Scotland and the U. K. already 
presented in Chapter 6 (Tables 6.1 and 6.2). From those 
figures it is clear that for Britain as a whole the early 
1970s were a period of rapidly rising real income and 
expenditure per person. Most importantly' however it would 
appear that the rise in real incomes and expenditure in 
Scotland was particularly concentrated into the period 
encompassed by the two years 1971-1972 and the two years 
1973-74. The figure which comes closest to assessing the 
impact on standards of living is that for expenditure per 
person. Between 1971-72 and 1973-74 the index (1961-63 
-100) for expenditure per person in real terms rose from 
124.2 to 142. i or 14% in Scotland. In the same period the 
index for the U. K. as a whole rose from 121.3 to 132.1 or a 
rise of 9%. Scotland was still lagging behind the U. K. in 
terms of both income and expenditure per person but the gap 
was the smallest it had ever been. These f igures could well 
provide the key to the gap in personal economic outlook 
which Alt calculated on the basis of the October 1974 
British Election Survey, At the British national level 
however the outlook was much more gloomy with the Miners' 
strike and the three day week of early 1974 providing the 
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most dramatic illustration of the economic uncertainties of 
the period. 
It is in this context that we have to assess the impact 
of the heralding of the arrival of North Sea Oil. With a 
background of rising personal standards of living in 
Scotland and economic uncertainty at the British level, 
North Sea Oil could be said to have removed some of the 
last barriers to the credibility of the Scottish economic 
project, and in particular to have temporarily wei. ghted 
economic expectations towards Scotland. 
We have to remember that the impact of North Sea Oil on 
public consciousness was almost entirely mediated and so we 
have to focus on the media through which its expected 
impact was transmitte. d to the general public - primarily 
the press and television as well as the organizations and 
politicians which made sweeping claims about it. If ever 
there was a raw material which functioned primarily as a 
symbolic object it was North Sea oil. The first point to 
make is one of the truisms of journalism - what is new is 
news. it was the newness of North Sea Oil which was news in 
the early 1970s - pioneering technologyr harsh conditions, 
glamorous Texans, helicopters etc. The Arab-Israeli war of 
October 1973 gave a boost to the economic significance of 
oil. The Miners strike which brought down the Heath 
government kept energy in the spotlight. Most important of 
all however were the things which were being said at the 
British level by Ministers and politicians. Hard as it is 
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to remember from our present vantage point amidst the 
wreckage of the British economy, in 1974 the general 
consensus was that North Sea Oil was going to save the 
British economy or transform the British economy - at the 
very least it was going to do a great deal of good for the 
British economy. Everybody believed that from Harold Wilson 
to Tom Nairn. And if it was generally believed that it was 
going to do the British economy a lot of goodr how much 
more was it going to benefit the Scottish economy. Not 
necessarily because many people believed that Scotland 
could get away with it all, but because surely Scotland 
could obtain some differential advantage from the fact that 
the oil fields were off Scotland's shores. It is in this 
contextr of a general belieff at the British and at the 
Scottish level, in the beneficial economic import of North 
Sea Oil that the significance of the SNP's 'Its Scotland's 
Oil' campaign must be assessed. The impact of that campaign 
depended upon the general centrality of the oil issue. 
Howeverr to return to the main point. The vital 
contribution of oil to S. N. P. success was its contribution 
to a belief in the economic viability of Scotland as a 
unit -a belief which was corroborated at the personal 
level by already rising standards of living in Scotland. 
The great mystery however is - what happened to North 
Sea Oil as a major political issue or stake after October 
1974. To a large extent it disappeared - in particular at 
the British level. And since the political significance of 
North Sea Oil was almost entirely a reflection of its 
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significance in the media, this was a reflection of its 
disappearance as a major news topic. 
As we have seen, these relatively short term factors 
influencing the balance of perceptions of the economic 
viability of Scotland as compared with Britain have to be 
seen within a much longer term cycle in expectations of and 
attitudes towards government in general. Combining the two 
levels, it could be said that the S. N. P. reaped its 
greatest success in a period in which there was a declining 
faith in the ability of government to achieve its stated 
goals at the British level, with oil allowing this general 
faith to be somewhat prolonged at the Scottish level? but 
before the loss of faith in government had reached a more 
general stage -a virtual anti-government stage - in the 
late 1970s. 
To the extent that the discussion so far has been cast 
in general terms, referring to 'voters' or 'the electorate' 
it has been misleading. The mechanisms outlined will have 
applied most strongly to particular social groups - the 
kinds of groups identified in the last chapter as being 
most likely to vote S. N. P. 
on the one handj, the symbolic mechanisms outlined are 
likely to have led to support for the S. N. P. to the extent 
that other bases for structuring political perceptions were 
absent. As we have seen, there was not a great deal of 
ideological structuration revealed in the responses to the 
October 1974 Scottish Election Survey and this was true in 
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particular of younger voters and S. N. P. voters. 
On the other handr the mechanisms linking the rise and 
fall in support for the S. N. P. with changes in the factors 
underlying the credibility of the Scottish growth project 
are predicated upon voting as a primarily instrumental 
activity. Such instrumental voting is also predicated on 
the absence of more ideological motives. In the last 
chapter we saw that S. N. P. support in October 1974 was 
highest among those groups whose whose life-experiences has 
been such as to maximise a highly instrumental - and 
unstable - orientation to politics. 
It is perhaps worth relating these factors - symbolism 
and instrumentalism - to different components of the 
S. N. P's support and to its long term dynamics. In the 1983 
General Electionp the S. N, P. received 11% of the Scottish 
vote,, below the level it received in its first full scale 
election campaign in 1970. This could be said to present a 
level of hard-core support for the S. N. P. Among this hard 
core, instrumental considerations would seem likely to have 
played a role secondary to powerful affective ties to the 
S. N. P. based on a strong sense of Scottish identity. 
Instrumental factors are likely to have been much more 
important to those voters -a minimum of 20% of Scottish 
voters but probably considerably more - whose moves towards 
and away from the S. N. P. shifted its level of support up 
from the base of -10% to 30% and above and then back down 
again. of course,, the world is not quite that simple, but 
that would seem to be as close as one can get to a brief 
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summing up of the sources and dynamics of S. N. P. support 
over the last twenty-five years. 
Thisr of course is only another way of saying that the 
long term ebb and flow of S. N. P. support is to be 
understood primarily in terms of the factors underlying a 
conception of government in general and Scottish government 
in particular without which an instrumental attitude to 
voting does not make much sense -a conception of 
government and Scottish government which believes that they 
can deliver the goods. 
From such an instrumental standpoint of course, the 
third condition necessary to justify voting for the S. N. P 
is a belief that the S. N. P. is a party able to succeed,, to 
deliver the goods. It is this third factor which has 
probably made the greatest contribution to the instability 
of support for the S, N. P. There was what could be a called 
a multiplier effect on the way up - each S. N. P. success I 
bolstered the belief that the S. N. P. would ultimately have 
its way - and a reverse multiplier on the way down. So 
although the more general pre-conditions determined the 
long term timing of S. N. P. success and failuret this third 
level has worked to exaggerate the inexorability of the 
swings. 
We can now return to the the questions posed at the end 
of the first section of this chapter concerning the reasons 
why Scotland's voting behaviour w. as different from that of 
the rest of Britain up to October 1974. 
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Firstp why the S. N. P.? Simply because the S. N. P.,, both 
in term of the emergence of the Scottish economic dimension 
in the early 1960s and the availability of a rich# 
rhetorical language of symbolismi myth and metaphor, had a 
script written and waiting for it. 
Second, why did support for the S. N. P. r after 
paralleling the level of Liberal support and abstention in 
the rest of Brita . in up to February 1974t move ahead of this 
level in 1974. Because October 1974 came at the end of a 
period of rapidly rising living standards in Scotland and 
because North Sea Oil was at the centre of public 
attentiont both factors working to increase confidence in 
Scotland at a time when economic expectations at a British 
level were at a particularly low ebb. 
Reprise: attitudes to devolution. 
As we have seen, 'Scotland' can be regarded as a 
category at the centre of a symbolic web which is both 
culturally familiar and personally meaningful. The act of 
voting for the S. N. P. is in a close relationship with this 
web. The act of responding to a survey question on 
devolution is also closely connected with this same web. As 
we have seen, the perceived salience of 'devolution' as a 
reason for voting was itself closely associated with having 
voted S. N. P. This makes it highly dubious that 'attitudes 
to devolution' can be said to exist in sufficient isolation 
f rom voting f or the S. N. P. f or the f ormer to act purely and 
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simply as a causal determinant of the latter. 
One feature of responses to 'Kilbrandon type' survey 
and opinion poll questions on devolution which has been 
cited as proof of their centrality and importance has been 
the long term stability in the aggregate distribution of 
these responses. As we have seen there are strong 
methodological grounds for doubting the validity of this 
deduction. Whatt in factr is this relative stability more 
likely to have reflected? To produce such stability all we 
need to postulate is that the people of Scotland have a 
fairly stable and positive attitude towards Scotland and a 
fairly stable and positive attitude towards democracy. Put 
the two together in the form of a question about 'Scotland 
having more control over its own affairs' etc. and what 
becomes surprising is that there are people who will reject 
this proposition rather than that 80% of the Scottish 
population have consistently supported in the abstract the 
proposition that Scotland should have more control over its 
own affairs. It is hardly a caricature to say that what the 
long term stability in responses to Kilbrandon type 
questions reflect is a long term stability in beliefs that 
Scotland is 'A Good Thing' and that democracy is 'A Good 
Thing'. This might sound simplistic but it is closer to the 
truth than some of the implications which been drawn. 
We have seen how support for the S. N. P. was highly 
contingent on economic perceptions and expectations and on 
attitudes to the state. Similarly, the level of commitment 
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to devolution for many voters is likely to have been 
contingent on the same set of factors. Since devolution 
takes the form of a change in the state apparatus and can 
easily be seen as an extension of that apparatusr general 
attitudes towards the state and in particular the balance 
of assessment between the costs and benefits of state 
action, are likely to have been particularly important in 
determining responses to the actual prospect of devolution. 
The devolution Referendum of 1979 came at a time when real 
factors such as rising levels of taxation and ideological 
factors such as the Labour government's own monetarist 
anti-public expenditure rhetoric and the nascent anti-state 
Thatcherist rhetoric had combined to shape an ideological 
framework which was much less favourable to any extension 
of state activity, 
That such factors as these were operative during the 
referendum campaign is clearly brought out in the analyses 
contained in The Referendum Experience (Bochelr Denver and 
McCartney#, eds.,, 1981). Bochel and Denver cite an ITN 
referendum day poll- which showed that two of the three most 
important reasons given by 'No' voters for their decisions 
were related directly to the overall shift from 'positive' 
to 'negative' perceptions of state activity we have been 
discussing. 31% of 'No' voters cited the cost of devolution 
and 23% cited the creation of another level of government 
as a reason for voting 'No' (31% cited the possibility of 
the break-up of Britain). Even more graphic illustration of 
the mechanisms reinforcing the contingency of commitment to 
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devolution on wider economic perceptions is given by John 
Fowler in his account of the impact of television coverage 
of the campaign. He suggests the operation of a 'montage 
effect' whereby 
"news reporting of the campaign could not be isolated 
from the general reporting of political news during the 
period" (Fowlerr 1981,, p130) 
As well as the 'guilt by association' which devolution 
suffered by being the policy of an increasingly unpopular 
Labour governmentr a more general factor was the overall 
tone of the economic news with which reporting of the 
campaign was juxtaposed. 
"An analysis of the news topics covered during 
the last three weeks of the campaign suggests that 
Scotland was in the grip of a minor crisis. With the 
exception of the particularly bad weather, which merely 
added to the gloomr strikes and industrial unrest 
monopolized the news. Strikes hit at the most sensitive 
domestic areas,, * while signs of a withdrawal of American 
firms from Scotland suggested long-termf incurable 
unemployment,, as the Government policy of replacing 
traditional, heavy industry by light industry seemed to 
be collapsing. Not only did these topics crowd out 
everything else but more importantly the message they 
implicitly carried was monotonous: the inability of the 
Government, whether culpable or nott to provide 
explanations or even consolations, let alone solutions 
to these problems. " (Fowlerr 1901t pl3l). 
What replies to standard survey devolution items reveal 
is not a level of commitment which has only to be tapped 
but rather a set of abstract background assumptions which 
may or may not be mobilizable. The extent to which they are 
so mobilizable depends upon how they dovetail with wider 
economic perceptions and in particular attitudes towards 
the state. While the discussions in The Referendum 
Experience confirm that the Referendum took place at an 
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extremely unfavourable moment in terms of the short term 
balance of such factors, it would be wrong to allow the 
explanation to rest entirely on such short term 
considerations. In fact,, the same long term shifts in 
attitudes to the state in the context of economically 
instrumental political orientations which would seem to 
have influenced the timing of the rise and fall of the 
S. N. P. were also at work to determine the outcome of the 
devolution Referendum. So even if part of the reason for 
the subsequent decline of the S. N. P. was the 'failure' of 
devolution, at an even deeper background level there is a 
case for saying that similar factors were at work to 
determine both. 
If symbolic mechanisms could be said to have determined 
the nationalist form which instrumental voting took in 
Scotland,, these same symbolic factors worked to determine 
'symbolic' responses to survey questions on devolution. 
Only in the real world crunch of the Referendum did the 
economic content underlying the symbolic forms emerge 




In conclusion, it remains only to tie together somewhat 
more tightly some of the threads which have wound their way 
through this study and in particular to specify a little 
more clearly the connection between the electoral success 
of the S. N. P. and patterns of social change. 
Taking '. social change' in the widest sense, each 
section of this study has been concerned with a different 
level of social change ranging through from industrial 
change to attitudes to the state to the falling birth rate. 
The secret of understanding the timing of the electoral 
success of the S. N. P. lies in the different time-scales of 
the various aspects of social change which have been 
documented and the ways in which they have interacted. 
To summarize the message of the study in these terms, 
the complex of social change can be divided into three 
levels. 
At the first level, we have traced changes in what 
could be called the 'micro-contexts' of peoples livesf 
changes in their everyday material circumstances. A Isocio- 
-graphic' portrait of such changes was given in Chapter S. 
Chapter 6 moved on to explore some dominant themes relating 
to how these changes were experienced. ' 
The second level involves changes in state action and 
in particular the taking on by the state of responsibility 
for economic management and even economic growth. In 
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Chapter 31 put f orward a general model of the implications 
of state action for ideological change and in Chapter 4 
traced the developments which led up to Scotland being seen 
as a relevant unit of economic performance. 
The third level of change is concerned crucially with 
how the changing context of political communication worked 
to achieve a meshing between experience at the micro-level 
of everyday life and experience at the macro-levely 
experience of the state. The crucial event in these terms 
was the arrival of television. I have not devoted a 
separate chapter to this strand of change but have tried to 
show how it interacted with the other two levels of change. 
At the end of Chapter 4F I showed how television played an 
important role in establishing 'the Scottish economic 
dimension' as the framework through which poliýics in 
Scotland were increasingly seen. At the end of Chapter 61 1 
tried to show how television worked to achieve a meshing 
between dominant forms of experience at the micro-levelt 
notably a consumption oriented family project - and 
perceptions at the macro-level, both in general and in 
terms of the Scottish economic dimension. 
In the broadest terms it was a particular coincidence 
of these three levels of social change - change at the 
level of everyday life, change in the structure of 
political communication and change at the level of the 
state - which created the ideological field within which 
the S. N. P. was able briefly to flourish. 
It was the nature of this ideological field which helps 
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us understand the rapidity of both the rise and fall in 
electoral terms of the S. N. P. Changes at the level of 
everyday life and the arrival of television should be 
regarded as long term background changes defining the 
ideological field but there was nothing about these levels 
of social change in themselves which directly pointed 
towards a Scottish nationalist response. In Chapter 7.1 
attempted to grapple with some of the factors which take us 
nearer to understanding why it was the S. N. P. which was the 
first beneficiary of this new terrain. These factors 
involved the role of Scottish symbolism in providing a 
ready made frame of reference for the S. N. P. combined with 
more economic factors to do with perceptions of the state. 
It is only by situating ourselves with such a general 
picture, however cruder of the meshing of different levels 
of change that we can assess the significance of particular 
levels of social change. 
I will briefly try to do this for the first of the 
broad levels, change in the micro-contexts of everday life 
as dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6j since this level is 
closest to a conventional definition of social change. 
What tends to be regarded as the key aspect of social 
change in this sense is occupational change. What has 
baffled analysts of the electoral fortunes of the S. N. P. 
more than anything else is the fact that patterns of 
occupational change in Scotland since the war or even in a 
shorter time-span have obviously had something to do with 
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the success of the S. N. P. and yet support for the S. N. P. is 
consistently shown to be fairly well distributed across 
social classes or socio-economic groups. In one fairly 
obvious sense, occupational change is a non-starter as an 
explanation for the rise in support for the S. N. P. simply 
because of the different rates of change involved. For 
exampler although the 1960s is regarded as a decade of 
rapid occupational change, from Table 5.7 we can calculate 
that the positive percentage difference between the socio- 
economic group structure in 1961 and that in 1971 was 6.2. 
In other words, 6.2% of the economically active population 
in 1961 would have to change socio-economic groups to 
produce the 1971 socio-economic group structure. Even if 
all this occupational change was from occupations with a 
zero propensity to vote S. N. P. to ones with a 100% 
propensity to do so, we are still well away from the order 
of magnitude of change involved in the S. N. P. 1s achievement 
of 30% of the vote in October 1974. Even in the entire 
period from 1921 to 1971 an 'occupational switch' of only 
16.5% was involved. 
Rather than there being a direct link between 
occupational change and the success of the S. N. P. j, it would 
seem rather that occupational change is just one aspect of 
a much more ramified pattern of social change and it was 
this wider set of processes which helped produce a 
particular ideological terrain which proved fertile ground 
for the S. N. P. There are two ways in which this wider 
pattern can be seen as a unity. 
The first derives from the 
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extent to which dif f erent aspects can be seen as causally 
connected to each. The second is that these changes are not 
experienced by social actors as separate compartments but 
as a total experience. 
In Chapter 51 explored some of the more obvious causal 
connections between different aspects of social change. The 
principal motors of the overall process were the partly 
overlapping expansions of employment in the service sector 
and white collar employment. The first had its main impact 
on patterns of female employment and the second on the 
level of upward occupational mobility. 
In order to assess the ideological impact of these 
patterns of change in the social structure it was necessary 
to put them in a context of economic security both in terms 
of rising standards of living and full employment and the 
welfare state. Moving on to the next stage is trickiest of 
all. The most general way to express the impact of these 
changes of political perceptions, and at this level of 
generality one has to oversimplifyj is that the prism 
through which politics was increasingly experienced was 
that of a consumption-oriented style of life centred on the 
nuclear family which such background changes had themselves 
made feasible. 
The arrival of television was itself an important 
aspect of these general patterns of social change. In 
particular television provided a channel of communication 
which on the one hand served to conf irm the kind of 
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identities generated by the pattern of change in 
occupational and family life and on the other hand served 
to mesh these identities with identities relating directly 
to the level of national politics. 
I have tried to avoid using terms like 'traditional' 
working class or middle class compared with 'new' working 
class or middle class as well as the invocation of general 
processes such as 'the decline of class based politics' or 
'partisan dealignment'. Although such characterizations 
obviously do capture important aspects of the broad pattern 
of social and political changep I have been more interested 
in trying to trace what happens within the emerging 
ideological framework. 
To the extent that political perceptions are not 
structured by ideology in the positive sense does not mean 
that they are to that extent chaotic or without meaning. 
The emerging dominant framework can be seen as an axis 
running from the consumer, nuclear family member, taxpayer, 
citizen,, English, Scottish set of linterpellations' at the 
'audience' end via channels of political communication 
dominated by television to the state and the nation at the 
macro- end. This can be seen as the dominant framework 
which is available to give meaning to the political world 
in the absence of critical perspectivest class 
consciousness or ideology in the positive sense. This axis 
defines the form of ideology in the negative sense, 
ideology as fetishism, in Britain and in Scotland. 
It is in terms of the determinants of change within 
382 
this dominant ideological axis that clues to the major 
'surprises' of the last twenty years in British politics 
are to be found. Given my topic I have focussed almost 
exclusively on the first of these IsurprisesIr the 
electoral success of the S. N. P. I have tried to show the 
way in which the generalization of this dominant 
ideological field was one of the preconditions for the 
rapid success of the S. N. P. The discussion in Chapter 7 can 
be seen in these terms as an attempt to show the kind of 
mechanisms - of ideological change at work within this 
dominant field. The concern was with the dynamics of 
fetishismr the dynamics of change in taken- f or-granted r 
common-sense ways of viewing the political world. I 
suggested in particular that symbolic mechanisms combined 
with shifting perceptions of the state and in particular 
the shifting balance of expectations at a Scottish and 
British level constituted the most important background 
factors underlying the rise and fall in S. N. P. support. 
I have stressed throughout the study that at an 
ýggregate level patterns of social change in Scotland moved 
in parallel with those in Britain as a whole. In terms of 
the main object of the study - explaining the success of 
the S. N. P. - the purpose was to rule out explanations for 
this success which depended upon the existence of patterns 
of social change specific to Scotland. The finding can be 
turned the other way of course. Much of what was happening 
in Scotland was happening in the rest of Britain. As 
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already pointed out, the main effective difference between 
the emerging ideological field in Scotland and in the rest 
of Britain was precisely in the area of national symbolism 
and national identity. 
In making the limited exploration in Chapter 7 of the 
way in which symbolism, and in particular national 
symbolism, can work to structure political perceptions in 
the absence of ideologically structured perspectives, I was 
aware that what I was saying applied just as much to the 
extraordinary (again, a 'surprise') about turn in the 
fortunes of the Thatcher government brought about by the 
Falklands war. This was a transformation occurring within 
the same dominant axis of political communication and the 
same dominant ideological field. Thatcherism makes much 
more explicit use of the terms involved - familyr consumer, 
taxpayer than was ever the case with the S. N. P. And the 
crucial difference of course is in terms of the approach to 
the state. I suggested at the end of the last chapter that 
a shift in the dominant perception of state action from 
expectations of the benefits of state economic management 
to concern about the cost of the state apparatus underlay 
the effectiveness of some of the dominant themes of the 
'No' campaign at the Devolution Referendum of 1979. This 
shift, based on experience of the failure of economic 
management, has found its full embodiment in Thatcherism. 
I am not trying to say that the appeal of the S. N. P. 
was like the appeal of Thatcherismr only that they can be 
seen as inflections of the same ideological field in 
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different historical circumstances and, of coursep in 
different countries. 
Miller (1981, pp214-216) showed how, at the 1979 
General Election, in addition to the presence of the S. N. P. 
in Scotland, the major difference between Scottish and 
English voting patterns was the extent to which Labour 
performed much better in comparison with the Conservatives 
than would have been expected on the basis of social 
structural differences. This pattern would seem to have 
been further embedded at the 1983 General Election. How 
does this square with the suggestion that the success of 
the S. N. P. and of Thatcherism can be seen as different 
expressions of the same ideological field? One has to bring 
in the consideration that as voting patterns have moved 
away from traditional class loyalties, away from being in a 
sense embedded in the social structure, voting trends 
depend much more crucially on the way issues are framed in 
the media and by politicians and governments and on the 
symbolic mechanisms involved in such framing. To the extent 
that the explicit emergence of the 'Scottish frame' was in 
part a precondition for the success of the S. N. P. and was 
further cemented by that success and in response to that 
successr it will have provided a defence against the 
manipulation of 'the British frame, -a manipulation which 
Thatcher has used to great effect in appropriating the 
family/consumer/taxpayer/citizen matrix. Two additional 
considerations spring to mind in this contextr both in the 
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form of queries for further research. The first would be 
the extent to which Labour's better performance in Scotland 
at the last two elections could be seen as a working 
through of the ef f ects of the much higher proportion of the 
Scottish population living in local authority housing (see 
Table 6.4). The second would be to wonder whether the 
S. N. P's success in attracting young voters in 1974 could 
not be seen as a capturing of these voter. s for the 
'Scottish framelf a frame through which they continued to 
see the political world even after a loss of faith in the 
S. N. P. itself. 
The main focus of this study has been an attempt to 
discover the meaning of the S. N. P. surge in terms of the 
experience of dominant patterns of social change in the 
thirty years after the war. As tends to be the case, it is 
what has happened since the S. N. P. 1s peak of success in the 
mid-1970s which allows us to see more clearly that this 
success was a product of particular social circumstances. 
The thirty years after the war can in hindsight be seen as 
a well-marked phase of Britain's and Scotland's social 
history. Although it was a period of rapid social change, 
there were certain background features,, some of them the 
motors of this social change, which remained relatively 
constant - full employment, the welfare state, rising 
standards of living, a high level of social mobility and a 
fairly consensual pattern of political competition - and 
which were taken for granted as 'normality'. It is only in 
looking back from the quite different circumstances of the 
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early 1980s, that these taken granted features can be seen 
as the major shapers of experience they were. From inside 
that 'normality' it was extremely difficult to see the 
extent to which the electoral success of the S. N. P. was an 
embodiment of many of its assumptions rather than a 
challenge to it. The decline of the S. N. P. coincided with 
the collapse of these assumptions. 
It is this historical specificity of the experience 
which produced the S. N. P. surge which makes looking into 
the future all but impossible. What is certain is that 
whatever the form in which the Scottish dimension is 
manifested in the future, it will inevitably be quite 
different from the confident surge which this study has 




APPENDIX 1. The October 1974 Scottish Election Survey. 
The data set of the October 1,974 Scottish Election 
Survey was kindly made available by Dr William Miller of 
the University of Strathclyde under the auspices of the 
Social Science Research Council Survey Archive. I also 
acknowledge Ivor Crewe, Bo Sarlvik and James Alt, the 
British Election Study at the University of Essex. 
The survey was carried out in the months following the 
General Election of October 1974. In Scotland 1170 
interviews were carried out representing a response rate of 
76%. Because of a need to dovetail with the British survey, 
the sampling design in Scotland was relatively complex, 
involving some weighting by strata. Since my analyses do 
not require precise estimation of national distributions 
but rely primarily on well-marked between group 
differences, I felt safe in not weighting the data on 
the grounds that any marginal improvement in statistical 
accuracy gained by weighting would be counter-balanced by 
the statistical and presentational complexities involved. 
Social Grades. Tables 6.5,6.6y 6.8,6.9 and 6.12 
A Higher managerial. 
B Lower managerial 
ClA Skilled non-manual 
ClB Lower non-manual 
C2 Skilled manual 
D Semi- and unskilled manual 
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APPENDIX 2. Industrial employment data. 
The data on the industrial structure of employment 
presented in Chapter 5 (Tables 5.1 to 5.5 and passim) are 
derived from the series produced by C. H. Lee,, the fruit of 
a heroic effort to recategorize occupational and industrial 
data presented in the Censuses from 1841 to 1971 according 
to the Standard Industrial Classification of 1968. Full 
details of the series and the data itself at regional level 
for Scotland and county level for England and Wales are 
given in Lee, 1979. What follows is no more than the 
briefest guide to the origins and coverage of the data. 
Series A 
Lee's series A data consist of a reworking of the 
occupation tables of the Censuses of Scotland and England 
and Wales from 1841 to 1911. Thus the scope of inclusion of 
Lee's series depends upon the Census's definition of the 
population to whom occupations were to be assigned. 
1851 to 1871 In these Censusesp those in work plus all 
those out of work who had previously been in some form of 
employment were included in the occupation tables. This was 
perhaps the widest definition ever used, and included the 
retired, the unemployedr institutional inmates as well as 
'family workers'. 
1881 to 1911 In these Censuses, retired personst persons in 
lunatic asylums and inmates of poor houses over the age of 
60 were assigned to the 'Unoccupied' group. The 1881 Census 
Report estimated that had the retired been included as 
before, they would have amounted to 2% of those appearing 
in the occupation tables. Lee (1979, plO) comments that the 
change in practice is 'reflected in the data with a fall of 
about five per cent in the male activity rate and eight per 
cent in the female equivalent. ' 
A particular quirk of the 1891 Census was that 'women 
engaged in domestic duties about the home were for the 
first and last time classified not as unoccupied but under 
the heading of domestic service' (Lee, 1979, p9) 
The occupational tables f rom 1881 to 1911 still included 
the unemployed and the long term sick who had previously 
been gainfully employed. 
Series B. 1921 to 1971 
The series B data are based on the industrial 
categorization first successfully introduced in the 1921 
Census. Although the principle of classification employed 
is much more compatible with the 1968 Standard Industrial 
Classification, the form in which the results were 
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tabulated at county level in 1921 and 1931 laid a 
methodological minefield. 
1931 In Scotland, persons 'out of work' were included in 
the tabulation, whereas retired persons were excluded. 
(Census of Scotland,, 1931,, Vol III, Table 16). The 
tabulations for the regions of England and Wales excluded 'out of work'. 
For comparative purposes I have recalculated the figures 
for Scotland as a whole to exclude the unemployed in 1931 
as well as reducing the figures for Great Britain by the 
number of Scottish unemployed which was previously included 
in the British total. 
1951,1961j, 1971 Here the position is much clearerp with 
the industrial tables consistently referring only to people 
in employment. 
Department of Employment Data, 1971 and 1981. 
The last two rows in. Table 5.5 refer to employees in 
employment. As well as the unemployed, the following 
categories are excluded: the self-employedr husbands/wives 
working for wives/husbands, directors not under contract of 
service, partners, persons working in their own homes, 
former employees on the payroll as pensioners, private 
domestic staff working in private households and members of 
H. M. forces. (Regional Trends, 1980, p210) For a fuller 
description of the Censuses of Employment from which the 
figures for 1971A and 1981 are primarily derived see the 




A. INDUSTRIAL CLASSIFICATION 
The industrial classification used throughout is based 
closely on the 1968 Standard Industrial Classification. 
1. Agriculture, forestry and fisheries. 
2. Mining and quarrying. 
3. Foodp Drink and Tobacco. 
4. Coal and petroleum products. 
5. Chemicals and allied industries. 
6. Metal manufacture. 
7. Mechanical engineering. 
8. Instrument engineering. 
9. Electrical engineering. 
10. Shipbuilding and marine engineering. 
11. Vehicles. 
12. Metal goods not elsewhere specified. 
13. Textiles. 
14. Leather, leather goods and fur. 
15. Clothing and footwear. 
16. Bricks, pottery, glassr cement etc. 
17. Timber, furniture etc. 
18. Paper, printing and publishing. 
19. Other manufacturing industries. 
20. Construction. 
21. Gas, electricity and water. 
22. Transport and communication. 
23. Distributive trades. 
24. Insurance, banking, finance and business services. 
25. Professional and scientific services. 
26. Miscellaneous services. 
27. Public administration and defence. 
N. B. 1. In the interests of continuityr Lee's series B 
differs in some minor respects from exact correspondance 
with the 1968 S. I. C. For full details of the composition of 
Lee's series B, see Leej, 1979. 
N. B. 2. In the interests of the strict continuity demanded 
by the shift-share analysis, this analysis was carried out 
on the basis of the 1958 Standard Industrial 
Classification. See Appendix 5 for full details of the 
changes involved. 
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B. SECTORAL CLASSIFICATION 
The allocation of the industrial orders to sectors 
follows fairly common-sense lines,, as follows. 
Agriculturer forestry and fisheries. 1.0.1 
Mining and Quarrying 1.0.2 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
I. O. s 3 to 19 
1.0.20 
Intermediate 1.0.21 to 23 
(Gas,, Electricity and Water; Transport and 
Communications; Distribution) 
Service 1.0.24 to 27 
When the analysis is concerned with the distribution of 
industrial employment (as in Tables 5.1 to 5-4)#, the two 
sectors of mining and quarrying and manufacturing are 
combined to produce an industrial sector made up of 
Industrial Orders 2 to 18. 
C. SOCIO-ECONOMIC GROUPS. 
The following brief definitions of the socio-economic 
groups are taken from Benjaminj The Population Census, 
1971. 
1. Employers and managers in central and local government, 
industry, commerce, etc. - large establishments. 
Persons who employ others or generally plan and 
supervise in non-agricultural enterprises employing 
twenty-five or more persons. 
2. Employers and managers in industry, commerce, etc. - 
small establishments. 
As in 1. but in establishments employing fewer than 
twenty-five persons. 
3. Professional workers - self-employed. 
Self-employed persons engaged in work normally requiring 
qualifications of university degree standard. 
4. Professional workers - employees. 
Employees engaged in work normally requiring 
qualifications of university degree standard. 
5. Intermediate non-manual workers. 
Employeesr not exercising general planning or 
supervisory powers, engaged in non-manual occupations 
ancillary to the professions but not normally requiring 
qualifications of university degree standard; persons 
engaged in artistic work and not employing others 
thereat; and persons engaged in occupations otherwise 
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included in Group 5 who have an additional and formal 
supervisory function. 
6. Junior non-manual workers. 
Employees, not exercising general planning or 
supervisory powerst engaged in clericalp sales and non- 
manual communications and security occupationst 
excluding those who have additional and formal 
supervisory functions. 
7. Personal service workers. 
Employees engaged in service occupations caring for 
food, drink, clothing and other personal needs. 
8. Foremen and supervisors - manual. 
Employees (other than managers) who formally and 
immediately supervise others engaged in manual 
occupations, whether or not themselves engaged in such 
occupations. 
9. Skilled manual workers. 
Employees engaged in manual occupations which require 
considerable and specific skills. 
10. Semi-skilled manual workers. 
Employees engaged in manual occupations which require 
slight but specific skills. 
ll. Unskilled manual workers. 
Other employees engaged in manual occupations. 
12. Own account workers (other than professional). 
Self-employed persons engaged in any trader personal 
service or manual occupation not normally requiring 
training of university degree standard and having no 
employees other than family workers. 
13. Farmers - employers and managers. 
Persons who own, rent or manage farmsr market gardens or 
forests, employing people other than family workers in 
the work of the enterprise. 
14. Farmers - own account. 
Persons who own or rent farmsp market gardens or forests 
and having no employees other than family workers. 
15. Agricultural workers. 
Employees engaged in tending cropsr animalst game or 
forests or operating agricultural or forestry machinery. 
16. Members of the armed forces. 
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D. HOPE-GOLDTHORPE CLASS SCHEMA (Tables 12 and 13) 
Class I Higher-grade professionals; higher grade 
administrators and officials; managers in large 
industrial establishments; large proprietors. 
Class II Lower-grade professionals and higher grade 
technicians; lower grade administrators and 
officials; managers in small business and 
industrial establishments and services; 
supervisors of non-manual employees. 
Class III Routine non-manual - largely clerical - 
employees in administration and commerce; 
sales personnel; other rank-and-file employees 
in services. 
Class IV Small proprietors, including farmers and 
smallholders; self-employed artisans; all other 
'own-account' workers apart from professionals. 
Class V Lower-grade technicians whose work is to some 
extent of a manual character; supervisors of 
manual workers. 
Class VI Skilled manual wage-workers 
Class VII Manual wage-workers in industry in semi- and 
unskilled grades; agricultural workers. 




A. British regions. 
The regions of Britain used in this analysis are those used 
by Lee in the published version of his data set. They are 
the result of an attempt to get as close to the New 
Standard regions as defined in April 1974 in England and 
Wales as was possible while retaining the county (the only 
unit on the basis of which the series was possible) as the 
basic unit. (For a fuller account see Lee, 1979, pp39-46. ) 
Thus the British regions are defined as follows: 
SOUTH-EAST Londont Middlesex, Kentr Surreyr Sussext 
Hampshire,, Berkshirej Oxfordp Buckingham, 
Bedford,, Hertfordshire,, Essex. 
EAST ANGLIA Cambridger Huntingdon, Norfolkr Suffolk. 
SOUTH-WEST Cornwall, Devon, Somersetj Gloucester# 
Wiltshire,, Dorset. 
WEST MIDLANDS Hereford, Shropshire, Staffordl Warwick, 
Worcester. 
EAST MIDLANDS Derbyshirer Nottingham, Leicesterp Lincoln, 
Northamptonshiref Rutland. 
. 
NORTH-WEST Cheshiref Lancashire 




B. Industrial Regions of Scotland. 
1. AYRSHIRE 
2. DUNBARTONSHIRE 
3. LANARKSHIRE (includes Glasgow) 
4. RENFREWSHIRE 
5. MIDLOTHIAN (includes Edinburgh) 




10. ANGUS (includes Dundee) 
ll. ABERDEENSHIRE (including Aberdeen City) 
12. BORDERS Berwickp Roxburgh, Selkirkr Peebles. 
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APPENDIX 
Shift share analysis. 
The shift-share analysis reported in Chapter 5 was based upon the industrial order by socio-economic group 
matrices for Scotland for 1961 and 1971. The Census Tables involved are: 
1. Census of Scotland, 1961t Volume 6r Occupationt 
Industry and Workplace, IIr Table Vy Industry by Socio- 
economic Group. 
2. Unpublished version for Scotland of Great Britain, 
Economic Activity Tablesr Table 33, Industry by Social 
Classr Socio-economic Class and Sex. 
The data from these two tables refers only to the 
population in employment. 
Where reference is made to individual Occupation Codes 
or Occupational Groupst the data is derived from: 
1. Census of Scotlandp 1961, Vol 6f Occupationp Industry 
and Workplacer IF Table 1. 
2. Census of Scotland 1971, Economic Activity Tables, 
Table 5. 
These tables refer to the economically active population 
i. e. including the unemployed. 
The 'computational recipe' for the shift-share analysis is 
as follows: 
For each socio-economic group (SEG) and for each industrial 
order (10) 
1. Calculate the the number in the SEG in 1961 as a 
proportion of all workers in the 10 in 1961. 
2. Apply this proportion to the total 1971 employment 
figure for the 10 Le this gives a hypothetical figure 
for workers in the SEG who are in the 10 in 1971 under 
the assumption that they still made up the same 
proportion of employment in the 10 in 1971 as in 1961. 
3. From this hypothetical figure for 1971 subtract the 
actual numbers in the SEG in the 10 in 1961. This gives 
the change in numbers which would have taken place if 
the proportion had remained the same between 1961 and 
1971. This is the INDUSTRIAL COMPONENT and must reflect 
change in the size of the 10 as measured by total 
employment in it. 
4. Subtract the hypothetical figure for 1971 from the 
actual figure for 1971. This gives the change in the 
number of workers in the SEG in the 10 which cannot be 
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accounted f or by the change in total employment in the 
10 and thus must be a reflection of change in the 
proportion of the SEG in employment in the industry. 
This is the OCCUPATIONAL COMPONENT. 
In the present analysis, the group made up of, for 
example, females in SEG 9 has been treated in exactly the 
same way as the group made up of all workers in SEG 9 i. e. in both cases change in total (male and female) employment 
in the industry has been taken as the relevent indicator of 
change in the size of the industry. 
In a more complex model it would be possibl*6 take changes 
in male and female employment in each industry as the 
relevent indicators, and by comparing the results with 
those of the present approach (which takes total 
employment in the industry as the indicator of industrial 
change) arrive at a specification of processes of 
substitution between male and female labour. 
Industrial classification used for shift-share analysis. 
Since the major changes between the 1958 (used at the 1961 
Census) and 1968 (used at the 1971 Census) Standard 
Industrial Classifications consisted of subdividing the 
1958 orders, a greater degree of continuity could be 
maintained by converting as far as possible the 1971 
tabulation back to the 1958 Classification as used in the 
1961 tabulation. 
The recombinations of industrial order involved were: 
1968 Orders 41 Coal and petroleum productd and 5, Chemicals 
and allied industries were recombined to the old Chemicals 
and allied industries order. 
1968 Orders 7f8 and 9, Mechanicall Instrument and 
Electrical Engineering were recombined to the old 
Engineering and Electrical Goods order. 
The following changes at the minimum list heading 
(M. L. H. ) level were made to the 1971 industry by occupation 
matrix in order to maximise its continuity with the 1961 
distribution. 
1190 male and 160 female members of M. L. H. 221, 
Vegetable and animal oils and fats were transferred back 
from 1.0.3 (Food,, drink and tobacco) to 1.0.4#5 
(Chemicals and allied industries) 
2640 male and 560 female members of M. L. H. 3901 
Engineers' small tools and gauges were transferred back 
from 1.0.12 (Metal goods not elsewhere specified) to 1.0. 
7,, 8,9 (Engineering and electrical goods). 
3680 male and 4740 female members of M, L. H. s 864, 
Advertising and market research, 865, Other business 
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services, and 866F Central offices not allocable elsewhere 
were transferred back from 1.0.24 (Insurancer banking, 
finance and business services) to 1.0.26 (Miscellaneous 
services). Thus for the purposes of the shift-share 
analysis 1.0.24 consists of Insurance, banking and finance 
rather than of Insurance, banking, finance and business 
services. 
B. Socio-economic group classif ication used f or shif t-share 
analysis. 
Changes in the socio-economic group classification 
between 1961 and 1971 were not quite so troublesome. The 
only major change and the only change for which it was 
possible to adjust was that 'Coal mines - other underground 
workers' and 'Coal miners (so described)' were reclassified 
from S. E. G. 10 (semi-skilled) in 1961 to S. E. G. 9 (skilled) 
in 1971. It was decided to follow the 1971 usage and change 
the 1961 distribution accordingly. Thus 23F860 workers in 
the two groups in 1961 were transferred from S. E. G. 10 to 
S. E. G. 9. 
The only other sizable change in classification was 
that pharmacists, dispensers and opticians with the 
employment status of employee or apprentice were classified 
in S. E. G. 5 in 1961 but were accorded professional status 
and classified to S. E. G. 4 in 1971. No attempt was made to 
adjust for this change in the analysist so the it will have 
artificially inflated somewhat the increase in professional 
workers. The numbers involved were around 1,000 in 1961 and 
1,600 in 1971. 
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NOTES 
Notes to Chapter 1. 
1. The fullest account is in Miller (1981) which also 
contains a bibligraphy of works relating to Scottish 
electoral behaviour. 
2. The party shares of the vote in each constituency are 
taken from the successive volumes of the Nuffield series 
'The British General Election of .... It (Butler and King, 1965 and 1966; Butler and Pinto-Duchinskyr 1971; Butler and 
Kavanagh, 1974F 1975 and 1980) 
3. This reorganization has*of course been superseded by 
the much more radical reallocation of 1983. 
4. The more normal measure of dissimilarity would be the 
positive percentage difference, equal to half the 
percentage difference. Since the analysis only takes 
account of information on the rank order of the 
dissimilarities the use of one measure as opposed to 
another makes no difference to the results. 
5. The program used was MINISSAF originated by E. E. Roskam 
at the University of Nijmegen,, as implemented in the MDS(X) 
Series of Multi-dimensional Scaling Programs maintained by 
the Program Library Unit of Edinburgh University. 
MINISSA#, a non-metric * multidimensional 
scaling program, 
implements one of the most basic and straightforward of the 
family of multi-dimensional scaling algorithms. Given that 
the similarity measures to be scaled were numerically 
derived,, a metric MDS program could have been employed. The 
non-metric version was preferred because it makes fewer 
assumptions about the data and because it gives more 
information about the achieved solution. 
The MINISSA program implements one of the most basic 
and straightforward of the family of MDS algorithms. 
In the present casel as pointed out in the text, the 
program can be seen as attempting to reproduce the rank 
order of percentage differences between region/election 
voting patterns in terms of the rank order of distances 
between the points representing the region/election data 
points in the solution space (Fig. 1). If Figure I 
represented a 'perfect' solutionr the two most similar 
region/election voting patterns would be represented by the 
two points closest together in the solution space, the 
second most similar by the second closest together and so 
on. The program attempts to achieve by an iterative 'trial 
and error' process a solution as close as possible to this 
perfect solution. 
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The index of disparity between the rank ordering of the 
dissimilarities in the data (between voting patterns and 
the present case) and the rank order of distances between 
the data points in the solution is known as the stress 
value, and it is this value which the program attempts to 
minimise. The stress can be regarded as a measure of the 
extent to which thp solution deviates from a perfect 
solution. The more dimensions whicli are specified for the 
solution space, the easier it is for the program to 
reproduce the rank order of dissimilarities in terms of 
distances in the space and thus the lower will be the 
stress value. For purposes of interpretation however, one 
wants a solution with as few dimensions as possible. The 
number of dimensions chosen is always a compromise between 
the demands of adequate reproduction of the data and the 
demands of ease of interpretation. There is no rigorous 
method for making this decision and since we are using the 
technique simply to show broad patterns in the data (rather 
than to find any underlying 'dimensionality' in the data - 
we know what that is, four),, two dimensions are adequate. 
The two dimensional solution had a stress value of . 131, just inside the level of . 15 which is a rule of thumb limit for a reasonable solution. Over two thirdst . 085,, of this 
total stress or lunscaleability in two dimensions' of . 131 
was contributed by just four of the region/election data 
points,, the North-East and Tayside in 1970j, February 1974 
and 1979 and to a much more minor extent,, the Highlands and 
Islands in October 1974. So to the extent that these 
contributions to stress represent idiosyncracy in voting 
patterns beyond that which can be accommodated in a two- 
dimensional solution, most of it is concentrated in the 
geographically peripheral areas. 
The final step was to input the co-ordinates produced 
by the MDS program to a program specially written using the 
graph-plot routines of the E. R. C. C. Graphics Package. 
6. The topic is explored by Bealey and Sewel (1981) who 
base their use of the term on the work of Michael Dyer. 
7. Miller pinpointed a different aspect of the varying 
sources of support for the S. N. P. With reference to the 
October 1974 General Election he points out that 
"The working class was more SNP than the middle 
class on the periphery but less SNP in Strathclyde. 
Howeverl the strongest class pattern was a pro-SNP vote 
by workers in Conservative areas balanced by a pro-SNP 
vote by the middle-class in Labour areas. " (Miller, 
1981, p196) 
Miller does not agree with the tactical voting 
interpretion but tends to see the pattern as another 
exemplification of the operation of 'balanced cross- 
pressures' deriving from the influence of constituency 
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class environments. Whatever the explanation, it is the 
simple fact that the S. N. P. does seem to have been able to 
stand for different things in different areas which is most 
interesting. In other words, the meaning of voting S. N. P. 
does not seem to have been the same in different parts of 
the country. 
8. See Miller's discussion of the widening contrast between 
Scotland and England in the gap between support for Labour 
and Conservative (Miller, 1981, pp232-233). The 1983 
Election has of course only confirmed the North-South 
polarization in British politics. 
9. It might be thought that on strict grounds of symmetry, 
one should also include in the overall measure of 
dissimilarity changes in vote when a party had stood in 
both seats at the first election and in neither at the 
second. It is a difficult point to answer but my feeling is 
that the votes lost when a party fails to stand add little 
information to that obtained from changes in the votes of 
the other parties reflecting this failure to stand. 
10. The same multi-dimensional scaling procedure (see Note 
5) was used to produce Figures 2 as to produce Figure 1. 
In this case however the stress value of . 191 for the two-dimensional solution was rather higher than one would 
normally be happy with. Faced with the prospect of 
presenting and interpreting a three dimensional solution 
however and given that-the two-dimensional solution is 
readily interpretabler pragmatism triumphed over 
methodological purity. 
We can put ourselves on slightly firmer ground by 
noting that two thirds (. 132) of the total stress was 
contributed by seven constituencies. 
The distances between these constituencies in 
particular and all the other constituencies in the plot are 
thus misrepresentatioris of the similarity of their patterns 
of voting change to those of all the other constituencies 















The patterns of voting change in these constituencies 
then are sufficiently idiosyncratic to be to an extent 
unscaleable in the two dimensions allowed. The likely 
reasons are readily enough identifiable in most of themr 
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and its contribution to total stress does not Prevent 
Edinburgh South from clustering fairly close to the other 
Edinburgh constituencies which were scaled. 
11. Miller's only comment on the relationship was that 
OThe more adventurous sections - male# and above 
all, young had switched more strongly to the SNP. " 
(Miller, 1981, p149) 
With respect to support for devolution the same theme 
was repeated 
"Men and young people were both pro- independence 
and pro-devolution. We may guess that these social 
groups are more restivej, more adventurous, more willing 
to accept or demand change. " (Miller, 1981, pII6) 
Notes to Chapter 2. 
1. My use of the phrase 'the national level of analysis' is 
inspired by Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussain's more 
specifically economic usage. Their relatively common-sense 
notion is well expressed in the following passage 
"What are 'national' economies as a level of 
analysis? They are the level at which certain crucial 
parameters and conditions of operation of an economy 
based on capitalist relations of production are 
determined; these determinations are various and are by 
no means necessarily 'economic' (in the classic sense). 
The concept of 'national' economy does not designate an 
essence (any more than does the concept 'nation' - 
moreover the term national is merely on of 
convenience). What defines such an economy are the 
factors which operate to determine and delimit the 
forms and conditions of economic performance within a 
region. These factors are not given and may vary ... 
(Cutler et al, 1979, pp244-245) 
or even more concisely 
'For us 'national' economy signifies not a pre- 
given unity of a people or the state as the 
horizon of 
a paid or vocational state functionary 
but a series of 
precise effectivities with a limit. " 
(ibid, p259) 
2. For reasons of space and because of the topic's rather 
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unproductive import I have refrained from including a 
preliminary survey of how the conceptual relations between 
society and the nation have been handled (or rather not handled) by non-Marxist social science. The general 
Position is s"=ed up in Elias' observation that 
w... many twentieth century sociologistst when 
speaking of *societyO no longer have in mind (as did 
their predecessors) a "bourgeois society" or a "human 
society" beyond the state, but increasingly the 
somewhat diluted ideal image of a nation-state" (Elias,, 
1978, p241) 
The problem has been addressed in terms of classical social 
theory by Smith (1983) and in an insightful but 
characteristically cryptic account by Touraine (1981). 
Tilly (1975) gives a concise account of the unit of 
analysis problem as exemplified in the theoretical 
approaches known as "political modernisation" or "political development" 
Edward Shils' (1975) specification of his usage of such 
notions as integration and centre and periphery is a 
particularly revealing view from 'inside' a dominant 
tradition. The element of intellectual autobiography in his 
account makes clear his direct debt to German idealism. 
For an analytical survey of primarily non-Marxist usage 
of the terms centre and periphery see Claval (1980). 
3. As Perry Anderson points out, in discussing Althusser's 
treatment of historical temporality 
'Althusser characteristically assumes that the 
'Social totality' in question is equivalent to a lsbcial formationtr in other words that national 
ensembles form the natural boundaries of historical 
investigationa (Anderson, 1980f p76) 
The contrasting positions of Dobb and Sweezy as well as 
other contributions to the 'transition from feudalism' 
debate can be found in Hilton (ed)r 1978. On Wallerstein's 
tendency towards 'externalism' see Skocpolr 1977 - quoted 
in Note 12 below. An especially clear exemplification of 
the terms of the debate is presented by Brenner (1977). 
4. Among the works dealing with dependency theory and wider 
aspects of the debate the following were especially 
helpful: Banaji (1977,, 1-980); Booth (1975); Brewer (1980); 
Foster-Carter (1974,1978); Friedman (1976); O'Brien 
(1975); Roxborough (1976). Among the 'protagonists' Frank's 
'auto-critique' and reply to his critics contained in the 'Introductory Questions' of Frank (1978) was particularly 
useful. In terms of the 'classics' of neo-Marxist 
dependency theory my main sources were Frank (1967,1975) 
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and Amin (1974). 
For a debate on the scottish Highlands conducted in 
precisely these terms see especially McKenzie (1977). 
5. The immediate context is Marx's discussion of the effect 
of fluctuations in the price of raw materials on the rate 
of profit and more particularly on the "Revaluation and 
Devaluation of Capital: Release and Tying up of Capital" 
although the point can be seen as having wider relevance. 
6. For interesting 'internal' confirmation of the timing of 
the writing of Capital in these termst see Engels' needp 
editing Volume III in the 1890sr to point out in a footnote 
"the new mania for general protective tariffs" and "the 
cartels formed by manufacturers in whole branches of 
production for the regulation of production and profits 
too" which had arisen since Marx had written in 1865 
"All ideas of a common, all-embracing and far- 
sighted control over the production of raw materials - 
a control that is in fact incompatibler by and large, 
with the laws of capitalist productiont and hence 
remains forever a pious wish, or is at most confined to 
exceptional common steps in moments of great and 
pressing danger and perplexity - all such ideas give 
way to the belief that supply and demand will regulate 
one another" 
(Capital#, Volume IIIF p215) 
7. And of course it is not insignificant that Marx moved 
from Germany, which in many ways he saw as representing the 
past,, to a Britain which in many ways he saw as 
representing the future. 
8. Marx's stormy relationship with Lassallej, characterised 
by Lichtheim as: 
"A Ricardian socialist in economicst an old- 
fashioned idealist Hegelian in philosophyr and an 
unashamed nationalist in politicst Lassalle stood for a 
sysnthesis of patriotism and radicalism which was 
immensely attractive to many Germans of his generation, 
though plainly quite incompatibility with international 
socialism as Marx and Engels understood it. " 
(Lichtheim, 1971, p86) 
could almost be seen as the expression in 
personal terms of Marx's problems with the 'national 
level'. 
9.1 realise that this is only one simplified aspect of the 
extrenmely complex relationship between the two levels of 
analysis in the Grundrisse and Capital. Short of a 
'methodological atlas' to these works I have found Zelenyi 
(1980) to be the best guide. 
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10. The above represents what is perhaps Marx's most 
elaborate and explicit treatment of the issue. The 
historical and methodological switching of priority between 
industrial and merchant's capital or simply between 
industry and commerce is signalled again and again in the 
Grundrisse and Capital. One could almost see the issue as 
perfect opportunity for the display of Marx's pleasure in 
apparent paradox. 
11. In the context of the Sweezyj Frank/Dobb, Laclau debate 
see Wallerstein, 1979, pp9-10. For an autobiographical 
treatment see Wallerstein, 1974, p7 and more generallyr 
1974, pp, 347-348. 
12. Theda Skocpol makes this point in the course of a more 
general critique of Wallerstein's framework: 
W... Wallerstein hoped to overcome the worst 
faults of modernisation theories by breaking with their 
overemphasis on national states and their tendency 
toward ahistorical model building. Ironically thought 
he himself ends up by reproducing the old difficulties 
in new ways. Thus strong states and international 
political domination assume crucial roles in his theory 
- though,, just like the developmentalists he reduces 
politics to economic conditions and to the expression 
of the will of dominant groups within each national 
arena. " (Skocpol, 1977,, p1069) 
Here Wallerstein is characterised as breaking his own 
methodological precepts by reifying the national unit both 
from the 'inside' and from the 'outside'. 
Skocpol then goes on to make a more general point which 
because of the way it illuminates the general argument is 
worth reproducing in full: 
"How could these things happeny given 
Wallerstein's original intentions? The answerp I 
suggest, is the "mirror image" trap that plagues any 
attempt to create a new paradigm through directr 
polemic opposition to an old one. Social science mayr 
as is often said, grow through polemics. But it can 
also stagnate through themp if innovators uncritically 
carry over outmoded theoretical categories (e. g. 
"system") and if they define new ones mainly by 
searching for the seemingly direct opposite of the old 
ones (e. g. "world system" vs. "national system"). For 
what seems like a direct opposite may rest on similar 
assumptions, or may lead one (through the attempt to 
work with an artificial, too extreme position) around 
full circle to the thing originally opposed. The better 
way to proceed is to ask what new units of analysis - 
Probably not only one, but several, perhaps changing 
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with historical points of reference - can allow one to 
cut into the evidence in new ways in order to 
investigate exactly the problems or relationships that 
older approaches have neglected" (Skocpol, 1977f 
p1089). 
Skocpolls points could be seen as applying to some 
aspects of the more general linternalistl/lexternalist' 
debate. 
12. As Wallerstein puts it 
"Scotland was a classic case - Lowland Scotland 
that is - of "development by invitation... " 
(Wallersteint 1980b, p633) 
nScotland's secret was not structural; it was 
conjunctural. The Lowlands were in a position after 
1745, in Hobsbawm's phraser "to take advantage of the 
exceptionally favourable European and British 
conjuncture of the end of the eighteenth century" 
(Wallersteinr 1980br p639) 
See also Smout (1980arI980b). Although I am not 
qualified to enter into the niceties of the discussion 
between Wallerstein and Smout on the crucial factors 
underlying Scotland's move from periphery to corep from the 
point of view of this study the main point is that from the 
Union onwards Scotland's pattern of development was 
dominated by the fact of occupying a structural niche at 
the heart of the British Empire. 
14. As Scott and Hughes point out 
"The Scottish economy has moved away from being a 
more or less separate economy in the nineteenth century 
- at least as autonomous as any politically independent 
nation might have been - and has become merely a 
relatively autonomous subsystem of the British economy" 
(Scott and Hughest 1980, p260) 
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Notes to Chapter 3. 
1. Obviously this discussion of the relation between 
objective reality and its ideological representation could 
be greatly extended. For more nuanced treatments see: Finer 
1980, pp4-6; Hall, 1977a, p323ff; Hall, 1977b, pp6l-64. 
2. Carol Johnson tackles this issue head on, her purpose 
being 
"to explore the relationship between two 
apparently contradictory elements in Marx's thought; 
namely his belief that proletarian revolutionary 
consciousness will develop in a relatively 
straightforward way under capitalism, and his 
argument, in his later economic writings that the 
fetishised nature of capitalist social relations gives 
rise to forms of ideological mystification which 
significantly conceal the basic features of the 
capitalist mode of production. " (Johnson, 1980, p70) 
Marx seems to have escaped the dilemma by maintaining a 
faith that effect of the development of objective 
alienation as the antagonisms sharpened would be to 
smash through the relatively feeble resistance offered by 
fetishistic consciousness. The universal, world-wide nature 
of the preconditions for such a development specified by 
Marx are often understressed, however, and we can usefully 
link this discussion back to that of the previous chapter 
in terms of a chain or nested set of conditions of 
possibility for the existence of revolutionary ideas 
presented by Marx in "The German Ideology". The immediate 
precondition for the existence of revolutionary ideas is, 
simply enough,, the existence of a revolutionary class. 
(Collected works,, Vol 5,, p6O). For 'the premises of the 
latter' we are referred back to passages dealing with the 
historical role of alienation (Collected Workst Vol S. 
p47). Then follows an account of the 'practical premises' 
for the development of alienation to generate a 
revolutionary class. 
"This "estrangement" ("Entf remdung") ... can,, of 
course, only be abolished given two practical 
premises. In order to become an "unendurable" powerr 
i. e. a power against which men make a revolutiont it 
must necessarily have rendered the great mass of 
humanity "propertyless", and moreover in contradiction 
to an existing world of wealth and culture; both these 
premises presuppose a great increase in productive 
power, a high degree of its development. " 
The passage which follows develops this final premise 
in a universal 'world-historical' sense 
"And, on the other hand, this development of 
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productive forces (which at the same time implies the 
actual empirical existence of men in their world- 
historicalf instead of local, being) is an absolutely 
necessary practical premise, because without it 
privation, want is merely made general, and with want 
the struggle for necessities would begin againt and all 
the old filthy business would necessarily be restored; 
and furthermorep because only with this universal 
development of productive forces is a universal 
intercourse between men establishedp which on the one 
side produces in all nations simultaneously the 
phenomenon of the propertyless mass (universal 
competition), making each nation dependent on the 
revolutions of others, and finally puts world- 
historicalf empirically universal individuals in place 
of local ones. Without thisr 1) communism could only 
exist as a local phenomenon; 2) the forces of 
intercourse themselves could not have developed as 
universal, hence unendurable powers: they would have 
remained home-bred "conditionsn surrounded by 
superstition; and 3) each extension of intercourse 
would abolish local communism. Empiricallyp communism 
is only possible as the act of the dominant peoples 
"all at once" and simultaneously, which presupposes the 
universal development of productive forces and the 
world intercourse bound up with them. " (Collected 
Works#, 5, pp48-49) 
3.1 have borrowed the term 'penetration' from Paul 
Willis's notion of 'cultural penetration' (Willisr 1977, 
pp120-121) which has parallels with the my notion of 
'ideology as penetration' although Willis himself (1977, 
p166) uses the term 'ideology' primarily in the negative 
sense - for him it is ideology which is penetrated. 
4. Here, I list only the most directly influential sources 
for these ideas. Probably the most philodophically coherent 
working out of the implications of com , municative 
context 
for the generation of belief systems is that of Jurgen 
Habermas. most useful was "Legitimation Crisis" (1976),, the 
paper "Legitimation Problems in the Modern State" (1979) 
and the brief paper "The Public Sphere" (1-974) The 
implications of Habermas' concept of 'the public sphere' 
for an understanding of working-class consciousness are 
discussed in Knodler-Bunte's (1975) presentation of Negt 
and Kluge's conception of 'the proletarian public sphere$. 
Also useful was Alvin Gouldner's "The Dialectic of Ideology 
and Technology" (1976). 
From a totally different directionr Phillip Converse's 
work- injected mainstream American electoral sociology for a 
while with a concern for the effects of communicative 
context on the generation of political belief systems. See, 
especially Converse, 1964; Campbell, Converse, MillerpWarren 
and Stokest 1960. 
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S. The kind of transitions involved find an extreme form 
of illustration in Herbert Marcuse's account, written in 
Germany in the 1930s,, of what he saw as the continuities 
involved in the transition from liberal to totalitarian 
thought. This ideological transition had its economic 
foundations in 
'the transformation of capitalist society from 
mercantile and industrial capitalism based on the free 
competition of independent individual entrepreneurst to 
monopoly capitalismr in which the changed relations of 
production (and especially the large "units" such as 
cartels and trusts) require a strong state mobilizing 
'all means of power' (Marcuse, 1968, pl8) 
Marcuse saw this shift from liberal to monopoly 
capitalism as underpinning an ideological shift from 
liberal to totalitarian thought in which 
n important elements of liberalism are picked up and 
then reinterpreted and elaborated in the manner required 
by the altered economic and social condition n (ibidt 
p12) 
The most relevant, and perhaps most central, element 
which is transferred is 'naturalism' -a belief in the 
natural basis of social relations. 
Behind the economic forces and relations of 
capitalist society liberalism sees "natural" laws which 
will demonstrate their entire salutory naturalness if 
only they are left to develop freely and without 
artificial disturbance. (ibidi, p12) 
*.. Liberalism believes that through adaptation to these "natural laws" the conflict between different 
wantsf the strife between the general interest and 
private interests, as well as social inequality are 
ultimately overcome in the all-encompassing harmony of 
the wholel and that the whole thus becomes a blessing 
for the individual. Here, in the centre of the 
liberalist system, society is interpreted through its 
reduction to "nature" in its harmonizing function: as 
the evasive justification of a contradictory social 
order. " (ibid, p13) 
In totalitarian thoughtr the natural basis of society 
is the folk (i. e the Volk or nation). 
"'Nature' is the f irst in the series of resricting 
conditions to which reason is subordinated. The 
unconditioned authority of the state seems to be the 
last... The naturalistic myth begins by apostrophizing 
the natural as 'eternal' or 'divinely-willed'. This 
holds especially for the totality of the folkr whose 
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naturalness is one of the myth's primary claims. 0*00 The folk is nature itself as the substructure of history, as eternal substance, the eternally constant in the continual flux of economic and social relations. " (Marcuse, 1968, pp23-24) 
6. See especially Perry Anderson's establishment of the case that 
"the general form of the representative state - bourgeois democracy - is itself the principal ideological lynchpin of Western capitalism" (Andersonr 1976, p28) 
7. This is well brought out by Webb (1977p ppl02-103). See 
also my discussion in the afterword to Chapter 6 below. 
Notes to Chapter 4. 
1. See for example Runciman's (19661 pp60-67) discussion of 
the prevailing mood in the 1920s and 1930s, pinpointing the 
existence of 
"a widespread feeling that a high rate of chronic 
unemployment was a natural calamity which the political 
nostrums of any faction or party could do no more than 
mildly alleviate" (Runcimant 1966p p62) 
2. The foregoing is a condensation of post-war trends in 
responses to 'salience' questions set by Gallup and 
published in Gallup, ed. j, 1976. 
3. See the discussion in Chapter 7, p308F below. 
4. My main source for the above paragraph has been Kellas 
(1975), Chapters 9 and 11 in particular. 
5. For further elaboration of the association between the 
'framing' and 'fetishism' effects of ideology the 
contribution of Stuart Hall would seem to be especially 
fruitful. See especially Hallf 1977a and 1982. 
6. For further discussion of the political effect of 
'Scottish identity' see Chapter 5F section IV and Chapter 
6r section IV below. 
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Notes to Chapter S. 
1. See especially Gouldner 'Reciprocity and autonomy in 
functional theory' (Gouldnerl 1967) A more recent 
contribution has been that of Anthony Giddens - 'Functionalism: apres la luttelf 'Towards a theory of 
structuration',, 'Positivism and its critics. ' (all in 
Giddens,, 1979). 
2. Most of the empirical analysis in this chapter is based 
on work carried out by the author as part of the project 'A 
socio-graphic account of the modern Scottish social 
structure' funded by the S. S. R. C. (HR6948). Fuller accounts 
of the processes involved can be found in the Project 
Working Papers: 1,, Demography; 21 Industrial and 
Occupational Structure; 3. Education and Social Mobility. 
3. David Lockwood's (1964) distinction between system 
integration and social integration is obviously highly 
relevant here. 
Useful in the present context is Gidden's specification in 
causal terms of levels of 'feed-back loop' of increasing 
reflexivity (Giddens, 1979, p116). 
On the Marxist side, the issue has received a great deal of 
recent attention in the context of E. P. Thompson's assault 
on Althusser. See especially Anderson's (1980) discussion 
in 'Arguments in English Marxism'. 
4. 'This comes very close to Cutler et als. * (1978) 
definition of the 'national level' as a level of economic 
effectivity. See Chapter 2 Note I above. 
5. This discussion has been heavily influenced by 
Gouldner's discussion of exogenous and endogenous sources 
of social change: 
"In the analysis of system changest a distinction 
is commonly made between endogenous and exogenous 
sources of changep that ist between forces internal and 
external to the system. Our emphasis here on degrees of 
functional autonomy and degrees of system 
interdependence may be linked up with this distinction 
between exogenous and endogenous forcest and seen in 
its further ramifications for the analysis of change. 
In noting that the functional autonomy of parts 
and system interdependence are matters of degree wep in 
effectr state that exogenous and endogenous factors are 
not qualitatively but quantitatively different 
different. That is, they are simply at opposite ends of 
the same continuum of interdependence and functional 
autonomy. Hencep specific system parts may be both 
partly exogenous and partly endogenous. Thus, if 
exogenous forces are peculiarly important to the 
understanding of system change, as they are commonly 
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held to be in Parsons' and other system modelsf any 
element in the system may be important in understanding 
system change to the extent that it possesses a degree 
of exogenousnessr though all need not be equally so. 
... social systems may be looked upon as composed of 
parts having varying degrees of functional autonomy and 
interdependence; thus the difference between the 
external and internal, the "inside" and "outside" of 
the system, is not an absolute distinctionr and the 
thickness or permeability of the system boundaries 
varies at different zones. " (Gouldner, 1964p p167) 
For some reflections on the 'systemic status' of the 
Scottish political system see Kellas, 1973r Chapter 1. 
6. Payne's (1977a) initial publication and interpretation 
of the series was the occasion for an assault on his 
methodological and theoretical procedures by Jones (1977). 
For Payne's reply see Payne (1977b) 
7. Jones (19771, Table 5 and p404) calculated that 
Scotland's excess of unskilled manual workers over England 
and Wales was not a reflection of differing industrial 
structures but was predominantly a reflection of a higher 
proportion of unskilled manual workers within Industrial 
Orders in Scotland. 
8. For other examples see Watt, 1982, p222 and Watson, 
1980, p154. 
9. The Oxford Mobility Study 
The study was carried out by the Social Mobility Group 
at Nuffield College, Oxford and data was derived from a 
survey in 1972 into occupational mobility among men aged 20 
to 64 and resident in England and Wales. A sample of a 
stratified two-stage design was drawn using the Electoral 
Registers as the sampling frame. Interviews producing 
usable information were conducted with 10,309 men 
representing a response rate of 81.8%. (Goldthorper 1980o, 
p39) 
10. The Scottish Mobility Study 
The study was carried out by a team based at Aberdeen 
University. In conception, the study was an offshoot of the 
Oxford study, although its approach diverged. over time. The 
survey was carried out in 1974/75. Interviews were 
conducted with 4j887 males aged 20 to 64 resident in 
Scotland (except for the Outer Isles) which represented a 
response rate of 81.2%. 
11. The following is a condensation of data initially 
presented in Payne and Payne, 1981. The aggregate trends in 
recruitment to non-manual first jobs are shown in Figure 1 
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of Payne and Payne, 1983. 
12. The follow-up surveys to the 1947 Scottish Mental 
Survey. 
The 1947 Scottish Mental Survey tested all children in 
. 
Scotland born in 1936. From this total a sub-sample known 
as the Six Day. Sample was drawn consisting of all children 
born on the first day of the even months of 1936 -a total 
of 1208 children. This group were then contacted annually 
by home visitors drawn largely from the teaching 
profession. Together with co-operation from schools and the 
Ministry of Employment, this produced an extremely high 
rate of follow-up. For example, by the time of the first 
report on the follow-up (MacPhersonr 1958) focussing on the 
experiences of the sample up to age 18, information on 
employment was complete for all but 10 of the sample 
(MacPherson, 1958, p15). By the end of the survey, after 
the thirteenth schedule issued in 1963, contact had been 
maintained with 1104 informants from a possible 1198F an 
astonishing success rate of 92% over 16 years. 
13. For a more detailed exploration of declining fertility 
differentials in Scotland see Kendrick, Bechhofer and 
McCrone (1983, forthcoming). 
14. For example the 'relative income' hypothesis associated 
in particular with Easterlin's approach and the 'new home 
economics' model. For an assessment of the adequacy of 
these approaches in accounting for post-war fertility 
swings in Britain see Ermisch (1982). 
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Notes to Chapter 6. 
1. of particular help have been Zweig (1961); Klein 
(1965); willmott and Young (1973). The major inspiration 
has been The Affluent Worker study. For a defence of this 
usage see Note 2 below. 
2.1 present the processes involved in this extremely 
genral way in order to avoid the immensely complex set of 
problems involved in characterizing 'the traditional 
working class'. Any brief attempt to do so is bound to 
create an impression which is too homogenous. 
3. The inspiration of the following section is primarily 
The Affluent Worker study (Goldthorpe et al.,? 
1968,1969,1970). The degree to which the findings of this 
study are generalizable is obviously a matter pf 
controversy. The authors themselves are relatively 
cautious, especially in generalizing to skilled manual 
occupations. 
In partial justification of extending the implications 
of their research to the working class as a whole,, 
can be cited Goldthorpe's characterization of Hope- 
Goldthorpe Classes VI and VII (skilled and other 
manual)based on the follow-up interviews to the Oxford 
Mobility Study 
"Work was not for them a sphere of life within 
which their ultimate goals were located; rather these 
goals lay outside their work, chiefly in fact in their 
domestic and-family lives, and the importance that then 
attached to work was that of being the essential means 
to their realization. " (Goldthorper 1980,, p239). 
I can do no more than express a conviction that the 
insights gained or confirmed in The Affluent Worker have 
come closer to the heart of the social trends which have 
underlain the shifting political patterns of the last 
tvienty years than anything I have come across written 
since. My main justification for citing the study so 
monotonously is that it is much easier to follow the thread 
of the argument in this way. 
4. The fact that the Affluent Worker sample were not 
restricting their fertility to any great extent is quite 
consistent with these arguments given the timing of the 
survey,, the early 1960s when employment opportunities for 
married women were only beginning ther rapid increase. 
5. In assigning women respondents to a social grade I 
have 
assigned unmarried women to the social grade of their own 
job and married women to that of their husband's. 
6. It is worth mentioning here that the political issue 
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which most fully embodies the consumer orientation is 
inflation. Moreover inflation is an issue which 
superficially appears to affect everyone equally. In this 
sense it is also, as Morley suggests in the above passager 
the national economic issue par excellence. During the 
period of the S. N. P. s greatest success, in fact for much 
of the late 1960s and, in particular, the early and mid- 
1970sj, this one issue dominated responses to the standard 
opinion poll survey question as to which was the most 
important problem facing the government or the country. In 
the mid 1970s, around 75% of replies to this poll question 
consistently named one or another aspect of economic policy 
and as Alt points out: 
'From the fourth quarter of 1972 until nearly the end 
of 1977 prices constituted at least three quarters of 
economic responsest and sometimes as much as nine 
tenths. ' (Alty 1979j, p49) 
The issue of prices similarly dominated the rather more 
specific questions on the importance of 12 named issues in 
influencing respondents voting decisions according to the 
October 1974 Scottish Election Survey. 29 per cent of 
respondents named prices as being the most important issuer 
54% as being fairly important and 18% as not very 
important. The next most important issue was Scottish 
government which 16% named as the most important issue 
influencing their vote, 47% as fairly important and 38% as 
not very important. SignificantlYr although 43% of S. N. P. 
voters named Scottish government as the most important 
issue (compared with 4% of Conservative and 5% of Labour 
voters) as high a proportion of S. N. P voters (28%) named 
prices as the most important issue as did Labour and 
Conservative voters. (see Chapter 7, Section II for a 
discussion of the problems experienced with this question 
in the survey). 
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Notes to Chapter 7. 
1. The survey was carried out by Social and Community 
Planning Research for O. P. C. S in the summer of 1970. In 
Scotland, 892 interviews were achieved representing a 
response rate of 75% (Kilbrandon, 1973). 
2. On the f irst method - assigning respondents to ideological 'levels' based on their degree of usage of 
'ideological' terminology see Campbell et al. r 1960#, pp222- 250; Conversej, 1964,, pp214-218; Nie et al., 1976r Chapter 
7. 
On attitude stability, see 
Converse, 1969. 
On 'issue consistencyr 
Campbell et al. r 1960, Chapter 231; Nie et al., 1976j, Chapters 
1969rppl95-l99. 
Conversef, 1964,, pp238-245; 
the third approach, see 
9; Converse, 1964, pp227- 
8 and 9; Butler and Stokest 
3. Nie, Verba and Petrocik (1976t also Nie and Andersent 
1976) claimed to have identified a marked rise in issue 
consistency (i. e. mean inter-item gamma) in the American 
electorate in the early 1960s. It was subsequently 
suggested (Bishop, Tuchfarber and Oldendick, 1978; see also 
Sullivani, Pieresen and Marcus, 1978) that this could have 
had a great deal to do with a change in question wording. 
For the rather inconclusive continuation of the debate see 
Nie and Rabjohnj 1979. 
4. See especially Mann, 1970 and the studies and discussion 
contained in Bulmer ed., 1975. 
5. Edelman (1971t p2) sees his approach as building on the 
insights of symbolic interaction theoryp structural 
anthropology and phenomenological sociology. My reason for 
using the work of Edelman and Bennett (1975) is entirely 
pragmatic. Their approach seems to take us closer to an 
understanding of what was going on in Scotland. Despite the 
flowering of Marxist scholarship in areas not too far from 
'the symbolic's, its highly theoretical nature and its 
tendency to 'over-structure' its topic does not help to 
make it immediately useful. 
6. For the most ambitious attempt to ground Scotland's 
'state of mind' in its historical experience see Nairnj 
1981p Chapters 2 and 3. On egalitarianism and the Scottish 
myth see McCroner Bechhofer and Kendrick, 1982. On Scottish 
educational mythology see Gray, McPherson and Raffe, 1983 
pp36-47 and 300-316; also McPherson, 1982. 
7. Here of course Raymond Williams' notion of the 
'selective tradition' is highly pertinent. (cf Williams, 
1977, ppll5-120) . 
8. Very recently there has been a surge of interest in the 
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visual and especially cinematic representation of Scotland. 
See especially McArthur ed. p 1982. 
9. Whether such things can be 'measured' on the basis of 
standard survey techniques is questionable. See for 
example, Brand 1981. 
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